, 8 April
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
I.BJ LIBRARY Mandatory Reviewocument3 _
Prospects for Stability in the Dominican Republic !
TABIE OF CONTENTS
THR
CONCLUSIONS I
DISCUSSION *
*
ECONOMIC 4
IIIB FOUTICAL ARRNA
IV, THE JUNK T"
V. THK ROLE OF TDK MILITARY
POST ELECTION FOM1ICAL PROSPECTS11
POST ELECTION ECONOMIC PROSPECTStt
x
PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the situation in the Dominican Republic and thefor stability during the next year or two.
CONCLUSIONS
in the Dominican Republic are discouraging.social, economic and political problems have beenby the eventsnd no easy solutions or sure roadsarc in sight.
so, conditions have stabilised enough so that chancesthe scheduled elections6 are good. IfJlalaguer remain in the race to the end, as now seems likely,willepresentative choice. Tho contest betweenmen appears close at present, and we cannot predict theany confidence^
winner will probably face major elements on die otherremain imrcconcilcd to the outcome even if the electionsfair and free. ^BHBBiifflflWflSBBSIISSB&SBSSHfi
litical prospects arc for further tension, Instability and disorder.
D. The continued presence of the Inter-American PeacePK) would serve to stabilize the situation; on the other handould tend to promote exaggerated nationalism and anti-US feeling, ami over time mightactor for instability. After the dec-
W(5)
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Hons and Inauguration of the new president, we believe that pressures for removal of the IAPF will increase on the part of elements withinhe Latin American governments whose troops are involved,
emmcnl comes lo power wl
and public opinion in the hemisphere.
nomic problems so intractable that any significant progress over the next year or two will be extremely dilTicitll- -and witltout foreign aid, impovsible. Kven with continuing infusions of US aid and other external credit assistance, the IJominican economy67 is unlikely lo do much more than regainevels. Thewill almost certainly take some tentative steps toward agricultural devrJopment, improved education, am) mote efficknt operations in the large state-owned sector of the economy; however, reform measures of the type required for sustained economic growth canrolonged period of political stability.
DISCUSSION I BACKGROUND
iawS
Ihe last dictatorial rule theears of Trujdlo which ended only with hit assassination ina particularly deep Imprint The Trujillo reign not only prevented the dcvrlopnu nl of political learlrnnormal political life, it hied fiesh hatreds and lirld back progress In neaily every sphere,ie economic, where there was modest growth. Much of the economic progress WW designed, for sliow, however, or was for tlie benefit of Ihe Trujillo family or close associates, and did utile to improve the welfare of the average Dominican. Pastryult of the Trujillohe political fabric is pmoeated with mutual distrust, andide gulf brtwwn the cm.il upper-cLus minority andat bulk of the population,gnorant and poverty-stricken,as increased as the Dominican peasants and workm liavc become more aware of their underprivileged condition.
two 'thirds of the people live in the countryside, mod of themmere subsistence from smill plots of land. Less than half the"
live talent,
Alilx-ugh almoM al
ve some inUiuie ol Negro and apaiiUti wood,trong tendency for those of lighter skin to look down on theones. The poor of the city streets aie often calicdnd political movements seekingppeal snmcUnves itfer to iippfT-slnss political groups as "ihe whites."
Doiniiiicans have had owe of the highest sustained rates ofb tVMs, of course, greatly complicates any cflcats lo DM*
r^fCNfcxOw* SovWH
tcrtudrdtvlJ* SOIVtS. ao incrrawwmliwt'J atullwn TV po*lh lateear; givenImrtfuvunnt In peats* lo- sUivI-mIi ti bcjlui and asattstSM,j to still bigUi
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mote nuoomlc or educationalt alio may havea) effects,ovn the longer term Mote than half the population il now IVsx thin IS Man old. the ytamg people, many of ihens not rrconeskd hLr Ihfir par. Ms lo docile acceptance of minimal tiling iltndardc, are likely toajor forcehtlt-sil change.
iiilnfcan military establishment, though it has rccnlly Itecrtchange, fa stillonscivalive force, which In thehas Irrdedlign itself with elements of lire civilian elite.*llic aitnecl forces had becomepiactori'ii guard ensuiing theeonlrnl over almost every aspeit of hie. In return they receivedshare Innstitutionalized system ot gt#ft. Over
Ihe past severalumber of the tnent reactionary andtH ctis have been displaced, and some of the yo. t, USTi<ns seem lo beense cf piofctsivnslisin and tespoosiUlity Even so, theorroups withinprobably continrie to regard themselves as the arbiters of Dominican politics and remain teady to intervene if they think the occiision renn'res it.
