intelligence memorandum
SOVIET MILITARY THEORISTS REAPPRAISE NUCLEAR WAR
directorate of intelligence
t0
FOREWORD
This memorandum surveys recent developments in Soviet strategic thinking as reflected in the writings of Soviet military officers in tho Soviet public press and specialised professional journals. It assesses these developments in the light of all-source information on Soviet weapons programs and in the context oftrends in Soviet policy. It is intendedontribution to an understanding of the influences and purposes which are now shaping Soviet military policy.
This is the thirderies of memoranda in Soviet military policy and strategy which the Office of Research and Reports has issued since the advent of the new Soviet regime. Previous memoranda in this series were: CIA/RRoviet Mililary-Political Relations Six Months After Khrushchev.iTinnnT. and CIA/RRhe Military Issue in Soviet PolicyEGRKT.
- ii: -
-SfiCRM
-SECRET
CONTENTS
Summary
I. The Current Issues in Soviet Strategy
II. Criticism of Deterrence as Guideline ofH. The Question of War as an Instrument of Policy . . . .
IV. Stress on Conventional and Tactical Nuclear
Capabilities
V- New Emphases in Strategic Doctrine
VI. Trends in Overall National Policy
. v
SOVIET MILITARY THEORISTS REAPPRAISE NUCLEAR WAR*
Summary
A new round of debate over military strategy and doctrine has been taking place in the Soviet Union over the past year. I: contrast with those during the Khrushchev period, which centered largely on practical issues provoked by Khrushchev's force reduction policies, the current discussions are broader and more theoretical, and are raising questions concerning the basic assumptions that have governed the development of the armed forces since thes. They arc addressed to the doctrinal and structural biases which Khrushchev's policies introduced into the Soviet military establishment, including the limitations on Soviet strategy imposed by the USSR's inferiority in strategic forces, its deficiencies in limited warfareand its lack of capability to use military power selectively for limited objectives.
In gamibling on the possibility of achieving deterrence cheaply, Khrushchev neglected considerations important to the credibility of the Soviet deterrent and to the morale of his own officer corps. He tended to forget that the capability to deter war restsillingness to face it backed up by an ability to fight it at variouslevelsOf intensity. The military deficiencies
bv V CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of Research and Reports and coordinated with thelntellig*"ce and National Estimates; the estimates and conclusion, represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of
which stemmed from this oversight lie at the heart of the current discussions, and Soviet hopesore confident military posture depend upon their correction. Military theorists are exploring the problems of nuclear war. They are doing so, not because they believe that nuclear war has become more likely or becauseelief that the Soviet Union can now wage and winar, but because they believe that preparing for nuclear warecessary precondition forredible and effective deterrent. Witheterrent established, the doors would then be opened for the exploitation of all the options of strategy that localized superiority in limited conflict situations might afford.
Soviet theorists have also stressed the need to develop capabilities for conducting various forms of limited war, including wars waged primarily with conventional weapons or with the limited use of nuclear weapons. The acknowledgment that tactical nuclear weapons might be employed without inevitably producing general war represents an innovation in Soviet military doctrine. It is not clear, however, whether they believe that limited warfare car. be conducted in Europe.
The tone and character of the current doctrinal discussions appear rorowing confidence among Soviet military officers that the means totronger deterrent postureore flexible military strategy are gradually becoming available. Statements by the Soviet leadership indicate that Soviet policy is being increasingly affected by the need to meet heavy defense requirements. There appears toelationship between these developments, which gives grounds for surmising that the strategic concepts which the theorists are now developing are based not on hopes alone, but on political commitments to the same objectives.
I. The Current Issues in Soviet Strategy
A new round of debate over military strategy and doctrine has been taking place in the Soviet Union over the past year. In contrast with those during the Khrushchev period, which centered largely on practical issues provoked byorce reduction policies, the current discussions are broader and more theoretical, and are raising questions concerning the basic assumptions that have governed the development of the armed forces since thes. The natural eagerness of the military professionals to settle their doctrinal scores with Khrushchev, and the hospitality which the new regime has accorded these endeavors, have undoubtedly contributed to this revival of theoretical discussion. But the main impetus has probably comerowing confidence among Soviet military officers that the means toore flexible military strategy are gradually becoming available. The prospecttrengthened deterrenton the growth of the strategic attack and strategic defense forces that is taking place in the Soviet Union--has undoubtedly fortified them in this expectation.
