STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection ol articles on tho historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contenis should be construed as asserting or implying US Government cndorsemcnl of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
As weighed in intelligence scales, found wanting.
THE SCIENCE ATTACHE PROGRAM VVnton Lexow
World War II clearlycience bad joinedAeco? nomicso longer merely academic dudpllneractical factor to be reckoned with in tbe International arena. Tbeof Slate, recognizing that this new factor would make itself fell more broadly than in strict application to weaponry, estabbshed as* earlycience Staff in its London embassymill Washington supporting element in its Bureau of Economic Affairs. It was notowever,ull-dress study was made of the imputations of the new factor for the organisation andof the Department
In Jjiiiuiy of ili.it year the National Security Council issued its first directive concerning the collection of basic scientificabroad. It gave the State Department tbe primary responsibility for this function. Subsequent revisions of tbeave broadened "basic" scientific information to all scientific and technical information except what is primarily military. Acting upon this directive and upon tbe recornrnendations of the Hoover Commission reporthe Seer clary of State appointed Mr. IJoyd Berkner to study aod submit recommendations on the role of tbe Department in national scientific policy and how it should organize and staff for these responsibilities. Berkneronunittee which went into tbe problem in detail with tbe aid of an advisory committee from the National Academy of Scienceolicy Survey Croup in State,
The Seiner Report
* References are lo use bWiopafhy al lhe end of the article.
In0 the Berkner committee submitted its report, "Science and Foreignt made nineteen generalon the basis of conclusions reached in the examination of nine
til*
Some topics were functions lo be performed, when (he orgamzational means for performing them.
With respect to organization, the recommendations were clearThe Depirtment should setcience Office"Science Adviser with assistantstaff. Abroad,should be established in some fifteen VS. embassiescountries. Representation in Communistnot
With respect to the duties to be assigned 'o this science office and the science attaches, however, the report foresaw and discussed atreat range ofcollection and disscmlna-tion of foreign scientific Information, support to international seien-hfic actsc.entsfic exchange programs, technical assbtance. ervsce to US. scientists and scientific orgrmizations. interagency lutbon ^gernent, and means for weaving scientific coru.dcrLru
omuUtmgasruSedwsth the intelhgersce aspects of the programposed attaches would of necessity bearfor
The scientific fursctions recommended in the report, it may be generalized, 'eDc categories: collecting .ndormarion. including intelligence information; promoter andthe interest, of the US scientific community; and monitoring the impact of science and US. foreign policy on each other. The subsequent hbtory of the science program in tbe Department hasreat degree been that of the conflict for priority among these three categories. On this matter the Berkner report gave no guid-ance. It felt that relative emphasis in the program and the true role of the Department would have to "evolve out ofhe exact blueprint will require Departmental drafting."
Vps and Downs
Acting upon tbe Berkner recommendations, tbe Department fa.
laced .dentine attachesumber of embassies. Two years later tbe program was greatly curtailed because of difficulties
m recruitment and tocreasing budgetary stringency. Tbe five over-seas posts filled3 would have been cut to three in tbe budget proposed forfter discussions with ClA and tbe National Academy of Science, tbe Department agreed to support five positions
from its budget, andStockholm, Parii. and Tokyo-were actually fiUed.'
In June5 the new Hoover Comrnustco report on intelligence activities carried the recommendation. "That the irsponsibibty It* procurernent of foreign publications and for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the bands of the CIA, with authority to appoint luch scientificas may be necessary to carry on _thii worklav Much to the dismay and embarrassment of the CIA and tbe Statethis was published without classification. The implication of espionage undoubtedlyerious hindrance in the recruiting of eminent scientists for attache positions. In addition, more budget cuts resulted in the withdrawal of the remaining it (aches at the end of their Current tours of duty, thus6 there were no longer any science attaches at alL"
In February6 the National Science Foundationeport On "The Role of the Federal Government in International Science" which hinted that the NSF should assume responsibslty for the science attache program. At about the same time CIAto give financial support for an expanded program either to the National Science Foundation or preferably to tbe StateThe Bureau of tbe Budget, however, refused to approve either NSF assumption of the program or the transfer of funds from CIA to the Department. These pressures from NSF and CIA, as well as from the scientific communityhole, may have induced the Department to review its program, now withered to one professional and one secretary in Washington, and in the late summer7 it was officially determined to re-establish it, beginning by Icolonguitable scientist to serve as Science Adviser.
This search was still under wayctober, when the Soviets launchednd gave an enormous push toS scientific program.8 State appointed seven newad scienceine of our embassies, and in January5 there werettaches inmbassies, two being assigned to each of six large ones. For comparison purposes aboutoreign embassies have science officers or attaches in Washington."
One disconcerting aspect of tlie State Department's revivedhas been its inability to fill the vacancy at the head of the Oifice of International Scientific Affairs, tbe office now responsible
Jar (he ao"mhustration and direction of the science attachespot had been vacant for moreear at time of
Definition of Functions
The latest guidance from the State Department to the attache
ten. reporting in accordance with the embassy program, andfte chief of mission and the VS. government in scientific and relatedhis instruction givesremendous latitude In choosing where to concentrate his effort. One science attache reported that his entire time was devoted to aiding US and host countrynother declared that faceting the exchange of scientists and scientific equipment and meetings and communications to this end took most of his time1
In these two instances when the intelligence mission went by the board, it appears that tbe attache was left on his own, not only by the Department but by the ambassador, to fiD whatever function he deerned most important; and scientists in this position are naturally most interested in jatisfying the requirements of the scientific world. Perhaps some chiefs of iiiission axe reluctant to meddle into tbe duties of such specialized members of their staff; perhaps some are-not interested in tbe attaches-ormer ambassador facetiously said hecience attacheigar store Indianrassiere*"
Of course itwo-way street; the science attache must fit into the non-scientific community of the embassy and prove that he is an asset to its whole endeavor.cientistwo-yearthis may sometimes be too much to expect'
Now that after ten years the programoing one. to tbe extent of placing the science attaches in foreign posts, the question is whether it will continue to receive the backing that brought about its revival This will depend greatly upon its value to the State Department in the interaction between science and foreign policy and upon its value lo tbe mtelhgeoce communityonsumer of scientific information. If the attaches continue, as many have, to serve primarily the interests of science and scientists, they will dis-courage this intelligence and foreign policy backing.
Within the Stale Department there have been some misgivings about the science attache system' After ail. the Department isrime user of icientifk informatioo. On the detailed level its interest has been very slight, and assigning to it the (espomibilin for collecting scientific information doesn't automatically create such an interest. With respect to tbe influence of scientific and technical developments upon foreign policy, it seems probable that their effects axe'felt only in long term and^o* not require constantFurthermore, there is other policy machinery within tbe executive branch geared to monitor scientific developments
Staffing PtobUmj
There are other difficulties. Recruiting has not been easy. Tbe scientist should ideally be an eminent person in tbe Seld. He should be biown internationally in order to have the entree be needs for collecting informationoreign country. There are very few eminent scientists who can spare two years forob. Inmany Kientists, on finding out that some of its duties are on behalf of intelligence, will have nothing to do with it. They feel that association with "spying" may jeopardize their scientific careers Tbe public recommendation of the Hoover Commission certainly didn't help in this respect'*
Another requirement in recruiting is for special qualifications, both scientific andcience attache who cant speak the language of the country where be is assigned will be seriouslySo will, from the intelligence viewpoint, one whosesdentific work does oot heriority field. The priority mtelhgence objectives have been and will probably remain in the physical sciences; biological subjects are in general of lowiologist attache can hardly be expected to report on nuclear physics, in fact be may become suspect if he is too curious about matters outside his own discipline.
There has in any caseroblem of orienting the science attache to intelligence priorities. Perhapsxpecting too muchcientist unfamiliar with mtelhgence should fall right in with its priorities. He tends to follow hb own interests or interpret the priorities as he sees them, so that be docs hit-or-miss, shotgun
porting. By the time his two years are up. he is just beginning to get oriented.
One remedy might be toorps of career foreign service scientists to fill at least some of the attachehese would have the status and the continuityoreign Service Officer but would limit their activities to foreign scientific affairs. In the eyes of foreign nations they would probably be regarded in the same light as the Jgrieultural attaches who report on importanttn agriculture abroad. During their home tours they would presumably be assigned to the Office of International Scientific Affairs. There is. to be sure, the drawback that theylose professional competence and stature by absence from the collegium of scientific study.
Desiderata
One of the biggest shortcomings of the science attache program has lain In its not being extended to the Communist countries. All the attaches are located in countries of low priority for scierrhfic intelligence. (Though sending one to Warsaw is now beingt is not certaincience attache in Moscow could do us anyhe Soviets would probably try to ignore him On the other hand, he could not lie systematically quarantined from all lectures, publications, and personal contacts;mall amount of first-hand reporting from Moscow would be more useful tothan ten times as much from London.
It looks from the intelligence viewpoint as though tbe scienceunctions should be narrowed to that of fulfilling the State Department's responsibility for the collection of scientific intelbgeDce information in accordance with priority objectives. He has been tooocal point for the scientists to converge on with their many problems and requirements, most of which could be satisfied through ether channels, including non-governmental channels.esult, his reporting has been negbgent of priorities and basicalry opportunistic, producing many reports of no Intelligence value. As for the sc icncc-policy relationship, this isatter requiring such constant attention as tocience attache program.
Once the functions were so narrowed, the establishmentimited career foreign service scientist cadremprove theof them might at least be tried.
BI8UOCRAPHT*
SeeietNofora].
i "Science and Foreignf Slatept ol Slate Bulletin.f Sum Bulletin,
SeiteaiSe Monthly.5
SoenoSc Anvrricao,
ulletin of Atomic
ulletio of Aloaiic Scieotlita. Oct .
' ft" Dept. of Sum BuDewv
S.tuniiy
IVp't of Suie Bulletin.
II. Journal of Chemical Documentation.
Bull*tin of AKmic SorntUU,
f Stele BuCetm.5
Waihiarton Pott, SI5
IB. Dep't of SUte. "Dune* and BtsponilhfliUct of Science
oeuuuioe on Ogitxubon of theranch, Beporf to Coorrtn. Ifi'U grace Aetivibet.S, Superintendent of Doeumei.n, US Pnct-m. Office.
Original document.
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