APHWVED FOA4 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGEcAM
TITLE: or Intelligence Processing
AUTHOR: CODIB Task Team VI
VOLUME: 10
STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ot intelligence.
All statements of faci, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
ihe authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of ihe Central Intelligence Agency or any olher US Goverrurient entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual siatemenis and interpretations
Beccmtnendaliont for tnvigorating and coordinating the community'sof data-hondltng systems.
OR LNTEIXIGENCE PROCESSING CODIB Task Team VI >
The team considered conceptual and managerial aspects of estab-usbJDg RAD programs for Intelligence data handling to be moreand more in need of immediate attention than technical aspects. Rather than concern itself with what technical approaches should ber adopted. what type of equipment is best suitedarticularand the hie, it therefore sought answers to such questions as the follcrwing. To what degree are the several USIBrograms for intelligence data handling mutually supportive? Are existing and planned programs adequate in size, balanced in content, technically sound, and adequately organized, managed, and funded' Can tbe technical leadership for such programs be irnproved9 How should policy be establishedoordinated community program9 What outstanding opportunities might be seized as immediate practical objectives? How might shortcomings in present data handling be translatedequirements and communicated to theleadership of tbe community?
Community Objectives
The team set out torarneworkoals with respect to data handling in the intelligence community to which to relate specific managerial and technical tasks and within which to identifyand achievements. It discovered instead that the community, as governed by USIB under established intelligence directives, bas no organized setbjectives (except as NSA and NPIC are n>
' Adapted horn pottSOu of ttt report datedS. The team, charged in the preceding March with defining tntrtagency goals for RAD in the processing of intelligence data, had representation from all USIB age octet except the FBI andand the help of consulants provided by the National Sciencetchaired by Dr. Rata M. Davis of the Office of die Seeretarv of Defense Tha adaptor* doe* not oreeaiiriTy reflect tbe view* of USIB or ms Committee oaoritha body ha* ysil completed action on the report.
IDH ft&D
hargedor their respective specializedno policy for establishing objectives, and no mechanismAlthough the federal governmenthole haseipliatlyoals, thereormal mechanismexecutive branch for advising the President on RAD.programs, and picking particular areas for concentratedto the President, his staff in the Office of
Science and Technology, and the panels and committees over .which he presides. The USIB community is represented in this mechanism only insofar as its member agencies are individually represented.
Tbe intelligence community in many ways functionself-contained entity isolated from the rest of the federal structure by organizational, managerial, and security barriers. This isolation causes it little or no distress in operational affairs, but scientific andactivities are another matter. Hera the coramot self-sufEcienL These activities, not only managerialut testing, engineering, evaluation, and Implementation, are often delegated in part or whole to groups outside the community.
Much such delegationn data handling Is useful, often essential The bulk of technical competence in general informationinformation sciencesoutside thecommunity, and many aspects of inteUgencc data handling are identical to those of general information handling. Multi-font optica) readers, for example, new storage media, large random-access memories, automatic translation, and improved man-machineare needed equally In intelligence and outside. There is no reason why USIB agencies shouldisproportionate share ofosts. Sharing these with others should permit thecommunity to concentrate its limited resources on those data-handling needs which are of unique or primary concern to itsnot only those of NSA and NPIC but also the indications and warning mission and many others.
Thus the concentration outside the Intelligence community olcompetence with respect to intelligence data handling may be viewed without alarm. Lack of competence within the community in the applicatioos of data-handling techniques to intelligenceor systems is unjustified, however, and tbe team believes that at present such competence is marginal at best. This belief is backed by the frequent use of contractors for system design and development the mediocrity of data-handling techniques and systems currently
used in the community, said the apparent lack of coocrcte planning for the application of more sophisticated technology.
It is frequently assertedack of federal or national objectives can be compensated for by weU-structured and documented individual agency objectives, so it may be that well-founded USIB member agency BAD objectives in intelligence data handling woulduitable substitute for the lacking community goals. The task team attempted, then, to discover Individual agency, .objectives fn order to assesstheir suitability. It was found that DIA, the military departments of DoD, and NSA had documented objectives. The State Department had none. Tha existence of CIA objectives was not dcterrnined, and the NSA objectives were not released to tbe team. It was obvious, however, that the objectives identified were not uniform in structure, were neither comprehensive nor cohesive, were grossly incomplete with respect to managerial considerations, and were not intended as guidelinesfforts. It was necessary lo conclude that the aggregate of agency objectives could notfor USIB objectives and that the individual objectives were of little use in fudging orfforts planned or under wry.