Although Khrushchev has left the scene of Soviet policy-making, the heritage of his policies and ideas has continued to weigh heavily on Soviet strategic thinking. ense, military thinkers are as much preoccupied with Khrushchev today as they were before his political demise, for the problem of finding, ways to escape the limitations which hia policies had imposed on Soviet strategy has been the common task of much of the theoretical writing that has appeared in the Soviet press since he left tho scene.
The military establishment that Khrushchev left to his heirspecial-purpose organisation whose value as an instrument of policy tended to diminish as the United States acquired greater capabilities. It was structured and trained toeterrent role, on an assumption that general war was unlikely, and that il any direct cUafa between the great powers occurred, it would inevitably result in an all-out nuclear war. The Soviet deterrent consistedery large force of medium-range nuclear missiles, targeted mainly against Europe,maller force ofimed at the United States. Both these elements were deficient in the chief characteristiceliable deterrent, namely, survival capability, since during the early years of deployment most Soviet missiles were placed innprotected sites, and hence wrrc
SECRET
"OfiORJH'I'*
vulnerable to US strikes. Although this deficiency' has been reduced by new "hard" deployment in recent years, the Soviet 1CBM force has remained inferior to the US ICBM force, both in survival"capability and numbers.
The structure and capabilities of the Soviet theater forces wore naturally affected by the view that the main role in deterring war, or in conducting war if it should occur, would be played by the strategic forces. Soviet ground forces were reduced and streamlined to improve their mobility and their capabilities for independent actionuclear environment. Integral supporting elements were minimized and the required stocks and materialapid advance against light opposition were pre-positioned in Eastern Europe. The tactical air forces were reduced and naval building programs were revised to accord with the more limited mission assigned the Navy. All of these measures were influenced by Khrushchev's belief that he could safely divert resources from the theater forces for what he regarded as more essential military and civilian uses. The result of all this was that Soviet capabilities to use military forces selectively for limited objectives were dimini shed
In effect, the Soviet military establishment under Khrushchev became the victimelf-fulfilling prophecy. Believing that war could no longer bo usedational instrument of policy in the nuclear age, Khrushchev gambled on the possibility of achieving deterrence cheaply. In so doing, heactor which was important to the credibility of the Soviet deterrent and to the morale of his own officer corps, namely that the capability to deter war restsillingness to face it, backed up by an ability to fight it atvol
The military deficiencies that stem from this oversight lie at the heart of the current discussions in Ihe Soviet military press. The critical problems of Soviet strategy hinge upon the question of the Soviet Union's own view of its military relationship with the United States. It is for this reason, undoubtedly, th.it the discussions have focused on the problems of nuclear war, for It is upon the solution of these problems that hopesore confidenl posture in the military relationship with the United States mainly depend. In exploring the ways in which the Sovirt Union could cope with the problemsuclear war, Soviet theorists have not necessarily concluded thatontingency has become more likely. They are seeking, rather, to face the
possibility squarely in order to find the ways inore reliable deterrent can be developed. With this assured, the doors would then be opened for the exploitation of all the options of strategy that localised superiority In limited conflict situations might afford.
of Deterrence as Guideline of .
A few months after the removal of Khrushchev, while the.new political leaders kept their counsel on defenseradual but unmistakable reaction to Khrushchev's policies began to appear in the Soviet military press. The reaction was marked by condemnations of "subjective" methods of policy formulation and appealstrengthened, more balanced defense posture basedscientific" analysis of the nature of war and of the requirements it posed. The keynote of the new movement in military thinking was the argument that military policy should be based not on the assumption that war was unlikely but rather on the assumption that, although unlikely, wareal possibility in the contemporary world.
The first and most direct assertion of this argumentwas presented by two well-known military figures, Major General K. Bochkarev and Colonelidelnikov, in an article in Red Star on They couched their argument in the form of an attack on unnamed comrades who, they said, stressed the "possibility of preventing war through the deterrent effect of nuclear rocket weapons, rather than giving sufficient attention to the possibility that war might occur. " The purposesthis attack on the premises of Khrushchev's military policy were probably mixed. Considerations relating to budgetary allocations may haveart. Indeed, this aspect of the argument was made explicit later in the year by the same Sidelnikov when he wrote in Red Star oneptember that the tendency to overemphasize the deterrent role of the armed forces could lead to questioning the "need to spend large resources on them. " Yet, it is also clearainunderlying the attackenuine apprehension that theof the armed forces were,being diminished by the doctrinal assumption that war was unlikely.
