APPROVED FOR4 CIA KSTOSiCAL REVIEW PROGRAM
Security As An Intelligence Conrounity Concern Patrick L. Carpentier
10
STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A colicclion ol articles on Ihe historical, operational, doctrinal, and theorelical aspects ol Intelligonco,
1
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in lntelligcr.ee are those of the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency oi any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting ot implying US Government endorscmeni of an article's factual stalements and inicrprctations.
Past progress and future desiderata in interdepartmental safeguards for lhe secrecy of intelligence.
SKCUIUTY AS AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONCERN
Patrick I-
In tbe part ball dozen years we have seen an Interesting and valuable evolution fioin an agencyommunity concept of security lor intelligence, in spite of diffiraftW that have stood to the way of the Interdepartmental approach to protective rrreesures. In the following pages we trace this recent evolution and look at the prospects ahead. Our purpose is generally to promote wider open discussion of those security questions which all our intelligence agenciesommon and particularly, with respect to tome major problems which have been recognized within the community for years but whose resolution requires executive or legislative action, to contributeroadening appreciation of their critical importance that can ultimately lead to such action.
E Pluribus
Security bas tractiticaialryepartmental matter, something far each agency bead to administer as final authority In his domain. This disjunction of authority derives from the fact that the agencies of the government were each establishedistinct national purpose and given corresponding prerogatives and responsibilities. Security concepts and standards, like other departmental programs, were shaped by internal considerations. The disjunction is sfiikingly illustrated tn the fact that an employee terminated for security reasons by one agency can. if found eh'gible by the Civil Service Commission, be taken on by another. These departmental prerogatives remain in force in the Intelligenceoncerted communitybas to be builtasis of mutual understanding and common purpose. Only the President or the Congress could dictate general
security measures beyond the minimum requirements now established by basic executive order and leguiation.
In these days of joint intelligence activities and widespreadof materials extending beyond the intelligence community proper, the traditional security concept docs not give intelligence agencies, particularly those producing sensitive materials, thethey require For sensitive intelligence tbe basic executive orders and legislation have had to be supplemented by agreenvent oo special measures. The faadecpiaey of the minimum standards is especially evident when budgetary considerations are permitted to dictate the degree of security that Issituation most likely to prevail outside the inteUigence community, where the threat of hostile penetration is oot ruDy recognized and community agreements cannot be enforced.
The statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect sources and methods, as set forth In the National Security Acts not accompanied by any implementing authority. ALVn Dulles, In The Craft of lattlligence. expresses the opinion that the legislative history shows an Intent to limit this responsibility to CIA intelligence assets. In practice, at any rate, the DCI has never exercised command authority over other agencies in regard to the protection of intelligence. If It were practicable to confer such authority on him it would obviate the difficulties of tbe voluntary approach to concerted measures, in which strong departmentalare partially compromised in order to achieve workable solutions tliat are still not completely satisfactory,
Even CIA assets, moreover, cannot be limited to the confines and protection of the Agency, and the same thing Is true for all other intelligence agencies. The mlelligence effort has become continually more interwoven. Thousands of reports are exchanged daily;joint meetings are held. Indeed, it Is doubtful that any one agency can now carry out any major intelligence activity in isolation. The resultant danger of widespread damageingle penetration was inustrated In the recent cases of Sgt Jack Dunlap and Sgt Robert L. Johnson, in which practically every agency In the communityseriously.
Thus the most effective security program imaginable in anyagency goes for naught; the level of security is that created by the lowest standards maintained anywhere in the intelligence flow. And the flow, as highlighted in the case of Sgt. Johnson, a
career soldier assigned to the Armed Forces Courier Service,the circle of tbe intelligence community. Thea point of penetration, will concentrate on the weakestsecurity problems of one agency therefore become theall others affected and theirommon concern.problem has been the lower personnel security standards setmilitary personnel Substantial remedial action is nowbut major problem areas remain. ,
The VSIB Committee
In this atmosphere dominated by departmental prerogatives but tempered by recognition of the need for coordinated action, the United Slates Intelligence9ommunity program for the protection of intelligence assets by establishing its Security Committee, furring the first years the Committee members each remained jealous for the prerogatives of their own agencies. It took three years of negotiation to chalk up the first majorthe issuance of, approvedstablishing uniform control markings and procedures for theand use of mteOigeDce. But now tbe mutuality of all agencies' interests bas been fully recognized. Interagency discussion is uninhibited and information is freely exchanged within the limits of effective security. Seldom if ever is any agency withecurity problem oot informed fully andarticipant in the remedial action. Limitations on concerted Committee action have been reduced for the most part to matters that lie beyond the authority of the intelligence agencies.
