THE CRISIS IN CHINA

Created: 7/15/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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FOR TEE DIRECTOR SUBJECT: The Crisis In China

1. After acre than eight months of turmoil and confusion the situation inside China seems to be settling down enough to permit some tentative conclusions about the near future. in the past few weeks have caused most observers to conclude that Mao is now in effective control over the party and the policies of the regime. Whatever explanation there may be for tbe troubles thisew equilibrium seems to have been established in tho top leadership.

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2* There does remain, however, controversy over what happened last winter and spring when Mao was absent from view for many months end when major party Journals took opposing positions. Although coot observers believe Peng Chen fellower struggle, perhaps touched offudden Illness of Mao, some believe that Peng wan tho victimurge organized and developed by Mao as part of the intensification of the "cultural revolution." Mao's

reappearance has made this debate less relevant to the current situation than It was scese tine ago when hla position seemed uncertain.

3. Whether Kao faltered or not.road sense all Chinese politics oust be regarded as heavily conditioned by the succession question. Even if Mao bac been in over-all command throughout the period, his colleagues must conduct themselvesharp eye cast toward their frlenda and enemies. Thus, It is plausible that Mao intended some general purification of tbe party and that the enemies and rivals of Peng Chen, notably Teng Hsiao-ping, turned Mao's campaign against Peng.

The Top Leaders

*. The principal casualties in addition to Peng Chen are Lo Jul-chlng (armed forces chief of staff and probable head of tbe secretu Tlng-yi (party secretary and chief of the party's propagandahou Tang (deputy director ofs well as lesser figures in the party propaganda and control apparatus and some military officials whose status Is ln doubt. The four top leaders under Kao hove emerged unscathed, though their relative power position is open to speculation. Teng Bslao-ping, as general secretary, gains an the result of tbe removaltrong

rival, Peng Cben. Lin Plao galea because of the unusual publicity associating bis name with the cultural purge. Chou En-lai haa not been hurt, and may have stayed aloof from tbe troubles last spring. Liu Shao-chi remains the nominal number two man, though he cay have suffered some loss because of the strengthening of Teng and Lin.

5- While one member of Mao's "brainhou Tang, woo purged, another member, Chen Po-ta, has been named to lead the "cultural revolution." ewcomer to the party center is Tao Chu, chairman of the Central-South Regional Bureau, and now replacing Lu Tiag-yi on the secretariat end as propaganda director-Teh Chiea-ying also moves onto the secretariat, tbe firstmilitary officer In that groupew balance of power under Mao thus appears to be talcing shape, but its details are cot yet clear.

6. Out of all this cooes one clear implication for the future. The long-standing stability of the Chinese leadership has bcea obaken. Whoever did what to whom, there must now exist deepand mistrust within the Chinese party from top to bottom. The chanceeaceful end orderly succession to Lul Shao-chi oraoist "collective" appears greatly lessened. The party leadership will live under tbe throat of an increasingly suspicious

Mao, or ia the tonne expectationicious content for power as he fades away. Thus, we areeriod of ouch greater uncertainty in discussing future developments in China.

Internal Policy

7> It is possible that current campaigns such as the "cultural revolution" nay fade sway or even be abruptly reversed. They may have been intended primarily to task the collapse of Mao's control last winter, and to Justify the disgrace of important officials. But ln view of Meo's apparently revived vigor, his profoundly revolutionary cast of mind, and indicators of at leaBt temporary stability ln the leadership, current policy statements should be given considerable credence, with allowance for the usualand ideological overtones always present in Chinese official

6. Chinese society Is probably in for continued bsbbIvc doees of political indoctrinatloa, with emphaels on tbe cult of Moo eod "politics in command." Tho effectopulation already weary of propaganda will be Increased apathy aad resentment. Support for the regime will further weaken as the policy of substituting exhortation for material incentives is pushed.

9* The intellectuals are almost certainly in for an even heavier going over than they have bad over recent years. Ibe regime

has already pinpointed colleges aad universities as bourgeois strongholds, and Is probably movingweeping "reform" of the educational system, an action of potential long-range significance. More than any other group, intellectuals will resent the ludicrous extremes of the campaign and tbe hypocritical role they have to play in It. Already sufferinghronic shortage of technicians, China may now face declining productivity and cooperation from its limited stable of trained specialists. Moreover tha effect of putting "politics la command" Is to subordinate technicians and scientists to tbe politicians, one of theor the colossal failure Of tbe Leap Forward.

10. Despite the apparent equilibrium in the top leadership, the entire party and government apparatusevertheless probablytate of confusion and apprehension, and it le difficult to see how effective political leadership or economic management can develop ln such an atmosphere. Aa for the military, tbe campaign has eliminated at least tbe armed forces chief of staff and secret police chief Lo Jul-co-tag. Others, military leaders cot identified, may have fallen. But tbe effect on tbe military is not clear. If the disruptive "cultural revolution" ia pushed hard, then it could be that such notions as learning to fly better try studying Moo more and flying less willoll on the morale and competence of the professionals. On the other hand, Lo Jul-chlng appears to have

In tbe political crisis in Peking. ehement anti-Soviet linetriking feature of current denunciation of the Chinese "anti-party" group. Bo Chi Minn probably visited Peking in secret, ot least once, to find out first-hand vhat the Implications are for Hanoi.

15. As for Sloo-Soviet relations, it seems highly unlikely that Peking will soften itsoviet line. Indeed, there has been an intensification of Chinese attacks on the USSR recently, taking the particular form of charges of US-Soviet "collusion" regarding Vietnam.

ABBOT SMITH Acting Choi man

OARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Original document.

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