Question of War as an Instrument of Policy
The same concern appears to be reflected in the renewed attention that has been given in the Soviet military press to the question whether war in the nuclear age can still be usedational instrument of policy
When thia question was debated with the Chinese some years ago, the Soviet position was that the principle of the relationship between war and policy remained valid in theory but that the application of the principle in the conditions of nuclear war would be invalid, because the goals of policy could not thereby bo achieved. Now the emphasis has perceptibly shifted. Tho burden of the argument now being developed in the military press (with varying degrees of rigor) is that nuclear war, like any war. is susceptible to rational control and that it can be used as an instrument of policy. Needless to say, the Soviet authors make clear that Soviet use of nuclear war would be for defensive purposes only.
La. Colonel Rybkin, whose article in Communist of the Armed Forces in5 first raised the subject in its present form, emphasized the practical implications of the question. "To maintain that victory in nuclear war is absolutelye wrote, "would not only be false on theoretical grounds, but dangerous alsoolitical point of view. " Rybkin did not push the argument to its logical conclusion; his articleragmatic understanding of the effects of nuclear warecognition that the applicability of the principle was circumscribed. But other writers following him dropped the qualifications which he retained. What they have been arguing, it is clear, is thatorld in which nuclear war was still possible, the Soviet Union should put itselfosition from which it could faceossibility with confidence.
IV. Stress on Conventional and Tactical Nuclear Capabilities
The military writings of the past year have sketched only the broad outlines of the practical measures that are being proposed to translate these doctrinal injunctions into reality. One conclusion that military writers appear to have arrived at is that the Soviet Union should seek to improve its general purpose forces in order to broaden the range of options available to it. in conflict situations. With increasing explicitncss. Soviet theorists now speak of the possibility of prolonged conventional war and of war limited to tactical nuclear weapons.
Although indications of increasing rcceptivencss to the ration of non-nuclear war have cropped up in theoretical writings for several years, it is only since the change of regime that top level military figures have taken public positions sympathetic to this line of thought. The first was Marshal Rotmistrov, who in attacking the proposal for
a belt of atomic land mines along the German border, in4 voiced the curious complaint that the upshot of the arrangement would be to trigger any hostilities to the nuclear level. The Implication was clear that without suchuropean war might take placeon-nuclear level. An even more explicit acknowledgment thatossibility was being reckoned with was given by Marshal Malinovskiy in In reiterating the standard Soviet line that victory in war depended mainly on nuclear-rocket weapons, Malinovskiyew qualifying proviso. This would be the case, he added, "if they are used."
Acknowledgments that tactical nuclear weapons might be usedar without triggering an automatic escalation to the strategic level are an entirely new note in Soviet doctrinal writings. umber of such statements have been made over the past year or so. General Shtemanko, for example, writing on the Soviet Ground Forces in Soviet Russia inade the observation that these forces wouldarticularly important role in wars not involving the use of nuclear weapons, "or involving their limited userominent military theorist. Colonel General Lomov, writing at about the same lime in Communist of the Armed Forces, went even further in acknowledging this possibility. Kmpha siting the need to prepare for the possibility of "local" wars, Lomov pointed out that Such wars had taken place over the world, and could occur "even in Europe. 11 He then went on to say that although such wars were usually fought with conventional weapons, "this docs not exclude the possibility of employing tactical nuclear
The question whether the USSR envisions the possibility of limited forms of warfare in Europe, as opposed to other areas where the interests of the great powers are not so deeply committed, is still ambiguous. Lomov, in the article cited above, at least left this possibility open, although he indicated that he believed it to be an unlikely one. If the nuclear powers become involved in "local" war. he said, "the probability of escalationuclear world war is always great and in some circumstanceshis position, carefully calculated to take account of all possibilities, yet conscious of the need to emphasize the main threat, probably typifies the main trend of thinking in the Soviet General Staff on this question.
As the logic of the trends described above would suggest. Soviet military theorists have come to recognize that the character and durationuture war cannot be predicted with any certainty. In
contrast with Khrushchev's assertionsuture general war would be decidedatter of days, Soviet writers now give greater stress lo the viewuture war may be prolonged, even if nuclear weapons are employed. In the literature of the past year or so, increasing attention has* been given to the need for preparing the country ahead of time for all the requirements that may be poseduture war. From this, further specific arguments are derived: the need for armies of great strength, backed by reserves of trained personnel, plus adequate stockpiles of materielapability to convert industry rapidlyar footing.