Another major accomplishment of the Committee has been the establishmentoordinated community mechanism to investigate security breaches more effectively and without duplication. InSIB policy statement established responsibilities for the exchange of counterintelligence and security information. Damage assessments and remedialions covering. embassies led to the establishment in4SIB Committee on Technical Surveillance Couirtermeasures which more effectively promotes and coordinates technical inspectionsrograms. The Security Committee has also prepared damage assessments and recommended remedial action in espionage cases. Personnel security programs have been substantially enhanced through Committee efforts. The Committee initiated the President's
a fid Community
I tire* Mvr of0 forbidding unauthorized disclosures of intcUigence and an Agreed Guidance of0 implementing the DuecnVe-
Exeelieut examples of coordinated encormiriity measures ut the systems of compartrnentatiou maintained for the protection of various categories of sensitive information. The special protection given compartmented infoimation, however, has unfortunately tended at rimes to depreciate the importance of prrXectinguncceopartrnented Information. Aclassified Secret or belowystem of compartnxntaticm is subject to higher standards of both personnel and physical security than ooe marked Top Secretode word. Those responsible for the handling of Oleg Feohovskiy, for example, would presumably have found code-word standards ofadvantageous in their operation.
There fa to be rubrrutted to the USIBroposedstablishing uniform personnel security standards for access tocd intelligence information. It will greatly enhancesecurity and simplify its adrninistratioo not to have independent standards for each ccenmunifyajor accomplishment will be the extension of tbe same standards to both dvilian and military personnel Uiiuurroity should also greatly facilitate seexxrftyin joint projects. Hopefully, this approach will be carried to Ks logical conclusion and eventually cover all intelligence, not just corn-partmeuted systems. In essence, this wouldistinct and unified personnel security program for all intelligence personnel and outsiders who have continued access to mtelligeoce. The operation of the proposed DCID may give impetus to. this eventuality.
Similarly in the matter of physical security. ExecutiveSafeguarding Official lnfosrnation in theof the Defense of the Unitedets the basic minimal standards, which, particularly for the storage of Secret material, do not give adequate protection in vulnerable areas abroad. TbeCommittee took up this problem1overnment-wide review of the Order and coniidered certain measures specifically designed for locations overseas. Budgetary considerations, however, prevented departmental representatives fromirm position on these measures in spite of their recogiiixmg the hazards of inaction. HcmefuDy. tbe stringent physical security given cornpartznentedwill eventually be appbed to all ioteUigcoce orinimum to sensitive uocompartinented materials.
UgulaiuY Needs
It has beta recogrjized thai tbe secure admrnistrs tenensitive agency requires that its bead have absolute authority, when be deems it in the national interest, to remove any employee summarily, without recoursemiiustrative review. Orsly thus can the highestof personal mtegrity, loyalty, and security be kept Inviolate Tbe first ruinmary removal authority teems to have been granted0 to the Secretaries of War andrm. USCa wartime measure directed against possible subversives. Then the Director of Central Intelligence was granted similar authority7 undere) of the National Security Act. This authority has been affirmed by the courts, and one case appealed to the Supreme Court waseview. The Director of NSA has by recent leg-nationlso been given such authority under delegation from the Secretary of Defense.
An Act of0) granted discretionary removal authority to eleven specified agency heads, and ExecutivefSecurity Requirements for Governmentertended this authority to all agencies of the government This Order serves as the basis for the personnel security programs of all community agencies, either as enabling Bulla*fly or. In agencies like CIA that operateeparate authority,odel in establishing criteria for employment Removal procedures required by it, however, are formal and detailed, quite inadequate for serious cases. Statutory authority for summary removal should still be given the aojninlstrative heads of all intelligence organizations.
Today Restricted Data, classified information on nuclear energy matters, is probably afforded without comparison the most distinct safeguards given any category of classified material. Its protection is specifically required by statute (Atomic Energy Act4 aspecial personnel security criteria for access to atomic energy information have been established. Only for Restricted Dataudicial injunction be petitioned against threatened disclosure. CIA has without success proposed similar statutory protection for "wteDigeoce Data" whose peculiarity to sources and methods requires it The present espionage laws are not adequate: conviction under tbem depends upon proof of latent to harm the United States, and classified information must be produced in open court to demonstrate the damage No injunction is possible.
l llliHIMUT
ond Community
An ad hoc committee of the USIB prompted by the defection of NSA employees Martin and Mitchell considered several proposals for remedial legislation. The committee was unable to come to an agreement, however, and further efforts were abandoned.
Although there has been official recognition at the highest levels of deficiencies in the espionage laws, other remedial proposals that have been made on numerous occasions have all been similarlyA major reason it undoubtedly the consideration that too stringent espionage laws could be given broad applications that would encroach upon dvil liberties and basic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The hard fact remains, however, that at things stand, purposeful acts of espionage have occurred and undoubtedly will continue to occur without adequate legal redress. It should be possible to secure adequate legislation against these within theof constitutional limitations Efforts in this direction must not be abandoned but renewed at tho earliest propitious time.
