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-POLiriCIALS.THE FOLLOW ING POINTS-
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GOVERNMENT campaign of the budohist HONKSnOf THEIfi LEAOWi ;'; %
permeated by FORMER
! AMD COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS, THE majority OF WW areIXLR1 ,WLUWCtEAS OP INTERNAL POLICY
ACETS of LIFE IN BURMA HAVE BEEN AFFECTED iY THE RGUB'S INEPT AND INEFFICIENT MTOrtOOS OF ECOMOHIC OISTRIWTIW.
i-fi'.ihsuwihcr continued IN many PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.
lSPI"WWSPONSIVE TO the.*
MOVEMENTS BY WELL-KNOWN BURMESEl HAUNC AND BO YANKAI HQ HERE UNDER
in's most CRITICAL PROBLEM'i'-OCATIOII THAT THE WYTRNMiHT'S ECWOHICUWW- AS ESTIMATED THAT NE WIN MOST NEEDS TIM TO ACCOMPLISH THESE ECONOMIC REFORMS EFFECTIVELY "
WDOEW REMOVAL THROUGH'ASSASSINATION.ULD WWW BURMAHAOTIC SITUATION./
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problems even more fundamental thau distribution, such as low industrial capacity togetherack of public response to he win's demands for increased productivity in both industrialagricultural sectors. shortages will continue to be filt throughout burma, however, in their subsistance economy, thearmers and peasants may be less affected thau urban residents v- ahd will probably manage to survive without too much difficulty vano despair- however, the maldistribution problems couldufficient effect upon residents cf rangoon to generatethat could possibly lead to occasional outbursts of
STATES, BUT THEY PROBABLY WILL MAVE LITTLE EFFECT IN THE LONG RUN. AT LEAST ONE-THIRD OF BURMA /ID MILLION OFILLIC BURMESE/ IS ih THE GRIP OF ACTIVE INSURGENCY AND HOT RESPONSIVE TO OR IN FAVOR OF THE RGUB. THERE ARE0 ACTIVE INSURGENTS /KARENS, SHANS, KACMINS, CHINS, KHT IRREGULARS.
'j' insurgency continued unabated. despite extensive army clearing operations in the north inhe army isshall civic action programs in the wa and kokang
tates. but they probably will mave little effect in the lok_at least one-third of burma /io million ofillion
CCMt'UrilSTS/ MHO SUCCEED IN TIEING DOWN LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE ARMY IN DAILY SKIRMISHES. IN ADDITION TO THE ETHNIC INSURGENTS, WHITE -FLAG AND RED FLAG GUERRILLAS CONTINUE THEIREUS ACTIVITY. THEIR NUMBERS HAVE GROWN DURING THE PAST YEAR TO THE POINT WHERE THE WHITE FLAG STRENGTH IS ESTIMATEDOO AMD THE RED FLAG. THE WHITE FLAG INSURGENTS IH PARTICULAR ARE WELL TRfilllEO, DISCIPLINED AND VERY ACTIVE IN THE ECONOMICALLY VITAL IRRAWAODY . OELTA AREA. IH THE VIEW OF BURMESE SECURITY OFFICIALS, THE WHITE FLAGSOST SERIOUS THREAT BECAUSE THEY ARE INHIBITING THE DELIVERY OF RlCE FOR BOTH INTERNAL CONSUMPTION AND FOR EXPORT. HE WIN FEELS FULLY JUSTIFIEO IN STRONG MILITARY MEASURES BECAUSE HE CONSIDERS THAT THE BULK OF THE INSURGENTS EXHIBITEO NOTHING BUT BAD FAITH3 WHEN THEY BROKE OFF THE PEACE TALKS WHICHNITIATED. THE KAREN ALLIANCE OF SAW HUNTER THA HMWE WITH THE RGUB SHOWS SIGHS OF WEAKENING, AND THERE IS MO INDICATION THAT AN ALL-UNION CONGRESS Of NATIONALITIES WILL EVER BE HELD TO UNITE BURMA. HE WIN IS UNCOMPROMISING IH HIS VIEW THAT THERE WILL BE NO AUTONOMY FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES. YET INSURGENCY, INCLUDING COMMUNISTAJOR OBSTACLE TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERGRATION
ALTHOUGH HE WIN HAS SAIO HE ISOMMUHIST, HE KNOWINGLY HARBORS WITHIN HISIDE ASSORTMENT OF REVOLUTIONARIES, LEFTISTS, EX-WHITE FLAG INSURGENTS AND COMMUNIST INTELLECTUALS. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE RGUB AS CIVILIAN OFFICERS OH SPECIAL DUTY /OSD'S/ IH POLICY MAKING AHD ACMINISTRATIVE ASSIGNMENTS. IH ADDITION, THESE LEFTISTS PRETTY WELL MAKE UP THE . BRAIN TRUST OF THE BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY, IT CAHNOT HOW BE STATED THAT AMY OF THESE LEFTISTS ARE UNDER DIRECT COMMUNISTAND ACT1HG WITH THE ORDERS OF BURMESE OR FOREIGN COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, THEY ARE CLEARLY IN POSITIONS TO BRIHG THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR OH THE DEVELDPMfNT Of THE RGUB PROGRAMS AND THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HEAVY DOSES OF MARXIST LEFTISM IN THE DSPP. THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO PREVTHT MODERATION, PARTICULARLY IN MARXIST ECONOMIC HATTERS APPLIED IH THISUMBER OF THEM ARE EXPERIENCED POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WHO COULD fORM THE NUCLEUSEFTIST PCWER GRAB SHOULD HE WIN DEPART THE SCENE WITHOUT HAVING ARRANGE0 FOR AN ORDERLY SUCCESSION.
ALTHOUGH HE WIH SWIFTLY DISPOSED OFOMMUNIST POLITICAL THREATS WHEN HE JAILEO HOIIKS, POLITICIANS. PLUS AUNG GYIAUNC, THEREEW POTENTIAL THREAT. SINCEEWS**
CONFOrWTTAL SO FOREIGN DISSQ!
Tltyil'AND MILITARY MOVEMENT WAS ADVERTISEDTHt NATIOMAL LIBERATION ARMY, SPONSORED BY BO YAKHAINC. MEMBER Of THE THIRTY COMRADES, AMD KAREN BRIGADIER KYA DOE. THIS GROUP ESCAPED TO .HAILAND IN JUNE TO SETASE OF OPERATIONS ANOUERRILLA ARMY MUCH WOULD RE-ENTER BURMA AND UNSEAT HE WIN. BO TANKAING IS KNOWN TO BE ACTIVELY SEEKING THAI AND/OR KMT SUPPORT, BUT WttT HE PROBABLY DESIRES. SUPPORT FOR HIS MOVEMENT, ITASCENT FORCE AT THE MOMENT AND WOULO APPEAR OESTINED TO ACHIEVE LITTLE UNLESS SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL SUPPORT IS AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, IF THAT SUPPORT IS FORTHCOMING, IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT FROM KAREN AND HON DISSIDENT GROUPS THE NATIONAL LIBERATIONMENT CANIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF INSURGENTS.
"*DESPITE THE LARGE NUMBER OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS IN BURMA, HE WIN UNQUESTIONABLY REMAINS IN FIRM CONTROL. THERE CERTAINLT LMOST COMPLETE LOYALTY IH THE DEFENSE SERVICES. TO BE SURE. THERE ARE EXAMPLESLOYALTY, SUCH AS SOLDIERS WHO GO ANOL AND DESERTIONS AND RESIGNATIONS CF SOME ANGLO-BURMAHS WHCH THE RGUB ;NO LONGER TRUSTS. BY ANO LARGE, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT THE DEFENSE SERVICES ARE FIRMLY BEHIND THE GOVEIWHTKT, THEIR MEMBERS DO ENJOT AN IMPROVED STATUS AS THE RULING AND GUIDING CLASS OF /BURMA, BUT PRIVATELY THERE IS PROBABLY SOME DISAGREEMENTSFFICERS AS TO WHETHER THE ARMY SHOULD BE SO EXTENSIVELY IHVOLVEO IN CIVILIAN EFFORTS. SOME GENUINELY FEEL THAT THEIR LACK OF
SALIFICATION FOR CIVILIAN DUTIES AND THE RESULTANT MISMANAGEMENT EMBARRASSING TO THE MILITARY.
