STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A conectlon ol articles on Ihe hrsloricaL cporauonaf. doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.
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Operational implications of his personality and attitudes toward authority.
THE CHINESE AS AGENT Robortioev
Toe i'sfcmait of an agent's character aod pertona-iry, essential for haixfling htm successfully aod evaluating bis production, ii of special significance with rcrpcct to Cbioesc agents because of certain distinctive Chinese traits. The great majority of tbe Chinese exhibit the same general personality pattern, and it is one that makes using them as agents difficult Tbey belongype that underneath the surface Is withdrawn and self-contained, that is not sensitive to diffuse or subtle outside stimuli, and that psychologically insulates itself against the outer world. By nature and by tradition the Chinese relytructured, mstltutionalucd society to which they give their loyalty as long as It protects and sustains them in their outward Ufa and leaves their inner independence unimpaired. An understanding of these characteristics that make up tbe general type willase officer find the best ways to handle them when tbey manifest themselves in an Individual.
During the past tenonsiderable effort has been made to accumulate data on the Chinese psychological make-up. Samples have been takenariety ofstudents in Hong Kong, other refugees horn mainland China, defectors from theChinese Natiooali.it soldiers and aviators, overseas Chinese in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, agents from the mainland, dock coolies from Hong Koog. Hong Kong white collar workers, andChinese from California, New York, and Hawaii. The sample remains less than systematic; it is heavy with people who for one reason or another could not adapt to mainland Chinese life.the primary characteristics of those from the different groups, as revealed under intensive psychological assessment show aof pattern that is possibly quite representative of the general Chinese population. This pattern is consistent with and clarifies the old stereotype of the "inscrutable* Chinese imbued with quahoJea of patience, pobtcocas, chmnishness, fatalism, stoicism, cruchy. xeno-
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phobia, dcviousness. rxugab'ty, and uidustriousness. The ultimate effect oo it of lifelong Communis! conditioning cannot now be gauged.
The Chinese Partem
A characteristic common to all was found toind ofisolation. This is not externally evident, and it seemsapplied to the superficially gregarious Chinese. Butthey showed thexDScsvcs to beype to whom psychological security and independence il of fundamental importance and who earn this by foBowing the discipline and rituals prescribed by theirauthority they are subjectgreatin order to avoid pryingery unusual percentage,. had test patterns associatedchizoid personality structure, that manifested by people wbo routinize their socialin order to free themselves for highly private and personalired mental activity. As long as there is strong external authority to guide and direct such people, they can be efficient and productive; but once that authority is destroyed or removed, they become splintered and chaotic.
These kinds of people exist in every culture. What is significant ii their extraordinary prevalence in the Chinese sample. An original tendency toward this type may luve been amplified by the crowded and unsettled milieu of prewar and wartime China, not conducive to much social intimacy or sensitivity. Cenuinely outgoing, socializing people were met with disillusionment, distress, and distraction; and the easiest way to escape was by Inward retreat It is, of course, impossible to determine whether the environment made them take that course or whether those who inherently tended to take it survived.
In general, then, the Chinese have the underlying tendency tointo their own thoughts. They can engage actively in the bustle of the workaday world without really putting themselves into it They feel no need to share theft inner experiencesovercome their self-cent eredness. This taterruliring tendency explains theirpatience in the face of privation. Itonsequence offrom their surroundings and preoccupation with their thoughts; they are at bottom independent of their environment as long as conditions for survival exist Thus they arc not bothered by livingrubby neighborhood, and they are hardened to the suffering of others. Theyarked lack of urgency, participatingin life's hustle for the sake of inner solitude and tranquillity.
Tbe Chinese ideal isorld of social interaction aod personal reUtiofjships but one so organized and ordered that Utile initiative is needed to meet tbe requirements of social Uvfng. The morethe external behavior, tbe freer their Inner activity. Theof eaternal life in order to avoid real conirriitment is manifest in their emphasis on rote Warning as opposed to comprehension andtyliration of behavior in social situations. The famed Chinese politeness does not come from consideration for others; itere-moisioosness which, lite other formalizing, serves tom-hUe at the same time warding off Involving relatiorisbipx. Another manifestation is extreme conventionality with avoidance and dislike of individualorollaryiteral-minded-ness and an emphasis oo recorded precedent which stifle innovation and imagination.
Storm. Dsrfy. end the Family
These psychological characteristics are reinforced by the Chinese tradition of formal structured life. In the old society that grew out of life in the villages, everyoneertain station; be was always the superior of some people and the inferior of others. The old were superior to tbe young, males to females, fathers to sons. etc. Though one's station In life might change with rime, no one was exempt from class uSa boo in the social hierarchy.
