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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
bearing on OXCART use over Cuba
PROS:
would establish and validate theof the OXCART system toefended area, in which weather
ontinuing factor.
It would confirm the reliability of the basic aircraft system.
Should they oloct to exerclso theefenses, it would provide an opportunity to try the first generation electronic jammers.
It wouldnique opportunity to test the response (detection range, handling capacity,oviet-typo air defense systemow cross section,Mach Three reconnaissance plane. This dynamic response is unknown ateven to the Soviets. In our estimates of Communist defensive capabilities, we have always assumed them to be perfect so as to be defense.conservative. However, they aro probably far from perfect and such exporlonce vouldoro confident Judgment of survivability in time of real need.
The initial reaction would be that of the Cuban-manned defenses. We would expect the Sovlots to move in and exploit this opportunity to calibrate their own capability. This would givealuable "before-and-after" look at the defensive capability which could be followed both through COMINT and through the warning/ intercept systems carried on OXCART itsolf.
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6. Utilization of OXCART over Cuba couldow-key introduction of OXCART into our ordinary reconnaissance operations, thereby signalling an upgrading of equipment used in such activities. OXCART use inituation would tend to accustom both the Communist and Free World nations to the concept of its normal use in the same role as the.
CONS:
easurement of the OXCART radarto the Cubans and Soviets, which isto them.
Unless we flew the missions off nominal, it would allow the Cubans and Soviets to pin down the operational speed, altitude, and turning radius of OXCART, which they now know only generally.
Since we must be prepared to turn on the electronic jammers even against exercises of theystems In Cuba, it would give them an opportunity to establish the basic philosophy of the first generation ECM. The noise Jammer (BIG BLAST) which works against the (FAN SONG) tracking radar is old hat, and would reveal nothing of Interest. The guidance link jammer (BLUE DOG) would reveal our insight into the Soviet command coding and our ability to override and mislead the missile guidance system. However, it should be noted that the second and third generation jammers would not normally be flown, and therefore neither tested nor exposed to compromise.
If our estimates of the OXCART invulnerability are drastically wrong and the OXCART were brought down
in Cuba, the Soviets wouldreat deal technologically, since much of the airplane would survive its crash. However, we consider this totally unlikely.
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5. Of the likely losses, the cross section and guidance link jammer would be the only significant ones. We could constrain the missions so as not to reveal these features; however, this would detract from the value of the operational validation.
6. Political considerations aro covered in Board of National Estimates Memorandum
)
Albert D. Whoelon Deputy Director for
Science and Tochnology
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