THE BURMESE SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY IS THE VEHICLEHICH NE WIN HOPES TO CONSOLIDATE THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM. THE BSPP IS ALSO APPARENTLY INTENDEO TO BE THE EVENTUAL SUCCESSOR TO THE BURMA ARMY AS THE MASS POWER BASE OF THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT. .SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE BSPPREATURE, CREATED ANOBY THE RGUB. ITS CADRE CONSISTS PRIMARILY Of MILITARY OFFICERSEW CAREFULLY CHOSEN CIVILIANS. NO EXPERIENCED ROUP NE WIN DISTRUSTS ANO DISLIKES, ARETS AFFAIRS. ATTEMPTS TO WISH THE BSPP ROLE IN THE BURMESE WAY TO OCIALISM, SUCH AS ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS COUNCILS AND PEASANTS COUNCILS UNDER PARTY AUSPICES. HAVE NOT PROGRESSEO FAR BETOND THEPLANNING ANO PUBLICITY STAGE. THE BSPP HAS BEEN USEDHANNEL FOR INDOCTRINATING THE PUBLIC IN THE NEW DOCTRINE OF BURMESE SOCIALISM, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THIS INDOCTRINATION HAS BEEN IN SUM. SOKELETON HAS BEEN CREATED BUTS LITTLE FLESH ON THE BONES.
. PART II THE FUTURE
THE CURRENT ISOLATED POSITION OF WESTERN OBSERVERS TODAY MAKES IT OIFFICULT TO JUOGE ACCURATELY AND MEASURE CURRENTuin rriNliTIOHS NEVERTHELESS, BASED ON AVAILABLE INFORMATION,m?ELY THAT TWELVE MONTHS FROM NOW NE WIN WILLSeR KIhOWILL HOT APP.AR TO BE TOO MUCH hmm FROM THE HAY IT IS NOW. THE CAST OF CHARACTERS SUPPORTING tit WIN MAY UNDERGO SOME CHANGES IN THE IIEXT TWELVE MONTHS THERE IS ASELUCTANCE TO BLAME THE PRECIPITATE NATIONALISATION OF BUSINESS AW ABSURDLY COLLECTIVIZED DISTRIBUTION"STEMS FOR THE PRESENT ECONOMICL^ni PERIODIC SEARCHESCAPEGOAT. IT IS LIKELT THAT THI!
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WILL COHTIHUf, WITH INDIVIDUALS BEING HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ECONOMIC FAILURES WITHIN BURMA WHICH COULO BE FAR MORE LOGICALLY LAID TO THE SYSTEN WHICH HAS BEEN RAPIDLY IMPOSEO. AT PRESENT, THERE ARE INOICATIOHS THAT SOME INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE BURMESE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ARE GROWING RESTIVE UNDER PUBLIC CRITICISM '- RESULTING FROM THE MALD1STRI8UTIOH OF GOODS. SOMEFFICERS AT THE LIEUTENANT COLON EL LEVEL ARE REPORTED TO BE SUGGESTING THAT THE RADICALLY INCLINED ADVISERS CLOSE TO NE WIN WHO HAVE BEEN THE AUTHORS OF BURMA'S CHAOTIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BE CIRCUMSCRIBEO OR REMOVED. HE WIN APPEARS TO BE RESISTING THESE SUGGESTIONS BUT CONTINUED LACK OF PROGRESS ON THERONT WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR MIGHT CAUSE HIM TO SACRIFICE CHE OR TWO OF THIS MORE RADICAL ADVISERS, THE MOST PROMINENT Of WHOM ARE BA NYEIN AND TIN PE. HE WIH IS RELUCTANT TO REMOVE SUCH MEN FROMINCE ME KNOWS AND TRUSTS THEM, AND THEY ARE TIRELESS WORKERS. NE WIN HAS JAILED MUCH OF THE ECONOMIC EXPERTISE IN BURMA, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE HANY FORMER BUSINESSMEN, NOW SIDELINED THROUGHON WHOM HE COULD CALL IF HE DECIOED TO DE-EMPHASIZE THE RADICAL SOCIALISM HE HAS HERETOFORE EMPLOYED. THERE ARE NO SIGNS OFREND, HOWEVERM E-EMPHASIS, IF IT COMES AT ALL, WILL COME SLOWLY AND THE COMING YEAR WILL PROBABLY NOT SEE MORE THAN THE DEMOTION OF SOME ADVISERS HOW CLOSE TO NE WIN. .
