OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
TITLE: The Detection Of Joe l
AUTHOR: Doyle L. Northmp and Donald H. Rock
VOLUME: 10
STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection of ortlclos on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.
All stiicmenis of faci, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence arc those of
the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the conterus should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual staicmenls and interpretations.
CIAvndeTK>urished but obstinate infant
BPif-'Aii' iV.system is rescued by Ot own
L, Norshrup
Daeudd H. Rock'
egan hut like many of theounded tn tie long Range Detectionield unit reported9ilter paper exposed for three hours0 feeteather plane flying from Japan to Alaskaadioactivity ofounts per minute,ounts over the recently halved official threshold of significance. But this time the slight radicatioo was toassive reaction.
Before it was over, the Air Weather Service had mountedpecial air sampling flights from Guam to the North Pole and from Japan to the British Isles. As tbe radioactive cloud moved east, Britishwere alerted and the RAF Sew missions bom Cibraharatitude. Other samples were taken by fixed air sampling stations In the Far East and North America and by Navy rainwater stations in North America.
Analyses of the air filter samples by Air Forces contractor Tracer lab and the Lot Alamos Scientific Laboratory provided unambiguous evidence that the Soviets had succeeded inlutonium bomb- The rainwater samples, analyzed by tbe Naval Researchthe Los Alamos lab. and the University of California Radiation Laboratory, later told rnore about the nature and timing of the shot. conclusion was udepeodeotiy confirmed by the British sampling and radiochemical analysis It was firm enough for Piesi-
' Tills is an editorial coajoiidaUooecret article hy the mthott ss-itb portions oi another ttndy of bfgbn ckofficatioa.
dent Truinan to announce oneptember thai in atomle device had been detonated by tbe USSR betweennd
How did it happen that an atomic test detection organization was in operation inwo yean before the earliest estimated time when there would be anything foe ft to detect? *
Ceneaii
In0 General Hoyt VanoVrsberg. as DO, actinghe Army Air Forces (RAD chief Cerseral LeUeyerseralrote Cerseral Ctovex, whose Manhattan Engineering District bad not only created the bomb but pioneered methods of defecting foreign atomic development work including test explosions, that the Central Intelligence Group proposed to. detection efforts, particularly by "continuous surveillance of tbe physical phenomena in thesked about suitablefor this purpose, requested data from last summers "Cross-roads" tests at Bikini bearing on It, and invited "advice and opinion" generally. Because such information had been most closely held far the MED and because there was anxiety at the time as to how military interests would be aafesruarded In MEDs imminent turnover to the new Atomic Energy Commission, thereood deal of Informal
two-yearthough cooveytag the fight eeosnjthe lavor. Is aa over-suDPUSksboa.d>rir fcy Senslof HCieolooper of Pw conrresuoosl tatol cODonrrree on atonsicertessnewtni oo the dates b. th* Sist Soviet bomb and foe mbrtantsal stockpluag had been coordinated more ar less thoKHirhlj smong the arrack* concerned. The fust ofdsted ISad the first bomb doubtfullmost certainly nota probable date esbmittblr. The Director of hsteTJigence of the three-owatt old US AF. bo-aver, bad not been consulted, and he wrota ihe DO thatsrasfor me to spptwiale the rshflosopby which pessnlts in opbmgUc ftadaag that Inevitably wttl tend lo soilodine of (sis* eacwity which eertalnly wiD be oo Incentive to(It was aot yet established la tbe oorn.nuiu'ty thst "IneeoUve to acnoa" wasroper fuisction of sntetllzeooe
Tha cothre- the earbeat "remotely pcatMe- date back to oud-lSSO and madeheear later. less than two months before Joebe interdepartmental Joint Nuclear ejwrsry IntelU-eence Committee reftersted ihese dates but fuzzed the earlier one by raying that new trdortrutlon oo one meihcd used by the Soviets "suggests that their first atocoic bomb cannot be cornpleted beforeevised version of this estimate forwirded to the Joint Cruetsouple of days oftself made theaaH coottogent upon this method 'a being (be only one they
consultation between parties on ibis request before Craves replied in writing el the end of December. He said that Instsumontation was practicable, but both instruments and procedureapid conununicatioos net would be necessary. Heibuiy agency should be designated to work the process out but approved tbe DCTi "taking tbet Crossroads, an annex showed, air sampling bynd some acoustic detection devices among other methods had been tried, but the results were not clear and condmfve.
After the AECs takeover from MED inommissioner Admiral Strauss was its chief promoter of "continuous ntonitoring ofe discussed the urgencyetection system with his fellow commissioners, with Navy Secretary Forrestal, and with On oral Vandenberg and leccnunended mterservice action. Later be apparently thought of himself as the one person primarilyfor what was eventually done.'
Onarch, whether on Strauss's urging or fa consequence of the earlier mltJatives. Vandenberg asked War, Navy,C, and the Joint Research ft Development Board to join with CIC ina committee of specialists to formulate an over-all long-range detection plan. This was done, and onune Admiral R. H. fiilleo-koetter, who bad succeeded Vandenberg as DCI, sent the other four ageneies the committee's fadings. Itetwork of acousticeismogiapluc network based mostly on existingystem for sampling air and rainwater by aircraft and surface stations, arrangements for existing laboratories to analyze the samples, and facilities for reportingontrol central that would direct operations. It thought two years might be required to getomplete network; into operation; but In the meantimeof normal background radioactivity should be established, and air sampling foe this purpose, wbich could be started inrrrrediately "through flights of suitably equippedust might "yield In-forrnatido indicative of an atomic explosion If any should have occurred during the. operations."
Action
^my Air Forces be given
ST?*? ar and tbe Navy*wo days before the Air Force Lewu L.
I
eparate service. Army Chief of Stiff Eisenhower issued this directive:
Tbe Cornmaodiaf.Arnty Air Force*,hereby charged wnk UV f iil retpoonbaiiy loraooUt nplcukxu anywhere to the wortd-Thno Indodf (he collection, jjyiii aod evaluation of (he required scseabac dm aad the appropriate dluemliiation of the muilljeoee-
In carrying out tfusbdJy, the CoaiBuu-iiog General, AmyAir Forms. wfD wflin- to the cuirWai essetingind 'ItcOtOa. hxh Mdua and wtfhout the War DepeiOneat. wSD eatablnh apcsrcoraala asiaogawtih etheragencse* far rsooeanry asBSeaac*fleetauXatsUa LsUoo -sthpartKS-ntinr, o>oo*
With this directive. Long Range Detection, as the Air Force named the program, was launched. Whether or not the directive intended that LRD literally be accomplished without additionalwas the tenor of some later mterpretarions and would have beenwith considerable thinking it the time it wasmade oo provision for implementing funds and established no priority for the- program
Two days later the Air Forces Special Weapons Croup, wlueh had been assigned the detection responsibility, began to plan withcore of other agencies trial detection operations In connection with the "Sandstone" tests scheduled at Enlwetok for the Spring& Allocations of the LRD effort, initially for Sandstone but to be continued in what was to be called an Interim Surveillance Research Net, were shortly agreed upon. Air Force would befor air sampling by Air Weather Serviceregular flight} had been suggested for this purpose even before the specialists' committeeat weather ground stations,entral control center, and for initiating or rssoeutoring research and experimentation by other government agencies and external iiistitulions, lt contracted with Tracesiab of Boston (and later Califcernia) to do tbe bulk of radiocfsemlcal analysis. Coast and Geodetic Survey would do special monitoring at its existing seismic posts and on discreetly arranged Input from foreign stations. Navy would be responsible for underwater sonic observations and rainwater sampling as well as some research in sample analysis techniques. Army Signal Corps would provide data from its existing and possibly some added acoustic nations AEC would participate ha research and development and in sample analysis.
Tbe hastily made arrangements for the Enisvetok texts turned out cjuite productive. Tbe capabilities of aircraft air sampling were clearly demonstrated with externally mounted air filtersapers- ExterrsrVe meteorological observationsacific line of intercept fee air masses moving eastward from tbe USSR. Tracerltb sample arialysis proved highly effective. Inlthough termed an experimental and developmental program rathor than purporting to,be operational, and long to be faced with budget difficulties which ruled outhe desired depth, actual detection surveillance began along lines which generally were those operative at the tunc ofear later.
Mortey TroubU
Even before the Sandstone tests at Eniwetok. however, theof funding research under the conservative eye of the Research and Development Board became evident The RDB, coordinator of tbe United States* burgeoning postwar defense-related research and development, in effect exercised command authority over agency budgets and so adjudicated mterservicc rivalries fn this field. Its consistent views on LBD were such as to reduce the scope of research to air samplingnited seismic studies. Tbe accomplishments at Sandstone were made possible by an AEC loan of left-overProject funds, obtained through the good offices of Admiral Strauss, and advances from other participating agencies.
Thus when tbe newly organized Air Force Office of Atomic Energyors it began interim survtallance Inesearch and development program wbich would haveuTioo fn9illion inheommittee on Atomic Energy under Chairman J. Robert Oppenbeuner would approve only that portion of it devoted to work on nuclear debris sampling and studies to tell whether an explosion could be distinguished from an earthquake. Tbe Committee said that acoustic methods showed so little promise of success at long ranges and were so ambiguous in comparison with radiochemical methods that tbey did not justify additional effort. AFOAT-1this position and askedeview by tbe RDB Committee on Geophysics and Geography, but the Board supported itsoo Atomic Energy.
From then ooas engagedontinuous running battle with tbe Coaimittoc, first under Cpperdsrarracr and then under James
Jot, I
B. Conant The initial program reejttfrcmentsflliori were cut Erstillion and then toillion.
laerseral Vandenberg, now Air Faroe Chief of Staff, wrote to the Joint Chief*:
U tbe JCS cannotto famish tbe RDB rbaUelc psidanoe wbleb will trioleateatrQircoce en atomicf MdSeteot Imnor-tanot to tmttfyewarcb and develtpoMat now under axuidentkm .
Soaeeary ef DrfcnH for decinoo.
The JCS dademorandum, but tbe RDB did not regard ft as sufficiently specific guidance andew panel of coosult-anU which was to report its views after some months ofe6nite determination, the RDB's Committor) on Atomic Energy voiced its "belief, the Air Force dissenting, thatillion total cost of Long Range Detection could be spent morether fields of research and de rmopmnat."
Practice for Real
While all this budge* battle was being waged, operationalwas accumulating In the running of the interim experimental net. There were communicafioas problems to overcome, specialized tof^stical support for the technical trams in the field to be arranged, operating manuals to be written, criteria of rignincauce to be refined,ost of similar matters to be taken care oL It was arranged that the Navy should establish on Kodiak Island, in the interestsaval research program, an experimental station which would also form part of AFOAT-li net. It bad ait. aluminum roofpecially designed run-off coOectioo tank. If there was no rainadioactive cloud passed over the station, "roof scrubbing" would be directed to collect the dry fallout.
Air Weather now bad roughlynd was reckoned to be using0 personnel in direct and secondary support of tbe interimubstantial number of this complement, stationed in the continental Unitedere available for alert scrambling to back up the programmed surveillance along tbe arcs from Cuam-Bermuda to the Pole, which required sir to seven regular long-range Eights eachours. It was calculated that the schedule would provide atpereerst effective coverage.
After the Sandstone testa the rambnum level of rignificaritwas setounts per minute for aerial filtersor those at ground level These were made criteria for an alert in the eipcTimental detection systemew operating procedure was put Into effecthe aerial rrunlmum was dropped, on the basis of accumulated experience, to SO counts per minute. Every alert was treated asossible Soviet nuclear test, but each of the fast UI could be shown teyond leisraaaHe doubt to reflect DOtbing more seriousolcanic explosion, earthquake, or normal variation' In background radioactivity. One source ofwas ebniinated when it was found thatbich consistently radicated radioactive contact upon return to base bad been contaminated on close in flights at Eoiwetok. Air sampling -settled into sooxuSingoutine.
Then shortly after dinner on Saturdayhe report from Alaska that set offame fn to tbeata Analysis Center incounts per minute on a'filter paper airborne three hours over the north Pacific. Almost immediatelyompanion paper from tbe same plane was clockedounts per minute; this was dispatched to Tracerlab to Callftmoia, whither it would be three days fa transit by ordinary flights. In tbe meantime tbe Alaska station made regularof decay rates oo tbe first paper.
As successive measurements were reported and plotted at Qse Wash-Ington Center, ft became more and more evident there that there must be fresh fission products in tbe atmosphere. Still, it could hardly be bomblassified chart left in tbe Center from Fridays intelligence briefing gave the latest estimate on (he date of the first Soviet nuclear test as follows:
Mori LUrIKS
Fosntls-WSS
Unless there was something wrong with this timetable
Sunday and Monday of tbe Labor Day weekend found thetaff amiously following the bi-bourry decay measurements oo the sample and sending out more sampling missions. Was this pickup from the leading edge or from the tail endadioactive cloud?
' Suebove.
-
To answer thishghts were scheduled tram Alaska to Hawaii on Sunday and from California to Alaska on Monday, tracing one westerly and one easterly intercept arcpecial mission was sent from Alaska to search the area oorth and cast over tbe Beaufort Sea.
Butestioo was answered without these special flights.
ufm^^
flight from Cuam measuredounts per
imes the designated threshold of significance This sample was dispatched by special aircraft to Iraccrlabr. enabiishrnerxt fn Cali-fornia and arrived the next day. Meanwhile, other decay mearure-ments mdicared the collection of long-lived radioactivity by USAF ground based air filtering units at Fort Randall andhe Aleutian chain earlyeptember andtation in northern Japaneptember. Positive mterceptlon was reported from the California Alaska and Alaska-Hawaii flights.
Manioc ConfrmaSioa
0 in tbe meaningeptember Tracerlab telephoned that the fission isotopes of barium and cerium bad been identified la its samples; five hours later ft confirmed tbe presence of the fission isotope of nsolytsdenom. Conducing now that the nuclear debris was very likely the resultoviet test,rdered an all-out effort to cx>uect as many samples as possible. All told,ndeptember, thepecial Air Weather flights sampling the area from Cuam to the North Pole and from California to the British Islesmoreadioactivef them0 counts per minute.
The flight crews had not been briefed on tbe highly classifiedmission. They only knew that at approximately three-hour mtervals on routine flightsould be depresrurized soew piece of paper could be inserted in the sampler mounted on top. Now during theperations the filter papers bad to be changed more treopxntry. After each change It took SO orinutes to regain cabin pressure and heat, and thenew minutes it would all be spilled again for the next change On missionsrours long in Arctic regions thiseal hardship. Rest
riorcnver, because of Ihe large number of special flights, were short or virtually nonexisterif.
eptember tbe sampling yield indicated that the air mass with the bomb debris was leaving the North American eootirsent headed for the Brtcbh Mi The President's approval was obtained to notify British arrrfacriues, and faight classified teleconference oneptember British scientists aod intelligence experts were passed tbe fafnrrrsatian n^
ere had been IllrSmg fhghVcvery other day fa the vicirtify aod south to Gibraltar. pecial flightN sent out oo
eptember and the Cthraltar flight onh collected fresh nuclear debris. Then other UK flights were vectored to malre further collections.
Byeptember Tracer lab bad completed Its analysis of the aerial filter papers, and the results madetebrrsmary estimate of the date of caigin of the9 August) and the type of fisnoo-able material it came fromince the end of the Sandstone tests Tracer lab had been engaged fa perfectingtechniques, makfag cahheabon mearurements on material Irradiated at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. One calibration not yet made ooocemedurry-up call to Los Alamos arranged for tbe required irradution over tbe weekend ofeptember and delivery of tbe sample to Tracer lab on Monday. This permitted tbe additional firm coodsrsion that large amounts of normal uranium were employed fa the Soviet device,
confirmation, the naval research station oo Kodiak Island, where gamma ray detectors beganeptember toise fa rtackground radioactivity, made two2 Septemberwere subsequently found to contain large samples of the nuclear debris. To get another independent analysis an aerial filter paper was sent to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.
All sources were also checked for geophysical evidence orBut no acoustic waves from the explosion could be found fa the records of the Signal Corps' acoustic net, and the Coast Surveys releseisnuc network showed no seismic waves from an explosion fa tbe USSR. The absence of acoustic and seismic data prevented any close deterirunatioo of the location, time, and yield of the Soviet test
Jot I
A clowning lite picked ihii juncture to hive the RDB studyin die spring piesent its report- It recommended onto the RDB Committee on Atomic Energy that the needby mstsumental merni be reeuirunediew tothe research and developmeot phase of the long rangeand that the LRD budget foee reduced to amillion lower tbio whit had already been obligated. Bythis rcconuneodibon bad been approved oo up thethe RDBtop order cancelling alt further LRD erpendi-
tures. In view of what LRD was expending Its effort on at tbe
nrrroment, bow ever,as^
to reverse this order.
Dr. Vannevar Bush, wartime bead of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, was asked loanel to review the LRDeeting was held before the psnel oneptember, attended by representatives of all agencies concerned, the radio-anib/sis bboritories, and the British government. AFOAT-1tlie technical data available and presented its conclusions. "
Analysis of samples bad identifiednd fissionAg'u. Ba'-r* ,andatios of these products established the date of fission as between SB andate confirmed by gross decay curves of the mired products. Autoradlographs showed that the radioactive material, some of itwas chemically dtfletent bom that from the Bikiniest!
mua roovtment out oi inc Soviet Unione radiochemicalugust placed the source somewhere over Asia between the east 3Stbth meridians. It was concluded:
TW ebterwdan tO costatfleot wttb Che view thai the oOr* of the fission pnviueti was ih* equation ot an atomic bomb whose nuekar comjiosiaoo wu runSii to the Alamot-otdo bomb.
A variety at aiwniarixHavecrap and Upon eumi ftation acne ol then turns oul to bt lechnSeally Ifatj Of those whichcliaalyeiulaUat wita the data, all call fo> tha ue of enoufh philoHu* SoHad* aa atovtk bomb.
Wc Uxrefoic believe that an ttorak bomb has been dewoated as staled.
The findings of the Hush panel were reported to President Truman, and oneeting was held in the office of thePress Secretary. Steven Early, to discuss the teat aad timingresidential announcement Thereecommend.twoew days' delay toore complete radiochemical analysis. Before the chairman could act oo this recommendation, Mr. Early was interruptedelephone call After listening briefly be bung up the plioneeand said, "Centlemen, themust be releasedhave been informedumor of the Soviet atomic test has fust crossed the UP desk arid will be on the streets ia an hour."
Later, plutoosum was separated from the Kodiak rainwater by the Naval Research Laboratory. This plutonium sample, purified at Los. Alamos, was foundlutonium chemist at tlie Urdversity oflab to have an isotoptc composition indicating originuclear explosion rather thaneactor accidentinute reexamination of acoustic records revealed weak signals at twoThese established the location oft Seroipalatinsk, the time0 GMT onnd the yield as aboutilotons.
Onctober Dr. Bush wrote Ccneral Vandenberg that bb panel, which Included Oppenheimer among others, had asked him tothe excellent work done by the agencies involved. His letter concluded:
ortuoata Out the AH Force initrtutoi this work earty, aad thai it wu parked with thcroighoqa and MLoe umjertiling wtudi has mar certainly paidt now has tasks whichot lessenedust its performance in the future wiH coafoiSD to (he high sUodards which it has already set.
Original document.
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