II. THE ICONOMIC PftJDICAMfNT
The Dainltikari Hi public is one of the poorest counbries in Latin Amerka. depending cldenygiicullme, whkh accounts forf CNP and employs tvt? (hlrds of the labor force. Id assets include aome of tlie mott fertile land In thelimate suitable to the cultivationide range ofrimaryystem linking all major agricultural regions, and an extensive, though poorly maintained, irrigation system in tho aridpait of the country. Uauvilc depositt ate being mined, and ihctc are small deposits of iron otc andie stock of other physicalsowcver, is small. 'I lino ate no exploitable deposits of petiotcum or coal, nnd live tiydio-elextilc power potential ft limited. Moreover, oiable land fa limited In eattnt. and tlse ratio of population to arable land Is one cf tlsc highest in tho hemisphere. Output of lite economy has been kept lowmall stock of capitaleneral Uck of traiisportatioa facilities in mralack of storage facilities at market centers, and little matrufait-irlngy the application of only rudliricirtajy forms of teeJiriotugy throughout much of industry and most ofandeneral lack of technical and managerial skttls,
Dominican foreign exchange earnings and gtncial economic activity arc heavily depcikimt on agricultural exports, principally sugar. About two-thirds
of tho sugar industry is government-owiscd. Production cost* In these slate-owried augur enterprises are so high that exports would be proClablo lot them only winn world prices are cxtracedlnaiUy high. Prices have been lownd4 and seem likelyemain so The countiy'a vislnci abilityx to at ions In exportrxieased by its heavy dependence on imports,
of the lkesinieaa bvfuary ts appnsiffutdy as fu&nii. aim*, easytwV50- 0 iwn
><c
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including many important staph foods such as rice ainl beam, ainl almost all capital goods, fuels, industrial taw materials, and consttuwi durables.
leirm of standard of living, tbe Dominican* are IrCtlcr off thanWith that exception they rank with die poorest among tliefed. housed, doctoicd, andtm Americanhasodest improvement in consumption standards over theyears, but. has been plaguedonsistently high level ofantl uisdereinployiiverit.
Dominican economy, which had shown generally rapid growth inafter Worldas done badlynitially, this was caused
Tnijilto's use of an austerity program to gain foreign exchange to build up Trujillo family foilune outside the counuy. The policy actions ol post-Trupllohich included guvniunent.il efforts to reduce uneinploy-ment by means of increased budgelaiy expendituies and hiring by stale-ow wil enterprises1 and whichapid rise in teat wages, generated demand lor goods far beyond the economy's capacity to produce or buy abroad, l'otitical instability caused private investois to be reluctant to irKiease capacity In response to this demand. Moreover, the use of state rntcipiLsesnational pauiinosiy" to provide increased employment led to sharp rediietroiiv in public sector sasing* andustained period of rapid price ibtvs and increasingly severe balance of payments difficulties ensued.
The rebellion in5 made these problems more acute at the same time that it lessened the ability of the government to deal with tbem. The CNI" dipped sonveercentlie diop in per capita GNPhoughecline In Individuals riot that severe. This was pertly because of the US emergency feeding program which for several months readied IS percent of the Dommleens. liven so. unemployment liscrcased from perhapsercent of the labor foice to aboutercent. The deficit In the government's budget rose somewhat over its level3
A particular difficulty$ which augurs HI for tho futureharp decrease In earnings from Dominicanillion from0 million totalbout half the drop was causedcclino In sugar productionesult both of the rebellion and of tho low world market price. Sugar output fellhort tons of raw sugar4 to
1 per tapiu spent rationalt (GN'f)qHiUic0 telov iben Win ADrricaii cojiilrh-f.nitfU'r.Ue number of Douilukuns are well-off as cmnfaird vviih ibis low sSamiud, lVic ue no locgrrfan ii) In who are very ikh.
eiittM|-iisr| In tliol tbem foimcc hnblings tt Che Trujillo famlly--acvount for abemt ball* the country's Indwtrial capital andourth of she mm! productive) land. Cuba I* iht only countiy ui ihewhlihigher concrotiatVin of means c4 procWUin Hi the binds nf ihe state. In. this bu meant thatpctky tt the deceive tactic in dkbI ecwwvmic oulleii and that potitits ane] ccnmcnics arc more thoroughly uitej twined lhanhe ease.
owever, the combination of UScdudion in tltc level of Dominican imports prevented fuither dctci ioratlon in the balance of payments.
III. HIE POUTICAl ARENA
t. has had no experience in achieving political compromise through representative institutions. Its political attitudes and organizations have not progressed far; the parties are generally young and highlyaige ptopottion of the people, especially of the lural peasantry, is nut politically conscious. In the li.tVs first free elections In% Juan Ilosch polled somecicent of tlie vote; yet wl*en the Dominican military Icadcts ousted Bosch inheie were no significant public demonstrations of^^otest^
The rebellion accelerated the process of political awakening innd widened tin: gulf between the various conservative groupings on the one hand and the various parties of the left on the other. The senior military leaders did not oppose the ovcilhrow of the Reid Cabral govetorient at die outset of the revoltpril. But when they realiied that tlse coup was leadingestoration of President Bosch and the constitutionheir reaction swiftly transformed the situationivil war, pitting the most militant elcnseiils of the left and tight against each other. There is no doubt that the extreme leftistsey role on the side of the "ccnistilutionalists" when tho fighting was at Its height and thai suUenueiitly titty have engaged in terrorist activities. Kor is there any doubt that elements of the extreme right have conducted terrorist operations In recent months, vvhteli have beendirected against members of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Parly (PRO) and against foiiner "coastilutlooalivT military figures.
Catcia Godoy, President of the Provisional Government which came to power inas given top priority to efforts to reconcile the adversaries of the conflict. An experienced diplomatan of decent, liberal Instincts, though not particularly forceful. Carda Codoy ejuklly came xmdci" fire from political conservatives and military chiefs for his responsiveness lo tho demands of tlie "conMilutionillsts" and his appointmentumber of men of various leftist hues to Important government posts. Indeed the strong support of OAS officials and of the Inter-Amtrkan Peaceequired toilitary coup against llie provisional president within his orst two months of office. The IAPF likewiseey role In opening up tlse rone of the oily previously controlled by "constitutionalist" forces and in supporting other measures aimed nt restoring order.
Ik
ense, live primary contribution of the provisional government lies been tocooling otf" period. Thatould undertake few policy initiatives and that it could notomplete restoration of civil order was of lessnspoitance than its ability simply to survive one esi.sis after another. Even loumber of "constitutsonalist' military leaders and sortie tup ranking olEcTrs of thr- rrgulu military establishment to asssgnnvnts Outdde the countiyrotractedcia Codoy was unable to work this out aececding to hisirn Mecvrr. siicceed tn sending abroad Ihe key eortstkultatnaltvi" officers and in making enough change in tic command of the tegular mititaiy to neinsit the installationew Minister of Defense, Generalcser, in whom he has scene eexiCdewc. and new chiefs of the aimy, the air force, and the police.
IT. By no means all the irnptov-rcnentc situation lias been attributable to Ihe provisional gove-mnicrd. Certain of llw military have shown an increasingly responsible attitude. Both Balagurr and Bosch have on occasion ptovkled needed eiidorsetiient lot Carda Codoy or at least have refused to partieipate In uioisousible or destructive acts of opposition Peihfps as ImpoiUnt aselse has been the bieaking apart ol the "unity ol the leit" which had beenresponsible for much of the strength ofconst Hut ion alisls" in llie wake of the rebellion. Not only did the 1'BI) ond the parties of the extreme left pull away fioui each other, but the latter resumed epmiicllng among themselves about whether to use political tactics or lei tor nml violence. The net elicit ofthese things has been lo pen nil nitor ulintiragile equilibrium.
