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66
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CURRENT SOVIET^ ATTITUDES -- TOWARD THE/ US
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A* indicated
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation
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? Con curring ;
)enny,or The'Difectorof Intelligence and Research, Depatt-
went of Stat*
Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor; lor Director, Defence Inlelligenceouis W. Tordella, for Director of the Nationol Security Agency
r. Char lei K. Reichardf, for Assistant-General Manager, Atonic Energy Commission; Mr. Wllllonregar, for Assistant,Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
subject being outside of theirI ?
Dr. Sherman Kent, for Deputy Director of CentralGeorge C. -
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secret
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
6
SUBJECT: : CURHEIIT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U3
THE PROBLEM
To assess the short-term outlook for Soviet-US relations, with particular reference to Vietnam.
COMCTUSIOK
On balance, we continue to hold the view that the men who took over from Khrushchev almost two years ago have been conspicuous in their cautious approach to both foreign and domestic problems. They Till go as far as they consider prudent in their support of Hanoi. Vc do not foreseehiftore radical and venturesome line of action or initiativeseaceful settlement.
GROUP 1
Excludedvnpr
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DXSCDBSKH
1: Over tbe pant several voeks, the Soviet government has further sharpened its attacks on US policies in Vietnam and hasuaber of additional steps to chill Its relations vith the US. These latest moves are clearly intended to underline Soviet condemnation of US bombing of POL facilities in North Vietnam early this aooth. The Soviets cancelled their participationports moot in this country, at the last minute. They have refused permission for on American news network to film shows in the USSR, hare staged anti-US protest rallies In the USSR and have In general been responsible for aoae deterioration in US-Soviet cultural relations ]T_
in public statements, the USSR has vigorously renewed itsof Hanoi's termsettlenent.
2. At the same time Moscow has avoided some provocative oaves which it might have made. For exanple, since the springhe Soviets have not permitted mass demonstrations against the US Embassy in Moscow, in contrast to recent mass protests in East Europe. After considerable hesitation, the Soviets agreed toS industrial exhibit to open next month In the USSR as scheduled, thus keeping to the letter if not the spirit of the new cultural exchange agreement. Berlin, that sensitive touchstone of US-Soviet relations, has remained quiet. Indeed, there are
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indications on tioscow'a partesire to minimize the chances for frictiont has acted to expedite the moveoent of Allied traffic Into Host Berlin. Despite the Inch of progress, the USSRto participate In the Geneva disarmament talks and Soviet officials in Geneva have in recent weeks showed serious Intercat inreaty governing opace exploration.
3* These contradictory manifestations indicate the growingof the USSR's position la regard to Viet nan, its relations with the US, and its position in the CocDunist world. The USSR has made important gains in its contest with Peking by supporting Hanoi and calling upon all Communist countries to participate in joint action to aid the DRV. In order to maintain this Improved position they must continue to support Hanoi, and, at the same time, disprove the endless Chinese charges of US -Soviet "collusion." For these reasons, they rosin unwilling at present to take any Initiatives to bringegotiated settlement. But the Soviets have shown themselves keenly aware of the dangers of escalation end reluctant to become deeply involved in the war. These attitudes hove placed important limits on Soviet reactions to events in Viet nan.
1*. esult of this dilemma, the Soviets, in order to register their disapproval of US policy, have turned to such well advertised areas of US-Soviet relations as cultural exchanges. The Soviet leaders recognize that the publicized sector of relations la an area especially vulnerable
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to Chinese attach. By tho sane token, the Soviets also recognize that they can attract the most dramatic publicity vhen bilateral exchanges and contacts are abruptly cut off. Moreover, US-Soviet exchanges In general nay be under somethingloud in the Soviet leadership because of the concern it has manifested recently over its control of the Soviet intellectuals. Thus, for internal Soviet reasons, as well as because of the Vietnamese war, certain areas of US-Soviet cooperation are likely to suffer. Inenerally hostile climate between the US and the USSR is likely to continue for some time.
5. Indeed, It may get vorse. Thus far, Soviet policymakers have confined their actions to those areas of US-Soviet relations which are secondary and presumably expendable. But further developments could impel the USSR to adopt more radical measures. The crucial question. Of course, is uhether the worsening in relations will be reflected in some new and dangerous Soviet action in Viet nan or elsewhere. Moscow's inability to influence thus far the course of events in Vietnam, pressures from North Vietnam for more effective assistance, and the contest with China for influence in Hanoi and elsewhere, are all factors which could cause the USSR to consider actions which it has thus far avoided.
6. We continue to believe, however, that despite uncertainty and apprehension concerning US policies, Soviet leaders see no realistic alternative to continuing their prosent course of action. The Soviets
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probably still have no clear Idea of how the Vietnamese war will develop. They appear to be Intent on Halting their own risks and we think that they will try to maintain this policy. But while we can be fairlyof the policy the Soviet Onion prefers and will try to pursue, there are still forces at play which could drew Soviet policyourse of greater risk.
US military pressure on Hanoi Increases, Sovietbe Intensified with more overt participation of personnel orof defensive weapons systems. Because of the USSB'a presentthe DRV'a air defense, thispecial area of responsibility Up to now, the Russians have not emphasised their role indefense. However, If this system continues to provethe Russians might be called upon to supply the DRVmore assistance, such as, improved radar, or sore technical
and advisory Soviet personnel.
has recently revived its earlier pledges to sendsupport Hanoi if requested. Such statements, made Jointly vithallies, seem primarily Intended to undercut Peking's charges of"collaboration" and to highlight China'I isolation, thoughnay also hope that the cove willeterrent effect on Ub
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in Vict nan. Privately, soae Soviet officials have gone out of their vay in conversations with the US to disclaim any intention of actually sending volunteers. Hoi;ever, it is just this sort of tactic which illustrates Moscow's continuing dilemma in VIetr.ua. If Hanoi did eventually call for such support, although Ho Chi Mlnh has recently saidove was unnecessary, the USSR would probably send odditionol technical personnel and declare their presence openly. Even then, the Soviet leaders would try to avoid the appearance of direct US-Soviet combat.
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Original document.
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