AmOVES FOR4 CIA Ei.STOR.CAL REVIEW
TITLE: Military
AUTHOR: Edwin C.
VOLUME: 30
STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection ol articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence,
All sutemenis of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
A review of mformation on enemy forces available lo thehe first campaigns of Ihe Civil War, its sources andeas used.
MILITARY
I. From Manassas to Frcderidtsburg
Tbe intelligence officer wboue regard for bis own morale will do wed to pats over tbe history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical bVcistoos in which Intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at alliece af intelligence ii prominently cited,ften an Iraplausibility about It: It does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive mteUigCDce does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of Cod than the result of organized effort The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappo in Orients; they avoid the relationshipespionage and military events so detenruraediy as to reirJorce the suspicion that maybe mtelhgenceusiness of littleand effect
Obviously, though, information about theororhave influenced events in that warmuch as in any other. ittle probing In the records1
what inforrnao'oo (or misirrformation) ft was in each case.
intelligence has been slighted because of the reticence of
men who knew its inside story. So the story was buried and
forgotten almost as soon as the Ink was dry oo theat Appomattox, and the battalions of Qvf] Warnot thought to dig it up.
Once brought to light, it significantly changes the history of To begin with, it upsets most of the luted beliefs about Choi
Prtncapal towns of dus study ate: War of the ItstesW Offieiel Record, cf
Vniom tmd CamtedertU Anws (USMC* wad by botorians hut
yWltLnr nfw GatLafj) onbundled and oat aaprcts cat rhe war; mawisrripe raoords la the Nationalibrary of Coofnaaa. aod several State coQcc-bons. and actable among rarfvala ccOrcGom. tha fwpen of On- Jcaeph Booker, whose prominent connection with uus subject is develioed in port II of the article.
the war thai was coming to his doorstep was one he had Invited by bii action three months earlier at Charleston-There has also been an intelligence myth oo the Federal side. McDowell, commanding at BuD Run, did not receive word that Johnstons brigades had left Wmchestcr until three days after their departure, and by that time be had committed his army to battlelan that counted on Johnstons being pinned down tn the Valley Tlius Johnston achievedfpectacnslarly .successful stolen rnarch, for which credit has always gone to the two cavaliers Job Stuart and Turner Ashby and the cavalry screen they set up. What Happened
The fact Is that by the time Johnston's rearmost units leftword of the movement had already reached the headquarters ol the Federal oommander in the Valley, Ceneral Patterson. It came through channels operatedvilian member of Patterson'salley native wbo was then and thereafter able to get news, usually via Negro messengers, from Unionists beyond the Confederate lines. But this, his first important report, was not accepted byuntil corroborated (presumably by reconnaissance) two days after Johnston was gone. Communicating the discovery to McDowell through Washingtonhird day, even though the telegraph lines were in order all tbe way to Fairfax Stauoo.ew miles of McDowell's headquarters.
During most of those three days McDowell was busylan of attack on tbe basis of reconnaissance which had to be con ducted after be reached BuD Run. His march bad been forced by pressures on the Federal Administration, and among the things be had not had time to get around to before leaving Washington was an adequate intelligence preparation. Later in the war It turned out there had been no lack of Union sympathizers in the locality wbo could have pinpointed In advance the undefended fords McDowell had to find while his army was kept waiting.
Tbe plan he developed sent bis main forceide turning movement to tbe right He would have taken the Confederates in the rear had they not bad their embryo Signal Corps on theignal observation post spotted tbe turning column andarning by flag to Beauregard in time for him to wheel about and meet it. Thus, after each side, through espionage, bad bad notice of the other's movements In good time, the decisive totelhgenoe at First Bull Runere report of visual observation on the battle-
JaUiHUJU. ULL UllLY
field. The only particular interest attached to it is that the means by which it was communicated was novel at tbe time.'
Decisive mtelhgerice, butIts irrtportarace has been almost uxmeticed while the Creeohtyw story goes onfame. Wbich illustrates the genera] point that in order tolace In theivil War intelligence story had better have about it either the scent of magnolia blossoms or the odor of
Not rairprisingly. tbe war for which each side was ill prepared opened with blundering application of intelligence on both sides. Beauregard's poor use of bis advance information would have earned him defeat had not tbe Federals been busy tccoonotearing up and down Bull Bun for three days, making up their homework. It was at the end of those days that Johnston's troops began arriving at Manassas,
Pinkerton Assessments
The Federal defeat at First Bull Run led directly to the elevation lo high command of Major Ceneral George B. McCleUan. Tbe history of the fifteen months that passed before Lincoln washed bis bands of this commander suffers from no lack of references toand to McCleUan's intelligence officer, tbe famous, or notorious, Allanuccessful Chicago detective. Tbe standard view of Mcaellan runs like this: Heuperb organizcr and administrator but was afflictedapoleonic complexast hesitancy to use the great army he built His super-caution and lhe failures that flowed from it were largely tbe result of Puikertoo's fantastic overestimates of Confederate strength.