Recommendations
In view of the importancen intelligence data handlmg, the need for sharing responsibilityith groups Outside the USIB corrununity. the absence of any USIB goals. poUcies, or mechanism to further tbe, aod the lack of coordination among present andflorts, the task teamet of actions. These actions are aimed at improving the managerial position of the community not only in handling Its internal operational requirements but in its dealings with other Inderal offices and groups outside the government It appears axiomatic that lioth the community and its member agencies will benefit in their individual and joint contacts with outside entities if they canniform and professional negotiating posture. The actions recommended are discussed below.
Policy mechanism. The USIB should setermanent body to establish community objectives and policiesn intelligence data handling. This body should have representation from allagenciesull-time executive secretary. It should coordinate the agencies' objectives, plans, policies, and evaluations and be the principal advisor to Chairman, USIB, in this field. Inreas it might, if deemed advisable, develop its own plans and ree-
where thetibuity ihould be delegated Il should have aulhority to get information on thelanning and budgeting but none to approve plans. Since its membership could not have the technical competence necessary to cover the whole field of inielbgenee data handling, it should have continuous access to consultants both within and outside the community. It should meet at least monthly.
Rmycrl^rgstttice. The USIBormal mechanism to disseminate technical information conc-inmg'cuneTit and planned datan the community. This service would handle only classified information, and it would utihie channels affording the needed security. It would be given access to iiiformation In lhe agencies, select that to be disseminated, and give It maximumbefore dissemination. It has been found that linking technology to the sponsoring organization or to the operational use for which it is Intended normally increases the security classificationocument and consequently the inaccessibility of the technical data in it.
For Open source materials, existing informatioa services appear to be adequate. If it is found that they are not. additional requirements can be levied on them to that tbe USIB reporting system doc* not have to liaiHlle such easily accessible informatioa
The task team believes that the classified in formation can be drawn from existing agency repotting mechanisms functioning with Lttle change. Bleed-oo* from these established systems should sufficeat least, and should serve to point op new requirements, if any. which would have to be imposed on them. If judicious use is made of individual agency personnel through the USIB policy body, this reporting service should need funds only for administrativeclerical and mail services, etc
Slrmidorion of personnel. Those responsiblendata handling need to be impressed with the importance of keeping up with others' pertinent research and development.ersonnel should be vigorously encouraged, if not gentry coerced, to make use of the open-source information services available to them as government employees. Theyubjected to scheduled evaluation to measure their effectiveness, competence, and awareness of. The importance of theirerms of the responsiveness of tbe intelligence community to any situation, crisis or normal, cannot be overestirnated; and yet they exist as anunrecognized, and uncoordinated group with no group allegiances and nopunishment mechanism.
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The Ink team had extreme difficulty In even Identifyingn intelligence data handling andommunity. Many whosponsibility for aproject were not even aware of anyone else havingThe policy body recommended above shouldan agreed-upon organizational listing ofa directory ofersonnel giving their
nleal personnel presumably do not'SlT* generally In work habits from other government technicaloD study of the information usage habits of government scientists and engineers made last spring should accordingly be applicable to them, and no separate survey of them should be needed. This DoD study, along with other evidence, points to either misuse or inadequate use of Information services by technical personnel and attributes itto lack of instruction. The team's recommendation, therefore, is that USIB arrange for the compilationeport listing thevailable information services and giving details on their accessibility and procedures for their use. Twelve months after distribution of thetudy should be made to evaluate changes In information usage patterns brought about by it This could then be the basis for recommendations for improvements. Thesedirectory ofeport on available information services,ollow-up study of usagebe accomplishedontractor under USIB supervision.