Press Leaks
These considerations lead us to the continually plaguing problem of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence materials, specifically through public informationreat deal of time and effort have been expended in the investigation of such occurrences without appreciable effect This problem impinges directly upon the freedom of the press, perhaps the most jealously guarded of the constitutional guarantees. Here again the espionage laws are completelythe criminal element inherent in espionage, intent to harm the United States, Is not even present Usually some high-level official makes the disclosure deliberately in order to elicit pubbc supportrogram which be considers to be in the national interest Motivation is suggested by the fact that most disclosures occur during periods of budgetary debate Personal gain for an enterprisingcan alsoactor.
The resulting damage to sensitive sources and methods, delicate international relations, and the national welfare has unfortunately led to no positive action to abate tbe problem. Newsmen, admonished on occasion by security authorities for acting against national Interest have shown no concern, they have been assured by the releasing official that the information leaked is not damaging. Such an official Is usually well removed from intelligence collection activities, has do understanding of source prcrtcction, and feels no guilt at circumventing
the established channels (or public dissemination which would have providedecurity review.
The question of remedial action In thii area inevitably brings up the British Official Secrets Acts, which afford practically absolute protection against unauthorized disclosure of any information origi-nating within the British government. They have been interpreted to cover even tbe premature release of certain wills which happened to be of popular interest. They male the mere fact of uMutborued disclosure sufficient to prosecute; the defendant must prove that his act eras not unlawful. Moreover, the court proceedings are held in secret to protect the information involved.
In the United States such legislation, by almost crverwhelmiog legal consensus, would be unconstitutional. But the fear ofhas also inhibited any effort to pursue lesser legislative measures which could be effective within the constitutionalommission on Government Security instituted by Congress5 to study ways tofair, uniform, effective, and realistic measures to safeguard both tbe national security aod the right of individuals" was aghast at the problem. It recommended making it unUwfuI for any person to disseminate Information classified Secret and above to any unauthorized person and unlawful for anyone to receive such Information knowing or having reason to believe it to be classified, with punishmentsineears in jail or both. As usual, the proposal received Utile attention.
The general belief that any corrective measures would meet with strong opposition from the press may not be completely accurate Responsible American newsmen have spoken in favor of an official secrets act, not of course one with tbe extreme stringency of the British Acts, but some kind of controls for public informabon Some disapprove, for example, of tbe publication of personal memoirs of government oefioab in the know so toon after their resignation as to affect sensitive activities and the work of their former fellows still so the government They know bow easy it is to develop sensitive information from government contacts, and tbey deplore the fact thatesponsible newspaper withholds from publication some matter of sensitivity it Is only likely to be scoopedessrival
ecent book on the British Official Secrets Acts.he Public Interest* Mr. David Williams decries tbe travesties resulting
' Renewed to.
in.ni
horn excessively broad applications of them, but be does notfrequent need for executive secrecy. He describes an"Services, Press and Broadcastingonsisting of representatives of tbe government,and now broadcasting and tdevision. Tbe Committeenews media(Defense) notices specifying matters whichand asking tbe forbearance of editors. Mr.over up
departmental errors. Nevertheless, this kind of active parti dps tioa of the press in its own disciplirung fn the national mterest seems toromising approach to the problem.
Perhaps an ad hoc ccirnmittee of representatives from responsible news media and from the government should be constituted,by executive action, to study the problem and submitThey could consider among other things the feasibility ofermanent committee to review proposed releases and furnish guidance in sensitive matters. If the whole field of national security information seems toourisdiction for it, it could be limited to sensitive intelligence information.
There is one other aspect of public release that calls for brief mention. The release of national intelligence requires USIBbut there is no provision for joint review of releases by individualoncerning nutters falling within theirSuch releases, however, may be based upon and revealing of mtelugeoce coUectioa efforts, and the effect on these efforts should be evaluated in advance by those responsible for their protection. It bas been the exception rather than the ruleroposed release has not been submitted for this kind of evaluation, but the impact fn these cases has been so substantial as to make it worth reaffirming that coordination with all affected parties should be accomplished prior to release. In almost every instance the release can, if necessary, be rewritten so as to protect the sources without interfering with its substance.
Conclusion
Security problems are not tbe unique property of intelligence, but tbe integrated character of community activities requires that aQ agencies and all their personnel join hereommon front Nor can ittatic front,atter of adherence to minimum standards. Opposition penetration techniques arc constantly shitting as areas of
vulnerability arc exposed; lecurity efforts must be dynamic and flexible to counter item.
hat have administrative control over urtelbgeooe components and activities should recognize the distinct need for protection of methods and sources that sets intelligence apart from DOeuntelligence activities. The mtelbgesoce chiefs should have Utitude and discretionary authority wherever possible, tn order to participateommunity approach to security The difficulties are complex, particularly with the advent of roach me systems which giveaccess to information autoniatacstlty.
InteUigence acts as chief promoter of security measures for the nation because it is roost aware of the hostile threat, dealing with it daily. Some measures to achieve greater security arc difficult to harmonizeree society, and that is why they have not been taken in the past But the nation needs toonstant watch oo the balance between security and personal freedoms. If theis too great in either direction, then corrective actioo Is warranted in tbe national interest Perhaps this paper will help focus thoughtful attention on the question.
Original document.
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