STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collccllon ol oillclos on tho historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoietical aspects ot intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the auihois They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents, should be construed as asserting or implying US Govcnunent endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
The first postwar crunch with the Soviet Union helps develop annotional estimating process.
MARCHCT I
Tbe "Much Crisis"s it is usually caJW, featured,balf year of steeply aggravated Sovieteries ofpolitical acts in Europe, accompanied by miUtary deployments in tbe Soviet Zone of Cermanyossible armed attack, which culminated in restrictions on access to Berlin at the end of the month. For Allied intelligence services the crisis posed tbedifficult task of assessing Soviet intentionsuns when the separate mtcuigersce agencies in Washington were each aniions for the autonomy of its own estimative machinery. It forced theof ad hoc interdepartmental committees which became theof the present national estimates system.
' InteUigence Advisory Committee, forerunner of tho USIB.first documentary lource toelow, third paragraph
To the Soviets, the March Crisis consisted of only the second act of what was.wo-act play, as act which they consciously precipitatedecision taken onb and carried out with their troop maneuvers and alerts of the last week of the month. But the Erst act, where the curtain roveable from Ceneral Lucius D. Clay in Berlin and in effect rang down with theeeting ofas the more critical. national interest and the development of supradepartmental intelligence. It was also svith reference to these ten days thai pubbe curiosity was titillated when the Eberrtadl report1 was released the following December, with its charge thatistaken intelligence estimate preparedepartmental Intelligence agency, stimulatedwhich. If followed, might well have had serious
Th* author ISistory of The Origins of theVeekadt and th*e (TS) lot tbe Historical Office. OSD. aodappreciate any conxOocti to this hiovMrw information from readers, cue of Ihn journal
For Ihe sake of simplicity in thi* presentation, detailed documentationThe principal personal tourers of information on the crisis wereLord Aksander of Hiluhorough, W. Park Armstrong. Jr,WiDiam B.ob D. Beam,Omar N. Bradley. Cess. Sir Noil Bro-nhmn. John A.haCharles p.an. Marshall S.man.larke. Cen.ay,opp. AdmLewis W. Douglas, William H. Draper, Jr,urand, Ferdl-
nind Eberstsdr, Col. David G. Errkine, Msf. Cen.jsdon. Lt. Cen. Ceorge P. Hays. Lawrenc* P. H. Healey. Lord Henderson. John D. Hickertrvn, Brig. Camowley. Franklin P. Huddle. Lt Cenuebner. Vlea Adm- Thomas I. Inglts. Can. Corns t. LcMay. Da-sd E. LAenthaL Lord Longford.ovett. MaJ Cen James McCorauwfc. LisdwrB t_ Montague. Robert D. Murphy, la-rrr.ee E. eWNeulviIW. John H. Ohhr, Lt. Cen. Maurice A. Pope, Col.urkitt. Lord Robertson ofrig Cen. Peter P. RodVi,eter M. F. Sichrl, Lord Strang.en. Sirtrong,tuart Symington, DeForrest Vana) Cen.alsh. Lt Cen. Albert C- Wedarswyer. CarroD L. Wuson, and Cen Robert J. Wood.
The principal doewnwnlary studies uied were these; lEhrxtadt) Task Fat* on National Sternly Organisation,Cummusinn Report. Appemfis C. rebatedMS (Washington*; Allen W. DoBes. Wltllam H. Jackson, and Malhlai F. Correa. The Centrol InltOieenc* Agency and Xatutnei Organization feeeport ro ih* Setioaal Sreuruy Connedemo from DeForrest Van Slvrk. Global Survey Cp ORE. CIA. to the DCI.ectub, "CtAh the Aa Forea onf Soviet Ir.tennons"emo from Robert Shun. Spatial AuuLtM, OSD. to tha See/Def.ubf: Tha 'March' Crisis'a The Foneiialrinceton.ntry ofemo fromen. S. La-Bey Erwln, Director of Intelllgenea IC-ll,. VSIntelligence Estimates inTS tsemo from Col. Robert J. Wood. Aide to ihe Sev/Def. to th* See/Def.ubs lotetltreoe* Fits-mates on the MarchTSa OSD He CDS. John A.rthur E. Sutherland. 'Report toerstsdt Task Force on the Central InteUigence Agency"p, In Ferdinand Ebenladlsi, Repprt.. Jackson, Historical Stsff. OA, "Notes on Ih* 'March War Scare"" Paper1 Mayrthur B.iitory ofnretfigmee Agencyhap. VlIIie* Adm. Thomas B. Inglii, "The March CrUls' so Intelligence Episode as Remembered. IS Years Later,6urtrsy of Ademralerxrlealey. Tba March CrtW' Marchpoiirtesy of Mr. Hcaley.
What followsentative and incomplete account of this first act of the crisis, drawing upon the memories and records of rarticipants, previous reports and surveys, and some additional research'
March Crista
Cold War Worming
During lhe fall7 the US. military governor in Cermany. General Lucius D. Clay, noticed that hb Soviet counterpart. Marshal Sokolovskiy, was far more cautious than before in his dealings with lhe Western powers. The two were still on friendly terms, but Sokolovskiy was unwilling lo "wheel andlay puts it. in the fashion to which he had been accustomed8 ands Marshal Sokolovskiy himself said in August, rejecting an American proposal for quadsIpartite currency reform,ery friendly attitude to Generalannot irsodifymy position" Clay bad thought bttle of Marshal Zhukov's recall to Mc<scow in early Marcheven bidding good-bye lo Ceneral McNamey orby lhe fall7 be believed lhat this change was made because Zhukov had tried to avoid squabbles with the Western powers. He knew that Marshal Sokolovskiy wished to avoid another war. but he was apprehensive lhat decisions in Cermany might be taken out fromontrol.
Soviet-Western relations had been marked during the year by L'S. promulgation ol the Truman Doctrine, Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan arid launching of an anti-imperialist propagandarowing stalemate in the round-robin Conferences of Foreign Minislers. and the creation of the Com in form in September. When in October, following Soviet security measures along the interzonal borders and during Bed Army maneuvers in tho Zone, it began to be rumored among lhe public that the West might withdraw from Berlin, Clay cabled his troop commander In Heidelberg that he did not wish to remove dependents of US. personnel from Berlin "unless you have intelligence reports not yet available here. Thisar of newts. and we must have lhe stout nerves. Any indication of weakness on our part would jeopardize our position in centrale must be as well trained as possible and on the alert tourprise action. Otherwise, sve are airtight"
Cenrral Clay recalls having been startled by Marshal Sokolovskiys speech before the Allied Control Council onhe (one and style were so unusual for him as to arouse lhe suspicion lhat his authority in Cermany had been undermined. Then onhen he listened to Molotov's attack at the London Foreign Minisiers' conference. Clay recognized some phrases and fell sure that Sokolovskiy bad beenypical Molotov speech on older.
Even after lhe breakdown of the London CFM. however, Ceneral Clay did not expect war. He recalls having discussed the possibility
with Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas and British officials in mid-December. Although he believed that the fomationest German state alliedhe West might possibly cause the Soviets toilitary attack, he considered it highly unlikely. Thewere capable of overrunning Europe to the Pyrenees, but they would suffer tremendous destruction at home, especially in view of America's atomic monopoly.. Commander In Chief in Europe, he was nonetheless keenly aware of the Insufficiency of ground forces remaining in his theater. On Decembere wrote his old friend ArWedemeyer. the Army's Deput^'Chief of Staff torations:
he prrwbaOon of Communism has been checked, if oot stooped, bv the thin American and British screen through the middle of Germany and the middle of Austria. Certainly this miiilsry screen Is partoordinated effort.
With the split-up at London, conditio ru In Germany,m sure tn Austria, are tense.ersonally discount (he prospects ofan not forgetoment that this I* possible and that if II occurs we must not be caught as we were at Pearl
Over the next twoumber of events gradually modified this position of discounting the prospects of war. From intelligence reports Clay was aware that the highest-level Soviet officials in Cer-many were shuttling rapidly back and forth between Berlin and Moscow; he viewed the halting. military trains bound for Berlin as an attempt to probe our steadfastness; and he interpreted the contacting of his political adviser. Robert Murphy,eneral "Ceotgiev" (who was really Lt. Gen. L. A. Malinin of the MVD) as an additional Soviet effort to gauge American plans for Germany. Most important in altering his feeling about the likelihood of war were his personal contacts with Soviet officials in Cermany. Inozen lengthy sessions during January and8 heor argued, with the Soviets about currency reform and other matters. He had infrequent informal meetings with Marshal Sokolov-skiy. and he noticed that the Marshal was now surrounded by MVD and MCB "advisers" and appeared unable to make decisions on his own.
When General Clay flew to London on Februaryor the opening of the London conference which would lay the plansest German state, heistinct shift in Soviet attitudes, but he was not sure of the new course which the Soviets would follow. Even when he briefly revisited Germany onhe day follow-
d
ing the collapse of (he non-Communist government in Prague, he was unablebtain any hard intelligence on proipective Soviet actions in central Europe. Back in Lcndon as the Czech coup becamefact, he discussed it with Ambassador Douglas. Bothitortent of new Soviet aggression; its brazenncss startled tbem.
The Washington End
Because Douglas was planning to return to Washington after the Brit round of the Inndon conference. Cleymought the ArruSassadorn appropriate messenger to convey his new apprehensions to Secretary of State Marshall The oral message would be that with the new tensions in Berlin Clay was no longer sure the Soviets would -not rbk warumber of years. It had been Ceneral Marshall who had first authorized Clay to Inaugurate inter-Allied defenseIdnd the two had corresponded ever since,the state of joint Allied defenses under cover of the state of "Lieutenant Peters'hus it was Clay's first instinct to warn Marshall when he sensed trouble ahead. Clay returned to Germany on Marchut the conference dragged on, and Ambassador Douglas was unable for another week to leave for Washington.
In Washington it was budget review time, and DoD was preparing its0 budget, whileupplemental appropriation fornenator Chan Cumey, Chairman of Ihe Armed Services Committee, notified Secretary of Defense Forrestal of his plans to hold closed hearings on tbe budget. Fonestal. the three service secretaries, and the chiefs of staff were scheduled lo appear before trie committee on Monday morning, March 8.
It mutt have been during this first week of March that Dirtctor of Army Intelligence and Assistant Chief of StaffieutenantSteven J. Cbamberlin flew in and met with Clay ineneral Clay recall! how be discussed his own apprehensions and asked formpressions. Chamberhn replied that we dsd not have any evidence of impending Soviet military action, but spring would be the best time for an attack. Then he atked Clay to cable Washington about hit fear of possible war. Clay remonstrated that be had oo definite facts which wouldormal report, that he
'Thisis baaed onClay's detailed id cvat "no recoUeetioo" ofolling.
iadarning informally via Ambassador Douglas, and hat Chambertin,. could convey these undocumentedhe Chief of Staff. But Chamberlm wanted to have, when he got iack toable he could show around the Prntagon. vord-of-mouth advice wouldn't have nearly so much impact.