But tho increasing Soviet emphasis on the possibility that war may assume various forms docs not give grounds for assuming thai priority attention is no longer being given to the possibility of general nuclear war. Despite the tendencies noted above to concede that localized clashes between Communist and Western forces might take placeimited basis and that even the introduction of tactical nuclear weaponslocal" war would not necessarily mean an automatic escalation to general war, Soviet theorists arc conscious of the fact that their capabilities to deal effectively with limited conflict situations depend upon the capabilities to prevent such situations from becoming Thus, the main problem for Soviet military theory continues to be that of preparing the armed forces to face the threat of nuclear war. As Colonel General Lomov put it, "ihe main direction" in the development of the Soviet armed forces is defined by "the requirements of world nuclear war. "
V. New Kmphases in Strategic Doctrine
There has been considerable effort over the past year to flesh out the bare bones of this doctrinal assertion with practicalas touclear war might actually be conducted. Military writers have been at pains to reconcile the long-held tenet of Soviet doctrine that force superiorityrerequisite of victory with thefacts of the present strategic relationship with the United States. The articlesumber of theoretical solutions to the problem of achieving superiority, based on exploitation of the peculiar characteristics ofocket war toahorableof forces. " Several aspects of modern war which are believed to offer potential advantage in thiB respect have received particular emphasis. None of the points made is entirely new to Soviet strategic thinking. What is significant is the emphasis that is being given to these points in the context of the genera] revival of strategic thinking that is now taking place.
SECRET "
First,ecognised that the USSR must be capable of detecting Western preparation for an attack. Marshal Sokolovskly and Major General Chcrodnichenko, for example, writing in Communist of the Armed Forces ofbserved that not only is it possible to detect in time the onset of an attack, but also the "start of direct preparation" for an attack. In other words, they added, "thereossibility of noturprise attack. " There is an implicit assumption here that Soviet strategy will be able to rely uponand detection techniques to recognize the threat of anworld war. There is also an assumption that the Soviet Union will bo able to turn the factor of surprise to its own advantage.
Soviet strategy could further rely, it is argued,owerful strategic attack capability to exploit the advantages gained through early warning. iscussion of "The Time Factor in Modernolonel I. Gurdinin, writing in Communist of the Armed Forces ofbserved that the "first massive nuclear strikes" can possibly predetermine the entire outcome of the war. Thus, he concluded, combat readiness has come to mean in part the ability of the armed forces to "thwart any aggressive attempts totrike and achieve the decisive goals of war in the initial phase." Colonel P. Trifoncnkov, writing earlier in Communist of the Armed Forces ofmputed even greater importance to this principle when he stated that timely nuclear strikes against the enemy willdecisive" factor in the struggle for force superiority. Such strikes, he further contended, can "quickly and radically alter the correlation of forces, "
"Thwarting" of an aggressive attack, based upon early recognitioneveloping threat,re-emptive Soviet strike, awhich the Soviet theoristsnly in veiled terms. Soviet strategy is said to he retaliatory, with liic Soviet forces held intotimely answering blow" to the aggressor. As it is treated in certain statements, however, this formula clearly contains tUe basisre-emptive doctrine. According to Sokolovskiy and Cherednichcnko, for example, in the article oited above, the "answering blow"not only involve retaliation following aggressive attack, but also the "frustration of the enemy's aggressive plans. 11 The "timely answen ng blow" therefore might be deliver--'! in response to anticipated enemy attack. The deliberate ambiguily evident in the treatment of this question probably results from the political sensitivity of the .questionwar initiation. Ars the Soviet Union's role in any possible
-SEefttff
war is always construed as essentially defensive, the theorists would be constrained fromre-emptive war doctrine
There is little indication in the public commentary that Soviet views on the efficacy of surprise strikes are based on any very sophisticated targeting philosophy. Expectations regarding this form of attack appear to rest on the general shock effects of nuclear strikes, which would presumably include disruption of command and control and perhaps paralysis of the national will <to continue struggle. But some references to the damage-limiting effects of surprise attack suggest that the influence of counterforce concepts is now beginning to be felt in Soviet strategic thinking. Lt. Colonel Rybkin, for example, in the article cited above, observed that the "more decisively and quickly" the imperialist aggressive actions are stopped, "the Jess-serious will be the unfavorableof the war."ore explicit reference to the damage-limiting effects of nuclear strikes was given by Colonel General Lomov, who staled that the abilityountry to resist an enemy nuclear attack depends first of all on how much the nuclear forces of the enemy can be "neutralized or weakened,"
Perhaps the most explicit reference to the defensive function of nuclear strikes was provided in an article by Colonel Krupnov which appeared in Red Star Noting the interaction that had always obtained between methods of attack and methods of defense in wars of the past. Krupnov observed that,esult of the introduction of nuclear weapons, essential changes were occurring in this relation-ship. Under present conditions, he said, one candrawing together" o( these two main types of combat operations. Now, he said, the function of attack and the function of defense are achieved "simultaneously" by strategic rocket strikes.
