CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
directorate of intelligence
BANDITRY AND INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA
"Lasall tha public disorder which has plagued their countryasives, disrupted the social and econoaic health of icany parts of the country, andackground for political unrest thatin the overthrow of two governments. The rural violence beganontest between Colombia's two traditional parties, the Liberal and Xt aoon degenerated, however, into unbridled criminality characterized by savagery and sadism. During the past four years it has lost grounda determined government campaign of military pressure and civic action.
Communist insurgency is related to theviolence but distinct from it and more Several groups have engaged in insurgency, but so far with little success, and the Communist Party has placed its principal emphasis on legal action. There have been recent indications, how-aver, that the party now may be planning greator stress on guerrilla warfare and that it may have International backingarger effort. If this develops, insurgency, which is not nowa threat to stability in Colombia, maynew dimensions.
Violence and Banditry
Political violence is common in Colombian history. odel of widespread banditry during the colonial period, it erupted frequently during the nineteenth century in the form of coups, revolutions, and civil wars, as well as banditry. 0 sporadic guerrilla warfare broke out between partisans of the two traditional parties but died out in the wider interest generated by the border war with Peru The assassination of popular Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan8 again
brought tensions to fever pitch, set off five days of massin Bogota and other cities, and gave new impetus to rural strife.
Pent-up frustrations and hatreds found release In an orgy of violence far beyond theof scattered public security forces. Conservative and Liberal groups formed in the countryside with almost religious fervor to attack each other with the most brutal disregard for life. The armed forces, which became in effect instruments of the ruling Conservative Party, were used for
INSURGENCY AREAS IN COLOMBIA
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repression of the Bandits, who were liable to summary execution, wereas all those overears of age who hid or fled from the armed forces. During this time no area of the country was free from violence. The ruraldisrupted transportation, and food shortages, economicand inflation increased in severity.
A military coup3 put Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in power to end the political and economic chaos. Thereemporary respite from disorder, but Rojas' gradual adoption of authoritarian methodsesurgence. Rojas was overthrown7esult of hie failure tothe country's complex The leaders of theand Liberal parties agreedyear truce,in the National Front agreement, which was approvedlebiscite and put into effectB. The agreement called for alternation of thebetween two parties and parity of representation in Congress and departmental (state) and municipal (county) bodies.
Violence once again The Liberal and partisan groups tended to settle down in specificand the old guerrilla chiefs became more or less peacefulleaders. Organized bandit gangs, composed of criminals who hadiving for years by looting and robbery, continued
to operate, however. To this day, although with dwindling frequency, these groups havein cattle rustling, theft of coffee crops, the "protectionidnaping for ransom, armed robbery, hijacking, and similar activities. Thoy have established reigns of terror in the areas in which they operated.
Measures of the Valencia Administration
President Valencia, who was inauguratedarlyhimself to eliminating the national disgrace, as it was by then considered by many Since the beginning of his administration the Colombian armed forces and police have carried out vigorous operations against bandit gangs, combining military action with civicand psychological warfare.
The success of theseis illustrated by the fact that2 thereeaths attributed to ruralwhile5 the figure was down two thirds. The first six months6 haveorresponding drop. The figures alsoharpincrease in bandit deathselative decrease in deaths of victims of banditry. here remained onlyctive bandit gangs, ofere Communist.
Comiiiunist Influence In Rural Areas
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in an area near tho town of Viota, aboutiles southwest of Bogota. ommunist control of the area had become absolute, and it was "administered" by the Colombian Communist Party as the Republic ofommunist militia still control the area, and it is only recently that the government has had any influence in the enclave. It is still considered completely safe by the PCC, which uses iteeting place (the Tonth Congress of the PCC was held there in, the site of the PCC training school,afe haven for fugitives.
Because of its usefulness along these lines the area has not been used to mount offensive operations, which would invite government retaliation. policy has been directed toward slowly eroding Communist control rather than directaction, which would reault in loss of life and thusthe government. There are probably now aboutrmed militia In Viota.
Another enclave at Sumapaz, farther to the south, hasimilar history; however, it has not been as tightly sealed as has viota. Thero arenactive but organizedIn Sumapaz.
Beginning In thehe PCC beganamong Liberal bandit gangs in the departments of Tolima and Huilaiew toward
hird enclave. The partyumber of the bandits to the Communist cause, among them Manuel Marulanda (Tiro Fijo) and Ciro Trujillo, now tho two most importantguerrilla leaders.
However, although their sympathy was won lt was notto establish an enclave, and the PCC was indecisive as to what to do with the bandits. Also, ideological conversion was not enough to transmute the bandits into insurgents. they now called themsolves Communists, they continued to act more from motives of profit than from political convictions.
The lack of reliable communications and the need for decentralization imposed by security consideration alsoto weak PCC control over the Communist The PCC leaders inand the handle groups in the mountains have maintained loose contact, but in general each group has gone its own way.
Active Communist banks now exist in southern Colombia in the Marquetaiia, Riochlqulto, El Pate, Guayabero, andn del Ariari regions. TheArmy, which estimates that there areeffectives in this area of southern Colombia, has kept up steady pressure on them4 as an extension of its anti-bandit campaign. Militaryand civic action programs have limited the freedom ofof the guerrillas and whittled away at their strength and Influence.
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Over Corar.uniBt Tactics
Colombia's PCC followed nornial Communist. Power was to be achieved through legal means oroup at an appropriate tine. Emphasis was onass following in the cities, with formationnited front and penetration of labor and student groups. The success of Castro in Cuba, however, led manyand Communistin Colombiaesire for more aggressive action. They pointed out that the traditional methods had been successfulin Latin America and had little prospect of ever being successful. They contended that guerrilla warfare was the only way for Communism to come to power in Latin America. Thehad proved that it wasand had pointed the way.
Such attitudes wereby the Cubans. The PCC leaders clung to the oldhowever, and various groupsarxist guerrilla war began to develop. Among the more important of these are the work-ers-Students-Peasants Movementhe Army of National Liberationnd theParty ofarxist/ Leninist (PCC-ML).
The MOEC, formedas been violence-oriented from its beginning. It has received some support from Cuba and has been especialy close to the In6 four MOEC members, believed to be the first
roup of ten persons, left Colombiaour-monthand guerrilla training course in North Korea. Possibly as manyOEC members have been trained in North Korea, North Vietnam, and Communist China. Although the MOEC, withctivists, is believed to have potential for guerrilla warfare, its violence has so far been largely confined to urban terrorismmall scale. At present it is largely inactive and divided intofactions competing forbut it could join forces with one or more of the other leftist groups.
3 the Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (JMRL) broke from its parenttheoderate-leftist branch of the Liberal Party, to set up an independent movement to work for Marxist At the same time the ELN was established as the armed wing of the JMRL and immediately exhibited its charactereries of bombings in Bogota and other cities. The ELN has received limitedassistance {possibly no more) from Cuba andof some of its members in Cuba, in5uccessful attack against the small town of Sima-cota in the Department of Santan-der. The raid, however, was not followed up, and ELN guerrilla activity was relatively quiescent untileries of clashes with governmentoccurred.
At this tlmo, rebel priest Camllo Torres joined the ELN aculty member at National University in Bogota. Torres hadeform movement which became increasingly leftist oriented. Inisactivities brought him Into direct conflict with the church hierarchy, and the disputea cause celebre which vaulted him into prominenceational loader. His decision to join ihe ELN gave therief psychological and propaganda boost, but ELN activitiesceased with the death of Torreslash with an amy unit in February. The ELN may now have as few asen in the field.
The PCC-ML was formed4 by menbers of the PCC who broke with the party over theue of "armed struggle" versus the "peaceful way" to power. The PCC-ML immediately sought Chinese recognition and support. was quickly granted, but the Chinese have boon niggardly with material support, apparentlylittle moreew thousand dollars and some The PCC-ML is attempting to organize guerrilla warfare, but its leaders are nowfor the same vices ofand bureaucracy for which they had previouslythe PCC leaders. In its turn, the PCC-ML has beer, wracted with dissension and schism. It is estimated toery limited potential for guerrilla action in the coming nonths.