Feedback system. Feedback from users ofotnor is the extent of feedback and its impact known. Tbe mechanisms nowmeet cms, validity studies, fieldconsumerlimited return and this largely confined to National Intelligence Estimates. There has been htde contact between intelligence analysts and IDH/RAD personnel
It would thus appear that tbe nature, level and extent of feedback should be studied aod the feasiDilrty of more systematic dialogue between producer and consumer at various leveb explored. The study would require the scroces of personnel particularly talented in the production process to work with experts in techniques foroutput
The Price of Inaction
If these recommendations are not accepted and some such line of action talten, the intelligence community will continue vulnerable to
external investigative and evaluative groups, with no recognizedposition from which to meet questions concerning intelligence data handling. The field of information sciences and servicesighly populated one in the sdentific community. The product of the intelligence community is information, and intelligence data handling is analogous to information sciences technology. So one canigh outside Interest In the intelligencen data handling. Such interest is good and should be maintained; and in-estigatjoos can be "extremelycc^TOeherrsives presented to the Investigaton. But this has often not been the case in tbe past
It is elementary management doctrine that when there Is acoordinating mechanism deficiencies are fewer and those which do exist are easier both to find and to correct It would help both the external investigators and the corrimunity to haveoordinating mechanism. Regardless of how well iotentioned an investigating group may be, when the data presented it are fragmentary and not Interrelated, its recoinmeodations are even more fragmentary and unrelated to the real problems. They maya thorn and by so doingumor* The' inteUigence community can ill afford any more such Investigations.
Internally, the deleterious effects of having no over-all interagency or USIB objectives or policy Inre felt in every phase ofctivity. There Is no structure on which tofforts other than the shapeless objective of satisfying users'he assignment to particular agencies offor urgent projects is difficult; ft must be done outside of normal community channels when it is done at all Failure to assign responsibility results In duplicative efforts on the part of every agency having some interest in the project; examples of this can be cited and documented.
Security barriers prevent personnel in one agency from acquainting themselvesoing oo in another. Another lamentablyoccurrence is failure to set up any criteria against which to judgeffort has been pursued far enough and should either be abandoned or declared satisfactory.
The recommended USIB objectives and poucies should be neither so broad as to lose meaning nor so narrow as to be less thanin aggregate. To be useful they should provide forthe best possible use ofaboratories, facilities,
funds, aad manpower, tbey should authorize and coeourage inter agency ccenmurncation and coordination; tbey should make the mem ol resource* and results external to tbe cocrununity. they shouldinterchange between the ccmrmrriity and other government agencies and between tbe toteDigence and scientific ccmunuruties. they must support federal objectives; and tbey should provide for measuring their own impact on community requirements andagencythout such.policy .and objectives, the continuing development cl more expensive equipment and moreand ioteUectually demanding technology will consume more and more of the community's resources, even without unjustifiedamong the uncoc^dinated agencies.
As technology and PAD in data handling become more expensive, in both talent and funding, the last ounce of usefulness should be realized from every project To this end IDH/RAD personnel should be better informed about completed and current RAD efforts every-where.ough estimate, one tenth of one percent of tbefunds earmarked for data-handling RAD tof spent on improvement in the haformatidn usage patterns of IDH/RAD officers, would give each of them throughout the community (he equivalentull semester of college-level education during the year. Thein the resultant RAD effort would conservatively be0 times that expenditure. The distribution of thelisting of information services and encouragement to use them is atlight first step toward such selflmprovcment
Technical Considerations
Id Its effort to identify discrete areas of intelligence data handling so as to relate' to managerial responsibilities, to applications, to mtelligcnce products, and to funding, the task teamreat deal of debberation chose two approaches. Tbe first of these was lo classify data-handling RAD by application, and twenty-two types of application were enumerated. These range from common ones like calculation of movements (sayxypUnarysls. andretrieval to some that may not bemonitoring of rystcrns (say lie detectionmage interpretation, pattern recognition, predictive calcuktions (say inlanning (say of penetrationroblem solving (say in inductive inteli-geocetc This listingasis for assessingefforts and deficiencies.
The second approach was intended primarily to highlight ways in which BAD in data handling could improve intelligence production and management in the community. The team believes that suchprising the development of theories, advanced techniques, and equipment and the application of these to the subject inhave the foUowing aims:
Experimentation with and evaluation of existing datt-handling ^'systems. %. *Wi. <Bfe- - 4MMt* Devclopsncnt of criteria and measures foe evaluating or designata-hand ling systems.
Improvement of management procedures for allocating resources
in the intelligence community. Analysis of practices used in exploiting data and data sources. Development and evaluation of information- or document-
handling systems. Improvement of techniques for producing and evaluating finished
inteUigenceualityevelopment of validity criteria for information. Including
criteria for data purging. Development of Improved procedures for intelligence training
rogramedevelopment of reporting mechanismsroject funding
and managerial data.
This listing served to emphasize the findings of the task teamthe intelligence community's useesources in the data handling area. There is no question but that this grossarea is too large aod diverse to be managed effectively as an entity. As its many constituent parts become more sharply defined, it undoubtedly will and should be split up so as to become more manageable. But the greater problem at the moment appears rather to haumber of its essential sub-areas requiring improvement are being neglected; they are not thought of asart of intelligence data handling because of tlie parochial and limited view taken by many towardrea. It was concern over this danger that prompted the above listing.
Another featuren inteUigence data handling brought out by the listing is the unmistakable way it transcends tbeand missions of individual agencies and so isSIB community concern. Almost without exception the intelligence
ducediven agency forms merely one part ot the requiredproduct. Thus tbe BAD protectsiven agency needew exceptions to recogriire related requirements in other ageooes. community priorities rather than individual agency priorities for RAD are needed;SIB mechanism is needed to coordinate andesponsibilities among the agencies.
In the course of the research which led to these generalizations the team uncoveredreas which seemed to demandattention under any criteria that might be established The most critical single one of these is discussed below.
/ndicfltioni /rUftfigrno*
EfForts to improve the processing of current intelligence information for purposes of Indications and warning have been under waylthough millions of dollars and hundreds of man-years have been expended In applying automatic data processing to this effort, the results to date have been disappomting. Because of this, the level of funding for RAD in this field is currently low.
In analyzing the reasons for the pastt should be recognized that indications is one of the most difficult fields in all of intelligence processing. It is characterized by extremely high volumes ofendency for Input data to be fragmentary, redundant, and ofvalidity, wide variety in types ofependence on all types of collection, severe time restrictions onriticalandom and rareendency toward rapid changes in focus of attention, and heavy dependence oo predictive evaluations. But the inherent complexity of the processing problem bas been aggravated by the inadecruacy of preliminary studies under taken prior to system design. Tbe mteuigeoce obfectrves havebeen staled in such broad terms as to be practically useless to the system designer. The designer bas usually been versed in some specific technology but not in intelligence. The intelligence analysts have known very liltie about current technology and have been too bard pressed keeping up with their work to give enough time to the system designer. The designers have concentrated heavily ontechnierucs. particularly with reference to level of militarywbich tend to obscure important anomabes rather thanght them.
Tbe warning problem isroblem of logical inference and association than of rtatislics. Evaluations depend principally on the
aleots of the artalyst-his inventiveness and toagmation, hisattern quickly, his inductive reasoning, in short, hisn this Geld must deal therefore. Sth human tZ orsarge degree. While the human-factors area is one in whirl there is much to be accomplished, it has been found to be one in which accomplishment is mostpate of human-factor,ecent years has ledonsiderable amount ofNevertheless several topics in this area do offer^promise and should be considered inpproach: "
DotarrrKeraation. Many automated techniques can be used to ease the burden of the analyst in having to handle large volumes of data rapidly, formation can be so enteredhat cumulative" data on any partKular topic is farmedlateh/avaiUble. Large counts of mformabon can be presented in simplified structure by automatic arrangemerjt mto graphic form. Different fields of ^formation can be compared cbrectly fa, combined displays and overlays. Timecan similarly be made.
s which may be too subtle for the analyst to note with the normal passage of time can be amplified by time-compression techniques to the threshold of recognition. Chrono-
greatly accelerated
time and ^process can be repeated (or reversed) at the analyst's desire. Such techniques can be programedompute, if the data
T:^ fa *ddi,ioDast trends.
^ ertrapola.^
raph beyond its plotted positions.
omputers become moreeconoiriicany available in recent years, the methods ofhave been greatly simplified- The recent advances innsake the computer accessible for immediatewith the operator, so that it serves himirect adjunctIt ss now possible, therefore, for an analyst to game aproblem in fragmentary data analysis in which manyvariations have to beP
Ccmmurxicatvm funtUmentaU. The process of corruriunication among people Involves far more than tbe simple transfer of tnforma-bon. To bo considered My successful It musthain or network of understanding. The physical sciences have mastered the transfer of information. The behavioral sciences have not been so successful in the communication of undemanding. Thisritical
idh
handicap (or the analyst eking lo establish meaningtudies in tho behavioral sciences might answer questions like these: Would the establishment of common goals improve tbe quality of communication in the warningWould personal contact improve understanding among tbe people concerned? Would group activity among analysts (likeheighten their imagination and contribute totemptipow to design an ADP system tp.assnt tbe indications analyst, the fouowing methodological avenues would have to be explored:
Document search.