Despite the importance which the Soviet theorists attach to the exploitation of surprise in war, they recognize that this factor could not eliminate the .threat of retaliation if it were attemptedower with the strategic capability of the United States. Consequently, military theorists emphasise the importance of strong "reactive" defensive capabilities. Lomov. for example, wrote of the need to insure defense "in the broad meaning of then which he included air and civil defense as well as the aboveblunting"measures. Rybkin, too, emphasized this need, when he wrote of the possibility of developing and producing instruments of war which
rHrF
could reliably "parry" an enemy's nuclear strike. What is being argued here, obviously, is that strong defensive measures provided by powerful long-range air and anti-missile systems, combinedapability to detect and blunt the attacks of an enemy, would go far to compensate for the numerical inferiority in strategic weapons which the Soviet Union.
These brief indications of the trends in Soviet doctrinal discussionovement toward certain concepts which have been present in US strategy for some time. These trends thus pointrowing maturity in Sovietapacity to change and develop as needs and capabilities dictate. They register the unwillingness of Soviet military thinkers to remain tied to doctrines which condemn the Soviet Unionsecond-best" strategic position and which deprive it of the flexibility appropriatereat power in the nuclear world. More importantly, they reflect the new political environment resulting largely from the escalation of the war in Vietnam and the ouster of Khrushchev. The military establishment no doubt has long believed what; it is now setting forth in print; the significant shift is that the political leadership apparently is now willing to have this subject aired because it shares the views of the military.
This is perhaps the principal lesson to be drawn from these discussions, for there is every indication that the strategicthat have now begun will be carried forward vigorously with strong official support. There have been intimations that Woslern research institutions--the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, and the Institute for Strategic Studies in Great Britain being specifically mentionedhave impressed Soviet officials as models worthy of emulation.. The call which General Yepishev. as chief of the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense, made atd Party Congress for greater efforts in the "scientific and technical" analysis of the "characterossible thermonuclear war" expresses the atmosphere of official encouragement in which the military leaders are now operating, one in which the politrcal leaders are apparently in agreement with the military about the need for revisions in military doctrine.
VI. Trends in Overall National Policy
The developments outlined above relate to one side of the policy makinghat is, they described certain of the pressures felt by the Soviet leadershiperiod when critical decisions
-
fi.vii CU 1'
c
affectingcurity position of the Soviet Union will have to be made. What effect these pressures will have in influencing future decisions on resource allocations and on the development and deployment of major weapons systems remains uncertain. Thus far. the Soviet leaders appear to believe that they can find ways of avoiding the hard economic choices which would definitely foreclose the chance of achieving one or more of tho objectives-outlined in the current five year plan.
The new regime's hope of avoiding the bp hard choices appears to lie in the expectation of an increase in output and in productivity of the economy through better management and planning techniques. The result wouldarger pie to cut among the other major claimants on nationalnvestment and consumption. ey factor in this prospectus, obviously, is whether the international environment will remain sufficiently calm to permit the Soviet leadership tothe satisfaction of some defense claims in the interests ofore balanced growth of the economyhole.
The evidence of the leadership's views on this question is far from conclusive, but such indications as have been given pointeightening ratheroderation of concern over national security. Certainly the Soviet outlook is influenced by the prospectontinuing US buildup of military strength in connection with the war in Vietnam. Several times in recent months there have been echoes of thoseacknowledgments regarding the burdens of defense which Inst year appeared tohift in the regime's policyreaterof military interests. Atd Party Congress in April, for example, Kosygin conceded that the relatively modest plans that were being projected for the growth of the economy were the result of the threatening world situation. "If matters depended solely one added, "we would surely have made substantial cuts in military" Similarly, in his election speech in. Breahncv asserted that "expenditures for the army and armamentsreat burden for the budget, for our national economy." Claiming that the Party would like to drop "al least pari of this load" from the people's shouldcrB, he went on to say that the "situation" did not permit this solution.
In sum, the public indicators of leadership attitudes suggest that Soviet policy has moved in the directiontronger defense effort. That this effort is large in scope and strong in momentum can befrom the statements by the Soviet lenders cited above and from
the similarity of these statements to others which preceded themear before. The trends of Soviet policy on the defense issue thus appear to support the implications of the doctrinal discussions analyzed above. This gives grounds for believing that the expectations that appear to be reflected in these dlscussions--namely, that the material means totronger deterrent postureore flexible military strategy are gradually becoming available to the Soviet military establishment--arc baaed not on hopes alone but on confidence that the political leadership is also committed to these same objectives.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: