6
4 INTELLIGENCE STUDY
THE NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION AND THE PARTY-STATE ISSUE IN CPSU
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Research Staff
This working paper of ^he DDI/Research Staff examines the ten year dispute, which continues, within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) over the question of the correct role for the Communist party in the modern Russian state. It examines the intense party-stateis reflected in the efforts toew Sovietthrough positions taken in the party and Juridical media.
Although not coordinated with other offices, the paper has benefited much from the author's discussions with colleagues In OCI, ONE, ORR. FDD and BR.I
ONE: ELEMENTS IN THE DEBATE ON THE
The Institutional Problem In CPSU
Tho Form Ol The Institutional
TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
Opening Moves On Institutional
21st Congress And The Council of
Khrushchev And Tho Jurists On Tho
22nd Congress And The Party's
The "Production Principle" And
Intervention of tho Presidium
Now Leaders And Old
23rd Congress And The Supreme
The "Brezhnev
Conclusions
The long-standing effort within the USSR toa new constitution reflects the dispute within the CPSU over the question of the correct role for thepartyodern, industrialized Soviet Union.
Unlike the display of Stalinist solidarity which surrounded tho promulgation6 of the existing Soviet Constitution, the effort toew basic law emergesackground of major theoretical and juridical, disputes over basic institutional questions.
The main issue at stakeremains ln the post-Khrushchevquostion of the future and function of the principal party and state organizations.
Under Khrushchev's direction, the project fora now constitution was partarger plan tothe party Into an institution that would absorbtraditionally performod by the ministerial apparatus of the state. Tho institutional transformation sought by Khrushchev appears to have boon aimed at enabling him to surmount buroaucratic hindorancoB to the exorcise of personal power whlcb have accompanied the post-Stalin slackening of political discipline ln the CPSU.
For dlvorso reasons, the leading members in tho party presidium (the party's highest policy-making body, recently ronamodnd the secretariat (tho party'Boxecutlve body) who were involved ln tho dispute on tho constitution rejected Khrushchev's efforts toroduction-oriented party, to enhance his personal power position, and to push his particular domestic programs. Suslov, the party's leading theoretician and the one who led the opposition to Khrushcbov's Constitution, argued
for the preservation of the traditional role of the CPSU as the idoological and political monitoreparate state apparatus concerned with the routine functions of running the country. Suslov thus upheld the viability of the existing state ministerial systemart of his argument for the preservation of the partyolitical organization. In effect, ho argued that Khrushchev vas pressing for the destruction of the true Identity of the party. eading officer of Khrushchev'scommission, seconded Suslov's opposition. Kosygin, the party's leading economic manager, supported the existing ministerial systemart of his argument for technical expertise in running tho complicated economic life of the country. The late Kozlov, the early heirduring the constitutional debate, appeared to balk at Khrushchev's institutional efforts to strengthen his power position. Brezhnev, the subsequent heir apparent, may also havo objected to Khrushchev's institutional schemes. Nevertheless, Brezhnev, like senior partyMikoyan, had strongly seconded Khrushchev's projectew constitution and roferred to the project in .the context of praising Khrushchev's conceptroduction-oriented party.
While Khrushchev's successors Initially soft-pedalled the idea of constitutional reform, the current party leader, Brozhnev, recently revived tho projectew And certain less controversial facets of the old questionractical role for the party have once again boon raised by the now constitutional commission chairman, Brezhnev, ln the contextow basic law. Thus, it is possible that the Brezhnev Constitution conceals an effort to sanction Juridically less contentious party-state policies suchworkingrimarily at the rank and file level,trengthened Supreme Soviet (the formal law-making parliament) in Its relations with the Council of Ministers (tho formal executiveho latter policy suggestion has been ondorsed by Podgorny, the current chairman of tbe presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and his protege Shelest, the party leador of the Ukraine. Kosygin, the current chairman of the presidium of the Council of Ministers, and ono of his first deputy chairmen, Mazurov,
have so far remained silent on tho Brezhnev-Podgornyto strengthen the Supreme Soviet. Kosygin and Mazurov have omphasized the nood lor an improved stato apparatus in running the complex affairs of contemporary Russia.
So far tho issues in tho current constitutional debate havo boenar more limited scopo than those raised by Khrushchev's hiehly controversial approach to the Institutional issue. Accordingly the currentdialogue Is silent on the themes that wereunder Khrushchev; namely, explicit subordination of ideological tasks to economic tasks in overall party work, the formula on the "withering away" of the state apparatus, the assumption of state tasks by the party organization, and other "social" organizations.
Khrushchev's conspicuous failure to altertho major governing bureaucracies in the USSR combined with the strengthened influence of tho Suslov-led party traditionalists in tho current politicalwithin tho CPSU makes it likely that at this stage the project of the new constitution tentatively scheduled for completion noxt year will not result ln any basic institutional transformations within the system. As yet no leader, including Brezhnev whose strength has steadily increased, either seems powerful enough or ready to forco through major changes. Tho best any leader might hope for, it would seem, would be to Introducein the now constitution which ho could use to Justify political programs now only in embryo.