* Alphabetic iJrnahng b/ Bag had been possible for many yrm (tbefrom theut il remained for AlbertS.toracticalhe hat. Tbe Confederatedetected tbe Federal movement aooai Bui Banlois early tmiriaarsttt. aad Myer was on tbe acid with
MeDunul arsta a* ogQahoeo. The Federals bad counted oobaBaoo for obaervatJoo. bol tbe bag. svtskb had to be inflated before leaving Washington, -ai eaughl in isiadsde tree* and abaa-tewad.
This view stands op only as long as it takes toew of Pinker-ton's reports Pinkerton did habitually credit the opposing army (led by. Johnston and then by Lee) with two, three, and even four times its true strength. In this much the standard accounts are correct. What die historians have failed to noticeraudulence
in Piiikerton's reports so transparent that It ts Irnpossibte to believe
McQellan could bave swallowed them.
Pinkertoo's basic order-oi-batde compilation was good enough.
t about tbe time of tbe Seven Days' Battles (June-July
hich Lee drove the Army of the Potomac from the eastern environs of Rsrhmond. Pinkertoo had Listednits ofsire. This was someoo many, but the list Included every one ofhat the Confederates didnd his'asngnnjeot of these to brigades and divisions, though less complete and correct than his list of regiments, was good enough to refute the charge that he and bis bureau were totally incompetent.
But if he cniizzed his scurces to get an average strengthrigade or regiment, be did not extrapolate thisigure for the entire army. Instead he derived what hemedium estimate" or "general estimate" byound average of numerous gross estimates of the total enemy force. These grass figures be obtained from everyone wbo wouldhose sourcealmost never better than mere campt,rem and refugees (source; rumor or pureeserters (frequent source: careful instructionsonfederateod spies (who seldom if ever came by any halfway official figures).
none of use scores of writers who have discussed Piokertoo's svorh. ia terms rsngiog from regret to ridicule, have taken the trouble to compareabulation with the actual Confederate oiganixalloo. Both haverint forears. Although Pinkerton'iot available la Bs cooteoiporarv formis postwar book. Spy of the Rebellion,) and thus could oantaia afteractean numerousof authenticity; Id tact, it appears to be an unedited version of tbe kind of working chart that ought have been la daily use so his bureau.
The shabbiness of this method showed clearly In Pinkertoo'*so clearly thatasual reader should have rejected bis conclusions. There also was an external reason for rejectingcommon sense. Theyy the time Lee got to his top strengthhis total, and the earlier ones, could not bave looked reasonable to anyone who stopped to consider the total manpower available to the South, and especially the number of weapons that the Confederates could lay hands on Such numbers in the Richmond area would have left atouple of their other key points so lightly defended that the Federal armies should have been able to move in almost at will.
,,rr aim
And these"medium" or "general"most revealing transparency in Pinkeitoo's repeating Hison gross estimatinghallowness of which nouitelligesice chief, even of limited inUrllect, wouldHis language alternates between puerile nonsense andvagueness which it would be hard for anyone toupportable thesis to present. Finally, there is hista best illustrated byTus'
considerable numbers of unknown forces, over and above those covered la his general estimates' Hit point of departure ao this argument was the Dumber of regiments and brigades that he bad identified. Early in Model lau's campaign that number was much smaller than the number the Confederates obviously had. This meant. Pinkerton argued, that the general estimates must also be much too small* Latter oo be purged bis reports of this non-sequitur only to replace it with another. When he had identified four times as many regiments, he again said the general estimate must be well below the truetime because organizational specifics indicated soumber of regiments.
This line of reasoning led him, by the timehart was fairly complete, into an even more absurd position. Saying that thereubstantial number of additional troops in units not part of the known enemy force was tantamount to saying there were additionaleven another entiretbe enemy lines, from which he had neveringle prisoner orand about whose eadstence he bad neverreath ofthe divisions he did have represented were well filled out with regiments and brigades. McCleUan, Pinkerton Assessed
a tttna when ho general ettunatc of the enemy in MeCfclvan's Immediate front. Piuimttm bad vleotiSed aboutgunrntt In equating the strength of theseootal, he seas saying to. efiect thai the Coedederafe*00 men pea regUu.nl-doubletrengthenes the actual ruengtk
e dad not organise Us army into oorp* until the fall ol IMS.
If any belief in Pinkerton't estimates remained after the method of arriving at themertood. it must have been destroyed by this display. The question arises how McCleUan could have toleratedorry intelligence job. There is no answer until it isthat be was constantly Insisting oo his need for more men aad
more time- Then it becomes plain that be was not looking for fn-formation about the Confederates so much as be was seeking to justify bis demands. In other words, intelligence was to McClellan noteapon against the enemy- itever against his superiors.
Thatrave charge, but the view It gives of McClellan isiece with otherarrogance, bis DissemblingiT%ommonplace.
How be could bave expected to exert leverage with such patent nonsense is another question. So far as this can have an answer, the answer must be that his estimate of the credulityountrified President was practically unbounded. One doubts that he even had the good taste to give Lincoln only gross figures and withhold the supporting "reasoning" Suspicion of the estimates was not confined to McClellan's superiors; even the Quartermaster Ceneral was aware of the fraud, and in fact it was be wbo rose to suggest that such rersortJng might be the work of disloyal hands.
But Pinkerton's secret service career persisted; he was McClellan's creature and McClellan was surviving despite his numerousof which the use of Pinkerton's intelligence to support hiswas one, McClellan was able to hang oo because the country was poverty-stricken for generals and because he was not by any means all weakness and sloth. Heagnificent army and he won not merely its confidence but its affection. Neither was his secret service all bad: besides conducting comprehensive interrogation that produced goodata, Pinkertoo succeeded in getting several spies into Richmond for extendednd he evidentlyood counterespionage job in the face of almost superhuman difficulties presented by the secessionist population of Washington and vicinity. McClellan, and Pinkertoo with him, were each able enough and successful enough todibility to their efforts that kept them in their jobshird of the war. Their inteUigence operation, however, must go down to posterity noterious effort that through weU-meant errors badly delayed theusual
' PiDkerton's account of thi* espionagehao heavy with Uniguuiy dialogue and'other embeCUhmcnb as to induce strong suspicion that he fabricated whole incidents and episodes- Most of bit ctsara of rienetratiag Richmond,arc rupported to some estrat by aratrrapceiry records. Although these do not show rnitsjons and results, they do reflect tbe spies* absence "within enemy lines" at the tune Piakerton's narrative puts them there.
charge againstas an essentially corrupt activity consciously aimed at justifying inaction and failure.*
Along the Shenandoah
While McOellan was inching up the Peninsula that spring.Jackson was consuming tbe attention of Federal forces in and west of the Shenandoah Valley. Outnumbered, be rehed on fast movement anduse for which be has won much praise turns out to have been decidedly less successful than supposed.
While occupied in tbe Valley with General Banks, be waswith an attack on Staunton by other Federal forces back in tbe AUeghcnics. His first act in countering this tlireat was toseudo-desertcr into Banks' campeport that he was moving to Richmond. In order to make the story stick, he actually marched his men over the Blue Ridge and put themrain. It was typical of Jackson to assure that the waiting train would be beaded east Then to the surprise even of bis innrrediate subordinates, be ordered the train's crew to take ft to Staunton, whither it steamed in reverse, back over tbe Blue Ridge and across the Valley.
All this was supposed to set Banks in motion eastward. Butreckoned without the incompetence of Banks' information service. Banks failed to detect the march across the mountains, be
or late this revehttoo of shadyoteBlgeneeS back room wul be teiitd upon ai new evidence against McCleSan'iuestion that has never entirely abated. Tbe Qwulermatter Ceneral who saw possible treason at mteTJigeoce estimates that were evidently fashioned to McCl'Qans order was only one of many contensporarie* who luspectcd (bit rhe geoeral was motivated by moreesireomfortableen and materirL McCIeuan consorted with anti-war Dcroocrats and nursed political ambitions that were neither opea nor well concealed; the* II was eery for bis eocoues to cooohide. from bisdragging leadership ot the army, that he wasictatorship orallowing the South to wio Independence by stalemate. When be ran for Presidentowever, be repudiated the Dcmocntic peace platform. The view of modern historians, tbougb try DO meansenerally that McOrUan was devoted to tbenion that was to be raved according to ho own lights.
To the present writer that view does not teem to be upset by tbe fadings presented here. The discovery of fraud fat McCJeiumS intelligence doe. oot essentially change what has long beea known about his character, and tbeof the fraud is asactor as the fraud itself.ard enough towe are forced to believeestnuatea so obviouslywere used in an effort to get more men and more time; St it even harder to believe that if McOeflan bad been plotting treason he would have placed such oasbcevesty on view, as he did. Thus Ihe transparency of lhe estimates argues against the disloyalty theory.
noticed only thai ihe Rebels were milling from his front. He lixed up the deserters story for what it was and concluded that Jackson had gone to Staunton. He gave chase, but too late to help the small Federal force west of that place, which had to draw away.
While our ait en tion Is directed to the Valley we may as well dispose of the Belle Boyd legend. Belle, barely eighteen at this time, owes ber fameeckless trip afoot to deliver mfcausation to Jackson as he arrived before Front Royal to achieve the mamhis celebrated Valley campaign. Banksmall outpost at Front Royal which Stonewall surprised and overran, thereby outhartldng his opponent and forcing him to retire across the Potomac Miss Boyd is raid to have made ber way, clad fn white, out of the town and across hills and fields, finding the Confederates by tbe sound of their guns.
Tbe story fa true enough, but ber reformation could bave bad belle or no value; It is unfair to Jackson to credit any part of his success to her supposedly fortuitous appearance. Jackson believed inend good planning. What happened at Front Royal was exactly what he had planned, aod tbe basis of his plan was some careful intelligence work. For two weeks be had been diligently collecting information from cavalry, citizens, prisoners, deserters, and spies. Evidently his conclusion from this wu that he could probably strike Front Royal with complete surprise.
Belle Boyd may have contributed to this information, but that is not what she is famous for. It would be hard to establish that she wasonfederate spy. but equally hard to say that the foolhardy act for which she is chiefly known was one of espionage-Miss Boyd literally flouted the fire of the Yankees. Mrs. Creenliow bad done the same thing only figuratively, but so braienly that she soonisit from the gentlemen of Pinkertoo's bureau. Both women seem to have been ruled by an impulsiveness that ill suited them to espionage. The main point of intemst in the Boyd case fa the fact that the Front Royal story has survivedair-raising example of Civil War mtelhgence operations. Such is the poverty of tbe literature.
John Pope or. Lee
It has been shown that McClellan was an even greater son-user of intelligence than history has made him. John Pope has also had the reputation of being an abominably informed commander; in his
uac unly
case the verdict must be considerably softened and his campaign reevaluated.
Pope became Lee's victim al Second Bull Run because be lostof tbe situation once tbe armies were at dose grips. This much bas been known, and it would be bard to overstate the extent of Pope's misunderstandings on tbe batUefiekL But it bas not been noticed that up to that point he had provided himself with excellent information arid had bandied his army very iklllfuDy Co tho basis of It-Pope In2 wax given command of the various forces that Jackson bad kept so well occupied in and near tbe Valley. Tbe new commander moved bis array east of the Blue Ridge, as rf to threaten Richmond, while McCIeuan was engaged with Lee on the opposite side of the enemy capital. Lee, after driving McCleUan away from the gates of tbe city, began detaching forces against Pope, who was maintaining an exposed positionone too numerous army.
Pope bad given his subordinates stern orders to use spies and maintain an active search for udonnation. Though be had the same small cavalry force from which Banks bad got so little results, be drove it to tbe limit Through this insistence and persistence he kept track of the Confederate buildup in his front as each new detachment arrived. Ills possession of firm information does much to explain his willingness to expose hisubject that has brought puzzled or critical comments from many historians.
In August, whenrmy was ordered back up theIts initial embarkations at Fort Monroe gave Lee tbe signal to turn on Pope in full force. By rail be suddenly moved out, taking the bulk of the army then still at Richmond. He concentrated, well coveredountain, directly across the Rapidan from Pope.
Moving from Richmond with tbe Confederates was one of Pope'sergeant in an Indiana cavalry regiment. In tbe role of pseudo-deserter be hadob as kxwnotive engineer with tbe Confederates. He jumped the train on which beassenger at the time, filtered through Lee's camps sotneltow, swam or waded the Rapidan, and was lucky enough to find Popeorward headquarters near the river. Pope pulled out of the trap as it was almost ready to spring.
The literature often gives intelligence credit for Pope's escape, ibis heartening historiogrsphtcal uDeraLty, however, singles out tbe wrong piece ofdispatchederal cavalry party captured, along with Jeb Stuart's adjutant and Job's 'own famous plumed hat. Actually tbe dispatch fcU far short of the sergeant's
information as an indication of danger to Pope's army arret it reached Pope after the sergeant had report
eek after leavingpidan. Pope sparrerj succeartully with Lee in the vicinity of Culpeper and Warreuton. Stuart returned the enemy cavalry's favoraid on Pope's1 rear headquarters which turned up dispatches showing that McOellan'f divisions were beginning to join Pope. Unable torolonged stalemate in hght oftankc it cot by retre*ting"SuF^ oetachmg Jackson0 mentxule sweep around Popes rightaD the way to Manassas, the Federal supply base, directly in Pope's rear. It was this stroke that threw Pope off balance. He never againalfway correct lizeup of the enemy's dispositions. Once Lee came up and rejoined Jackson, the Federals were routed.
Lee could not bave had any real hope that Jackson's march would go undiscovered, but that was what happened. Nor could be have hoped that Pope would almost completely lose command of the situationitched battle; that also happened. This result raises the question bow an information service that had been so effective up to that time could bave falien down on the Job so completely.
Part of the answer Is that Pope'i spies were too few to cover as much ground as Lee was then covering. One of them got into the Confederate lines and found plenty of forces to report oo, but these constituted Lee's rear, aod his advancechanging by the minute. Tbe rest of tbehat the main reliance for discovery ofovement, and of enemyafter battle was joined, was on the cavalry, and by this time Pope's horsemen had onlyerviceable mounts. Hispressure for information had fust about exhausted bis facilities for getting it On the batdefield he was not necessarily empty-headed, as so many students of the war would bave it. be was simply
" Authority for attributing the Federals* escape to this osptora ta tusdeniabiy respectable: It at Pope's own statement. The conflicting version, stronger and asore esplicit than Pope's, ts found ia an unpublished affidavit by Ceo. McDowell, wbo -as with Pope when the sergeant reported. This conflict and others hke at reveal one of tbe roaio causes of the obscurity of the CM Warstory: There was no iccnrtry-eiajjuicatkxi system, and official despatches andreports commonly found their way Into the press. This porribihty evvjesdy caused ccnunaaden to hold back the intelligence background of their actions or overstate the influence of overtly obtained inteUigence.
ft?iv
r
urr r
Because ft is Impossible to persuade oneself that Median had any senous mteotion of using intelligence in directing his army the Intelligence incidents in his Wchrnond campaign seem almosthence their omission here. Intelligence is mcam-fcable however from the story of his campaign against Lee in Maryland, in September'
entire war, so stunning thatcClellan had to act on it. An operational copy of Lee's plans fell into tbe Federals' hands.'1 Lee, after his crushing victory over Pope, setred tbe opportunity to invade (he North. He crossed the Potomac to Frederick, at which point be decided to reduce tbe Federal position at Harpers Ferry so that be could use the Sheruuidoah Valleyine ofHe sent off more than half his army on this mission, and it was the order that directed this movementederal soldier picked upivouac area the Confederate* bad used at Frederick.
McClellan saw bis opportunity but moved so slowly that Lee had time to roconcentratc behind Antietam Creek. Lee's far smaller army fought the Federalstandstill, but It was so depleted that he had to retire into Vu-ginia.
That muchell-known story, lt reveals McClellan profiting littleevastating piece of intelligence (which, be It noted, was obtained not by effort but byad he moved with even moderate speed, he could have caught the Confederates while they were split into four segments, three advancing on Harper's Ferry from different sidesourth remaining with Lee.
In fact the wastage of intelligence was even worse than theversion indicates.
ee MiBican.tsnbope. -Lost Order, Lostn Studies II.
The "Lostomprehensive as ft was, left something to be desired. Itimetable for investing the Ferry, but there was reason to question wliether the movement was up to schedule. It was only partly specific as to the placement of the force left withhe vicinity of Hagerstown (and In fact the one specific position it gave had changedut McClellan learned something of the progress of the largest of the three detachments, and be also discovered Lee's positions about Hagerstown.
This information came mainlyolunlcer spy, anpreacher whose travels had put him la thenear Harpers Ferry. Possibly because the attack on thecommanded by the pious Stonewall Jackson, tbe parsonto go his way. His way took him quickly to acompany picketing north of llagerstcrvvn. He hadtown, so be wait back through the Unes. filled in that caphb frJorinatioo;
to McQellan's headquarters by night and gave the story in full. Two dayi had elapsed since tbe "capture" of the Lost Order, but it was two more days before McCleUan attacked atcant ten mites* march. By that tfrne most of the enemy's detached forces were back with the main body; the remainder arrived during the battle and turned back the Federals" final push.
The best intelligeoce is seldom good enough. The Lost Order was the best any commander could ask for,through no initiative ofgready improved on it This was enough to insure thestructioo of Lee's army. All McCleUan gainedechnical victory.
At Antietam inteUigrace did oot simplyattle; It caused one. Without tbe Lost Order and tbe parsons espionage, McCleUan would probably have contented himself with protecting Washington and Baltimore, or at most with maneuvering to get Lee back across the Potomacight
Frederickrhurg
McCleUan's successor when Lincoln relieved him in November was Ambroseeneral who is remembered favorably only by historians of the barber's art. Burnside knew the Chief wanted action, and be delivered it He moved the army immediately from Warrenton to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg,arch on Lee, who couldn't make up his mind what was going on for eight days. The Southern leader was mindful of several courses of action open to the enemy and he had information to support all of them; this, as one author points out, left him "accepting everything as equally credible and equally
What Burnside had in mind was crossing tbe Rappahannock and marching for Richmond. But be waited so long for pontoons to put
- Kenneth P. Williams, Lincolneneraloh. New..
him over the river thai lie gave Lee lime not only lo arriveorrect reading of hit intentions but to bring up tbe entire Army of Northern Virginia from Cuipeper and the Valley. When the Federals finally crossed, it was into the teethortified positionigh, steep ridge. The resultlaughter, and Burnside's early removal.
Without knowing what informationlan was based on, his attack looks like pureInhat some jk esislarsataoris^
that it originatedisunderstanding of the ConfederateBurnside made his main thrust against Lee's left, behind the town, because he believed that that sector was relatively weak; be thought most of the enemy strength was ten to fifteen miles downriver. In fact the Fredericksburg ridge was more densely defended than the less formidable ground on the Confederate rightecidon-makers Ignorance is likely toit harder thanorrect decision back to some correct information. Where Biirnsides mlsconceptjon came from Is not dear. Wary of the numerous hands through wbich telegrams to Washington passed, he gave the Ceneral in Chief only his conclusion about enemyand did not say what specific reports led to it, or indicate their sources. Certainly there were interrogations; perhaps some of the subjects were persuasive pseudo-deserters. Certainly there was observation by balloonists and signal oGcors; perhaps coves and deception were used against it with good success. And certain ithat the Federals enjoyed the advantage of reading the cipher used by the enemy Bag sUtions; cvidenUy the messages that tbeput "on the air" were deceptive or of little rignificance.
In any case, Burnside's problem was not so much having incorrect information has having little mformatioo of any land, good or bad; and the fault was his own. Hb failures of understanding are far less excusable than Pope's; tbe front was stable, he had plenty of cavalry and plenty of time, and he also bad the initiative, which enabled him to concentrate on finding the enemy's weak spot The "mtelbgcnoe explanation" of his disaster consistsist of emissions:
inkerton, who uridcrstandably could feel that his service was tied to McClellan"s. bad left the army. So far, so good. But Bum-side did not seize the opportunity to replace him with an effective secret service. The new bureau consisted of one man. John C.year-old ex-private, who had no lack of ability but
could no* command even enough support to be jure of getting hit hands on subjects for mterrogafion-
umsides plan made sense when it contemplated crossing to FrcdmcJtsburg in tbe facemall enemy force. He was not sufficiently vigorous in soeldng to discover the enemy's gradual recon-centratioo that made it progressively lessew of John Pope's "Send out and get me some information" dispatches would have helped, though perhaps not enough to dissuade the impatient Burnside.
orst of all Burnside allowed his cavalry to limit its scouting to the enemy's far flanks. Some of his horsemen should have been lent across the river dose to Fredericksburg, to take prisoners, rec-onooiter. and if necessary probe tbe Confederates until theyhere they were strong and where weak.
Some accounts have ft that Lee trapped Burnside into attackingwrong place. Perhaps so; but it is evident that Lee'sin deception were overmatched by his opponent's abilitv
Part II, to be carriedutureooerr the Choruxl-lortome end Cetfyrhurg campaign, (in which the Federalsew intelligence bureau that produced information of peat value to theummarize, the principal metrxodological lessons of the article, and evaluates the commanders most prominentlu mentioned as intelligence users.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: