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INTELLIGENCE
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Observaliom of lhe attaches in the Soviet Union in Ihe fall.
THE FACE OF MOSCOW IN THE MISSILE CRISIS Wiiu'am F. Scott
Soviet brinkmanship Is the Cuban crisis^ oiocused the attention of 'Kremurwlogiiti onrelaSvery new'fJoVscept Trrthe leiicon of international conflict, "crisishii term rocompatin both the chess-like move* one Opponent makes exter-naliy against the other and the Internal measures he takes to control tbe crisis at home. It is on the latter that this article will chiefly bear.
A complete understanding of how an opponent hat gone about lhe management of past crises is of course virtually out of the question. Censorship and security measures, along with mismterpretatioos and miscalculation* on his part or hit opponents, areew of the obstacles. But an insight into the enemy's habitual modus operandirisis would be of such great importance in reading his intentions another time lhatodest contribution to such anshould be worth while.
The Weeks Before
What went oo in the inner councils of the Soviet Union during the Cuban confrontation may never be known, but certain aspects, chiefly internal, of its management measures were witnessed by tbe military attaches of the American embassy in Moscow. What follows is their wotm'i-cye view of the Moscow scene during that tense period, their observations reassembled and reviewed with benefit oform's-eye viewhe best available lo foreigners in the USSR; they are permitted in lesa than one percent of the total Soviet land area.1 This was truend the restrictions have
'Big Brother Stdloth the US. and Canadian air attache* rent thi* aetStt* bona a* tbe beet and meet eaprenive devolptioa available of Soviet restriction* on foreigners. Cranlrhtw write* thathehe image of the display pot onbenefit in certain arlreted places:oree great dues,oren collectiveoraond one or twond if it it objected, as It so often is, thatmpoaiibte toholeLeningrad, Tashkent, AbnaUplay cabinet, lhe answer il lhat you don't know the Russians. Becauserecisely what tbe Soviet Government con do and
not been relaxed since then, the nuclear test ban treaty, grainand the advent of Brezhnev and Kosygin notwithstanding.
A number of events which at the time seemed to have no semblanceonnection with Cuba occupied the attention of the Moscow attaches during October. Early in the month an. naval attache was declared persona nonecond member of the embassy staff received the same news onhen onh all attaches were speculatingon thesigrnxlcance of China's attack on India, which Soviet media did not mention until three days'after the event.
The flow of news about Cubaeculiar pattern in the weeks before tbe crisis broke. At the end of August Che Cuevara had arrived in Moscow, and oois request forand technical specialists to train Cuban servicemen was re-ported. After that Cuban coverage cameontinual stream, reaching its high on Septemberhen TASS hilmiiiated about theof the United States which might plunge tbe world into universal thermonuclearrom this point on the attention given by Soviet news sources to Cuba declined, though there were occasional articles such as that In Itoestto oo Septemberescribing American reaction to the Soviet-Cuban agreement for the constructionishing port. From the 1st throughd of October, Yemen received far more publicity than Cuba.
The Crisis Breaks
The first information about Soviet missiles in Cuba came to tho attaches in tbe newscasts of the Voice of America and the BBC. VVncn these were in Russian they were totally jammed, but the januriing of the English was less severeart of it could be understood. The overseas editions of the New York Herald Tribune and the New York Times, generally arriving at the embassy several days late, provided avidly devoured background information.
Soviet news sources did not report tbe blockade which President Kennedy had announced on Octoberntil some forty-eight hours later. Then Prooda carried on the firstoviet version of the President's speech distorted io such fashion that the Russian people would not know about the Soviet troops and ballistic missiles in Cuba. This kind of news management made it difficult for the Western diplomatic corps to appraise tbe degree of importance the Soviet leaders actually attached to the situation.
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Theoviet reaction immediately manifest was to order all diplomatic travellers, including dependents, to return to Moscow. (An exception was made for the Slate Department officerthe Robert Shaw chorale on its tour of the Sovietwo USAF air attaches on the first legeningrad-Tashkent.Moscow trip were contacted by an Intourist representative and told the Soviet government could not guarantee their safety outside of Moscow in view of. actioo over .Cuba. Totcst this travel bars,. and other NATO persoimei'filed, aaair the normal officiarpro-ccdure, letters of intent to travel outside Moscow. These must be filed in advance of departure, giving the complete itinerary and dates; then if there is no reply it Is understood that tbe travel can be undertaken. In all cases during the Cuban crisis notice cam* that "the trip cannot be registered for reasonsemporarystandard phraseology forbidding travel to the vast bulk of the so-called "open" areas of the Soviet Union.
