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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
bearing on OXCART uso
ovor Cuba
>ROS:
1. It would establish and validate the operations capability of the OXCART system to performeconnaissanceefended area, in which weathorontinuing factor.
2 it would confirm the reliability of the basic aircraft system.
they elect to exerciso theit would provldo an opportunity to trygeneration electronic jammers.
wouldnique opportunity to
st the response (detoction range, handling capacity,oviet-type air defense systemow cross soc :ion Mach Three reconnaissance plane. This dynamic -esponse is unknown ateven to the Soviets, in our estimates of Communist defensive capabilities, we have always assumed them to be -perfect so as to be defense conservative. However, they aro probably far from perfect and such experience wouldore confident judgment of survivability in time of real need.
initial reaction would be that ofmanned defenses. We would expect the Sovietsin and exploit this opportunity to calibratecapability. This would givealuablelook at the defensive capability whichfollowed both through COMINT and through thesystems carried on OXCART itself.
DATE:7
6. Utilization of OXCART over Cuba couldow-key introduction of OXCART into our ordinary reconnaissance operations, thereby signalling an upgrading of equipment used in such activities. OXCART use inituation would tend to accustom both the Communist and Free World nations to the concept of its normal use in the same role as the.
CONS:
It wouldeasurement of the OXCART radar cross section to the Cubans and Soviets, which is probably unknown to them.
Unless we flew the missions off nominal, it would allow the Cubans and Soviets to pin down the operational speed, altitude, and turning radius of OXCART, which they now know only generally,
Since we must be prepared to turn on the electronic jammers even against exercises of theystems in Cuba, it would give them an opportunity to establish the basic philosophy of the first generation ECM. The noise jammer (BIG BLAST) which works against the (FAN SONG) tracking radar Is old hat, and would reveal nothing of interest. The guidance link jammer (BLUE DOG) would reveal our insight into the Soviet command coding and our ability to override and mislead the missile guidance system. However, it shouldoted that the second and third generation jammers would not normally be flown, and therefore neither tested nor exposed to compromise.
If our estimates of the OXCART invulnerability are drastically wrong and the OXCART were brought down
in Cuba, the Soviets wouldreat deal technologically, since much of the airplane would survive its crash. However, we consider this totally unlikely.
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Original document.
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