On Friday morning Marchfter Chamberlin had flown back toClay revealed his doubts to his Europeanajor Ceneralalsh. Ceneral Walsh remembers laving been greatly relieved to learri,of his^chiers change in attitude: or many weeks he had been urging the reluctant Clay to warn Wash-ngton of impending trouble. He now interrupted him, sayingou feelood chance of war, we had better get thend looked around the office for some paper to write in. He did not want to let Clay out of the roomable had been prepared, lest he change his mind. Ctay began to dictate,aking down what be said, as best he could,ong pad of yellow paper.*
Ceneral Clay gives his reason for acceding to Chamberliniaside from the possibilityurprise attack, as tbe likelihood of trouble in Berlin. He cites his proposal of the preceding December to send armored convoys through obstacles on the autobahn ifHe recalls having hoped that his warning mightuickening of rearmament, so that hb positionthe Russians would be as strong as possible when the erbb broke.
eornt history of these events thui errs in fU liurrprrtaboo: In notifying Washington thai something was up. Ceneral day was aetlnt purely on hit ownhis -as one of the rare eases in rexnt American heJSty when the responsible Commander on the ipot has not only wued something thai the imrlligenee eipeits bad ovatsooked but also dared to torn in union* tha feeling to his superiors." dward Smith, The Defense of Berlin;1
General Walsh recalls that Clay originally began, "Within Ihe last fewaveubtle change in Soviet" But when he read what be had dictated he decided to move to theentence near the end explaining what hb previous belief bad been. When tbe cable was ready for transmission they found,ast-minuie check for any confirmatory intelligc ncQi thait tht' H'tIipi com* mandant. Colonel Frank L. Howicy, who had also sensed trouble, hadeport which was already being sent to Washington via intelligence channels. Ceneral Walsheference lo thb and gave orders that the message be transmitted by "the underground
Marth i:
ouble ervcryptedpecU]nt ^ hAgency
The Trigger
The transmittal of the message lo ASA al Arlington Hall eomrneoced. Berlin time, March 5:
FBOM CLAY EYES ONLY TO CHAMBFRUN FOR MANY MONTHS. BASED ON
TEN YEARS. WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKSAVE mT I
* rKUNCS MAY COME
DRAMATICANNOT SUPPORT THIS CHANCE IN MY OWN THINKING WITH ANY DATA OR OUTWsRD EVIDENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS OTHER THAN TO DESCRIBEEELINGEW TENSENESS IN EVERY SOVIETVIDUAL WITH WHOM WE HAVE OFFICIALNABLE TO SUBMIT ANY OFFICIAL REPORT IN THEOF SUPPORTING DATA BUT MY FEEUNC IS REAL VOtADVISE THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THIS FOR WHATEVER IT MAY BE WORTH IF YOU FEEL IT ADVISABLE.
Colonel Howley'i mforrriation arrived In Washington dura*
Upo. Mure ofWerenca, Soviet Ke-nm.nd.har. representingll Mi -erepi.rd .nd .crdtn* mamK
Z March.such increased Soviet violence in attacks dial, brla^ed lhat Corral KotAov.u acting node,ttacks are thoroughly prep^ ^provoked.ncidents of meeting!
' TheWerenr. to Soviet, intention, in Berlin whkh may be temporary ot permanent, Include* u> following elcmani,:
ffort to build case that cpiadrlpirtito government la unable to ope.ale In Berlin.
omplete opposition to .greament of anyuadripartit. mcrta^
As Waller Millis noted in editing The Forwtd Diorier. Clays cable "fell with Ihe forcelockbusterne unnamed CIA official unaware of the background of the warning later told the press. Thereorld scare Just because Ceneral Clay had some bad
apple strudel the night" Ceneral Chamberbn evaluates the warning as "greatly instrumental in bringing theocus among those in responsibility in our governmentrophetic of whatew monthsut he is not *S0 certain that it succeeded in quickening defense measures.*
Chamber (in baud-carried the "wars it, to Ceneral Bradley, interrupting the Chief of StaffHe recalls having distributed it further only asBradley, but Cfcricral Bradley
authorized. The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royatl.having read it that afternoon, and Secretary of Defense Forrestalopy of it in his diary under theate. Aside from Forrestal, there is no indication that any non-Army personnel saw it at this time; as Ceneral Chamberlin hinted later, it was apparently regarded as "an Army matter" for the first six daysame in. High officials of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Air Force, and the Navy and of CIA say that they first received formal notice of it onnd President Truman's first known mention of it on that date suggests that even he may not have been among tbe original recipients.
Humors of Wart
In advance of. cabinet session that Friday. Marchnd Ceneral Bradley met briefly with Secretary Forrestal,to discuss the Clay cable. Meanwhile, down the corridor from Ceneral Chamberlin's Pentagon office, in Roomntelligence Group under Colonel Riley F. Ennis began workcrash estimate" of Soviet intentions.
That evening Secretary of the Army Royal! was the hostuffet dinner for the service secretaries. Secretary Forrestal, and the AEC commissioners. Unaware of the warning cable, AEC Chairman Lilienthal was surprised by the tenor of the conversation:
ome into floyalrs office, he wis asking (and later we all eiplored theow long would it take us toumber of. "eggs" to, say. the Medfienancan? The idea of using them, Royal) said, disturbedreat deal. Symington raid the American public was completely mum-formed about how quickly we could go into action and whit we could do. And so oo; itattier grim hour of this kind of talk.
On Saturday Ennis's Intelligence Croup reported on iltto Secretary Royall and top Army officeii. The key paragraphs of Hi estimate read:
nlikely thai the Soviet* wtf] take rruhury action either toat Out of Berlin, or Cermany. although they have the undoubted capability af tnitlatJng otTensive operation* tn Fiirape and tha Middle East withoutwarning However, wa have no avid*nee thai they Uuend lo dot Ihlt tlma.
It remaloi oui urinate that the Soviets wul continue theirtaking cam to avoidhe possibility nauica that it. S migKt^imd-ftteMly touchrantl
The following Monday, Marcht the closed hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Secretary Forrestal told theabout Clay's warning lo otdcr to emphasize that we could not assume any "sale" period of years but must prepare for the contmgeocy of war so as to reduce its likelihood Abo on Marchmbassador Douglasrom London and probably gave Secretary of State Marshall Ceneral Clay's message.
On Tuesday, the day after Forrestal's closed-door testimony on the Hill, rumors spread around Washingtonlay "Idler' warning of war. and on Wednesday, at Forrestal* news conference, there were questions aboutertain Clay letter to you in regardhange in the evaluation of the international situation with regard to the possibility of" and abouteport that it was saidenate committee in closed session lhat this Government or the military chiefs no longer fek we were safeorrestal tried to answer these in general terms
CIA's Office of Reports and Eilamates, under Theodore Babbit-sent an issue of its periodic ftec'ru of lhe World Situation to press onaving heard nothing about Clay's warning:
he Communist coup In C'ecrwnlovafeli has exiled widespreadWa dor. that this event reflects any suddei increase in Sowrt capabibttet. more aggressiver anyurrent Soviet policy or
Also onrmy intelligence sentevised collectko directive toilitary attaches and six army commands around the globe:
ndtntSom are that,pvrtod of oVIitwrattoa since breakup of CFM last December. Soviets may have decided ope* policy for lUi HuioncaDy. tprmg or early siunmer hai been the write* selected fee initiation military ope rat Mini Western Europe Therefore, information bearing os Soviet intentions next four to tit months of vital and immediate Internl Dept. of Army.
On Matchhe morning papers carried stories about tbe"suicide" of Jan Maiaryk, the Crech Foreign Minister, raising the question whether his knowing too much may have precipitated his death By this time Air Force intelligence had learned informally of the Clay cable.ad mamuined, Ceneral Chamberlin and the then deputy At. Ceneral Cabell,omewhat "paternalistic" attitudeuring this period, sometimes providing it with information withheld from othert is not known, Thowcver. whet ber this knowledge had any causal relationshiphe Air Force's commencing on.that date the first short-range atomic' war planning since World War II. Informal knowledge of the cable or Indirect repercussions had already caused reviews of war prepared-ness outside the Department of the Army. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Inglis. writes:
To th* best of my it collection the euftem* and eonienii of this (Matchicipatch were not made known to me by Ceneral Chamberlin For aetrral days thereafter. Howe-er, Indications teached m* that there was Incieated tension and anasety In high places.as not completely >ur-pcised when Ceneral Ctiambarlin disclosed th* despatchoitUag of Intelligence Chiefs In his orfica on March
Interdepartmental Coordination
On Marchhe service chiefs of staff flew to Key Westeekend meeting with Secretary Forrestal. in an effort to improve interdepartmental cooperation, delineate service roles and missions, review possible requirementsupplementaludget, and set guidelines for theudget. Secretary Forrestal's effort to create an mterdepartrnental "spirit of Key West" may have triggered Ceneral Bradley's wish to have an interdcpaitmental review of Clay's warning.ound appraisal of Soviet intentions would greatly assist the JCS and Secretary Forrestal in deciding what budget requests to make of President Truman and the Congress. And there was the question of other defense measures: prior to the formal sessions oft Key West, there were discussions of whether to ask for the Immediate restoration of selective service and of "whether or not now is the time for fuming custody of [atomiel weapons over to the Armed Services."
Whatever the precise rrwtivation, before leaving for Key West Central Bradley, possibly on Forrestal's suggestion, appears to have asked Chamberlin toombined estimate on the "svar Bradley and Chamberlin are unable to recall the circumstances
for sure. The late Robert Blum summarized most of what was known back in
In the coups, of the [relies. Jackscn-<Wa] Intelligenceive
> [theby the Eberstadted to collect more.to what actually happened are quite divergent and no two peoplesame story. There are. however, some points which seem tothe first place, the messages received from Ceneral Clay were notin an orderly coordinated manner In order to arriv,nestimate. There wis some coopeistlon between thebut* am not yet oirUmth. ArrayV AirCIA did no. come uporrect evaluation when th.wrong, although evenhiaOy and after considerable delav. theminterdepartmental esamlnatton of the situation order' the aiitptoes
These observations now require slight modification: there appears to have been some mutual exchange between ArmV and Air Force intelligence; and although CIA did not "come uporrect evaluation when the others weret didorrect evaluation when the warning was made available to it.
One additional reason that General Chamberlin resorted to tbe IAC as an estimating forum appears to have been his fear that CIA estimates, written without knowledge of the Clay cable andmmimizing the likelihood of war, would be given undue weight:
o not recallas so disturbed over an Immediate probabtlirv of war in the Spring of
o remember that we had some hesitancv of taking in all around strategic estimate from the CIA because of the comparativeelt that only by using the resources of all intelligence ageoeiesound estimateuined.
On Marchr early onh. Chamberlin telephoned the DCI. Admiral Hillcnkoetter, and asked whether he would mindpecial session of the IAC in ChamberUn's office. Whenasked why, Chamberlin cited without further specification an "important Armylthough IAC meetings were usually held in the CIA headquarters, Hillcnkoetter agreedpecialat the Pentagon, and it was scheduled for the morning of Friday,
Tbe Stale Department intelligence chief, W. Park Armstrong.ecalls having thought, during the ride out to the Pentagon, about
the precedent which was being set. with its appearance of subjecting the IAC to the controlepartmental service, rather than CIA. He wondered what the rrveeting would be about; bad he known that it would involve estimating Soviet intentions, he would have brought along OIR's Eastern Europe chief, William B. Baltis.
Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Inglis was also puzzled by the meeting in Ceneral Chamberlins office. Mr. Armstrongthatrolonged discussion about procedure before the meeting reached the substantive issue, Inglis wanted,to knowas happening: waseeting of the IAC, in which case Admiral Hillenkoetter should be at the head of the table, or was it fust an informal get-together? Chamberlin immediately offered to turn the chairmanship over to Hillenkoetter, but the DCI declined on the grounds that it was Ceneral Cbambcrlin's meeting and in his office, Finally it was agreed lo beormal IAC meetingMeeting of tbe IAChaired by Chamberlin.
Chamberlin then opened the meeting and tabled as the subject for discussion Clay's cable, which he read aloud to the assembled directors. The reactions were varied, but again the subject ofdiscussion was procedure. Admiral Inglis relates:
This dischnuie immediately raised twohe weight to be attached to the substance of the despatchhe manner in which it bad been handled. As presented at thatas not satisfied with either.
nd Airere talcing the contents at fareseriously that the possibility of immediate national mobdlrationull scale shooting World War III was mentioned.
My first reaction was to lake the substance of the messagerain of salt, but In any ease to subject it to thorough staff evaluation before arrivingonclusion. My second reaction was dismay that tbe despatch bad not been referred to CIA forthwith for coordination and correlation.
This was the very function for which CIA had been
When the discussion turned to the substance of the cable, no one voicedpectation that war would "come with dramaticbut there were distinct differences of view: Hillenkoetter, Inglis, and Armstrong were inclined to doubt its likelihood, while chamberlin. with Ceneral McDonald. was less confident that peace could be maintained. Some of the participants thought that Chamberlin considered war imminent Ceneral Chamberlin himself, however, recalls having been primarily concerned about. preparedness. In bisajor and immediate
buildup, primarily of land forces, would serve botharninghe Sovi.tj and as insurance against their launching an attack.
Procedure! MdsttOf*
Admiral Inglis suggested establishing an ad hoc committee under CIA chairmanship to study the matter of Soviet intentions, and this was at once agreed. Us estimating procedure would be different from the usual one wherein CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates woulda situation, prepare an estimate, send it around to the y. -IAC agencies to get criticisms or proposed additions, revise the draft, and then let the other agencies either concur or attach dissents.
This is what had been used on the standing ORE estimates which predicted hostile Soviet actions but nothing likely to culminateeliberate war. The new procedure would give the other agencies the feeling of being centrally involved In the estimating process and encourage their disclosure of Information which they had previously kept for their own departmental use. Thus the IAC chiefs' agreement on Marchilestone in interdepartmental cooperationorerunner of the systemational estimates introduced0 The report of the Dulles JacksonCorrea survey later8 observed:
The most significant exceptionather general faili.ro lo coordinate Intelligence opinion in national elUmatrieries of reports oo Soviei capahllltln and intentions, beginning In March, IMS, by an ad hoc com.his case illustrated that, when properlythe misting Intridepartmental arrangements can. under the leadership ol tha Central Intelligence Agency, provide use President and top potlcy-maktn with an authorltanve intelligence estimate
ome initial delay Mowing the receipt by the ArmynturiV in* menage Iron Ceneral Clay, the Preiideet onMSrief short-rangehe importance of thisparticularly in an emergencyifficult lo overemphaitre.
After the Marcheeting each agency sent out requests to the field for information useful In clarifying Soviet intentions. Admiral Hillenkoetter returned to his office and asked his Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, Theodore Babbitt, to prepareollow-up session of the IAC directors, accompanied by ibeir experts, to be held that same evening. OBE was organized along geographic lines, but there was one generalClobal Survey Croup" to which Mr. Babbitt turned for the forthcoming task. The "group" consisted of only two people, Indwell L, Moqtague and DeForrest
Van Slyck; the Utter was to become chairman of the proposed ad hoe committee.
Mr. Lawrence P. H. Healey of ONI's Estimates Staff retails learning of the Clay cable at Main Navy late in the afternoon that Friday:
hen ihe March crisis8 suddenly appeared, the Eittmateapruned (of suchand further sided by (he bet that om was itnall and conseo,ii*nlly easy to eoordlnaM. The most important (actorthat Admiral Inglis was always available to ill hands if the subject was
ram^TUjrT^sdlr that AdrWlr^tai sa^armned ns,ata to thea told me thai CenrraJ Chamberltoad setpecial briefing on tbe Soviet threat and bad Invited atteodanee from Navy. Air Form, and OA. [Alsodmiral Inglis asked ma to go along withelieve it wu at thta point when Admiral Inglis snowed me the Clay dispatch that appears to The Torrrrlai DiarWr
Ceneralfficers andovered allaspects o( the Soviet condition and than sal by.ecall, there were probably aboutuestsAfter tha pe* tenia two. Ceneralappeared qumtor comaaettt. Admiral Inglishaieople bad arrived at (he same poUOoo that ONI held.
Ceneraltated that he did not [entirely] agree wilh hit people and gave his own opinion to (be effect that the impending situation could be dire. Cat*ml McDonald of tha Alt Fore*ixogly Oipportod Ceneral Chamberlin He also introducw! Ceneral Cabell, wbo wu
banatter of days.
ceaD. tbe Best CIA speaker (probably Mr. Vaa Shrek) gaverather diplomatic suanrntry of has views which agreed with the substance of what Admiral Inglis had sard Shortly after, however. Dr. Samuel A. D. Hunter of the ClA Western European gtoup Hood up to say thatrexritatiOD admirably presented the known capabilities but he felt thai many Intangible* changed ihe picture (what bea logic ol Uva BiuatioaT) to one of grave conCe cecals Chamber Uo and McDonald! rushedo turn, asked his nans* again, ibook hands and coa-grarulatcd bias.
Tha ptesaatattoo and eearvwnta over, Admiral logbaode baek from the Pentagoneeling thai we were going lo have to spend tome lime ea what we used to rail 'intelligence ina, the ordeal ofaulty inteUigence picture which bad beean 'the frotil
- i" around (own.
The members of the ad hoc committee under Van Slyck prepared for their first formal session oo Saturday morning,h. The State Department representative.aUis, recalls having to tell his wife of the Saturday meeting, without much satisfaction, but knowing that thellilleukoettcr had presumably
briefed onword on Soviet intentions by Monday rooming. Van Slyek had not beenopy of the Clay cable, but he at least knew it was Clay't opinion that war might be imminent and that this was why his committee had been convened.
On Friday each of the armed lervices had sent to its fieldequest that tbe readiness of current emergency plans be reviewed:
Recent dcTclopoepild iltuittoo mate It advisable for all addrtisc[rji tofu'lj ybur^trVni emc>gcncr plans and insure that ruchInstructiaru as might be rcquUrd to cipcdite placing these plans Into effect are prepared.
This message Is based on general liruation and not on any new develop, menu not known to you. The Navy and Air Force have dispatched limila* mruagea.
Abo Friday and Saturday,ntelligence officials around theembassies, military intelligence headquarters, and CIA stations, undertook to reassess Soviet intentions The CIA station chief in Berlin and bis deputy, Dana B. Durand and Peter M. F. Sichel. for the Erst time learned ol Ceneral Clay'sarning. They visited lhe OMCUS intelligence chief. Colonel Pdcr P. Bodes, and hiseputy, Lawrence E. dcNeufville, to make an informal estimate, and all four agreed that lhe Soviets were not ready for war. In7 Durand and Stchel hadajor Soviet drive lo oust ibe Western powers from Berlin; this warning had led in WashingtonIA Special Evaluation forecasting that the Soviets would use "every means short of armed force" to compel the Allied withdrawal. As they now reviewed the situation, these two were convinced that the Soviets were planning further measures, short of war, to lhe same end. OMCUS intelligence had reached the snrne conclusions, although Colonel Bodes' chief, Major General Walsh, consideredistinct possibility and had therefore made arrangements to evacuate his family from Berlin.
Other reports for the ad hoc estimating committee came from tbe Heidelberg, PuIIseh, Wiesbaden, and Karlsruhe headquarters, from Ihe embassy in Moscow, andndcn, where Winston M. Scott Major Ceneralissell. and their staffs obtained information iiom British intelligence. In Washington, each agency had keyworking overtime to assemble the material Onecommittee, chaired by Captain Samuel B. Frankcl of OHE's Eastern European branch, ptovided an excellent compendium of
information on the USSR. Thii committee of Soviet experts had developed from an informal scries of weekly lunchei; it now servedonvenient clearing-house foe material on the Soviet Union.
Esttnurrfoe Tug of War
On Saturday morning the ad hoc committee met at CIA headquar-ters with Van Styck in the chair. State Department representative Ballis remembers that the two majors he called them, were Van Slyck of CIA end Colonel Ennishose respective organizations would have the bulk of relevant field-source information. Colonel Ennis was undero get backing for the Army's efforts to obtain passageelective service act and universal military training, as Van Slyck later reported to the DCI:
heHated that Central Chambrdatn [tie
i) wanted to have includedaeommrndation tee the .lull and urstvenal military tralnliif,rnphsUcally refused to consider.
Van Slyck declared, he recalls, that he was "running an intelligence estimates committee, not an appropriationsnd the group then limited its enquiry to its mandate from the IAC respecting Soviet intentions. The effectelective service program or UMT would be considered, if at all.eparate estimate. It was not until the IAC meeting of the following Mondaygain stressed Ihe need for an estimate supporting the draft and UMT.
According to participants* recollections, the committee'sthai Saturdayrolonged debate over semantics and whether wu could be calledr whatever. Although none of the members argued that war was likely,epresentatives opposed any direct statement thai it was improbable or unlikely, as Van Sfyek, Ballis. and Healey regarded it During the drafting sessions officials from the several departments came in from time to lime with additional data. Admiral Hillcn-koetter stopped In occasionally to ask, as Van Slyck remembers. "Van, is therean do forr, as Ballis recalls, to bringup of coffee-Van Slyckreliminary draft estimate which underwent revision during the sessions on Sunday.r. Ballis notes the importance of this procedure, of the fact that "Van Slyck wrote the estimate, and we reacted lo It. He was the key man In the
March
y the final session on Sunday, unanirnoui agreement hid been reachedraft estimate that war was improbable over tbe nextays. This conclusion was supported by details concerning Soviet activities, military and political, in which the absence of any of the usual indicators of impending bostuities was presumably controlling.
