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MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Special Activities
Comments. Thomas III Memorandum
to the Director, BOB
That time of the year approaches when we must take up the cudgels and do battle with Mr. Thomas over whether the OXCART program shall continue or be smothered for lack of funda. Since it can be said safely that Mr. Thomas will most likely carry into the fray the same attitude towards the OXCART program that he had last year, it behooves use propared for his attack this year. Assuming hie attitude remains unchanged and not knowing what tack ho will tako this year, our best preparation is to closely examine his memorandum of5 for errors in fact and rationale. Thus armed we will boetter position to meet his assQQlt on the OXCART program's existence.
Since the Thomas memorandum is somewhat disjointedly organized, all comments will be arranged in the same sequence.
) In his opening paragraph Mr. Thomas states that tho
his figure includes thend its fire control and missile hardware; the TACBOARD program with its expensive
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) In comparing the flight capabilities of thend the OXCART vohicle Mr. Thomas does not tell the wholo story.
What the paper in question seems to avoid is the demonstrated fact that2 is an operational, proven system in being. The statement that theill suddenly achieve operational readiness in6 was highlyand, in fact, not achieved. As indicated by Mr. Thomas, then-flight test has yet to demonstrate performance which would tend to validate design specifications. Tho0 pounds heavier thanhich fact alone dictates theill attaineet less than2 at any given pointrofile of missions of ihe same range. Furthermore, theroject office itself holds6 date for anything approaching full Approved For
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operational readinesseployment capability.
According to theodel specification, the planned altitudeaximum range.is0 feet. Range% afterburner maximum altitude profile of0 feet. According to Lockheod Aircraft Corporation Aerodynamic Report, the2 altitudeaximum range.fterburner0 feet. Rango% afterburner maximum altitude profile0 feet. 2 altitude0 foet with full afterburner has been demonstrated.2 maximum unrefueled range. at altitudes0 feet has been demonstrated. We feel that tho figure0 feet in the Thomas paper for thes grossly unfair and misleading, and that. range for that aircraft is in the same category.
) So comment, otherp-date of the figures. Delivery date oi lasthould be noted,hus limiting the full fleetapability until
) In troating Proposed Utilization it is apparent that Mr. Thomas is unaware of the fact that thererohibition. military aircraft violating the air space of any nation be it in tho Middle East, Southeast Asia, or elsewhere
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iled flight plan or the explicit approval of the President to souba or North Vietnam and Laos. Except for Cuban and Vietnamese reconnaissance, thes constrained to peripheral missions in peace time.
While not specifying tho number of missions projoctod for the OXCART capability thoy would appear significantly fowor than thou projected for tho Assuming that fourost aircraft will becomo operational aircraftotal then ofperationals) and holding sixs on
"hard alert for crisesit would appear
from Mr. Thomas' paper thatould bo capablo ofissions0 day poriod as opposed toissions with an operational fleet of sevonXCART vehicles. The OXCART projection ia based on best professional Judgment resultingreat deal more flight experience than has been gathered in therogram. Thus, tho projected ratio is somewhat out of balance with thoyingactornd the OXCARTactor. GbTlOUdly, the projection* wore pulled out of thin air. Moreover, no mention is made of the immediate availability of the OXCART as opposed to tho severely limltodn being.
Mr. Thomas assigns, as une of three overflight missions to thehe Uicdlend Southeast Asia, and to the OXCART cq assigns Southoast Asia as one mission. Except for
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appear. To the reader, who would not examine closely the assigned missions, it would bo im-;ictt that theas reconnaissance responsibility for China. Unless there havo boon najor policy rovorsnls by theommittoo, or high authority, this responsibility resides on theideanned overhead roconnaissance.
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It is neither for Mr.r the writer to
dotermine whether overflights are to be attributed to clandestine or military departments. Thatecision for the President to make in consultation with the highest councils in government. To measure the valueovert reconnaissance asset in dollarsifficult chore. Certainly the people of the .iiited Statesot quarrel with the cost ofnm conceptionhat day,hen the
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annot but disagree wita Mr. Thomas when ho writes thatrojected budgetould not
e basic economics ofalternatives which are dis-
) o comment to recommendation to
procure moress been made since the manor dura was written. No comment to the predicted attrition rato of thexcept to mention that the firstoss has been experienced since Mr. Thomas wrote his memorandum. Lir. Thomas writes: "The only thir.f; that will bo lost iss ;OXCART) claimed distinction, of covert overflights.
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Asin our discussion abovo, wc do not believe this distinction is meaningful. It is certainly not worth the costaintaining2 program." The initial assignment of responsibility for covert overflight of hostile territory to She CI'Aresidential decision based on the strongation ofso-called land Committee which concludedas "dangerous for one of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight." ay incident0 and its aftermath provide no evidence which would indictvalidity of that decision. On the contrary, the Soviets engaged in extravagant, but unsuccessful, efforts to link Powers with the military in order to strengthen their propoganda position. His documentation and identity with CIA, however, had been too well established for them to make even aconvincing case. It is our strong conviction that we would beonsiderable disservice to thekBBw wore we to permit the OXCART capability to be lost. As has been demonstrated over the last nine years, the flexibility of choice botweenilitary asseton-military asset with non-military attribution has been mostx also should bo pointed out that, when advised of OXCART's operational sta';usoadiness to deploy to Kadena inir. McCeorge liuac:y,ling tho time was notthen forayo., tec was an ace we should keop up our sleeve.
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When Mr. Thomas speaks ol disposing of tho OXCART aircraft, he does not suggest the method of disposal. To mothball the OXCART fleet under this proposal wouldcandalous waste of an asset. He also suggests disposing of themimehen there will notully operationally ready capability to assume the OXCART rolo.
A decision to close | s unwise for It denies to TAGBOARD any semblance oito state that asegree of security canto that program ;uas is afforded the
IDEALIST rjozrziL at Edwards AFB is not the comp-ote story. UrA-ou'otc-iily, physical security could be maintained, but speculative conjecture on the part of base and off-base personnel could not be contained. The TAGBOARD, fully rigsed, is an unusual configuration, to say the least, and its mission could be surmised easily. The same would obtain with the OXCART program by basing2 fleet at an accessible airfield facility. At the present rate of expenditure, the
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y it should be noted tiiat the OXCART program is will oo tlie only integrated supersonic reconnaissance asset avcilable to the United States Government throughiaso out th.. ow or inould be to deny theced the Uniteton-military (covert) overflight captjility. The lack of intelligence information available only from ut "in ovorhoad reconnaissance severely restricts policy and decision making ability of the Chief Executive.
AsS
Research and Development Special Activities
Original document.
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