CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCX
6
KEWjFAHDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Implications of tbe Current Cabinet Criols In South Vietnam
Tbe current cabinet crisis derives from
an unfortunate meshing of two of tho major divisive factors
which have long cccplicated political life In South Vietnam
regional rivalries and the Issue of civilian versus military t
control. It does notav development, bat Barely the first significant manifestation of these furri mental maladies since the September elections. It will not be tha last.
seven cabinet ministers (outho havetheir resignations are all of Southern (CochinChinese)
hird major divisive Influence is religion which Is not yet openly Involved in the crisis j but should the crisis drag on, religious animosities and political Jockeying among tha various religious groups could readily cone Into play.
origin and are civilians.* shay share the general southern antipathy toward the northern "carpet-baggers" who dominate the ky government and the military establishment. they also suspect that the military leadership will not fulfill its pledgeransition,ivilian government. the visits of various ovn leaders (in particular those of police director, general nguyen ngoc loan) to military-dominated south korea adds fuel to southern suspicions. with this backdrop of traditionalthe heavy-handed action byortherner, in arresting an acting cabinet ministerallying-point for the southern ministers. they began to pressure ky and to charge that loan was attempting topolice state." moreover, the imminence of the manila conference gave then an advantageous moment to bring pressure on ky. the ministers assumed that ky would be eager to avoid any political crisis before thein particular one involving tbe issue of civilian-military relations which the us considers crucial to the "other war" in vietnam.
the exact status of these ministers is unclear. ky has said that they have agreed to remain at their posts until after the manila6 october). nonetheless, the resignation statements have appeared in the press after the ministers supposedly agreed to stay on, and tbe statements at least appear unequivocal.'
It Is also likely that General Deng Van Quang (IV Corps Cccrnander) and perhaps General Nguyen Hun Co (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War) are involved behind the scenes in the challenge to Ky's regime. Both men are Southerners. More important, they have strong personal reasons to oppose Xy: both men are prime candidates to be removed from their posts for corruption.
k. in any event,ortherner (Tonkinese) andman, is almost certainly the ultimate target ofalthough the ministers have acrupuouelyKy personally. Instead they have aimed theirthose close to Ky, particularly Loan, hood of thesecurity organizations; but also at General LeHI Corps and Marino Commander; Bui Diem, Secretaryfor Foreign Affairs; and Dinh Trinh Chlnh, Secretaryto tho Primemen ara all Northerners.
Because they command the security forces in the Saigon area. Loan and Khang provide much of the physical protection for the Ky regime. Should Ky be obliged to remove these men, his power base and prestige would be seriously weakened.
be crisis has already done some damage to Ky's image. Regardless of the immediate outcome of the crisis, Ky will go to Manila with hie domestic housetate of sane public disarray.
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Onere has already been adverse foreign publicity on this score, and tne heavy press coverage of the proceedings in Manila will engender more. In South Vietnam, the crisis has helped dim the glow left hy the successful September election. It also has publicly raised the issue of civilian-military conflict. This will have reverberations in the Constituent Assembly where thereizeable and vocal bloc of Southern delegates, the most notable and most vocal being Tran Van Van, who may he working covertly with the dissidents.
6. Implications. The crisis can almost certainly not be resolved before the Manila Conference, and the best that can be looked for ia its deferral until after the Manila Conference.eferral would put tho best face on an embarrassing problem at Manila and night allow things to simmer down in Saigon. On previous occasions, Ky has been adroit at fashioning conpromises which have at least temporarily tended to placate the contending elements. If no compromise can be reached this time, or if Ky is compelled to meet the problem head on, he has two alternatives: o accept the cabinet resignations, oro sack or substantially curb Loan.
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If Ky does accept the resignations, it vouldlow to civilian-military relations and would further exacerbate regional rivalries. There wouldhorus of unfavorable publicity In the foreign press. To lessen the impact ofove, Ky would probably try to replace the ministers with other Southernera. Be could probably do so, and this would help, lievertheless, there wouldow round of anti-OVN statements, charges of "militarynd the like. Some of the firebrand Southerners in -Uie Assembly might resign in protest. In these circumstances, there might be seme street demonstrations and the militant Buddhists might strikeemporary alliance with sane Catholic Southern elements.
8. ove by Ky to drop Loan could cause more immediate and serious problems. Ky realizes this and has said that he will not fire Loon, though like all decisions in South Vietnam, this is probably not Irreversible. As director of the two major security organizations. Loanower In his own right. he is the foremost figure in the loose grouping of young, hard-line officers collectively called the "Baby Turks." Loon's removal vould raisespectre of reneued military factionalism which has not seriously plagued the GVU since the removal of General Thi last spring. Moreover, Ky has confidence in Loan,
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whoajor role In upholding the GVN In ita recent victory over the militant Buddhists. Inove against Loan, Ky vould he avare that this vould only temporarily appease the exposition elements and only vhet -the Southerners1 appetite for more concessions. Loan's removal under pressure vould weaken Ky in the eyes of all concerned.
9. On the whole, the best thing that could happen would be that the crisis not comeinal head before Manila and that after Manila it can he settledompromise or at leastot overly disruptive showdown. The worst that could happen wouldhattering of the unity among the military. At present andong time to come, military support, and probably predominance as well, is essential for any regime in South Vietnam.
SHERMAN KENT Chairman
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
Original document.
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