CENTRAL
AGENCY
OF RATIONAL ESTIMATES
6
KEMORAKDU'. FOR THE DKECTQR
SUBJECT: The Crisis In China
After more than eight months of turmoil and confusion the situation inside China seems to be settling down enough to permit some tentative conclusions about the near future. In the past few weeks have caused most observers to conclude that Mao is now in effective control over the party and the policies of the regime. Whatever explanation there nay be for the troubles thisew equilibrium seems to have been established in the top leadership.
There does remain, however, controversy over what happened last winter and spring when Mao was absent from view for many months
and when major party Journals took opposing positions. Although most observers believe Peng Chen fellower struggle, perhaps touched offudden illness of Mao, some believe that Peng was the victimurge organized and developed by Mao as part of tho Intensification of the "cultural revolution." Mao's
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reappearance has cade this debate less relevant to tbe current situation than It was some time ago when bla position seemed uncertain.
3. Whether Mao faltered or not,road sense all Chinese politics must be regarded aa heavily conditioned by tbe succession question. Even If Mao bao been In over-all command throughout the period, his colleagues must conduct themselvesharp eve east toward their friends and enemies. Thus, It Is plausible that Mao intended some general purification of tbe party and that tbe enemies and rivals of Peng Chen, notably Ton? Hsiao-ping, turned Mao's campaign against Peng.
Tht Top Leaders
Ibe principal casualties la addition to Peng Chen arc Lo Jul-chiog (armed forces chief of staff and probable head of the secretu Tiog-yl (party secretary and chief of the party's propagandahou Yang (deputy director oft well as leaser figures in the party propaganda and control apparatus and scow military officials whone status ls ln doubt. Ibe four top leaders under Mao have emerged unscathed, though their relative power position la open to speculation. Teng Hslao-plng, as general secretary, gains as tbe result of tbe removaltrong
rival, Peng Chen. Lin Ploo gains because of the unusual publicity associating his name with tbe cultural purge. Chou En-lal baa not been hurt, and may have stayed aloof from the troubles Last spring. Liu Shao-chl remains the nominal number two man, though be may have suffered some loss because of the strengthening of Teng and
Lin.
one member of Mao's "brainhou Tang,another member, Chen Po-ta, has been named to leadrevolution." ewcomer to the party center is Tooof the Central-South Regional Bureau, and nowTing-yi on the secretariat and as propaganda director.
Teh Chlen-ylog also moves onto tbe secretariat, the firstmilitary officer in that groupew balance of power under Mao thus appears to be taking shape, but its details are not yet clear.
of all this comes one clear Implication for thelong-standing stability of tbe Chinese leadership has Whoever did what to whom, there must now exist deepand mistrust within the Chinese party from top to bottom.
Tbe chanceeaceful and orderly succession to Lul Shao-chl oraoist "collective" appears greatly lessened. The party leadership will live under the threat of on increaalngly suspicious
Mao, or in the tense expectationicious contest for power as he fades away. Thus, we areeriod of much greater uncertainty in discussing future developments in China.
Iatercal Policy
is possible that current campaigns such as themay fade away or even be abruptly reversed. Theybeen intended primarily to mask the collapse of Mao'swinter, and to justify the disgrace of Important officials.
But in view of Mao's apparently revived vigor, hla profoundly revolutionary cast of mind, and indicators of at least temporary stability in the leadership, current policy statements should be given considerable credence, with allowance for the usualand ideological overtones always present in Chinese official pronouncements.
society la probably in for continued massivepolitical indoctrination, with eophasis on the cult of Maoin cocnand." The effectopulation already weary
of propaganda will be increased apathy and resentment. Support for the regime will further weaken as the policy of substituting exhortation for material incentives Is pushed.
intellectuals are almost certainly in for angoing over than they have had over recent years. The regime
strongholds, and ia probably movingweeping "reform" of tbe educational system, an action of potential long-range significance. More than any other group,ill reaent the ludicrous extremes of the campaign and the hypocritical role they have to play in it. Already sufferinghronic ahortage of technicians, China may now face declining productivity and cooperation from its limited stable of trained specialists. Moreover, the effect of putting "politics in command" ia to subordinate technicians and scientists to the politicians, one of tbe reasons for the colossal failure of the Leap Forward.
10. Despite the apparent equilibrium io the top leadership, tbe entire party and government apparatus Is nevertheless probablytate of confusion and apprehension, and it is difficult to see how effective political leadership or economic management can develop in such an atmosphere. As for the military, the campaign has eliminated at least the armed forces chief of staff and secret police chief Lo Jui-cblng. Others, military leaders not identified, may have fallen. But the effect on the military ia not clear. If the disruptive "cultural revolution" is pushed hard, then It could be that such notions as learning to fly better cry studying Mao more and flying less willoll on the morale and competence of the professionals. On the other hand, Lo Jul-chlng appear* to have
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been replaced cm the party secretariatrofessional military officer, Yeh Chlen-ylng, which suggests that the military may still be spared the worst excesses of Mao's new campaign.
U. It Is also en open question bow far the radlegalization in the cultural and educational spheres will extend into economic policy. There have been recent high level statements about another "leap forward." But these could be part of the polemics against the anti-party group who allegedly attacked the last Great Leap. In any case, while wc would notepetition of the extremes of tbe original Leap Forward, any sharp step-up in the pace could be disastrous for an economy still recovering from the excesses of the first leap. Hot only are food supplies more vulnerable now, but diversion of scarce resources to the military programs has left the economy with little resiliency for absorbing inept In the rural economy* for instance, abolition of the private plots mightogical outgrowth of the present political campaign. If so, this would severely cripple food output.
Foreign Policy
12. It is possible, of course,adical turn of internal affairs could spread to foreign policy. Most observers, however, think the opposite is the more likely. With Internal affairs in flux
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and deraandiog greater energies and attention, It might be prudent for the regime toertain equilibrium abroad, lent foreign developments Intrude on Internal programs. Recenthat tba main enemies are Internal onesseems to point ln this direction.
13. Ihe Vietnamese varbviously the touchstone for testing whether Chinese foreign policy has been affected by internal troubles. There are no signs of change in tbe Intransigent Chinese position. Most observers agree, however, that in general the internal crisis serves to reduce the chances of Chinese intervention ln Vietnam. Chinese reaction to US bombing of NVN's POL sites seems to bear out this estimate. It ia significant that in the wake of tbe new bombings the Chinese have reiterated the old line that, while socialist countries must support Hanoi, the main burden of the war must be borne by the Vietnamese themselves. And this reaction came after tbe time when the leadership situation seemed to have stabilized.
la. Horth Vietnamese-Chinese relations, however, have become more complicated. Hanoi has moved, despite Peking'seutral position between Peking and Moscow. And the NFLSV has followed suit. It may ba significant that this "centrist" course was first denounced by the very man, Teog Hsiao-ping, who many think is one of tha principal architects and beneficiaries
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Id the political crisis in Peking. ehement antl-Soviet linetriking feature of current denunciation of the Chinese "anti-party" group. Ho Chi Minh probably visited Peking In secret, at least once, to find out first-hand what the implications are for Hanoi.
15. As for Sino-Soviet relations, it seems highly unlikely that Peking will soften Itsoviet line. Indeed, there has been an intensification of Chinese attacks on the USSR recently, taking the particular form of charges of US-Soviet "collusion" regarding Vietnam.
ABBOT SMITH Acting Chairman
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
Original document.
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