At the same time. attaches put intooint plan for comprehensive, around-the-clock inteUigence observation toand environs, looking for anything out of the ordinary that might illuminate Soviet Intentions and reactions to the situation. They were particularly alert, of course, for any indications that tho Soviets were preparing Moscowhermonuclear exchange. Wereoffices being evacuated? Were civil defense measures being taken? Were the normal number of trucks to be seen on the streets, both day and night, or was there an unerplained increase orHow many people wore In lines buying food at Moscow markets? What was the attitude of the people toward Americans in restaurants, theaters, and the subways; had this changed?
Among the places under scrutiny outside the city but within tbe forty-kilometer radius permitted were two civdian airfields. Vnukovo and Shcrmetyevo, the latter serving both domestic and international flights. All key installations such as these were checked at least once each day. The rounds were made primarily by autorreObile, although some districts were covered oo foot and bydeep and extensive system which, with its heavy blast doors, may constitute the worlds largest and best civil defense shelter. As is customary in Moscow for US. personnel, no one travelled alone, two-man teams being the general rule. The Soviet surveillance was normal- -that is close and constant Seasoned attaches accompanied new arrivals, and Department of State personnel assisted whenever their normal duties permitted. The attaches of the three services completely
Missile Crisif
pooled their efforts, sending to Washingtoningle joint report. Hcsponsibility for its preparation was rotated among the three, and it was coordinated with the Deputy Chief of Mission or hisbefore being dispatched.
Business as Usual
On the surface, life in Moscow proceededormal pace. After Octoberhe Soviet .television, radio, .and press spoke daily .of the "high-handed American aggressors" and The "criminal intentions of the enemies ofut there was still no mention that Soviet troops or ballistic missiles were in Cuba. Further, no significant changes could be detected In the life of the city, nor any changes in the Russian peoples attitude toward Americans. Waitresses in hoteb and restaurants, clerks in stores, and taxi drivers gave no sign that the famed Russian grapevine was working to inform the people of the critical turn of events.
During the week of Octoberhe Red Army held its usual night rehearsal for the annualarade in commemoration of the Bolshevik revolution.ewcomer the tanks, missiles, and other weapons rolled out would have presented an ominous sight; hut the experienced attaches noted that rehearsal procedures were normal und the weapons almost identical with those deployed during the last previous parade.
Perhaps the most ulked-about event In Moscow during the week of the crisis was the opening of tbe New York City Balletbad let his dislike of abstract and modernistsc art be known, and here Balanchine. the world's leading exponent of the modern school of theater, was opening with an unfamiliar concept of ballet in the city where that ait form had its strongest tradition. The balletuccess. Night after night the troupe playedull and enthusiastic house. Soviet criUcs, initially rather reserved until they found that the regime was not offering serious objections, gavereviews. Many rugh-raruting Party members and Moscow'sintellectuals attended. Aod at no time did they, or anyone else in the audience, suggest by their behavior an awareness of the world crisis centered off the southeast corner of tha United States.
There wasecond cultural import from the United States in Moscow during that week. Onhile the New York City Ballet was performing at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, an American opera singer,ines, was featured at the Bolshoi.
The central box was occupied by Comrades Khruihehev. Brezhnev. Kozlov, Kosygin. Mikoyan, Polanskiy, and Criiruh. Khruihehev ted lhe audience in lhe applause.
For lhe night ol October. air attache had invited four Soviet Air Force officers and their wives to be his guests at the New York City Balletuffet served afterward-otel (this in returnail-aod-farewell luncheon the Soviet Air Force had given for the new attache and hishen the inviUtioos had been extended, aboutoviet liaison officer had hinted that at least scene of the guests would accept. With the news of Octobert became unlikely that any wouldiplomatically, however, it was necessary to proceed with all preparations. The Soviets apparently were waiting for the testations to be withdrawn, but tbe embassy protocol officer concurred that thi. should not be done. Finally, about noon onh, the day of the party, the Soviet liaison officer called; be regretted that all the guests had been called out of town and so could not accept.
Maneuver*
There were, however, instances of manipulating both news and people for purposes of crisis management. On Octoberoviet news media gave unexpected publicityelegram that Aleksey. the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, had senthant,Ceneral of the United Nations. Il warned that mankind was threatened by the outbreakorld waresult of actions taken by tbe US. adnimisrration against the Republic of Cuba. The United States was violating Christian teachings. To the attaches it seemed that Aleksey's telegram was mote for Russian internal con sumption thanhant Sulin had used the Russian church in World War II to get popular support for has government;might be starting to woo the nation In case of similar need.
A second device, one familiar to Americans in recent years, were thenhe day the Soviets reported. blockade of Cuba without mentioning their own troops, missiles, aod aircraftalf-hearted attetnpltudentwas made. Fifteen or twenty studentsew ink botdes at the embassy, then moved on to Spaso House, the ambassador's residence some seven blocks away, andew more. Then they disbanded. There hadn't been enough of them even to interfere seriously with traffic in front of the embassy.
IJ'llT1!
Cri'iii
The big officialighly organized oefair, came onhe Soviets look every possible precaution thai it not get out of hand. Hundreds of troops were moved into side sheetsew blocks of the embassy to ensure complete control of the crowd at all times; these were in place before the demon-stratioo started. The gathering of the crowd afterward in front of the embassy was no more spontaneous than the movement of the troops bad been. TnicUoads of children werehort distance away.and banded signs denouncing impenalism, colonialism, and so on.
The youthful protesters had no notion that the Soviet leaders were squirmingirtual ultimatum to remove their strategic weapons from Cuba, they had been told only that the Imperialistic capitalists of the United States were planning to invade the homeland of the peace-loving Cubans. What they did know was that they were getting outew hours of school and work There were not moreew thousand of them, and their performancenthusiastic. After about two hours, apparently an order towas given, and the demonstrators appeared happy to oblige. As the last stragglers departed, the security troops also moved out from the side streets where they had been keeping watch.
The Crisis Passes
The first hint about Soviet missiles in Cuba was given to the Russians0 hours.ew hours after thewhen the Moscow radio argued. if the United States believes it bas the right to demand removal from Cuba of missiles described by Washington as offensive, then it will be natural to recognize the USSR's right to demand the withdrawal of American destructive rocket weapons fromountry that is our next-door neighbor,"
On Monday.epresentatives of the entire Moscow attache corpseception at tbe Turkish embassy. The Soviet Armed Forces sent token representation. By then the general feeling among the attaches was that the crisis had at least receded The Turkish attaches were worriedecret deal bad been made and recendy. rrussiJes would be removed from tfaeir country.
That tbe crisis was fully ended became apparent oo Novembereception at the Japanese embassy. An unusual number of
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itnior Soviet Air Force officers was present, and their attitude toward. air attaches was more nearly appropriate to the days some seventeen years earlier when the Russian and American allies met on the Elbe than to the aftermathesperate hostileAlmost completely ignoring their Japanese hosts, the Soviet officers insisted on toasting and drmlring with. airmen. Clearly impelled by relief from tension, they offered toasts to peace, to friendship, and even to "the possible marriage of my grandson wilhe^police officer attempted to break up the toasts between the Soviet Air Force chief of staff and the US. air attache, the chief of staff told him to "get the hellnd this unprecedented behavior was no isolated accident: on Novembereception celebrating the Italian national day. Soviet Air Force officersimilar great cordiality to the US. attaches.
Nrf ObttnoSioni
The attaches had seen nothing In Moscow during Ihe entire period of the Cuban crisis to reflect the serious external tension. The only observable Soviet reaction was the ban on all travel in the Soviet Union, and this was not put Into effect until after President Kennedy had announced the blockade. Two attaches who flew to Vienna by way of Kiev on Octoberere treated with exceptional courtesy on the aircraft and by customs officials in Kiev.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is still difficult to point to any unusual Soviet behavior during the month of October. The persona noo grata actions against an assistant naval attache oo5oreign Service officer oo Octoberere probably, as thought at the time, in retaliation for the expulsion of two Soviets charged with espionage in tbe United States- The timing of the Chinese attack on India may haw- been entirely comcidence; ilthe Soviets who were framing some Indian pilots in tbe USSR
Although tbe public did not know it until months later, the Soviets' confidence in their own internal security was also shaken in October. Ond, the day the United States annouiiced the blockade, Penkovsky was arrested, implicating the top leadership of the secret police as well as military mtelligence. In Dec-ember ihe Soviets,S. attache to have been involved, updated an old film, entitled "Along the Black Path* and designed to alert the Soviet public
against the US attaches, and showed it on television and in fourteen Moscow movie theaters simultaneously.
From the viewpoint of crisis management and intelligence, this suppression of any outward sign during the Cuban crisis reempha-sizes the Soviet ability to control news and deceive the people by that subtlest of propaganda devices, the half truth And as well as could be observed during that week, the Soviet public responded exactly as their leaders desired. One only hopca that this control would not be successful in suppressing all indications of preparation for hostilities if there really were such preparations.
Did tbe Soviets never intend to do anything but withdraw from Cuba if it camehowdown? Were the Kremlin leaders prepared for miscalculation and explosion of the crisis info open corifhct? To what degree was tbe Soviet military machine alerted to this possibility? From the worm's-eye view in Moscow, such questions could not be answered. But complete domination of tho internal environment assured the Sovietigh degree of flexibility in utiUring psychology and propaganda. In this respect crisis management as practiced by the Soviet Union has the advantage over its counterpart in democratic countries.
Original document.
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