Cutront Line of the PCC
Facod with the formation of competitive Marxist organisations and the defection of many party members, the PCC hasine which it considers original. The Colombian theses hadcrystallizedbyhen Secretary General Gilberto Vieira-Whlte wrote in Problems of Peace <ind Socialism: -In Colombia, partisan warfare is not yet the principal form of struggle. The peasants' guerrilla movements are maintained and developed inspecific regions, particularly those which have suffered attacks by the In regions where the guerrilla movement has sprung up and been maintained it hasthe principal form ofand the axis around which mass action is developed, broadened, and strengthened."
This idea was roort> clearly expressed and formally adopted by the PCC in the politicalof the party's Tenth congress in "In Colombia there is opening an originalway, based on the use of all tho methods and forces of mass struggle, combined according to concrete, local conditions andconditions. Peasant guerrilla war is one of the highest forms of mass struggle and only prospers and grows where it is linked with the masses. At present, althoughguerrilla war is not yet the main form of struggle, it ismorn important every day."
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a positionumber of purposes. Beingand Ideologically correct, lt is persuasive and is the soundest argument formulated by any Latin American Cceanunist party for not rushing intowarfare. It keeps the PCC within the limits of legality in Colombia, permitting lt tothe other "methods and forces of massuch asin elections, labor agitation, overt propaganda, etc. It has not, however, preserved the unity of the party.
It is difficult to judge the sincerity of the PCC position. The party gives considerableand international propaganda support to the guerrillabut so far there has been little evidence that it hasany real guidance ormaterial help to the guerrillas. The moreleaders may feel that the time is not yet ripe, and they may be frightened by the serious reverses suffered by tholrneighbors,don the path of armed Bureaucratic lethargy may also be an inhibiting factor.
Nevertheless, there have been indications that the PCC leaders may take their policyaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaWmmt'e National Executive Committee"to support to the highest degree" the guerrillas inColombia. The PCC is also apparently considering accepting an overture from the ELN for The PCC and ELN are
compatible In aims and ideology, and their respective leaders have never quarreled. It would be logical for the two groups to collaborateeriouswar.
The PCC loaders apparently would like to take over the ELN. even though they consider the ELN leaders "adventurers." The PCC leaders feel that with proper reorganization, training, and direction the SLN mightorthwhile Insurgency force. The SLN leaders, for their part, undoubtedly would like toassistance from the PCC, but they would probably resist being taken over by the party. Each group has something tothe other, and if theircan be workad out,couldeality within the coming months,if there is pressure for it from Cuba and tho USSR.
In late April and earlyommunist bandit leaders in southern Colombia set up the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forcespparently with the blessing of the PCC. The formation of this group has been given considerable publicity by Radio Havana. Also, the Hanoi radio reportedune that the deputy commander of the National Liberation Front Of South Vietnam "warmly greeted" the formation of FARC. Such propaganda support suggests that the PCC may indeed beerious effort to step up guerrilla warfare inand that this policy may have international Communist
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All of the insurgent groups have at one tine or another been interested in seme forr. ofof the various guerrilla forces. The latest of these, worked out inas "Plan Aurora" lan of the ELN, the MOEC, and tho PCC-ML forinsurgency. Duringowever, leaders of the ELS, reflecting on the failure of the plan to achieve results, decided to work only with the PCC.
Outlook
Inhe publicsituation in Colombiabright. The banditwhich has plagued thefor years, is under control. The leftist guerrillas are split into several groups and are either inactive or on the The Colombian econosry ia not strong, but it is relatively stable and is making soeo National elections worn
held tn March and in Mayranquil atmosphere, and nocrises exist at this time. Poverty, inflation, and other causes of unrest aro but the people seem to have rejected violenceoans of solving their problems. The armed forces are strong and united behind the government. They are reasonably enlightened, and they have gained valuable counterlnsurgency experience through years of combatingand bandits. As ltnow, the various insurgent movements together orare capable at this time of only limited urban violence or isolated guerrilla actions.
Nevertheless, if the PCC is really anxious to begin serious insurgency through the PARC and the ELN, and if the partysubstantial assistance from Cuba or the USSR, thocould change drastically.
Original document.
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