NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Trends in Soviet General Policies
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Coneuned mi by ihe UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Al indicated overleaf6
Aulhentkalcd;
Colonel, USAF ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. USIB
N?
The following intelligence orgoniioliom participated in tho praparalion ol Ihis eslimale;
The Cancal Inielligence Agency ond Ihe intelligence organfioltoiK of llie Depart menu of Stale. Defeme. the NSA. and AtC.
Concurring:
Oi. R. J. Smith for Deputy Daector ol Central Intelligence
Mr. George C. Oennoy.or the Director of Intelligence one! fieworch, Depot.-menl of Store
lieutenant GeneralF. Cor roll, USAF, Director. Defense Intelligence Agency
lieutenant Generol Marshall S. Conor, USA. Director of tho Notional Security Agency
Dr. Charles H. Reichordl for Awii'ont General Manager for Administration. Atomic Energy Commission
Abstaining:
Mr. William O. Cregor, for Auluont Director, federal Bureau of Inveitigotlon. thebeing outildeof his jurisdiction.
jirrnBT-
TRENDS IN SOVIET GENERAL POLICIES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate main trends in Soviet internal and foreign policy over the next year or two.
CONCLUSIONS
the stormy years of Khrushchev, lhe Soviet Unionhave settled down. The new leaders haveumberpolicies, which are more realistic in terms of Sovietgeneral ihese policies arc more conservative. Internally, thetrying to tighten up; they are trying to control the variousforces set loose under Khrushchev. Externally, theyfirst attention to problems in the Communist world,challenge of China. They seem fairly well satisfied withthus far, and probably intend no great change in the
there are trouble spots. There are tensionsregime and the intelligentsia. Economic plans are still toand their failure would sharpen the question of how far andgo with reforms, particularly in introducing the "profit"strains on the allocation of economic resources are likelyimposed by the demands of the military and space programs,ambitious agricultural plan. Though Brezhnev has emergedregimes leading figure, the ultimate locus of power and thcof its exercise are far from settled.
for foreign policy the regime has done well in isolatingand regaining positions in Asia lost by Khrushchev, butdepend on what happens in Vietnam. The Soviets probablywar to end soon, preferably by negotiations. But they do not
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yet have this much influence in Hanoi, and they will probably have to stick by their presentmilitary aid and political support, but limited actual Soviet involvement. US-Soviet relations have been constricted by the Vietnamese war and no significantarc likely as long as thc war continues.
D. In Europe, tlie Soviets will be moreking to exploit dc Gaulle's disruptive maneuvers within NATU However, there is not too much they can do as long as their policy is fixed on tbe division of Germany. An active policy is likely to be continued along the wide arc of countries south and cast of the USSR. Tbe Soviets have made progress in thisIran, India. Pakistan,will try to consolidate their gains at the expense of both China and the West.
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DISCUSSION
23rd Congress of rhe Soviet Parly confirmed lhc main lines ofdomestic policy that have been gradually evolving since the fall ofManaged in the business-like fashion which is ihe image cultivatednew leaders, the Congress produced no spectacular surprise? and noinitiatives.
I. IHE LEADERSHIP
In theonths since Khiushchev's removal, his successors have managed rather well in running the country without serious political upheaval and in settingown stamp on the whole range of Soviet foreign and dorneslic policies. Within the framework of collective leadership, however, friction has continued over both policies and power positions. For the time being. Brezhnev has emerged as lhe leading Ggure of the group.
This apparent stability is probably related both to the personalilie* of the leading politicians and to the peculiar circumstances of the USSR at this time. Neither Brezhnev nor any of the other leaders appear to possess the highly combative spectacular style of conduct that characterized Khrushchev.reat extent thc new regime has established the rule of the party bureaucrat, and this encourages policies and practices which are less upsetting to theorder. There has been marked tendency for poUtical decisions to come down near the center of the Soviet political spectrum.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that each major policy decision has produced some contention. This has not resultedolitical upheaval, in part because the regime has not been under the pressure of acute crises. And, in addition, much of the regime's activity has beeniscarding of Khrushchev's organizational superstructureask anti-Khrushchev consensus lhal evolved while he was still inand resulted in his removal.
Prospects- We think the outlook over the next year or so is for aof thc present situation. The "collective" leadership will probably endure for this period. In our view this means that, though some individuals will gain in influence and others slip from power, no single person is likely to amass powers approximating those of Khrushchev. This should provide an element of continuity and stability in major policy fields-
Al the same time, thc struggle for leadership will continue and perhaps become more intense. There isarge requiremententral point of command and authority, and this point tends to be thc party leader. Brezhnev appears to belassic pattern by gradually enhancing his own position, most recently acquiring Stalin's old title of General Secretary.
scoffer
hus collective leadership may break down ilirough (he efforts ofiy Io eipand his jmsition. or through lhc efforts of the others lo- or remove htm. The durability of tollrctivc leadership also depends lo some eilnil on how critical lhc problems are. particularly ihc tjometlic ones. Thu* far tin' li.tilers Iiaveillingness lo compromise on many of (he very issues which in the past proved the mustand thc allocation of economic prioillics. This suggests thai if may bo tome time licfore specific policy issues become so acute lhal <iltcrnative and opposing policy lines will be sharpened lo Ihe poinl of provoking an overt power it niggle. In addition lo personal ambitions, lhe most likely causes for eventually undermining the prevailing balance are lhe perennial problems of lhe USSR: the economic issues, including defense; the proper relationship between (he patly and thc slate administration; and the question of policy toward (he intellectuals. And, of course, serious foreign policy setbacks could cause differences among lhc leaders. Finally, the entire question of how lo deal with Stalin, which was skirted at lhe Party Congress, could prove to be lhe most immediately explosive.
II. INTERNAL POLICIES
he present leadership hasistinctly moie orthodox character than Khrushchev's. In most fields of internal policy, except for some aspects of economics, the regime has sought to curb the unite liberal tendencies lhat were evolving under Khrushchev.
forty. The plight of tbe parly was an important cause of the returnore fundamentalist Communist outlook By his frequent reorganizations. In) insistence on the party's more diiect management of the economy, histoward dissident writers, and his icpcatcd waves ol dc-Stalinization, Khrushchev bad gone far in disorienting the parly professionals. The party was expanding rapidly, and many technicians and specialists were being admitted to membership. Disarray in the international Communist movement alsolo lite erosion of the party's confidence in its power and doctrine.
new leadership liasonsiderable effort to counter thishasonsislenl concern to stress the parry's authority over allendeavor and to revive thc morale and elan of fhe party worker. Thoughdirect participation In the detailed management of economic affairsreduced, its command and control system for policy decisions hasIdeological indoctrination and the practical value of theorygreatly rcemphasized, potential infringement! on tbe party'sas thc investigating authority of the Party-Slate Conirol Committee,abolished. Central Committee meetings hm been held more often,participation of non-party specialists from outside interest groups hasThe regime apparently intends to slow down the expansion ofstricter criteria have been laid down for membership, the quota forin leading party personnel Has been abolished. Tha general bnc ofthc prestige and moral authority of tbe party explains in part Iheoldpolitbuio. 4
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The desire io build up lbc party's image confronts (he current leaders with the problem of Stalin's reputation. They are clearly interested in undoing the extremes to which Khrushchev went in denigrating his predecessor, yet they recognize that any very explicit efforts at rehabilitation could stirtorm within thc USSR and throughout Eastern Europe They have apparently not yet fUed on the proper way to cope with the problem, certainly they had no solution in hand at the time ofd Congress. -Sen the nsoe was virtually ignored.
Tlie effort In enhance the party's prestige and influence may exacerbate, rather than heal, underlying tonflicts in the USSR, lt is hardmall power elite to exercise total control of the complex social and economic problems of an advanced industrial society. The pressures for greaterintellectual, andbecome more insistent. The effectiveness of reforms in economic policy and organization requires greater participation by technicians, greater respect for expert opinion, and more freedom of decision at lower levels. But recent trends indicate that there is considerable resistance tooosening up of Son ret society. Many lorces vnthin Sovietthe secret police, the military, the Stalinist lifefarvfind apolitical climate more compatibletheir aims and ideas. The groundwork is thus being prepareduture conflict.
This resistance to change is by noeturn to Stalinism. The control of the paily over the secret police and the military will almost certainly continue. Shifts to harsher methods, such as iccrnt repressions of liberal writers, still have fnirly well established limits. The reaction of the Soviet intelligentsia to thc arrest and trial ol two liberal writers and to tlie rumored rehabilitation of Stalinontinuing vitality among thc moreelements in the Soviet scene. And professional economists such as thc Liberman School, who ateore modern, unorthodox persuasion by Soviet standards, have made considerable headway. Nevertheless, In terms of the evolution of Soviet society, the present period appeals lotagnant one.
Thehe Five-Year Planas set the new regime's course of economic policy. Not only does il establish less extravagant goals than Khrushchev did, but it addresses many of the chronic problems that have plagued the Soviet economy during the past five years. The plan isambitious. It seeks to regain the growth rates of, raiseoutput, narrow the gap between heavy and light Industry, double investment in agriculture, increase the efficiency of Industrial management, and do all thii without having to reduce military and space programs.
The plan looks toward an economic growth7 percentate comparable to the good years in thcnd considerably better than our estimate ofercent average of the past five years. This optimistic projection doe* not rely on significantly greater injection! oi Labor
rtifled eittniw oi UM USSR's reooomy wiU t* provided InM.
and capital than in iho pair Instead, the pbn ilvpcuds on squeezinginputsgreater return in both industry and agriculture.
s before,he agricultural sector willecisive factorihc regime's economic prospects. In every respect, the agricultural program introduced by Btrrhnev is an ambitious5 peiceril rise in total agricultural output over the plan0 (scrcent rise in grain production; Intal investmentsillion; sizable increases in deliveries of machinery, especially trucks to agriculture;umber of measures to stimulate individual efforts through material rewards. Thc program is costly andteady, persistent effort, free from the meddling* of the political leadership. Thc regime is also making the questionable assumption that existing institutions andarc appropriate for effectively absorbing these great new inputs. Weather, of course, mayore critical factor than all the careful planning done in Moscow. All things considered, however, lhe Soviet Union seems embarkederious and extended effort greatly to increase agricultural output0
Another major factor in Soviet economic performance will be the weight of Ihe military and space programs The available dsta do not permit preciseut it appears lhat the Five-Year Plan allowsise in expenditures for Ihese sectors Indirect evidence, including the statements of lhc political leaders,olitical climate favorable for the miliary eslablishment and (or an expanding military effort. Even if thc tales of growth planned for national income anil productivity fall below the ambitious plan, miliiary and space expenditures can still growoderate pace. But if thereeneral failure in economic peifotmance, the claims of military and .space programs are likely tu become critical. At best, thc competition for icsourccs will continue, and it will become more acute if thc economy's peifonnance falls substantially below the planners' expectations.
ccording lo plan, the light consumer goods industry will finally haverowth rate comparable to that of heavy Industry Consurncr hard goods will become mote plentiful, quality should improve, and. on paper at least, light industry is no longer lo be thc orphan of the economy. However, the prospectubstantial rise in the standard of living is only fair.all Soviet plans have promised much and delivered less lo tbeand it seems likely thai, over the plan period, political and economic pressures wilt again leadowngrading of light industry.
Economic Welorm. The Soviet leadership is pinning many of lis economic hopeseries of reforms In industrial management. These reforms, which were introduced by Kosygin last September, arc designed over Ihe long nm to give industrial managers greaterhiring and firing in arranging contracts with customers and suppliers, in setting work assignments, and io distributing bonuses. Efficiency is to be improved, not only by lying bonuses more closely to Individual performance, but also by charging enterprises tor tbe use of hied and working capital and by crediting enterprises only with goods actually sold rather than wiih goods produced. Three features cast doubt
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on the success of lhc reforms. First. Moscow will still make the key decisions: tho ij-nntHy and assortment of output, thc amount and type of investment, the rale of introduction ot new lechnology. and lhc size of lite wage fund. Secondly, lhc profit at ulily of enterprises it highly dependent on lhe prices set for Ihcu jaw material and finished products, yel present price schedules are obsolete and are nowong nnd complicated revision Thirdly, there is considerable question about lhe willingness and capability of Soviet managers to adapt to thc new system.
The Economic Outlook Given the questionable prospects for agriculture and llie probable heavy impact of military and space spending, we think the regime's plan is overly optimistic and depends too much on every sector in-Creasing ils efficiency rapidly. Tbc economic reforms could provide an initial stimulus, as7 rcoigam/aliun did, bul ibey may prove so disruptive as to hamper production Over Ihe longer lerm, these is likely to be even greater bureaucratic resistance and interference, and further high level policy conflict over Ihe pace of reforms If so. then uncertainty and confusion may actually reduce lhe chances for belter economic performance In any event, tbc overall economic outlook tl only fair. Since the planned rales of growth aie noi likely to be achieved, hard economic choices will coniinue to confront the regime.
As always, the political factor weighs heavily in any estimate of Soviet economic prospects The present planttable leadership andon Ihe main lines of policy Moreover, tbe Soviet economy has btlle flexibility or margin (or error. Thc policy of reasserting tbe role of the party and lhe (rend toward orthodoxy could frustrate plans for effective reform and henceise in productivity. II performance fails to meet expectations, there willtrong tendency to blame lhe reforms, but there will also be counter pressure lo implement Ihem more rapidly and fully. Thus, polilical contention over economic policies and the reform program will probably become acute if the economy (ails to display (he vitality that ii hoped for
hcpecial mention should be made of the improved position of lhe military. Though the party fully intends to exercise closeumber of circumstances have probably combined lo increase the relativeof lhe military leaders in Iheir field of competence. Unlike Khrushchev, tbe present polilical leaders have not yet entered into public debates on military doctrine. There iserious concern over tbe Vietnamese war, thofor Ihe USSR of thc buildup and expansion of the US armed forces, and tbe growing power of China, all of which make the civilian leadership look for expert military counsel. Moreover,ollectiveingleb not likely to lake the lead in setting himself against professional military advice without guarantees of broad support. Thus we believe thai lhe Soviel military establishment now finds itselfelter position loearing for its special interests and policies than in recent years.
'Soviet Diililary policy will be more fully dbooied inofl. scheduled for6
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OREIGN AFFAIRS
houghSoviet leaders have seemed more preoccupied with1 ten than foreign affairs, there have been noteworthy changes in some aspects ol Soviet foreign policy as well.ense, as in domesticore conservative view of the international situation has evolved. This trend in foreign affairs has been icflected mainlyeordering of priorities: the Soviets seem must concerned with the immediate problems and issues of thc Communist world.esult, Soviet policy has been focused on the China problem and, within this context, the Vietnamese war.
There is no indication that the new regime has radically new or different views concerning the various factors and conditions which must shape Soviet' conduct. Doubtless, they still see their military power as serving two basicthe USSR, and expanding its influence. Hosvpvcr, they apparently estimate that thc present balance of power in the svorld does not permit Ihe more aggressive and assertive policy which characterized Soviet conduct during the Berlin crises and the Cuban missile venture. At the same tune. Iiossfver. the Soviets have also muted lhe atlempt to creale an almosphcieetente with thc US and base redefined ihcir peaceful coexistence strategy in somewhat more negative terms. In sum, Ihe Soviets apparently see the present period as an unfruitful one, either for major accords with the West or major gains at its expense.
The Chine Problem. Tlie Soviets have been generally successful oversl year in isolating China within thc Communist svorld- Chinese mis-ealctila lions. Soviet tactics,easure of good luck have allart in this success, symbolized by thc presence at the Soviel Party Congress of almost all Communist parties, despite thc Chinese boycott. Thc Soviets have been willing to contest tbc Chinese more actively while persisting in pleas for "uniled* Communist aciion. They have avoided public polemics, svhilcthe essence of their ideological and poliiical position. This approach has enabled Ihe Soviets to shift much of the blame for continuing the dispute onto Peking.
In view of this record, the Soviets will almost certainly continue this general approach. Meanwhile. Ihe Soviets probably have an interest in keeping thc door open to China in theost-Mao leadership reexamines itsisolated position.