AN ORGANIZED COUP AIMED AT REMOVING NE WIN FROH POWER SEEMS AH UNLIKELY PROSPECT WITHIN THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. HOWEVER, IF OUP DIO OCCUR, IT COULO ONLY BE MOUNTED SUCCESSFULLY BY ELEMENTS OF BURMA'S HILITARY FORCES. AS NOTED ABOVE, HINTS OF HILITARY DISSATISFACTION ARE BEGINNING TO BE NOTICEABLE BUT THE DISSATISFACTIOH APPEARS NOT TO BE OIRECTED AGAINST NE WIN BUT AGAINST HIS RADICAL. .
A SOMEWHAT MORE CONCEIVABLE CONTINGENCY ARISING DURING THE NEXT YEAR WOULD BE THE ASSASSINATION OF HE WIH. /THE ASSASSINATION OF AUNG SANRAGIC AND SENSELESS PRECEDENT/. IF SUCH AN UNHOPED-FOR EVENTUALLY OCCURRED, THE MILITARY. SUODLNL" RENDERED LEADERLESS, WOULD PROBABLYULING JUNTA. UNTA WOULD BE TEMPORARY AT BESTOWER STRUGGLE AMONG THE TOP HILITARY LEAOERS WOULD PROBABLY ENSUE. TRUGGLE COULD LEADERIOD OF PROLONGED INSTABILITY WHICH WOULDIGNAL FOR THE SOVIETS AND CHIHESE TO TRY TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE OVER SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS THROUGH OSD'S ANO OTHER AGENTS OF SUBVERSION NOW IN PLACE WITHIN THE RGUB. IF HE WIN WERE TO BE REMOVED FROH OWER THROUGH ASSASSINATION, THE PUBLIC WOULD EXPECT THE RELEASEU AND OTHER POLITICIANS. THOSE HILITARY OFFICERS IHHEQIATELY SUCCEEDING HE WIN, WHO ARE PROBABLY MUCH LESS POLITICALLY CONFIDENT THAN THE GENERAL, MIGHTARGE-SCALE RELEASE OF DETAINEES IN RESPONSE TO THIS DEMAND. /POSSIBILITIES ATTENDANT TO THE SUDDEN ASSASSINATION OF NE WIN AND THE RELEASEU ARE MYRIAD AND ARE NOT DEALT WITH IN THIS PAPER/.
ONE FACTOR WHICH WOULD AMELIORATE THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF NE'WIN'S ASSASSINATION WOULD BE HIS PRIOR DESIGNATIONUCCESSOR. IT IS NOT KNOWN IFUCCESSOR HAS BEEN HAMED. NE WIN'S REMOVAL WOULD, HOWEVER, PROBABLY PRESENT SUCH POLITICAL EXILES AS BRIGADIERS MAUNG MAUNG AND AUNG SHWE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO BURMA. IF BRIGADIER AUNG GYI, REPORTED TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT IH THE BURMA ARMY, WERE RELEASED, HE MIGHTIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN SUCCESSOR GOVERHHENTS.
HE WIN'S REMOVAL FROH POWER BY SUDDEN DETERIORATION OP'KEALTH ISOSSIBILITY WITHIN THE MEXT TWELVE HONTIIS. THIS WOW r
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PROBABLY NOT BE SO PRECIPITATE AS TO OtHT HIM THE OPPORTUNITY OF MAKING SOME ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSFER OF POWERESIGNATED SUCCESSOR.
