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tBj LIBRARY Document # f
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
6
SECURITY CONDITIONS IN FIVE COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by (bo UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated overleaf
6 DATE .
FOR RELEASE
4
NOTE: This is the estL-nete. No further version will he published.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the HSA, and the FBI
Concurring:
Dr. B. J. Smith, Acting CIA Member of USIB
Mr.enney, Jr. for The Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Marshall S- Carter, Director, national
Security Agency Mr. William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director,Federal
Bureau of Investigation Mr- Welter B- Young, for the Director, United States
Secret Service
Abstaining:
Mr> Howard C- Brown,ssistant General Manager
Atomic Energy Commission, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USEH USED SEPARATELY
WARBIHG
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws,SC,nd 7Sk, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
CENTRAL IDTELLIOEBCB AGENCY
SUBJECT: SECURITY CONDTTIOflSIVE CXXOTIES
OF THE WESTERfl PACIFIC AREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the likelihood of incidents which would endanger President Johnson during his visits to Australia, Rew Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea.
THE ESTIMATE
1. Australia and New Zealand. The security situations in Australia and Hew Zealand are roughly similar. Both countries are in tho final weeksational election campaign In which Vietnan is one of the principal issues. In both countries, students, intellectuala, leftists, ana others have demonstrated against participation in the war. Sonc of these demonstrations
xcluded fron automatic downgrading and ceclas sificat ion
have Involved as manyeople, but they have been peaceful. Both countries are lllwly to peralt some demonstrations at the time of the President's visit.
The pollco ond security agencies of both Australia and Hew Zealand are well-trained and competent. In close cooperation withfficials, they will take all possible precautions todemonstrators and will probably be able to prevent anyvhlch might endanger President Johnson. Their problems vlll be mode sore rana/jcable by the generally high regard for the US which prevails anonc the people of both countries.
Thailand. The great majority of Thai people ore loyal to their government, particularly the Crown, and favorably disposed toward the US and its role in defense of South Vietnam. Tho small-scale Communist insurgencies in northeast Thailand and In the south have had virtually no lepoct on the security situationbe indigenous Thai Communist Party is outlawed and, in any case, probably has fewerembers and would be incapabla of mounting any significant demonstration against the President. Even among students and Intellectuals, there is little overt ant1-US sentiment In Thailand. Any demonstration attempted by these or other potentially dissident elements would probably not attract
noreandful of participants and could be controlled easily by Thai security forces.
k. Thai security forces in the Bangkok area are fairly well-trained, their domestic Intelligence capabilities are good, and they would round up potential troublenaJiero if it seeced prudent. There are close relationships between the Thai security forces and US officials in Thailand and the Thai will cooperate to take precautions to prevent any incident which night endanger the President. The National Police (including its CentralDepartment and the Metropolitan Police) will have the primary responsibility for security during the President's visit to Bangkok. On any occasion in which the King participates, the wen-trained elite Royal Guard will share responsibility. If considered necessary, the security forces would bo augmented by major units f the Thai Armed Forces stationed nearby. He believe that Thai security forces will be able toituation in Bangkok which would jeopardize the President's safety.
5. Security at US bases in northeast Thailand is the responsibility of special Thai units, armed and supplied by the US but under Thai command, and stationed on and around the bases. These bases are close to the operational areas of
armed Thai Coamiunist dissidents, The Thai security guards may he infiltrated "by Communist agents. Thougli none of the bases has yet been attacked by the Thai insurgents. It Is possible that terrorists with advance information on the President's destination would attempt sabotageinor armedortar attack, on the base he visits.
6. Malaysia. Kaloy3iaeak but vocal leftwing opposition which strongly opposes US policy in Vietnaia. Pro-Communist, ethnic Chinese youths from this opposition constitute the principal security problem in Kuala Lumpur. Over the past year, small groups of them have damaged US property and engaged in noisy demonstrations against US officials. It is likely that these same extremists will use the occasion of the President's visit to attempt once more to show their hostility, and small-scale sporadic demonstrations will probably occur.
T. Malaysian security officials will detainand other extremists who might have access to Kualathe President's visit. Security during the visit willresponsibility of the Royal Malaysian Policeand experienced force with specializedtotaling several thousand man with intensive training in
riot control. ilice nco funotione of the BMPoncentrated in its Special Branchre highly developed; there ia an axcollent capability for swift rcapoase to foot-breaking situations. Tho BMP vill cooperate closely withfficials and ve believe that It will be able to prevent any situation that will jeopardise the President's safety. We believe, furthermore, that it will prevent any large demonstrations and keep any small demonstrations from getting out of hand.
8. South Korea. There is little overt opposition In South Korea to US policy in Vietnam. Under the vigorously enti-Ccwmuniot Pak government, of course, such opposition would be suppressed. Mare important, it would probably be unpopular; cost South Koreans clearly approve of US military intervention in defense af spall Asian nations. There is much less certainty, however, that South> Koreans approve President Pak's heavy cocmitaent of HOC combat troops to the conflict. Bis leading political opponents chargo him with weakening tho notion's defenses; more vehement critics charge that he ia bartering Korean bodies for US dollarscrieo of shady duals. Such charges have failed to sparkpublic opposition to tho government; nor has the generally favorable Korean attitude toward the US been impaired. We believe
therefore that President Johnson, when ho viaits Seoul, willriendly reception fron most South Koreans.
la possible, however, that Pak's politicalstimulato araall demonstrations in connection withvisit in order to cause the Pok rjnrernment to losetactics ore traditional in Korean politics; moreover,leaders ore currently engagedo-holds-barredto discredit Pok. It is unlikely, however, thatleaders, most of whom seek US friendship anddeliboratoly endanger President Johnson In the coursedemonstrations or other antics.
any case, ve believe that South Korean security forces
available In the Seoul area would be capable of controlling any
hostile dooonstratlon andituation which would
jeopardize tho safety of President Johnson. The national Police,
who willajor shore of the reopensIbllity for the visitors'
safety, are tough and experienced In croud control. So are the
ROKt indents pexnanently assienod to internal security
duties in the Seoul area. Intelligence orconizationsthe ROK
I In the only previous comparable visit, the public reception of President Eisenhower0 was so enthusiastic that the Preeldential motorcade bod to bo rerouted to avoid the crouda.
Central Intelligence Acency and tho ROK Array Counter Intelligence Corpsaxe efficient and cooperative with their OS counterparts. They will probably round up known troublemakers and issue stem warnings in appropriate political and student circles.
Vhilo there have always been some north Korean agents In tho Seoul area, their missions have not involved deliberate violence but rather intelligence collection and recruitment.
In the eventresidential visit to OS military bases north of Seoul, ROK forces would probably share securitywith OS military forces. In view of the generally secure conditions prevailing in this area, we do not believe thatisit would involve any significant risk to tho President.
13- General. In none of those five countries con wo exclude the possibility of an assassination attempt, for exampleoncur*lot or psychopath.
Original document.
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