IV. THE JUNE ElECIIONS
lie provisional government hat made good ptogress in setting up the machinery forune elections, in which the votui ate toew tour-yearpeeiatVit* from the Oiganintsoa of American Stales have been serving as advisors to the Dominican Crntral Kiev linos Board since early January, and time arc plans to bring In some additional OAS technicians and observers for election day. The electoral law specifics that except at directed by (he FJectlons Boaiil the security futoes will remain in theirhe framework be in place for relatively free and fair elections, if the politicalcliuialcdocs not srrioudy wwstn. !
hange of climate couM come about in anyumber of ways. Because ofepth of political cidntoviiirs, small incidents involving theforces and students or wotVeis could turn Into major confrouUtioos. The return to. of such cnirtioveisial figures as Francisco Caaimno or
*Tbc prestJcDt and sice ixnsdrbtul caudidalee almtj run un Die same tkkctleident, vko prrtidna ami olyidllv. Tsvcntr-Msen srnitces andtrinbtiiniitVa ate Id Le rlcctrd fur four-year7 miydid raunclbnae, fnrtxim. No immtxr of the pcovuioaal govtrturitiitandidal* lur any <il the clcilise olto'f- Mritilais oi tho umed loiccs aod police are fotltddrn toDominicans our IS yeai old ce of any are if they arc ot hive been Hurried) arc rt.jjucd to vute and may befo not.
est in roiilrl provoke new double. Assassination of one of the leading pa'iiv il KgiKci onIit>'HMHBJBJBHJpBfpJBJ>j
imWB iheio has. however,ailed dVciease incilous-rsen of vtolrtst soctoVtits sinee ear ly thb year.
Klements of both ratremct find (he two major candidates, Joaiiuin Balaguer and (nan Bo*<h. unacceptable alternatives. A* rrcctsOtii approach,f (ho ridit oi led may aKernplisrupt ihem by urn In lading trnoiiSt acts or. In the case of tin: far hit, dying to provoke inddniti Involving (he police, mitilaiy or IAPF. In recent weeks the pro Castro Mill ofvolutionary Movement (Mli-lji) and (he otthndoi Dominican Communist Partynn- ivtieated that (hey accept electionsone pmsilile Dilution to (he preterit iumi and they are hi fly lo devote their eririgks to seeking support forosch. However, the militant IVma.wan Popular Movement (MID) has eipictsed oppOssTson to the eWtfern. It trsay dy top trouble in Santo frmsingo. but its linulcd capacity forit son will be coon(rrcdproved police and nilhl.iry capabilities and theof the IAPF. Although we anticipate souse Increase in trouble and violence, we think the situation will probably remain orderly enough so that elections can (akc place as scheduled.
Balaguri served Trujillo for yrart arid was president wlien ihe dictator was assassinatede retained (his position foe about eightiurntxr of measures dcslgiicd to appeal to (lie lower income gioups Today be heads use large avl pcitooilutK: Kcfonnist rattyomposed of moderates,nd some TrussDisla demerit. Hisit populwtir, refonmst and designed to appeal to the peasantry and other low income gioups. FraiKfseoa, the PR vice prcsideiilial nominee,eading IH organization man but has little popular suppoit.
Hoseh, who for yearseader of the antl-Trujillo Miles,ttctidciit2 by an overwiiclming majority, but ho wasguch weaker oppotHitf than Ralagucr. barely trsciitakine, office, he was swept from powirilitary coop. Ilosch isiV idei of tbe well organized Dominican rvevolut.kie.aiy Parlyn united behind his candtdaiy. He is dearly (he candidateupported by the radical RcvolutKnuryy the pro-Castro MH-IJI, and by the Moscow orientedHowever, Bosch lias sought to disassociate himself fromparties, and his publicly rejected the support of theand (lie paitlcs of the eatrcme left command few votes hi(he I'llI) butake up (he margin of difference Inelection.1'RD ticket has tome added strength froui thev of Atrionlo Cu/man, wlioime was considered asfor provisional president. Cu/uvau things no Large personalbut he wtllertain aura of rcvpectababty.
birdsKfcisii.il cwrxliiljte, who appeals mainly to Pouiinlcanand rightMs is Rafael Bonnclly. IVesiileut of (he Council of State
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ilai mini ihe country inafter Bala gnu's ouster He it mlnn loJoule xnul right iJ miIi i parties mloihe N
Integration MmrrDcnl (MIN)ontest between Baliguei and Bench. ButUM-lly tan be espeeted lo pull votes away fromouh appears to be In the lead, prcsiuies will grow on the pail ol MIN and Til suppoilcia to unlly against him. However, tlie ambitions of Individuals in both groups, as well as the longstanding animosities between elements ol the two putties make such an alliance dinVult. Some MIN sponiors probably hopec the organizationohtical Fronti the military could rvreise power in the rveotuccessful corp.
t rs likely that the candtJalcs of thecie parties wall slayhe contest to the end.
Boschhbguer will be making their appeal to the same sector of the populace- the urban and rural pour. Running on rc'niinst platforms, each has his strong points Balaguer is identified "ith the peace and order ol ibe Trunllo peisod.irivr when manyongan end lo upliraval and anarchy. He is probably lerneinUred favorably among the urban lower classes foe bis largesseany Domkiscans are ansious, above all, toeturn to the violerice and chaos of5 rebellion. Balaguer appeals lo them with his pledget of conciliation and unity of action. His PR lieutenants have done some organizational work, and he himself haseries of tiips info the eountiyside to rally the voting groups likely to give lu'ci greatest backing However Ihe PU campaign so far has not snatched the vigor of Ihe campaign of the PUD.
Bosch's mate* advantage) is his ability tocal lo the Dominican masses in terms they find under stand able and athaclive.ampaigner he has unusual abditiet His general reputation for opposuig tlie unpopular IJoniinkan military establishment will also attract voters- The PHI)owerful soke in the mnrstriet and agencies of the Prosassonsl Coveinrnenl and thb influence will ;ihe party erinskkerable leverage at the poflV Should the ienpfraaaon thai Boseh is going to win cotaimue to grow, he would also prcattendency to get on ihe bandwagon
candidates have recognizableonnellyundoubtedly rat intoote. On the other hand, if Balaguer
T_
JO. All things considered, we believe tlie election will be clcnc. Balagucr got ofi to an earlier start. Bosch now seems to be gaming rrsomentum We cannot predict tho outcome with any confidence |
V. THE ROtF OF IHE MILITARY
be new Vliniit.tr of Defense'cter has slated thai the Dominican mililary establishment will abide by tlie election results, whatever they are 'Ibis Implies motehange In mililaiy attitudes than we think Iras yet taken place If Bosch were eketrd, some key figures in the military would want to prevent biro from taking or holding office "Diecsence of ihe IAI'K would probably inlubit tbrm fiom acting quickly; indeed their eapectalion as to when tlie IAPF might witlidraw would probablyactor in dettimlning their tuning. 'I lie dissatisfied rnlbtary otneeis might also wish to delay action for snrne liove so as to take advariUge of scene sprcilc action of the no* govrtn-merit which might render It unpojKilar or otherwise vulneiable.
i? If. on (he other hind, Batagoer were elected, he would begin with tbe acceptance of tlie military establrthment Moreover, he wouldnmamge to persuade lenders of live aimed forces lo go alongoves Inward will and economic reform, even if thesetcsls from rightist politicians. Initially, sharp cippos.lscsii from the etfrrme left would improve, rather than detractits standing with the securitye might, however, low this rappoit if he used ihr police and army lets vigorously than they thought was required to put down leftist-instigated demonstrations and violence.
ne of the roost arduous Usls facing any new government it lo continue the gradual and delicate process of resisting ihe military so that eventually it will become the servant ot the government. If the prejidenl moves chunsUy in this, he may provoke the very military fnleivention he is trying to rule Out. If lie acts to reduce the strrnglh of the armed forcesay risk loss of capability lo cope with eivtl disorder, terrorism, or.
M Whatever Ihe nature of government action, there are likely to be growing differences of attitude and political opinion within tho militaiy. and particularly within the anny. Incteaclng numbm of younger army oflkers, NCOs. and enlisted men will ptobably become antagonistic toward thelite groups. The PBD his been making efforts lo build Influence within the military; the more exUeino parlies are likely lo lay too. Although this will tend to decrease the danger of ititmriitron by tlie military establishmenthole, it will add to the dangerew split within tlie military and the abgtrnen; of military units with Opposing political factions.
VI. POST ELECTION POLITICAL PROSPECTS
isrn Ihls unceiUMi allegiance of theilitary, the IAPF wall continue,hile at least, to be the primary stabilising factor in. lis presence reduce, ihe chancesoup from the right and of Insurgency fioui tbeft. Thus the chances of any Dominican government for survival will be substantially greater as long as the IAPF stays on. Its cetstlnued presence would, howcAet, lend lo promote exaggerated nationalism and aotiUS feeling, and over lime mightactor for instability. After thei elections and the inauguatlon of tho presidentuly pressures for removal of tho Force will probably increase, on the part of elements wilhtn. tho Latin American govtmnvnis wliose troops are mvolved, and pubttc opinion in the hcniUphere.
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The revolution and its aflomilh have produced ih.lip new animosities, dilbiult if mil impossible to oveuonte. Wr think tHo broad Urgency wsthitt
. will he toward continuing growth of Iht political Wt. Howof
this will benefit the pasties ofti.n* Itbowluall Wt will, of course,n the priioimsnce ofws well as on the Uadeaship and competitive sllll of dir. parties involved.
All time pailirs of the extreme left- -the militant Mil)nd the Hth ol June Revolutionary Movement (pro Castro) hove gained some gimiud during Ihe past year. Their mianbtls have taVen tin? leading role at the university, anduiulx'i of positions in the goveiiimeut buieauciacy, they continue to have uiBucuc, although they are by no means the stiongcst force, in the labor union mos-erneni. Ihey have, moreover. subsUMialry snueascd their capability, in tnins of wrapons, training, experience, and cadres, to carry out urban letionsin or guemlU warfareails ofosuiuyside- although in general the rural population remains unsympa iheti a
'Iherchat tl the modeiale hit is politii*lly frustrated, some elements may make common cause with tlie enierne Wt. In tl* event thst Rosch were elected and later displaced by the military, lids combination on the left would becomeertainty. In combiualion, tlsc various leftist parties couldeavy pressure on any government by means of political strikes, student agitation, and general vs-nlence. This might in turn provoke strongly repressive action by the military and finally leadew outbreak of civil war, wirh possible divisions among ihe military.
n any ease, the govauruent winch comes to powtrury willhave- marly as much oppotitiem aa harkingll be confronted with socii.i, eooiiumk and potitkal pioltlims so intractable that any significant
accomnlidirnent over the ncvt year or two will be extremely difficult. If It falls to move forward at all in these fields, the support it begins with will shrink away and lis vuIntrabilily will Increase. Thus the outlook for political stability Is discouraging.
VII. POST ELECTION ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
During tlie remainder of this year the Dtwiiniean eeoiiotny will probably continue to recover froin the low point readiedhis recovery bIwwevw, to taring CNP back as far as4 level. Spending for consumption will almost certainly dominate, aod no large-scale privatef:utn cither domestic or foreignikely,iable political solution.
Thrt new government's econoiiile focus07 will be largely limited to sliuit-iun measures to provide immediate benefits to llie populace There will be strong piessiue to cul rlown tinemployinetit ond central govern-ment spending can be expected to increase eomidt-rably. lite budget deficit0 Is likely to runillion Increased demand for goods will probably lead to appreciable price rives. If for political reasons Useshould undertake greatca- expansionist spending policies, ptloe Increases would bo sharper and pressures on ihe country's balance-of-payments strooger. There probably will lie significant deterioration in tho Dominican balance of payments0 and without Improved production and prices for sugar tlie outlook7 remainsise in imports and the probable stagnation of exports could0 deficit for goods and services in the range0 million.
US program loans and food supplies, combined with loans from the Inter-American DcvclopriHail Hank and other developmental credit assistance, can inect much of the expected sliOrtfall in Dotniniean finances and materially help with pressing supply problems. Tlie Dominican government may,liavo to givo serious consideration to devaluationeans of restoring the balance In international payments. But unless this were doneartarefully worked out stabilization program, thereood chanceound of price and wago increases would soon vitiate its benefits.
n shott. Dominican economic policies07 will be almost entirely aimed at achieving .hort-tcitii and largely pobtlcal results. Thewill almost certainly take some tentative steps toward agricultural dcvclop-ieier-t, improved cdoealion, and more efficient operations of the large state-owned sector of tho economy. US and other lending agencies aro already supporting protects in these Hues. Nevertheless. Iho economy will remain vulnerable lo export price fluctuations and it will faceong tiiuo such problems as an iivadeauate marketinghortage of capital, backward technology ineiveial lack of technical and managerial skillsraveof government management and resource allocation- Hcform measures of
Original document.
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