IN THE FIELD Of FOREIGN POLICY, AS LONG AS THE BURMESE FOREIGN MINISTRY REMAINS UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF FOREIGNHI HAH, IT IS HOT LIKELY THAT BURMA'S POLICY WILL DEVI AYE MARKEDLY FROM ITS PRESENT NEUTRAL COURSE. THE MOSTUCCESS OF NE WIN'S REGIME HAS PROBABLY BEEN tTS ABILITY TOEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL POSTURE AND THE AVOIDANCE THUS FAR OF INVOLVEMENT IN ANT MAJOR INTERNATIONAL OISPUTE. /THE MAINTENANCEON-COMMITTED INTERNATIONAL POSITIONODEST ACHIEVEMENT, BUT IT IS THE ONE AREA INTATED OBJECTIVE 'OF THE RGUB HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLY ATTAINED. THE CONTRAST WITH INTERNAL ECONOMIC MATTERS. WHERE THE PROFESSIONALS HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND PLANNING AND EXECUTION PLACED IN THE HANDS OF IMPRACTICAL, THEORETICIANS AND AMATEURS IS STRIKING/.
NE WIN'S PERSONAL ATTITUDE TOWARO MAJOR WORLD INFLUENCES BURMA'S FOREIGN POLICY ANO ACTOR WHICH BE IGNORED. OVER THE HUT TWELVE MONTHS, GIVEH THE LIKELIHOOOWESTERN CRITICISM Of THE CONSPICUOUS LACK Of SUCCESS OFREVOLUTION IN BURMA, NE WIH'S SENSITIVITIES HAY HAKE HIHPERSONALLY MORE HOSTILE TOWARD THE FREE WORLD. /THE
COMHUHIST POWERS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAKE SURE THAT ANY COMMEHTS THEYABOUT BURMA WILL BE CASTIGHLY FAVORABLE LIGHT/. AYURTHER REDUCTION CF THE ALRLAOY DRASTICALLY CURTAILED WESTERN IN BURMA, WESTERN INFORMATION PROGRAMSE FURTHER IMPEDED, ANO THE CHRISTIAN HISSIONARIES STILL REMAINING IN BURMA HAY BE FORCED TO LEAVE.
PUBLIC REACTIONS WITHIN BURMA TO THE BURMESE WAY YO SOCIALISM WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BE LARGELY VOCAL AND NEGATIVE. NEFFICIENT INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CONTINUES TO DEPRIVE THEPEOPLE OF DAY-TO-DAY NECESSITIES, FORCING THEM TO BUY AT HIGH T" BLACK MARKET PRICES, WIDESPREAD INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINING WILL GO ONA HIGHER NOISE LEVEL AND ISOLATED INSTANCES OF VIOLENT PROTEST ; COULD TAKE.PLACE.
"THE ATTITUDE OF COMMUNIST CHINA TOWARD BURMA DOES HOT APPEAR LIKELY TO CHANGE DURING THE NEXT YEAR'S TIME. THE CHIHESE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION IMMRKATIOH-ALLY THAT BURMA IS UNDER ITS SWAY, THEREBY ANNOYING NE WIN, WHILE AT THE SAME TIHE MAINTAINING BASICALLY CORRECT RELATIONS. SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE WHITE FLAG COMMUNISTS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE AT THE SAKE LEVEL AS IN THE PAST. DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM AND LAOS MAY, HOWEVER, CAUSE THE COMHUHIST CHIHESE TO UNDERTAKE PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO PAVE YHE WAYILITARY INCURSION INTO BURMA. RGUB SECURITY SERVICESSAY THEY ARE ALERT FOR SUCH PROBES, AND SHOULD THEY BE DETECTEO WOULD PROBABLYARKED WORSENING OF SINO-BURHESE RELATIONS.