While the committee was drafting this joint estimate over thethe several departmental intelligence organizations weretheir own drafts, in order to help their, representatives contribute to the joint estimate and also to highlight diSerences with it or bring Out nuances lacking in it Ceneral Chambcrun improved the weekend by preparing, for Ceneral Bradley to read upon his return from Key.ajor review of the international situation, the possibility of war, and the inadequacy. forces. The memorandum rao eight pages of single-spacedines in all Its tenor can be gauged by the following excerpts:
9
Memorardum lo the Chief of Staff Sub|eet: estimate of World Situation
Military Imbalance.
The Soviet Armed Forces, reorganised and largely teequipped during tbe past year, overshadow the whole of Europe and most of Asia.
he Soviet Armed Force* have weaknessesheseo not appreciably affect tha short-range capabilities of crtikkly overrunning great eipantes of the European continent.
The United Slates has no forces in being which could prevent the Soviet overrunning of most of
resent forces which might oppose Soviet aggression throughout the world are tftcapabla of offering moteeak and unorganised delaying action us any of the likely theaters.
International Terusoo.
The world is now divided Into two camps, heightening the element of strain and making it possible that otherwise trivial incidents may beinto the spark that touches offbe advent of spring, coupled with coming elect!Ocu In Italy,fford no prospects of an early lesseoing of the tension which- Armed Forces Unequal to Cornmitments.
ar Increasingly Possible.
AD intelligence agencieseneral war might bethrough mischance oriscalculation on tbe part of either the Soviets or the United SlatW .. amioes not oRet
any evvdene*oot* concluilve now then wu th* cas* lU monthjear ago the Kill of war I* greater Irt the light of rhc current Incrraae of Uitrmatiooai tension, wax will becomeprobable.ummary
United Stateiithout th* backing of adequate armed ttrsmgrjiot proving fuckiiful in stemming ih* Sovieth* Soviets could overrun moch of continental Europe and th* Middle I'm before our latent itrengih could be breught lohe armed force* can no longer baa* thalr ibength and plane only upon theirofet military actloa. Continuously prepared, th* USSR can deteimlne npon war whenever tb*it ranoenary.onctutvjna.
o an eatent noty the ratherh*arrying the burden of military occupation duties and overseasbuthe least prepared of the tervicei to fnlMI rU national defeniehe Army muit immediately preparelong the following general
h Bring th* Regular Army. byecessary to compuliory military service.
e. Augment the lire of th* Regular
d. Bong our machinery for genenllon to an alarl. Liir't th*f further feaeign
Ceneral CbamberUn did not mention our small but significantof atomic weapons or the Armyperations consensus that after Initial setbacks the Western powers would be able to re-conquer western and central Europe and cause irreparable damage to the Soviet economy. He did cogently argue the need formoreear before the Soviet atomic bomb and events leading to the Korean War. This wasolicy than anpaper, though il was the Menertirieoial intelligence estimate" which the Ebersladt Task Force, without having seen It. thought might have had "seriouseneral Chambeilinswas the improvement. military capabilities; his deputy on the ad hoc committee, Colonel Ennis, had just agreed that the Soviets were not planning to launch an attack.
Admiral Inglis thought that the hysteria which might attend some degree of mobilization could result in "serious consequences* and might possibly trigger an accidental war. In the second act of the March Crisis, however, we shall find that the Soviets, in launching an elaborate deception operation onccompanied it by measures of troop discipline and control designed to minimize the
March Crhit
risk ol accidental wax and that in fact the March ccmfrontation at no turn* came close to war. Andersona) opinion is allowable, it is this writer's belief after five years of contemplating the March situation thatajor mobilization program as recommended by Ceneral Chsmberlin would not have triggered war. It is always tempting to dramatize the brink-of-war situation, in Thomas Hardy's words, "War makes rattling good history, but Peace Is poor reading."
Among the agreements reached during Forresul's meetings with the JCS at Key West was one, to press the Pjesident and theupplemental appropriation fory any of the several possible measures, the defense budget for3 was the lowest of those between World War II and the present. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, returning from Key Wert, were wary of any intelligence estimate which might be used, in an election year, as an argument against the supplemental9 appropriation and the increment in the0 budget which they considered essential to the nation's security. In advance, therefore, of the IAC meeting on Mondayhe chiefs of staff made known their apprehensions to their respective intelligence chiefs. Admiral Inglis recounts:
While the Intelligencedeliberating, and thereafter, outsidenitesbuildingu calledI believe it was General GibeD. then) and pouibly by Central CKamberlm. who tried tohat ONTi estimate wat toohat it should be mora In lute with tha purport of Ceneral Clay's metonsulted Healey again. We itood firm.
Admiral Inglis recalls having been also under some internal Navy pressure to adjust tbe estimateiew toward budgetary
I was Mid that use otherspecially Use Air Forte, were uuo* Ceneral Oay'i message to obtain more Ceatgretstona)tape-ciaOy for lheroups of homben, lhat the Army would ux it lo obtain tha draft md/or Universal Military Training; that (Le Secretary of Defense all also ad'ocatjng UMT. The Nivy was being placedornpetrtM* disadvantagehange om1 erneaataomething Oireatenang imt>er*ding wu' The Navy needed more appropriations, too.
I stood firm, eiplalntng the reasons for ONI's estimate.
Buiealize thai this wu Much? In Central Europe the harvcttind the ground wu drying and firming. Tha wu Use logical tun* lo ripect the Russians to "march "
My reply wu lo the efforthe Navy needed more ippr opit would have lo make its cat* with reasons otherhony wlr>
March Cfilii
stare from ONI. Quite gretuilouily. and outside tho scope olay have added that if anyone resJJy espected wsr, be had betteran immediate, hill-Kale crash mobdtjattou ratheronderous Ume-coniuming UMT. The dialogue ended.
It wa* this stand of the DNI which ultimately set Ihe pattern for the other service intelligence chiefs at the IAC meeting on Monday morning, when they and their top advisers, including the members of the ad hocormal session at CIA chaired by Admiral Hillenkoetter.
AgreemenI
Van Slyck presented the conclusions of the ad hoc committee. With its detail and showing the effectsompromise effort to sit Ihe fence on the likelihood of war. the draft estimate was unacceptable to the IAC The following is Admiral Inglis' recollection:
The IAC, Including OA of course, then debated at tome length theof the joint estsmat* which was to go to live President andanted toeservation that "the possibility of war could not be ruledNI did notay havelug forf so it was probably voted down as being beyond the scope of an intelligence teport.
But Hillenkoetter. who had seen the President again, required an answer for him that morning regarding Soviet intentions. The ONI representaiive on the ad hoc committee, Lawrence Healey, hasthe scene:
ur draft was so late aod split that Admiral HubraVoetter decided to narrow the issue and ttrongarm theulerikoetter saidto the effect thai the President wanted flat Yes or No answers to three questions wilh no etooorarfrm of anruenr. The questions were;
ill the Soviets deliberately provoke war in th* nestays?
n tbe nestays?
n IMS?
These questions were rather poorly hectograpbedlain sheet of paper. Their informality, brevity and bluntness had th* effect of an unespeeted ice-cold shower oo they impression that at leas) the majority answered No.
As there was general agreement that war was unlikely for at least the nextays, it was decided to consolidate the answers to questions
Morch
,. An estimate was dratted on the spot which summarized Soviet Intentions in two paragraphs:
examination of all pertioant available information has producedevidence that the USSR intends toilitary acltontxiiays.
Is oothat (he USSR will retort lo military actionnest
While argument continued" clause,handed this statement to Theodore_Babbitt. .and BabbittitIA^esttrnateto President Truman at the White House. Later inthe IAC directors reached agreement on the full text. Asto the Airhird paragraph contained" clause, andoncession to tbe Army awas drafted on UMT and selective service.
With slight variations, the estimate was distributed under several different covers on theof Tuesday,o theas CIA Intelligence Memorandumithout other concurrence; to the President, the NSC, and other recipients of CIA's Dailyas Special Evaluationith unanimous concurrence of State, Army, Air Force, and Navy; and with notice of the concurrences, to the President as Intelligences it was finally hand-carried to the White House: Memorandum for (he President
Reaiteisment of Soviet Intenrioni for the Nest Sirty Days
eiamlnation of all pertinent available information has producedevidence (bat the USSR intends to resort to military actionnest ststy days,
weight ofell as evidence, also leads to thethe USSR will not resort to military action within the out ilsty days.
is. nevertheless, the ever present possibility that someincident may result in wu.
In an even briefer Intelligence Memorandum,he IAC disposed of the effects of UMT or the draft upon Soviet intentions:
Memorandum for tbe President
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organiratsons of the Departments of State. War [tie:svy. and Air Fotce agree thai if the Congressniversal military training act and/or selective service act Ihesa measures, taken singly or together, will not of themselves cause the USSR to resort to military action within the nextays.
Although the formal estimates were not distributed until Tuesday, thethe extent that there was aover by Monday morning. Admiral Ingbs has summarized the situation as of
So far. Intelligence was concerned the "Match Crisisnded with tho meeting of the IAC ont was then gene.allv accepted that intelligence must be correlated, that CIA had the authority and lesporjaibiltty to do the correlating, that CIA must bo provided quickly with all information from all sources, and that all the other arencici must be consulted and all information erchanged fcept when tho item was obviously technical and of interest to only one department
Other war scares followed but henceforth they wen takenndo. The procedure had been established.
There were strong temptation, to aDow our Judgment to be warped. As regularly as the cherry blossom* Uoom in Potomac Park, every spring in Washingtoncramble for Congressionalittle war scare recurs at this time of year, not every year perhaps, but often enough to be moreoincidence.
Tbe easy way for as might have been to "Remember Pearl Harbor' and push the panic
However, had we njccumbed to these temptation* and given face value to theight have led to an ill-conceived aod enormouslv eipca-llve general mobiliaaUon. This would have put the whole world In an uproar. It might even havear.
Iteasure of Intestinal fortitude to stand up against the pressures...
The procedures facilitating mterdersartmental teamwork in theprocess, thus established byere to proveduring the last days of March, when the second phase of the crisis reached its climax. What appears to haveell-planned Soviet deception program ledlurry of excitement, but with the estimating procedures built up under the tensions of early March the Soviet activities were correctly assessed and reported, so lhat the highest policy makers in Washington could concentrate upon Ihe localhreat to the Western presence in Berlin. These steps in8 were small but crucial ones inenuine intelligence community.
Original document.
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