OXCART
Yi IH!
Ccrainlst Beetrti OXCART for Reconnalssane*
to Oh ofover Cuba
Fourvo par month for tvo months Tba vehicle vould ba detected and identified
Wa think it moat likely that there would bettempt to shoot down th* aircraft, and that the Communists would elthsr make no public issue of th* matter, er would keep public controversyery low key. If thsy did smka am Issue at all, It would move likely tmke tha form of private warning to tbesjalnst us* of OXCART over th* USSR. But there are other possibilities which are Included ln ths discussion below.
1. The Borista know of th* *aist*nssS aircraft sueh as thee believe that they do not know the details of its capabilities. One virtually certain reaction to tbe flights would be for ths Soviets to us* them to main more information about the vehicle.
2. Ihe Soviets might be puxaled as t* why we were using
this vshiols at this time, for returns which would probably sot seem to titan worth the cost of revealing more of tbe aircraft's capabilities. Thsy would vender why wq chose to Inteeonce this new factor into the Cuban situation which is fulet, and ln which
or releasi
sate:7
handle via BYEMAN
control systsm only
they prebnbly consider that ve are getting all the intelligence we need from uavubllclzed aadhia* thair aaat likely interpretetlone would ha that the flighte represented eithertage in the routine replacementapability which was obseleaoeat, er (b) final trials before use of the aircraft over Berth Vietnam, over China, or even over the OBfla.
3. We think it unlikely that the Soviets (or Cubans) would attempt to shoot tbe OXCART dews with aaissile. We see no reason why the OXCART should be attacked whens not.*
a. The real Question Is whether the Soviets would deolde to aake an Issue of tbe matterublicly or privately. They sight do ao out af concern that the US was preparing to use the vshlole ever the USSR, and outesire to getssurancespublic or privaterenouncing any such use. It ia also possible that they might use it as ao ocoaslon for raising the whole question of overhead raoonnelaeance (including that byr aore ovaerally forarder linehe UB with respect to Vietnam.
5. On the whole, we think it unlikely that the Soviets would want to heat up the International situation ever this Issueif only bacause It would Involve embarrassment about
are advlaed that any such attempt against the OXCART would almost certainly be unsueceasful.
mX
OXCART
flights over Cuba, and uncertainties about how to deal with OXCART la the future. Hence we doubt that they wouldublic furor, or reopen the whole question of overhead reconnaissance. There is about an even chance that they would make private representations toarning against use of the vehicle ever the USSR.
Whatever the desires of the US and Soviet governments, something about use of this vehicle over Cube might become public, either by Cuban declaration or by leaks to the press. In such case tbe Soviets would surely declare their ability to deal with the aircraft over the USSR. If there were substantial publicity, the Soviets might feel constrained toreater issue of it; we think they would prefer not to de so.
If the vehicle came down in Cuba (which we are informed is extremely unlikely) and especially if the pilot were alive, there would certainlyreat deal of propaganda and publicity. The chances of Soviet actions along the lines mentioned above would substantially Increase] we still do not think the Soviets would create an international crisis. If the aircraft cams dawn at sea and was not recovered by Cubans, Communist reactions would probably be the same as if it had returned to its base.
OXCART
6. There It on* etherpossibility worth oanvaastng. Ths Cubans nay bs sufficiently annoyedeconnaissance, and sufflolsatly soger to doonething about It, to sales upon usa of ths OXCART as evidence that the US ltaslf hadtatic situation. They night than oensldsr that It gave them license to useissilesircraft subsequently overf Lying their oountry. Ue believe that they would net think tbe risk worth taking) it does not smka such sense from their pod at of vlewi moreover they would almost certainly be restrained by the Soviets.
FOR TiX BOARD Of NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
9- Chinese Communist and Berth Vietnamese reactions would be limited at most to propaganda if the affair became public. Both countries would doubtless expect the vehicle to be usedm, but ths Bbrth Vietnamese at least expect direct UBin any ease, we do not believe that either oountry would take the event aa evidence of US intentions to escalate war In the far East, though both might issue propaganda to this effect.
ansae! IIPIH OXCART
Original document.
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