THE WHITE FLAG INSURGENTS DO NOT AT PRESENTERIOUS THREAT TO THE RGUB DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH ANO THE AREAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL ARE UE WHAT . L'NDtR EXISTING CONDITIONS, ANY SIGNIFICANT HILITARY VICTORIES BY THE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS APPEAR HIGHLY UNLIKELY UNLESS THE COMMUNIST CHINESE DRASTICALLY ALTER THEIR PRESENT POLICY AND GIVE THEM SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL SUPPORT. IT IS ALSO UNLIKELY THAT THE RGUII WOULD BE WILLING TO END THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY BY OFFERINGECLINE THE CPB/WF/OALITION GOVERNMENT. DURING THE NEXT
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TWELVE HON THS THE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE
TO EXPAND THEIR AREAS OF CONTROL AND INFLUENCE BUT NOT SIGNIFICANTLY.
" 'oTHER WSURGENT ACTIVITIES WITHIN BURMA WILLH MUCH AS THEY HAVE IN PAST YEARS. ETURN TO INSURGENT STATUS OF ELEMENTS OP THE KAREN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS BEEN ST3CUGLT RUMCftED FCR THE PAST FEW MONTHS. BRIGADIER LIN HTIN IS PARTICULARLY RESTIVE, AND IP HE RETURNS TO INSURGENTHE RGUB'S ATTEMPTS TO GET ARMED INSURGENTS TO JOIN IN PROMOTING THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM WILL HAVE BEENLOW. IF LIH HTIN TAKES UP ARMS AGAINST THE RGUB, HE WOULD BE OPERATING IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA OF EAST AND SOUTHEAST BURMA AS THE BO YANNAING-KYA DOE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMT. WHILE THE LEADERS OF THESE TWO GROUPS ARE NOTOWARD EACH OTHER, THE PRESENCE OF TWO NEW INSURGENT FORCESHE SAME AREA WOULDEAVY AOOITIONAL BURDEN OH THE BURMA ARMT. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE NLA WILL DEVELOPIGNIFICANT MILITARY THREAT IN ITSELF. HOWEVER. ITS MIRE EXISTENCE COULDPROVE TO BE AN IRRITANT TO. RELATIONS, IF THE RGUB
BELIEVES. SUPPORT IS BEING GIVEN TO THE RTAANNAINO CROUP.
.'uTO^mi'MLE Of THE BSPP IN THE COMING1 YEAR WILL PROBABLY DIFFER LITTLE FROM THE POSITION IT NOW OCCUPIES. NE WIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE BSPP DEVELOPMENT HIGH PRIORITY. LARGE CHUNKS Of TIME OF OVER-WORKED SENIOR RGUB OFFICIALS ANO MUCH MONEY WILL BE SPENT ON EFFORTS TO EXPANO ITS ORGANIZATION ANO ACTIVITIES. COLONEL THAN SEIN, REVOLUTIONARY CCUKCIL MEMBER AND JOINT SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL ORGANIZING COMNITTE OF THE BSPP, WILL PUSH THE BSPP VIGOROUSLY.
[XPANDING BSPP ACTIVITIES ARE (XPECTEO TO CREATE SOME PROBLEMS WITHIN THE RGUB. FRICTION BETWEEN PARTY PERSONNEL, BOTH CIVILIAN ANO MILITARY, ANO ARMY OFFICERS OPERATINGTRICTLY MILITARY FRAMEWORK SEEM INEVITABLE AS THE FORMER MOVE INTO SPHERES Of ACTIVITY HOW THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LATTER. ERHAPS Of LONGER RANGE SIGNIFICANCE, AS THE BSPP ORGANIZERS ATTEMPT TO SIGN MORE PEOPLE INTO THE PARTY ANO TO CIVILIANIZE THE CADRE. THEY WILL FINO IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO KEEP OUT THE OPPORTUNISTS AND THOSE, PARTICULARLY THE COMMUNISTS, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO INFILTRATE THE BSPP WITH INTENT OF TAKING
IT OVER.
CONCLUSION. POSITION AND INFLUENCEORATION OF.THE WESTERN
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