Vietnam. Both Ihe Chinese and Ihc Soviets have made the Vietnameseey issue in their dispute. The future course of thc svar may prove thc decisive test of whether the Soviets can consolidate their gains against the Chinese. At this point, the Soviet leaders Ihemselves probably have no clear idea svhere the war is leading. In our view, their own preference probably isegoliated settlement. At thc same time, the contest with China forin Hanoi also pushes Moscow in the direction of greater support for the war. But the Soviets clearly appreciate the dangers and risks of confrontation with tlie US. Thus Soviet policy is truly caughtilemma.
SEtWET
Inituation, there is always (he possibilityustrations,and unforeseen developments will ilraw Soviet policyore radical course. Thc USSR miglit disengage fiom its commitment of support, or. moreight sharply increase its involvement through employment of new weapons and Soviet personnel or through pulling pressures on thc US in other areas. While wc recognize these possibilities, we think ft more likely that the Soviets will coniinue roughly along preseni lines, supplying military aid as necessary, bul mainly in defensive systems, seeking lhe while to limit their own risks. They are likely lo await new opportunities to exert influence on Hanoi in lhc direction of settling the war. Though lhc Soviet position in Hanoi has improved, il is doubtful that lhe USSR yet has thc influence to persuade the DRV to alter its stand. Nor can tht Soviets afford independent polilical initiatives or any semblance of cooperation with the US on theissue.
Relations with llie US. US-Soviet relations will be largely restricted by thc Vietnamese wor. Thc Soviets would piobablyurther worsening in relations if dirtaled by (heir interests in Hanoi. Even before the USSH's involvement in Vietnam, the Soviet leaders probably hid decided thai tbc prospect of lesloring their position in the Communist world was well worth some deterioration in relations with the US. But they hive also displayed an awareness lhalould go loo far. We expect that they svill try to contain thc effects of Vietnam and to maintain contacts and channels for the future, when and if lhc Vietnamese war is settled
Europe. Al the Parly Congress the Soviels began to lay the groundworkore active European policy. Their general view, as expressed by Cromybo. is thai the Western bloc is loosening and that contradictions and tensions afford tbe opportunity loi the Soviets to deal independently with each of the Western allies. Now the Soviet! seem prepared to test ihis thesis wiih direct contacts nnd, piobably. renewed proposals in the realm of European security.
Thc new line will probably be conciliatory largely out of deference to de Gaulle, in the hope of encouraging him lo carry out duruptive actions within thc Western Alllanc* Many well-worn proposals are likely lo be reworked to lest European reacttonst the reduction of armaments and troops in Central Europe, stabilization of European frontiers, prohibition on deployment or transfer of nuclear weapons As for Cermany. Soviet concern that French actions will enhance West Cermany'sATO may heighten Moscow's interest in some improvement in relations with the FRC. Thus, despite an intransigeant public posture, tbe USSR willertain flexibility in its attitude toward Bonn. Because of this desire to exploit and explore thc possible consequences of French withdrawal from NATO, lhc Berlin question is likely to remain quiescent.
However, unless the Soviets arc prepared to change iheir Cerman policy, which is highly unlikely, there is not much they can offer lo Paris or Bonn.
Moreover, in our view lhc Soviets continue to believe thnt no Europeancan be consummated without the participation of thc US, which remains the preferred partnerialogue.
Eflsfcrn Europe. Soviel relations with Eastern Europe have settledairly consistent pattern, and the USSR seems to be paying more heed to the views of thc Eastern bloc tlian it did under Khrushchev. The reluctance of Soviet leaders fo raise the unsettling question of Stalin at the Party Congress in part probably reflects this change in attitude. This trendore practical working relationship seems likely to continue, though frielions are bound to arise now and then, particularly over thc problem of economic relations. The Soviet leaders would like to tighten up the Warsaw Pact organization, but they will probably remain unwilling to take any bold initiative in fhe face of continuing oppositionumber of countries, particularly Rumania.
N&iPiolijcration. This is another field in which the Soviets have virtually JlOOd still, partly because of Vietnam, but mainly because of their overriding concern with the question of nuclear wcnisons and Cermany. In our view, the Sovietsrowing intereston-proliferation agreement; but they arc more concerned that Cermany acquire no voice in the use of nuclear weapons. Moscow is likely, therefore, to continue its resistance to any agreement that did not foreclose this issue without qualification. As long aj the non-proliferation question remains open, the Soviets will probably be reluctant to move on other arms conirol questions.
The Underdeveloped Counlries. For several year* we have characterized Soviet policy toward thc "third world"igorous effort to displace Western influence and buildtrong Soviet position. While this has been generally tjue. there has alsoradual scaling down of Soviet expectationsomewhat more (elective approach in particular. This has become more evident under ihe new leadership. Africa seems to receive moreattention in present Soviet policy, and the USSR has played no role of impoi lance in the Rhodesian crisis. As for Latin America, the Soviels feltto tone down the more militant aspects of the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana,
The present Soviet regime seems able to accept setbacks in these areas with fairly good grace, perhapsore realistic view that instability in thc underdeveloped countries is inevitable. The problem of Algeria illustrates ihe difficulties for Moscow inuccessful policy of dealing with one-party. non-Communist regimes. The Algerian delegation to the Soviet Party Congress walked out because of the presence of Algerian Communists. Yet thc Soviets are committed to providing miliiary aid to Algeria, and this hasdespite the removal of Ben Bella and tlie new Algerian regime's more hostile attitude toward local Communists.
The Middle East andtriking feature of Soviet diplomacy last year was thc concerlod eflort to improve Moscow's position along tlte wide arc
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countries stretching from Turkey through India and Southeast Asia to Japan. This effort began with an adjustment of thc Soviet position on Cyprusonsequent improvement of relations with Turkey. Foreign aid agreements were completed with Turkey. Iran, and Pakistan, these three countries accounting forercent of new Soviet aidreat impetus fo* Soviet policy was provided by the successful mediation of the India-Pakistan dispute at the Tashkent meeting. Despite significant obstacles to improvement ofwith Japan, the USSR has nevertheless made progress, particularly in the economic field Military aid. particularly in Syria, Iraq, and India, continues lo be an important Soviet instrument for unptuving the USSR's position.
cheduled visits manifest an active interest in the UAR, Turkey, and India. The Soviets will continue to try to balance their assistance and support for India with an effort to consolidate their increasedakistan. Tbe Sovieis will be seeking to loosen Turkey's relations with both NATO and CENTO and of Iran's and Pakistan's relations with CENTOSoviet concern over Laos is evident, and the Laotian King's visit is planned this summer. In short, the Soviets ait likely toery active policy in the areas south and easi of lhe USSR, not only to further their anti-China policy but also io strengthen their general position in areas where they probably believe the US is losing ground.
In Indonesia the decline of Sukarno and the destruction of theParty raises set tons questions for the Soviets. While they arc undoubtedly gratified at the Chinese setback, they will not wish the US to establish aposition.esult, Ihey are probably prepared to continue good relations with thc Indonesian military and suppori them with further assistance. Eventually they may work toommunist Party that would look to Moscow for guidance
The Outlook
While many specific policies lemain unclear or even undecided, theof the Soviet leaders docs suggest the way in which,road seme. Ihey view the world and lhe USSR's future in it. Their approach is increasingly realistic They do not act as though they bchve that striking gains for Soviet policy or Communist aspirations we availableost of countries. They do not seize upon every crisis, near or remote, as an opportunity to advance their cause suddenly and dramatically This b. in our view, something more lhanatter of style. Rather it seems torowing appreciation of lheof the world, tlie unpredictability of events, and the limits on Soviet ability to direct, or profit from, political change in foreign countries.esult, tho USSR may be able to avoid many mistakes and to operateophisticated and eflVctive fashion in areas who* genuine opportunities eatst
Fundamental Soviet objectives have not beeney arc to(he security of the USSR, and to work toward the establishment of a
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new leaders extends aod deepens th* trend which dates (torn the Cuban missile crisist contrasts shaiply with tlie period which preceded that crisis, when Soviet foreign policy seemed grounded on simpler conceptions ond more olravagant expectations. Perhaps thc chief significance of Khrushchev's ouster, therefore, isolitical change of the first magnitude inside the couniry has notN basSoviet tendency lo temper their revolutionary outlook on tlie world with concerns of national interest and great power status.
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