Interrogation of thlelligence analysts. Observation of current manual analytic processes. Experience with previous automatic systems. Research on types of indicators.
Analysis of the intelligence mhastnicture supporting the system. Manipulation of tbe ADP system under laboratory conditions.
Previous systems designers have confined their efforts aim onto the fust four methods, probably because these are gen erally straight forward and the least costly. Inadequate effort has been expended on indicator research and the infrastructure, virtually none on laboratory trials.esult, there bas been little more than an attempt to automate some part of what is already being done manually. The value of such an effort is highly questionable, given the inherent superiority of the human mind over machinen such areas as judgment, imagination, and inductive reasoning
With reference to indicators, lengthy lists have been prepared by various tnteUigcnce organizations, some officially adopted by the fJSIB. Tbe individual indicators are identified as ominous events or conditions which it is assumed would occur prior lo hostilities. But until recently very little effort was expended on developing lists of specific phenomena that particular collectors should look for asthat these ominous events or conditions are taking place. Thus what is needed Is extensive research to list such indicators of the indicators, the assignment of individual Items on such lists tocollectioneporting system designed for rapidand processing, and extensive collation of tbe results in tbe respective indications ceoters.
The success or failure of any automated system is heavily dependent on the related inteUigencesystems, field for-mats, communications systems (including digital datanter-face between intelligence organizations, etc. Vet system designers working in the field of current intelligence have traditionally focused their attention oo infonnationarticular intelligencetreated in isolation. The result has been that, on the one hand.
machinable form information available from other organizations swamps the personnel assigned to the task. Only byiven subject area, say Cuban ground forces order of battle, fn its totality can an effective ADP system be developed for it
All too little effort has been expended in attempting to analyze in depth the methods of analysis now utilized in current intellieence It is unlikely that this can be done in the operational environment of an mdications center because research and development cannot be permitted to interfere with its regular day-to-day work. What is needed, therefore,esting of analysis techniques usingeparate facility, as itaboratory, andof the results with the regular product of the mdications center. In this manner some of the areas which today are considered so diffi. cult but which seem to offer great potential, such as cross correlation of different subject filesersonnel movements with missilean be explored in depth.
In summary, although the results of past efforts to improve process-ing capabilities in indications intelligence have been disappomting. the task is not impossible and general lines of approach can be drawn. It is believed that the present range of manual analysis can be extended sigruncantly through these new approaches.
For Immediate Action
The task team selected five of its recommendations as in its view requiring immediate action. These are listed below. They are not in order of importance or urgency; the team believes they should all be adopted. They are not interdependent however, and any one or any combination of them could stand alone.
The establishment of an BAD policy body to advise the Chairman. USIB. Withoutody there is rtothing to which the
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aceompushmentrojects in intelligence databe related orof indications inteUigence. Early expensivethis field have no doubt resulted in burnt fingers; butand equipment have since improved, and newbeuse of mformation services. This can becompiling andeport on allof use tofficers and how to usea survey of usage patterns shouldestablishment of criteria for evaluating data-handling For this purpose two different types of systems nowmight be singled out for systematic experimentation and In the past, IDH systems have been developedrecognized requirements but without benefit ofcriteria to insure that the requirement was fulfilled Itthat the development of such criteria will beboth people and resources, but the cost is justified inthe extremely large amounts that have been spent onestablishmenteedback mechanism from consumersto producers andersonnel. Moexists to measure and make known the results ofbad usage of existing data-handling capabilities in theof finished inteUigence. Results are written upUSIB with very Utile if any foUow-up toan estimate proved to be incomplete or in error. Anreview group is recommended which wouldor not the IDH capabilities were adequatelyall the available data properly used. This wouldto work more closely with
ersonnel. An initial analysis to determine feasible feedback techniques would require about one year.
Original document.
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