6
No. .y,
No. . 1
REPORT
FOR RELEASE DATE:1
RELATIONS IN POLAND
AGENCY
OF
INTELLIGENCE
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN POLAND
The simultaneous celebrations this yearhousand years of Christianity in Poland and ofnationhood have brought about the most serious confrontationecade between the politically powerful Roman Catholic hierarchy and the Communist regime. The regime's vehement reaction to the church's millennium celebration plans and theof rival observances of the state millennium will provide occasions for friction throughout the year.
Aware of Catholicism's central role in shaping Poland's western orientation, the Communists since coming to power have sought to weaken the church's hold over almostercent of tho population,its traditional identification with theand emphasize that under Communist leadership Poland has embarkedew stage of its history. Both main protagonists in thisprimate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, and the party boss, Kladyslawcontend with strong emotional issues, divided loyalties, and extornal ideological influonce. While neither can publicly accept indefinite coexistence, neither has so far pushed irreconcilable differences to explosive
Both sides are fully aware that the outcome of the church-state struggle will also have potential long-range effects on Polish relations with Germany and the West, on Polish relations with the Soviet Union, and on the world Communist movement.
Dispute Flares
The current eruption ofchurch-state rivalry was initiated by the regime lastover the issue of theepiscopate's conciliatory letter to the Germanessage sentdetailed conferences botween Polish and German bishops at the second session of the Vatican Council last fall. ettorormalofuch ln-viatlons extended by Wyszynski to Roman Catholic episcopates around theattend the principal celebrationay at Czestochowa of theof Poland's acceptance of Christianity.
Evidently alarmed by the warm response of the German episcopate and the voluminous
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CHURCH-STATE PROTAGONISTS IN POLAND
Stefan CanJIndGomolka
Cvdinol Wyuyndii'*w'5 Ak-flnl
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favorable commentary by the West German press, the Polish regimeituperative campaign against Wyszynski's"antlstate" attempt toolitical dialogue with the German church and to call into question Poland's entire postwar orientation toward the USSR. The regime alleged that the letter reopened the issue of the Odcr-Neisse frontier. The letter, it was charged, also failed to take cognizance of the existence of East Germany or to take an unequivocal stand against "revanchlst" elements in west Germany. In addition, the regime complained that the letterPolish acquisition of the former German territories in the Westecessary adjunct of territorial losses in the east, instead of as an act of "historical justice." Finally, the regime objected to therequest to "forgive and be forgiven."
Gomulka personally entered the fray for the first tine onanuary,peech in which he attempted to clarify lines of argument which by then had become obscured. Hethe Polish episcopate of disloyalty on the issue of the Oder-Neisse frontier, butthe party's main chargethe church was intent on using the millenniumto stress itsear-old positionbulwark" against the encroachments of Eastern despotshristian Europe.
The resulting debate hasinto the sharpest church-
State controversy since Gomul-ka's return to poweroth sides have increasingly given the impression that they are staking their prestige on the outcome.
Using all forms of news media and every occasion tothe church, the regime has bolstered its arguments against the episcopate with stinging personal attacks againstWyszynski. As partonsistent effort toedge between hira, the rest of the Polish hierarchy, and the Vatican, the regime propaganda apparatus has portrayed the cardinalascist and as the main obstacle to improvod church-state relations as well asossible Polish-Vatican accommodation. Although the mounting charges againsthave become reminiscent of those which led to his detention under house arrest3 there arc no clear indications that similarsteps against him arecontemplated.
Deprived of all means of publicizing his case except from the pulpit, the cardinal has vigorously rebuffed regime charges. He has, however, steadfastly refused to modify his basic position or to beinto taking more extreme steps. He has consistently called upon the people to show restraint and "patience in suffering."
Regime Measures Against CKurch Millennium Events
The regime's immediatein the present campaign
has clearly been to curtail the church's attempts to use the Blllcnnlum celebrations toto foreign observers. Including leading prelates, the magnitude of Its following in Poland. To this end, the party has limited International in the religiousand prevented the church from further contact with episcopates abroad. On 9Cardinal Wyszynski was barred from foreign travel and thus from attending scheduled observances of the millennium at the Vatican in mid-January and from making planned visits to tho Vatican In late Hay and to the US this fall. In early April the regime announced its decision to bar Pope Paul, all invited Catholic prelates, and most organized foreign fromay religious celebrations in Poland.