Status was not merely ceremonial, it carried with it obugatious. It was tbe duty of inferiors to defer to the wishes of superiors both inside and outside the family. Inferiors were obligated to work for their superiors, to seek and accept guidance from them, to pay taxes, perhaps to perform militaryuperiors for their part had the obligation to protect their inferiors and insure their livelihood, to give advice and decide connVting Interests, and to support community mtercsts. The relationship was thus one of mutual obugation for mutual benefit, and no ooc bad die right lo act individually.
Mutual obligations began at home in the family. Each member bad lo receive family approval for any undertaking. No one could take it upon himself to gousiness wititout family consultation and consent He could not even travelistant place without family discussion and approval. Though many of the old restrictions on individual decision began to be loosened even before theachieved power (most notably on individual selectiontrong sense of faxnfly solidarity still persists today.
Family1 not,ase in point, lightly implicate each ather in risky venture? such as espionage. Recently an otherwise cooperative agent concealed (or seven months information about abrother who worked in an electronics plant In Pelcing. In xher cases, some agents have felt compelled to report their agent roles to family members.
Family reUiiousliips and obligations axe thus sootetimcso agent operations, but they can also be helpful, sayember living abroad agrees to cooperate tn tbe defection of one inside Pima wbo is able to travel abroad Unfortunately, the Chineseare also aware of this possibility and seldom send people with relatives abroad to staff their foreign missions.1
On the debit side, again, mutual obligations sometimes lead to nepotism In operations. An agent may be under considerable pressure to place relatives on the payroll, especially if ha has an enabling overt position, as, say,ublishing enterprise we support- Even if our vigilance should prevent his hiring them, be may yield to theirfor Gnancisl assistance and so have to pad bis accounts or otherwise misuse our funds. Awareness of this hazard will be useful in policing operations.
Authority
Outside the family, the ultimate superior is tbe regime, which must live up to what Is expected of itrotective auttaority In the sameatheroost striking example of these expectations was found In examining the cases ofefectors from Communist China on whom the data was sufficient to determine motivation. Almost all of these defectors felt that the regime had let them down or was about to
The long tradition of authoritarian government
with their kind of family life, has accustomed the Chinese to rely on those above them not only for perfection and means of livelihood but to tell them what to do. That the modern Chinese who may consciously disavow the old attitudes probably continues unconsciously to act on them was illustratedecent defector who had lived under Communism since he was nine years old. Commenting on histo life in America, the defector said he had found It most difficult to make decisions about what be wanted to do. He wished others
'See "Chinese Defectionsy Henry Hooks, is Sruber IX. X9 IT.
would have told ham what they wanted him to do rather than ask him about his own preferences.
No doubt the Communists have found this acceptance of authority useful for many of their purposes, but tbe sailing effect it exercises oo creativity, imagination, improvisation, and innovation has surely hampered them as well For us an inference should bei-reefing an agent unaccustomed to excellingnd Inclined toward Uteral-mrrsdedness, we should bo explicitly detailed, leaving nothing to bis poor imagination. In general the Chinese are the kind of people who need "How To" manuals.
Many other conseo1uencei of significance to our operations item from these attitudes toward authority. In seeking recruitments and defections, first of all we are attempting to substitute ourselves as the targets protective authority. To succeed in this effort we must impress the target with our ability to perform the role and meet its obligations. Rather than pose as an unprepossessingn mihst. we should make it clear whenever possible that we represent the United States Government Our manner, though gracious, should be slightly aloof. Yet wt should avoidfor tha Communists have scantized tbe people to what onetermed feudal rrsaririers.*
The Chinese defector does not expect, or want, to be treated as an equaL The egalitarian tendency to American society and tbe freedom it permits do not hold tbe attraction for him that one might suppose; one escapee from the mainland said these qualities of American society were positively frightening. Heociety more secure, less equal or free, and therefore less competitive. Though be may expect us to talk in terms of freedom, individual dignity, virtue, etc, be will really be listeninglear statement of our expectations ol him, risks he may have to take, andf our ability to protect him. He will want to know what compensation he will receive, what training he may expect, where he may eventually be resettled, what hisfor earning his living are, and other practical information. Wc should be prepared to give him this.
On the other band, wc should also think in terms of the obligations of the defector to us and capitalize on the Chinese disposition to fall in with the desires of constituted authority. If be respects tbe person directing him and clearly recognizes himepresentative of au-thority. be will do his best to meet our espectationt of him. even to the point of going back, if feasible, and working for us in place.
Fatalism
Of some bearing on (be Chinese acceprarace of our authority may be firs fractionalecent letter from inside Chinaelativehinese complained bitterly about bis lot under the Communists, only to conclude that nothing he or anyone else could do would change his djxumsUnces Txmimunlst rule ise said- It has not yet run its course, so no matter how many people oppose ft, it will not collapse."
In dynastic times the Chinese believedynasty fell because Heaven had withdrawn the emperors mandate. Crop failures, floods, droughts, pestilence, and banditry were not seen as causesto the collapse but as signs of Heaven's displeasure. The rebellion lhat finally toppled the emperor succeeded only because ft was in harmony with the forces of destiny. Clever men would always be alert for the right time to switch their supportew dynasty.
Wc should be able to capitalize on this traditional concern with reading the trends of destiny tn our efforts to promote defection among Chinese Communist officials abroad. In both the propaganda we direct against these officials and in agent contact, we should try when possible to Illustrate that the tides of change are ttsrning against the Communists. When we reach the point of open approacharget, we might suggest that he break off bis identification with the losing regime and live outside of China where he could Improve his skills while waiting for the trend to turn. This concept mightatisfactory rationalization for an official who would otherwisedefection an unpardonable departure from accepted rules of behavior.
Face and Fabrication
The imperatives of fulfuling his role in bis structured society lead the Chinese to an extreme reluctance to admit failure in discharging an obligation. (The Communist institution of criticism andclashing head-on with this trait, can have prevailed only by virtue of Chinese submissive nets to requirements and conforrnism with groupis face-saving may reach the point, if be cannot pleadhanged situation invalidates the obligation, of laying to make it appear that be bas discharged it when fn fact be has not
The bizarre sequel of such an attempted deceptionhinese agent some years ago was the agent's blaming his case officer for his having fabricated several mteliigence reports. If be had not
constantly pi earned me toe said,ould not have had to fabricate" It was of vast importance for him to avoid the shame of not having lived up to his role as an agent, and be felt do guilt at having used deception to this end Though Chinese ethics teaches honesty and personal rectitude, the shame of failure mayreater threat to one's integrity.
This incident need not have happened. The case officer bad failedto realize that fn merely asking the agent toask he had
accordedertain standing that the agent would seek to protect It would endanger it to eaprets doubt about being successful. If the ease officer had fully discussed the proposition, erpbCrtythe posribuity of failure, the agent could have qualified oh commitment, be would not have felt pushed Outimb.
Tbe case officer also probably missed important later clues. Before resorting to fabrication, the agent likely procrastinated In the hope that he would not be pressured further. Or perhaps he attempted to convince the case officer that unexpected difficulties (difficulties that did not reflect on his own abilities, of course) bad arisen, only to have them brushed aside When the warnings were ignored, he had no way out except to fabricate.
Levels of Reward
The Chinese agent should not be over-rewarded or often rewarded in advance. He will take bad pay and ill treatment when he bas no alternative, but he becomes increasingly ritualistic and lessas he feels more and more secure. He aims to progresstatus in which be no longer needs to earn security because he already bas attainedingle month's salary in advance may do no harm, but regular advance rewards will not necessarilyorresponding obb'gatioa To get the most out of hb agent, the case officer shouldliding scale of rewards on wbich each point is set at the lowest level acceptable to the Chinese.
Case officer's and agent's understanding about comperisatioo must be identical. The Chinese may expect certain benefits not explicsUy agreed upon and feel wronged if be does not get them. He mayandmall salary as condition for increased benefits covering sickness and old age He expects the case officer, asauthority, to play the role of benefactor in time of need, and if the case officer refuses Ue cannot count oo tbe Chinese to make any special effort for him.
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The Chinese expects rewards for loyalty and seniority even though he ts doing the same type of work as always and doing it less efficiently. This explains the large Chinese bureaucracy and the army's retention of large numbers of men in their fifties and sixties. The government feels responsible for providing for them. It cannot pension them economically or find them employment elsewhere. If it suddenlyoo this obh^tion, not only those affected but the Chinese public at large wouM'react in anger, ksxpu&Tagreements on all these matters will help avoid later complaints and poor morale.
Recap
Tbe Chinese personality pattern and the legacy of traditional Chinese society (between which there is presumably some causal relationship) combine to make the Chinese as athe Chinese officialto dislodge from bis quid-pro-quo loyalties to regime and family. The principal wedgeailure in the quid pro quo. These same factors require that, once recruited, he be handledight-reined patcrrialisrn, with special regard to his immediate aod permanent security,ose eye to the limits of his capability, and with authoritative direction in detail. Tbe case officer should of course not assume that any particular Chinese individual will fit this pattern precisely or atcontinued conditioning under the Communisty modify itit does embody the dominant observed tendencies and should be usefulrame of reference against which to gauge the man at hand.
Original document.
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