The regime's refusal to permit the long-planned papal visit apparently resulted in part Trom its repeated failures to gain concessions from the Vatican, which has steadfastly refused to deal wltb Warsawthe cardinal's back. on the most recent negotia tiontt concerning the papal visit suggest that the regime's most sought-after goal was theof an additionalcardinal specifically to the formerly German "Recovered Territories." This would have implied Vatican recognition of Poland's western frontiers, and somewhat diluted Wyszynskl's dominance ofPolish
To drive home the point that even curtailed religious celebrations will not go the regime has spelled out detailed plans to hold rival secular observances of the millennium of thestate. Host of theso events will be designed to portrayyearof the Communistgum? as the ultimate flowering of the thousand-year history of the Polish nation. The regime's plans also include, however, major cultural and sports events which will see* to siphon away popularfrom the religious celebrations.
The first simultaneous church-state events took place without Incident at Gniezno and Poznan--both ancientmid-April.it appeared that thewan consciouslyonfrontation on the popularit had up to then studiously'a temperate response to sharp regime attacks against him and the ostentatiousof troops wore probably instrumental In preventingdisturbances.
While there wasevidence of popular support for the church at both rallies, Wyszynski's moderation may well be Interpreted by the regimeignificant victory, andIt to clamp further onay rites to be held at the most revored of all Polish religious shrines,
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an Cora, near Czestochowa. Domestic pilgrimages toalready have been barred, and other travel restrictions, such as reducing the number of available trains, reportedly have been instituted. Stringent regime secarity measures roport-edly are planned both atand in Krakow, where lesser religious celebrationsay. The regime isass rally in Katowiceay which probably willilesians.
Despite these regime mens-urei, some one million Poles and many individual foreign tourists may .ittend the early May rites, creating seriousof public control. The expected mass participation in an emotionally charged atmosphere could easily spark demonstrations. Although the regime probably would blame any disturbances on Wysxynski's "incitement"of the people, it is unlikely to risk widespread unrrst merely to justify further possible steps against the cardinal.
Motivations and Protagonist*
Tho regime's sudden onslaughthort period of warmer church-state relations has led to reports that Soviet "advice" if not direct pressure Influenced Warsaw in its decision. However, the course of the five-month struggle and the history of Polish church-state relations6 strongly suggest that the decision was Gomulka's own. Although Moscow may have had its own clear reasons to be alarmed at the Polish church's letter to the
German hierarchy, it could rely or Gomulka to counter any church moves which would jeopardize the basic identity or Soviet and Polish foreign policy toward Germany.
The vehemence of thoattacks against the church and the cardinal can be attributed in large part to Gomulka's awareness that he stands alone among Communist leaders In having toowerful internal ideological opponent, Wyszynskl's repeated implication that the Communist regimeassing if unpleasant phase lo which the Polish nation must rMpond with traditional vitality and forbearancethe party loader, who Is equally intent on demonstrating to foreign and domestic critics alike that the virtues ofcan ultimately persuade the Polish people to foresako the church.
During tho Initial period of political consolidationomulkautually acceptable modus vlvendi with thefully aware the church's political Influence, was far greater than that of his weak regime. Wyszynski'a release from three years olin6 was followedhurch-statein December which removedime most of the main points of friction. Official anti-Catholic propaganda warn stopped, and religiouswas permitted in the schools. Independence of church
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wan established, and clergymen imprisoned on political charges were released. Some seized church property was restored and, above all,was permitted topersonal contact with the Vatican.
Although tho stabilization of Gomulka's power soonirtual nullification of most of the guarantees contained In6 accord, the regimethisolicy of gradual and flexibleon church Influence. It haa thus been relatively in undercutting or meeting negative public reaction to the growing secularization of Polish life through restrictions onactivities. Thesehave included theof religious instruction from state schools Inof church property,taxation, barring of public religious processions, drafting of seminarians, harassment and slow liquidation of religious or-dera, elimination of the church press, and personal repression of individual priests.
ignificantof the power relationship in favor of the regime by last full, both sides made several hopeful moves toward some formesire to enhance theirbargaining positions on the eve of the millennium Thus, in September, the regime responded warmly to Wyszynski's public reiteration of his support for the official position on the Oder-Neisse
frontier; politburo member Zonon Kllszko, Gomulka's chief aide, referred to Polish bishops as patriots; an unprecedentedof Polish prelates wereto attend the Vatican Council; and some moveswere made to reopen adialogue between the church and the state.
This improved atmosphere disappeared almost overnight with the bishops' letter to the German hierarchy, which the regime struck at the essence of its foreign policy. To Gomulka, the bishops' letter must haveery real threat, both in substance and in theIn which he first learned of it. There is little evidence, for example, to contradict the regime charge that the church failed to inform the authorities of its intentions. The regimo apparently had to rely upon the text of the letter published In the West German press. As for the content Itself, the regime clearly could not accept the episcopate's Justification for Poland's acquisition of theTerritories" asfor its postwar territorial losses in the East. Equallywas the church'sto leading foreign prelates without prior consultations with the regime. Finally, the letter's appeal for mutual forgiveness, and Inn apparent partial equation of Polish sins In the postwarof Germans with Naziatrocities In Poland were not only unacceptable to the regime, but appeared to offer fruitful ground for propaganda
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all. Gomulka could not allow the church to steal his central role as protector of Polish national interestsis Germany. He could not leave unchallenged theear Implication that,eneration after theolicy of reconciliation toward the Germans would servo Poland's interests bettor than the regime's consistent Nearly all Poles are united in supporting thof Poland's postwar western frontiers and fear renewedpower. For the regime to lose its carefully fosteredas primary spokesman for the Polish presence on the Oder-Nelssc would have deprived it of one of Its few solid claina to popular support.
An additional motive for Gomulka'* response probably rests in the spirit ofraised in the episcopate's approach to the German church. In line with the Vatican's movesesolution of ancient Christian divisionsorld scale, the Polish episcopate's initiative contrasted far too sharply with Gomulka's adherence to the Communist ideologicalthat the world la divided between mutually hostile forces.
Domestic and Foreign Reaction
Divested of specific Issues, the church-state struggle inhas again emerged as one
between two opposing political forces seeking popular support. The so far cautious power plays exorcised by both sides suggest thai neither Is certain of its ground. While the church has clearly retained the support of the vast majority of the Polish people, there is evidence that some initial popular confusion resulted from the form if not the substance of the episcopate's approach to the German bishops.
The regime has been at least partially successful In exploiting the still strong memories of Nazi occupation among the people to portray the church's offer of forgiveness as "proof" of disloyalty to the modern Polish state andof history. Suchapparently has beeneffective amongintellectuals, many of whom have long viewed Hyszynskl's strong adherence to the concept of lhe "chureh-militant"nti-Communist) as inimical to the interests of Romanin Poland.
Elsewhere in Europe, both East and West, the Polish church-state struggle apparently iswatch closely. The Austrian press in particularajor commentator on the Polishand may well be used by both the Polish episcopate and the regime for publicizing their points of view.
The Czechoslovak andregimes, mindful of the potential effects of the Polish struggle on their predominantly Catholic peoples, apparently have cooperated with Warsaw in demonstratingthe Polishown have made peace with the authorities. East Germantoward the Polishinitiative apparently was heightened by the failure of tbe letter to acknowledge the existence of the "GermanRepublic." There have been several unconfirmed reports of East German pressure onto react sharply.
In West Gormany, where the issue of "reconciliation with the East" gained new publicearlier last fallesulterman Evangelical Church memorandum calling forolicy, the Polishmove was generally hailed as an indication that Warsaw's unremitting hoatillty toward Bonn Is not fully shared by all Poles. This response, in fact, has been one of the primary cudgels used by the Polishto claim that the church aovt bad encouraged West German "revanchlst" elements to press their territorial ambition* in the East.
Outlook
Both the church and state will probably soek to use this
year's Millennium events to their own advantage,punctuating the struggle with tactical moves designed to maintain some degree ofover future developments. Such moves have been evident in Gomulka'sanuary speech, in thearch party dailywelcoming the"clarification" of the bishops' letter, and in Cardinal Wyszynski's consistentlyresponses to specific regime provocations.
Despite this apparentawareness that little would be gainedhowdown in which neither side had hopeecisive victory, tho course of the rival millenniumthis year will hold constant danger of popular It is doubtful that tho episcopate will soon be able to satisfy tho regime'sdemand that it loyalty" to the state, or that Gomulka will moderate his personal animosity toward the cardinal. Reglmv attacks against Wyszynski will probably be maintainedigh pitch, and there Is little likelihood that he will be permitted to visit the US this fall. in line with Its past attempts to isolate Wyszynski within the hierarchy, themay eventually makemoves toward the rest of the episcopate.
irm commitBent to the kobI of eliminating the influence of the church on the Polish people, Goaulka hasshown skill andIn pursuing hishu transformation of the Catholic Church In Polandolitically and socially factor. His awareness that the struggle Is likely to be prolonged and tho outcomeis evident from his
statement in1 that "religion Is deeply rooted in our It is difficult to say how long lt will persistfor tens of years, and possibly muchhe cardinal, for one, not only share* this view, but has made lt clear that6 theChurch in Poland looksto another nillennluo of shaping the consciousness of the Polish nation. (OOPHUH
Original document.
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