Summary
Part one of the paper briefly examines tbe content and form of tho post-Stalin debate over the institutional roles ofparty and state.
Part two of the paper reconstructs the devOlopmont of the controversy, and the devOlopmont of the positions-of tho
current Soviet leadership. It concludes with anof the contrasting constitutional positions within the current Kremlin command. To summarize tho chronological development, eight time periods in the constitutional debate are singled out:
Tbe first, Involves theof Khrushchev's constitutional position. In this period,evived the -withering away of the state" thesis that had been buried by Stalin, ade clear his controversial position that the withering thesis meant tbat responsibilities of the state apparatus would in fact be diminished,eld thatexisting state apparatus would not remain undertressod that state functions vould be transferred to "socialsuch as the party, the Soviets,unions,
placed party workroduction-oriented, rather than on its traditional ideologlcally-orientod basis, and
implicitly arguod that tho party organization, theform of socialould laterfor or merge with tho ministerial and soviet
, various political and judicialexposed their opposition to Khrushchev's constitutional scheme. The opposition vas led by presidium member Suslov whotrong stateven after the realization ofo strengthen his case for the preservation of the party as an ideologically-oriented organization. Leading Soviet Jurists entered the debate In this period and presented their contrasting briefs on the projectew basic law.
By1 Party Congress, the debato appearsundercut Khrusbchev's institutional views. Heto gain party sanction for the priority ofIn tho nev party program which gaveusualthe political-ideological over economic tasks in 7
Despite this setback, Khrushchev2 movod ahead with the project toew constitution and toward the end of the year gained formal adoption of his reorganization of tho party "production principle."
The reaction that followed tho2 Cuba nlBsile debacle constitutes tho fifth round in tho debate on the constitution. During this period, Khrushchev's decentralization policy, an important part inuffered setbacks and the project of theshowed no sign of progress. The statements of Kosygin, Brezhnev and the late Kozlov manifestedof view on the project.
Despite signs of high-level disagreements, Khrushchev inenewed his efforts to move forward on the constitution. Indications of resistance to his plans were suggested in tho public handling of his mid-Julyspeech which appeared to qualify his comments by noting that he made only "preliminarywhile two years earlier he had "defined" the main tasks of the now constitution. In addition, the role of the state apparatus was highlighted ln the Soviet media in tho period following the mid-July constitution commission meeting, secretariat member Ponomarevuslov-style theoretical defense of tho state system
ear after Khrushchev's overthrow, his major Institutional changes were abolished: first2 restructuring the partyroduction basis and7 decentralization of the state ministries were fully revoked. The party withdrew, to its sphere of political-Ideological leadership, tbe state apparatusits prerogatives as the economic manager within tho system. Suslov took his usual part as the protector of tho ideologically-oriented party, leaving mundane tasks to state institutions. Brezhnev initially endorsed this line, but as time wentas pressures for hardgave increasing emphasis to theof the party's involvement in the economic sphere. Be was, however, cautious not to associate himself directly with the discredited Khrushchevian formulations on the production-orionted party. In defense of the prerogatives of the state, Kosygin sought to mark out tho realm of economic-industrial management as his quasi-autonomous jurisdiction. With Podgorny's shift to the chairmanship of the Supremo Soviet another dimension to the institutional
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REGRET
1SEGRET
rivalry entered the picture: the movement aimed atthe powers of the Supreme Soviet in its relations with Kosygin's Council of Ministers was pressed. Brezhnev's endorsement of parliamentary reforms to put teeth into the Supreme Soviet seemed dirocted not so much toward boosting Podgorny (over whom he had gained the advantage) but rather as another way of diminishing Kosygin's state apparatus. Suslov, while apparently not objecting to the expansion of the Supreme Soviet's role, continued to concentrate on the concept of the Ideological party.
As these cleavages developed, the project fora new constitution once more grew ln political And Brezhnev's6 announcementew Soviet Constitution would "crown the majestic half-century course of ourwell ongender the eighth round in the debate. This possibility isby the factrezhnev surrounded histo the new basic law with references reminiscent of some of his predecessor's party-state conceptshe members of the new Kremlin oligarchy presentedviews on the respective roleB of the patty, the Soviets, and the state apparatus and their In sum, Brezhnev's move on the project is likely to sharpen the Internal conflict over the institutional issue as various elements seek to Incorporate theirinto tho regime's basic law.
During tho momentary political vacuum in theproduced by Stalin's deathighly unusual Joint session of the CPSU Central Committee, tho USSR Council ol Ministers and the Presidium ol the USSR Supreme Soviet was convened in order to undertake the lirst actions ol the post-Stalin regime. rief moment the three bodies representing the party, the state ministerial bureaucracy, and the parliament wore depictod as co-equals. While the Supremo Soviet presidium was soon relegated to its usual ceremonial functions in Soviet politics, the cleavage between tho party and statehas ligurcd prominently ln contemporary Soviet politics. It reverberated in tho Khrushchev-Malenkov struggle ineriod and the charge raised against Malenkov lollowing his deloat that he attempted to put tho state over thehis ultimate Intention orexpression to an underlying issue. Ironically, as Khrushchev's policy6 on cut increasingly deeper Into the prerogativeshe state apparatus ho became subject to the reverse charge and after his iall he was denounced for attempting to Involve the party in functions traditionally exorcised by the state.
In the post-Khrushchev leadership, institutional Issues are once more enmeshed ln leadership politics. At present the Supremo Soviet apparatus enters into the political equation slnco the top posts of tho party, tho stato apparatus and the Supreme Soviet aro dlvldod between three poverful figures in their ownand Podgorny. While Brezhnev is clearly in the and Podgorny in tbe weakest strategic position in terms of factional politics, this circumstance is more likely to exacerbate rather than simplify any attemptational roordorlng of tho Soviet institutional structure.
In brief, since the passing of Stalin's system of personal absolutism, institutional Issues havo been an ever-present and increasingly Important dimension of Soviet leadership politics. These issues under Khrushchev and
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more recently ln the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgornybare been mirroredontinuing discussion and debate within the regime over the interpretation andto contemporary Russia of doctrines received from Lenin and Stalin on the party and state.
Part one first briefly discusses the broad political context of the institutional issue and secondly sets forth in summary the basic doctrinal elements of tho debate over the organization of the Russian polity.
THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN CPSU POLITICS
Since its founding the Soviet regime has suffered from basic defects in its Internal constitution.* Both the relationships within the ruling group and between the major political structures of the regime havoeflnod and established channels or regularized methods for containing and resolving political conflicts have been almost wholly absent.
These defects of the Soviet "constitution" have been variously manifested7 perhaps mostin the absence of any arrangoment for theof power from one leadership to another. Theof power has been and remains an Irregular andproceeding fraught with dangers for the ruling
most of this paper the term constitution is used ln its genericis, the overall lnsti-tutlonal structure and political practice of the Soviet polity. The paper also discusses the effort in the post-Stalin regimo toew written constitution to supersede6 Stalin Constitution, but the context will make It clear when reference is being made to the constitutional document.
party institution itself. The "succession" crises however are rooted ln the perennial conditions of Soviet politics. The authority and powersrise lender have never been stablized ln clear-cut institutional terms and have been vulnerable both to the eccentricities of factional politics and the shifting balances of Institutional forces within the regime. At the some time the institutionalof the party and state rather thantable environment for the resolution of political conflicts have served as counters in power struggles among factions of the leadership.
Under Lenin and Stalin the problem ofand stabilizing both political authority and theof the regime remained submerged. Largely through his prestige as the author of Bolshevik victory7 and the force of his personality, Lenin dominated and gave unity to the new Soviet regime. Thoughadically different political character than Lenin, Stalin alsoersonalist regime. The dictatorial sway be Imposed is oftenystem of "institutionalized" terror and, indoed, from the standpoint Of tho society subjected to tho terror this was precisely true. Howevor, in terms of inner-regime politics the terror prevented institutional factors from gaining autonomous political force and thus affecting tbe personal powor of the supreme leader.
With the erosion of Stalin's system of terror after his death, institutional factors began to gain inin Soviet politics. Khrushchev's leadership itself reflected the change. While he strove in his own way to lead ln the personalist tradition of Lenin and Stalin, be devoted more and more energy6 to the effort both to institutionalize his position and reshape the institutional structure of the regime. (In way ofStalin, especially in the last half of his rulo, displayed little Interest, if not contempt, for theof his institutional status. Molotov occupied tho premiership ln the heyday of Stalin's dictatorial powers and even Stalin's title of Ceneral Secretary of the party fell into disuse.) Khrushchev, for example, engagedustained but not notably successful effort to establish
himself formally as the "head" of the partyody which is formally based on the concept ofand the political equality of itso sought to overcome the potential for conflict in the regime resulting from the division of executive authority between the party and state by taking over the premiership in addition to the post of First Secretary. He evidently regarded or cane to regard his straddling act as only an Interim solution. In the last tvo years of bis Incumbency, for example, Khrushchev sought to underscore his executive supremacy over party and state byeries of Jolnj; presidium-Council of Ministers meetings. Khrushchevoncern with his formal position also was echoed lnof Khrushchev by some military figures as the "Supreme High Commander" of the armedtitlo similar to the title held by. President under tho Constitution. Reports at the time of Khrushchev's fall that be was attempting to setev executivedesigned to separate himself from his presidiumseem at least credible ln view of bis previous moves.
wn concept of the internal organizationarty bureau was reflected in his creation ath Congress of tho Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR. In contrast to the conceptollective of equals, tho new bureauierarchy of ranks (chairman, first deputy chairman'and so forth) modelled after tbo Council of Ministers. Khrushchev's RSFSR Bureau was abolished after his fall.
Khrushchov's awareness of the constitutionalwas not narrowly limited to securing his personal position. As has boon noted he was concurrently engagedroad effort to reconstitute the overallstructure of the regime. 2 reform of the party was partong-term effort at once aimed at assuring the institutional supremacy of the party ln the Soviet system and at reshaping the role of the party ln contemporary Soviet society. From the standpoint of tho
traditional separation of party and state functionsvas movingadical direction. Under his prospectus of the "transition to communism" the statewould be reduced and its functions graduallyby the party which would increasingly Involvedin the management of the economy. Khrushchev's project for institutional reform aroused powerfulboth in the party and state apparatus and it fell with him.
esult the institutional problems Khrushchev sought to resolve have been posed anew ln theleadorship. In fact, in this socond decade of the post-Stalin period, the institutional anomalies of party and state remain essentially unchanged. The regime formally still has no less than three executiveparty secretary, tho Premier and the Supreme Soviet chairman heading the respective hierarchies of the party and state ministerial apparatus and the Supreme Soviet parliament. Strictly speaking the party has no genuine executive official, rather it is ledcollective" organ of political equals (politburo, formerly presidium). By* contrast tho arrangement of authority and officialis far more clearly defined and rationally organized in the state ministerial apparatus and the Supreme Soviet structure. Unlike the party organs, each has its defined order of ranks and subordination.
In addition, the principles of coexistence between tho party and the institutions of the state continue to be surroundod by ambiguities. In form, the apparatus of the state remainseparate order of political power. Indood, party dominance within the regime has to date been complete, but the party leadership has always had to compete with the latont but real danger that these Institutions provide potential frameworks for alternatives to party rule. This consideration has Increased inin the post-Stalin period. No longer is thounity of tho internal regime enforced by an all-powerful or dictatorial personality. Nor is the internal discipline within tbe leading group as tight as lt once was. Further with the passing of Khrushchev thoof party and state once more become entangled in
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the struggle for leadership among his successors. Under such circumstances the Institutional dualisms of the regime canisintogrativereffect. While the party has succeeded in keeping the system more or less unitary in practice the diversity of institutional forms has affected tho pattern of post-Stalin Soviet politics.
THE FORM OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
While post-Stalin Soviot politics has been subjected to extensive examination and analysis, one body ofbearing on the institutional dimensions ofpolities--especially tho party-stateboen given, at most, only passing attention. This evidence consists of tho extensive dobate in recent yoars in party and Juridical literaturo (and loaders' statements as well) on the future of the party and state apparatuses in the "transition to communism." WhllelfaO discussion has boon conducted in elaborate and abstruse doctrinal terms, it has echoed tronds and conflicts within the loading group over the institutional issue.
Much of the debato has revolved around the Marxist-Leninist notion of tho withering away of tho state under communism. The "withering thesis" was, and remains, closely tlod in with Soviot constitutional theory.* Tho constitutional role of the state apparatus under Stalin's reign was predicated on Lenin's doctrino in7 State And Revolution that the USSR would passtransitional Btage" calledstage In which the role of the state organizations (for example, the secret polico) would expand rather than withor away.
The futurism of Soviet constitutional law contrasts with Western constitutional law, whicb is founded on past or existing political Institutions.
Under Stalin, the party became, in practice, one of several Institutions oi governance. The constitutional role of the state apparatus undor Khrushchev's plan, however, was predicated on Lenin's further assertion in the same workubsequent transition to the "higher stage" of "communism" during which time the state was supposed to "wither away." Khrushchev held that the functions of the state bureaucratic organization would be transferred to "social"as tho party, "the highest form of socialthe Sovlot Union progressed toward tho "higher stage." Those resisting Khrushchev's purposes (including, in particular, Suslov) drew on other elements of doctrine or reinterpreted doctrines on the state ln favor of more conservative positions in elaborate arguments dealing with two key questions.*
One argument dealttrictly functional what would the role of the party and the ministries be during the period of the withering away of the state? The Khrushchev school stressed that during this period the party's "main task" was constructing the "material-technical foundations for communism." Tho Suslov group stressed that such activity was limitod to the "main economic task"of the party, thatob subordinate to the party's traditional ideological and political "guidance." The former school, tep-by-stepof its position, argued that the state functions should bo transferred to social organizations during the
two examines the presentations of the legal advocates of the Khrushchev school (principally jurists P. S. Romashkin, P. Burlatsky, II. Mnatsakanyan, M. Akhmedov and A.nd the past and presont opponents (principally jurists G. Shakhnazarov, M. Plskotin, B. Mankovsky, V. Chkhikvadze, V. Kotok, andhe penultimate section of part two examines theof the advocates of the Brezhnev-Podgorny proposals for groater soviet control over the ministerial apparatus (jurists A. Makhnenko, V. Vasllyev, H. Binder, H. Shaflr andutafyin).
withering-away period. Included in this definition of social organizations were the party, the Soviets, trade unions, young coatmunist league, comrades'all organizations other than the state bureaucracy. Khrushchev's developed constitutional views, all social organizations during the withering period would converge into an all-embracing socialconcept of the party of the future. The other school sought to justify continuing reliance on tbe state structure in tho transition to communism. Their arguments, in effect, opposed the notiononvergence of party and stateoncurrent diminution of tho role of tho state apparatus. In this connection, they defended the traditlonalcconcept of the party asolitical-ideological rather than managerial-administrative agency of govornance.
In this context, two CPSU party8th and theused as Juridical and theoretical precedents for certain functional arguments of the two opposing schools. The 8th Party3adhat the Soviets were state organs and that the party ought to "guide" soviet activity but not "replace" the soviet organization,hat the state system would dissolve "after being freed of its class character". aftor the attainment ofho Khrushchev group stressed the socond proposition of tho 8th Congress and, in effect, distorted the first ln tortuously arguing that the Soviets (like the party) were social organizations. The Suslov group concentrated on tbe first resolution and dccmphaslzed the second. h Party1ormally sanctioned an earlier pronouncement by Stalin that "under communism the state will remain until such time as the danger of foreign aggression has vanished." The Suslov school, emphasizing the needtrong state apparatusits coercive organs) in the face of the external threat fromaudedh Congress*for strengthening the state on the eve of tho war with the "imperialists" (in this case Nazibe Khrushchev school allowing thath Congressecessary Justification for maintenanceoercive apparatus against the extornal throat also
stressed the theme that the Internal need for thestate vas waning in the "transition tot commun ism."
Also ln the functional context, two doctrines on thetraditional concept of the "dictatorship of the. proletariat" and an Innovation Introduced atd Congress, tbe "state of the wholeprominently ln tbe arguments of the opposing schools. Khrushchev interpreted tbe transition from theof the proletariat to tho state of the whole peopleanifestation of the process of withering away of the state and the assumption of state tasks by the party and social organizations. Tbe Suslov school resisted this notion holding rather that the state of the whole people doctrino meant an increased role for the state, and the presorvatlon of the party's traditional rolo in the "transition to communism." Since Khrushchov's fall, the concept of the state of the whole people has onco more apparently become the subject of controversy Inside the regime. d congress's complete silence on the doctrine suggested the presonce of strong pressures within tho leadership to shelve tbe concept. Brezhnev'sof the notiongenuine people's state" after the congress bore earmarks of an attompt to como up with an alternative formula. Behind the Brezhnev move may be the current Issue produced by moves by some regimeto strengthen tho authority of the Supreme Sovietis the Council of Ministers and the ministerial apparatushole.
A second argument was put in terms of time: when would the state withor away? Khrushchevested lnterost in realizingthus his particular view of the production-orientedsoon as possible. Suslov and other opponentsested interest inback the realization of "communism" as an important part of their case for tbe maintenance Of the traditional roles for the party and state. While both schools statod that the process would behe former took pains to explain why it would take as much as two decades to build communism. year deadline was raised at1 party congress.) On the basis of thohis schoolino which emphasized the urgent
necessity to commence, now, the withering away oi tho state. The latter-school went to some effort to posit that communism would not be realizednd that the state system at that time would be strengthened, not withered. In the post-Khrushchev leadership, theopposing any hurrying of tho advent of "communism" in the USSR appear to have won the day at least for the present. The ambitious goals of Khrushchev's economic program which was to take the USSR to the very doorstep of the communist society have been sharply scaled down and tbe successor leadership has generally avoided any explicit commitmentarget date when thoto communism" is ostensibly to bo completed in the USSR.
TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL-INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
INTRODUCT ION
With his sweeping Industrial decentralization ln7 Khrushchev forced the issue of tho relation of party and state to the center of post-Stalin politics. His assault on the super-centralizod stato apparatusfrom Stalin was the opening actionunning battle ovor basic institutional issues in the Khrushchev and post-Khrushchov rogines. Tho industrial roform which aroused Immediate resistance from tho Molotov-Malonkov opposition and others was among the major issues involved In the challenge to Khrushchev's leadorship inhe reform Initiated Khrushchev's effort to diminish tho role of the state apparatus and. Insure the supremacy of the party apparatus in post-Stalin Russia. The effort registered Khrushchev's avareness that the perpetuation of party hegemony within the Soviet system had increasingly become an Institutional problem. His drive, however, stirred powerful forces opposed to major institutional changes and not surprisingly2 restructuring of the party apparatusey event in the load-up to his overthrow in On the evo of his fall he was pressing ahead with an effort to lncorporato thechanges he had already effoctod and apparently others ho was planningew constitution replacing6 Stalin Constitution.
As Khrushchev developed his far-roaching program to transform tho regime's institutional structuro hesought to Justify it in broad doctrinal terms. He turned to various legal theorists to elaborate his position. Some enthusiastically took up tho task, others were lukewarm and still others engagedisguised effort to dilute and undermine tho Khrushchevlan Juridical literature focusing on institutional and constitutional mattersirror of the conflicts
and cross-pressures that developed Inside the regime under the impact of Khrushchev's project.
The following section details the development of the conflict, the reaction to what may be broadlyas the "Khrushchev Constitution" for thoUSSR both before and after bis fall, and finally the reemorgence of the Institutional-constitutionalin somewhat altered terms among Khrushchev's
OPENING MOVES ON INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Khrushchev's first major foray into the sphere of industrialdecentralization of the managerial structure of the state apparatus in earlyin the midst of conflict in tho Soviet leadorship.
He launched his bold venture despite theposition of his presidium opponents after the Hungarian revolt. 6 Congress deStalinization policy wasloudesult of the revolt and he had beenforced to theon the Stalinthe presidium. His decentralization project in fact came on the heelsajor managorialln6 that was not of his own making and which was. opposed ln concept and design to his7 industrial reform. The6 reorganization had enhanced tho powers of the state apparatus through tho creationew centralized economic directorate and super-planning agency, tho Gosekonomkommlssiya, headed by Pervuklnuture member ofho Khrushchev reform, by contrast, dismantled the central ministerial apparatus sooking to shift major economic responsibilities from the state to the party, especially its territorial apparatus. Thus, the new local Councils of the National Economy creatod by the Khrushchev reform came under the purview of provincial party organizations.
wen
At6 Congress, Khrushchev had stressed that the party must Increasingly Involve Itself ln "problems of practical economics" but he gave little hint that he vasirect attack on tho traditional state structure. His industrial reform emerged with no forewarning and bofe tbe earmarksurprise move ln the central committee aimed at setting his opposition ln tho presidium off balance. He did succeed ln recouping the initiative with the reform proposal but Itsproduced sharp conflict ln the presidium and tbe tenuousness of Khrushchev's position in tho ensuringvas revealed lnhen he came precariously close to bolng overthrown by his "anti-party" rivals.
Khrushchev's Decentralization Theses
Khrushchov Introduced his reform planentral committee plenum The plan calledweeping,decentralization of the administrative structure of Soviet industry by settingetwork of regional economic councils in the place of centralized ministrlos. And on7 tho central committee released the famous Khrushchevian "theses" which clearly identifiedministerial system as his target. The "thesos"hat with the creation of rogional councils of national economy there would be no nood to have union and republican ministries to run industry and construction,n apparent reference to Peruvkin's Goskonomkommlssya, that the creation of new central organs under the USSR Council of Ministers would mean "theof the old form of management onlyew name but of an inferior type." assage in Khrushchev's "theses" charged that "some comrades" wero in favor of the latter scheme. After the7 leadership crisis, "comrades" Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov woreas among the opponents of Khrushchev's plan. Soon after the ouster of Marshal Zhukov ln7 from his positions on tbe party presidium and tho Ministry of Defense oven the ministries connected with the defense industries were downgraded to stato committees.
With the diminution of the role of the ministries, Khrushchev concurrently held out the prospect of thoof the role of the Soviets. Thus, along with his Industrial reform decrees, the ministerial system vas also the target of an earlier Khrushchev-supported decree of the party's: central committee entitled "on improving the activity of the Soviets of workers deputies and strengthening thoir connections with the masses." Tho decree, datednabled the Soviets to assume legally functions residing in the state apparatus (the ministries, or executivo committees at localhe decree also provided added sanctionhrushchev-emphasized campaign which called for volunteers to assist, if not assume, the work of the state employees lncorrectional, protective, medical, cultural, and recreational functions.*
Khrushchev's Withering Thesis
With organization and political gains in hand,in7 revolution anniversary speech formally resurrected the "withering away of the state" thesis which had been buried by Stalin and his chief postwar state theoretician, D. Chesnokov.**
to the official Soviet statistics presented in National Economy of tbe5 percent reduction in the number of state administrative workers took place3 This reduction coincided with the post-Stalin emphasis given to the volunteers' campaign. According to the same statisticalharp Increase ln the number of workers in the state apparatus during Khrushchev's last year0 workers were added to3 force) wastbe first year of the new leadership0 additional administrative workers were added.
losing his seat on the smaller3 party presidium (he had beenember of the expanded presidium at tho2 party congross and selected (footnote continued on
That the withering thesis had been buried by Stalin and Chesnokov had been made clear ln the latter's3 Pravda citation that
on the basis of the balance of experience of the Socialist. Stalin for the first tine ln the history of Marxism, came to the striking conclusion on the necessity of maintaining the State even under Communism 'if, by that time,encirclement has not beenand he placed before us tbe task ofin every way the power of thestate.1
Earlier,91 lecture at the Department of Economics and Law of the Academy of Sciences, Chesnokov had made the traditionalists" case for the preeminent role of the state ln building communism. ound Soviet socialist state Is capable Of ensuring thoof the material-technical basis of communism." And like6 Stalin Constitution, Chesnokov1 lectured that the role of the party is that of thenucleus of the state and other organizations of Soviet society." (Thes the leading core of all organizations of tho working poople, both social and
Khrushchev in his7 speech set out to reverse the bases of the Stalin-Chesnokov "non-withering" thesis. Linking7 decentralization drive to the withering thesis, Khrushchevhree-partof Lenin's vagary in State And)
(footnote continued rrom
by Stalinember of anman commission to rovlse9 party program) Chesnokov lost hisas editor of Kommunist ln In5 ln the wake of Khrushchev's public attack onarty Life article implicitly linked Chesnokov with the pro-consumer views of the disgraced Malenkov.
that the stato would ?wlther away" under irst. Khrushchev hold that "communism is no longer in the distant future." Second, he stated that statewould be diminished during the movement toward "Tho Marxist-Leninist teaching on the state and Its withering in proportion to tbe movement of society toward complete communism Is of enormouso said. Third, he concluded that the state "will wither away completely when tbe higher phase of communism sets in." (Two othor parts of Khrushchev's withering9bat state functions would be transferred to social organizationshat tbesocialwould assume productivethus become
*Tbe process of the "withering away" of state court functions was graphically demonstrated during this period.orles of harsh "anti-parasite" laws were promulgated by tho several republics of the USSR. The laws, ostensibly aimed at reforming "hooligans" and "work-shirkers" among other suchere to be carried outewly establishod network of tribunals called "comrades' courts." The Khrushchev-endorsed tribunals, somewhat similar to Stalin's "troikas" reportedly abolishedere placed outside the jurisdiction of the regular state-run criminal courts. And while the new party-run comrades' courts were engaged ln the sphere of criminal law, theyudicial maneuver directly related to tbe basis of Khrushchov's interpretation of Soviet"withering away" of the functions of governmental bodies and tho transfer of state tasks to non-governmental, "social organizations" such as the irregular tribunals. Khrushchev drew this conclusion int Party Congress speech in the regression to Stalin's systom of party-run kangaroo courts and the subsequent "violations oflegality" that wero reportedly handed down in the comrades' courts tended to strengthen the appeal ofconservative view of the state among severalliberal Soviet jurists. The views of the leading lawyers on this question are examined presontly.
'SEGRMT
more than tho "leading core" of thesubordinate all other tasks, such as ideological work, in the building oi communism. Party production tasks were equated with party Ideological work in Khrushchev's6 Party Congress report, but the lattor work was not then explicitly subordinated to the former. The final step ln Khrushchev's witheringthe party would then become tho "all-embracing" or "multi-purpose"in modernln
Following the basic guidelines set by Chesnokov In the early fifties, the opposition to Khrushchev's party-state scheme maintained contrary conclusions on Khrushchev's withering thesis in an ensuing debate on the constitution. The debate vigorously commenced at tho next party congress.
t CONGRESS AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' DIMINISHED HOLE
Having occupied the highest party, government, and military* posts, Khrushchev att Party Congress told the delegatos on9 that "some" rovision
a year after the fall of Zhukov, Khrushchev had established the "Higher Military Council" (sometimes referred to as the Supreme Military Council or MainCouncil by Soviet military spokesmen) with himself as chairman. The Higher Military Council, which seemed to bear some resemblance to. National Security Council, consisted of key military and party personnel who served as Khrushchev's personal advisory group on matters rolating to defense. Two or three years after the creation of the Council, Khrushchev donned the titlo of "Supreme Hightitle which apparently had been intended to indicate that Khrushchev's military authority was comparable to the military powers expressly granted in. Constitution to tho President of tho (footnote continued on
Of6 Constitution was ln order. He did not cast his remarks on the constitution in antalin context aa he did ath Party Congress. (In6 secret speech at tbat congress, Khrushchev emphatically concluded, vith no further elaboration, that in order to "abolish the cult of the individual decisively once and for all" it was necessary "to restore completely tho Leninist principles of Soviet socialist democracy expressed in the Constitution of tho Soviotather, he announced at9 Congress thatrevision was necessitated by the fact, announced earlier by him in his congress report, that the USSR was entering upon the "higher stage" of history called "large-scale constructionommunist society."
continued"from
United States: "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and therticle II, Section 2. tudy on Khrushchev's role ln military policy making seo CAESAR XXIV of "The Higher Militaryof tho USSR.")
One year after the fall of mV*Mhrhev.oviet interpreter (
jxaenxineq nimseif as chairmanDefense Council"
only other reference to
Council" dates back1
SEGRET
Khrushchev argued tbat the basic law of the laud ought to recognize the endeavor of building communism, as well as all tbe theoretical and functional changes, such as the expanded role of the party and "withering away" of tbo state apparatus (whose higbest body is the Council ofhat he said entering the "higher stage" embraced. He told the dolegates tot Congress that
The Communist Party, as tbe highest forn of social organization, as the leading dotachnent, the well-tried vanguard of the natloo, leads all the social organizations of the working people.
Comrades, at present, when our country isew and most Important period of development, the need forsome changes and additions to the USSR Constitution has ripened. Since the adoption of the constitution, overears replete with events of world historic significance havo gone by. Socialism has loft the confines of one country and hasighty world system. Important changes have taken place in tbe political and economic life of the Soviet Union. Tho buildingommunist society hasirect practical task of the party and the people. All these great changes ln the domestic life and ln the International situation should be reflected and set down legally in the Soviet Union's Constitution, the basic law of our state.
The Practical Party Corollary of the Withered State
Two principal constitutional changes, Khrushchev's report further indicated, would be recognitionhe transfer of state functions to "social organizations",
which presumably included theho highest font of social organ la ats well as the local Soviets, the tradeomradea' courts, he practical role of the party in "buildinghe latter recognition meant the Involvement of the party ln all nationaland administrative functions as well am the party's traditional ideological and political tasks.
Khrushchev's report thuslear Insight Into his long-range goal of establishing. In thisInstance by constitutionalarty that would take the place of the state. Accordingly, thestate adminlstratlveffunctions which vere centered in the Council ofcentral governmentwhich had been the base of power for Khrushchev's recently defeated rivals, malenkov andgiven little recognition ln Khrushchev's congress report. Be said that state functions vould be transferred tosocial organisations" during the process of the withering away of the state into what Khrushehev called and continued tocommunist social self-administra-tion."
Khrushchev gave as examples of this "withering away" tbe transfer of certain undefined aspects ofservices away from "governmenthus undercutting the Ministry of Culture, tbe transfer of health services asd resort facilities to the trado anions and local Soviets, thus undercutting stateand the strengthening of the newly formed comrades* courts, and "people'shich had set up aand rival party-run system for the stats militia and court heirarohy.
* That the withering thesisirect bearing on the future of state coercive organizations (tho state militia and the state security bodies) vas made even more explicit by Khrushchev eight months after tbe congress. But the rationale foronnection waa made ln his congress remarks on the changed role of the secret police. While assarting at the congress that lt would be "stupid and criminal" to do away with the state militia and state
security bodies due to "imperialistethat the "spearhead" of such bodies "is primarily posted against agents sent in by imperialist states" and he emphatically reiterated that "at present we have no people in prisons for political motives."
The Old Party-Old: State Opposition
The Khrushchevian corollary that the withering away of the state and the transfer of ministerialto social organizations would be metarallel rise of tbe functions of the party was promptly challenged att Congress. The opposition was led by presidium member and senior party theorist Suslov who, in hisanuary congress speech, lgnorod Khrushchov's appeal for additions and amendments to the Stalin constitution as he attempted to undercut the principal foundation ofconstitutional thesis.*
Suslov argued that as the Soviet Union enters the "highorhe traditional role of the stateunder the Council of Ministers would nothe role of the party would remain in the
only high-level statementarty official to endorse Khrushchev's remarks on the need for ohangos and additions to the Stalin Constitution was madepeech attributed to then presidium member and chairman of the Supremo Soviet presidium (the ceremonialoroshilov. The speech was Inserted in the officialrecord oft Congress with tho belated explanation that it was not delivered at the congress due to "illness" of the speaker. While the speakerexpressed that Khrushchev's constitutional plans were "completelyoroshilov did not elaborate on the former's withering thesis. Voroshilov at the next) was listed, by Khrushchev, among the members of the "anti-party group."
Ideological field. The state related functions of the party, Suslov pointed out, were to "raise ideological work" and "guide" the planned activity of the people.
Separating Soviets from social organizations,presented his functional and temporal argument that
the increasing role of social organizations by no means leads to a_ reduction of the role of the state or oconomic
organs or or the great role of the Soviets during the
gradual transition from socialism to communism."* Suslov followed his argumentcathing remark about the attempts of "Yugoslav" revisionists to depreciate the importance of the state and state organs "and, thus, ideologically to disarm the working class in tho struggle for tho victory of socialism."
Khrushchev linked the party and local Soviets with social organizations. And in further contrast to Suslov's argument, Khrushchev remarked that "the implementation by public organs of several functions which at the moment belong to tho state will broaden and strengthen the polti-cal foundations of the socialist society and will lead to the further development of socialistnd Khrushchev's remarks on the Yugoslav view of the withering away of the state were not cast in atone. In fact he went out of his way to point out that "wo do not quarrel with Yugoslav leaders about tho formation of the workers councils or other questions of their internal life." (The Yugoslav workers' councils seemed to bear much in common with Khrushchev's notion of local level voluntary social organizations.)
*hraphasis supplied here and elsewhere in this paper unless otherwise noted.
Finally, Suslov rounded out his casetalin-Chesnokov defense of tho state organization; "The state is preserved nOt only under socialism but also in certain historical conditions under communism, when the capitalist states and the capitalist camp are still preserved and.
sc.
consequently,when the danger of the Imperialist attack on our country and other socialist countries is still not eliminated." (The logical conclusion to Suslov'sstate doctrine was made by constitutional Jurist B. Mankovsky, who1 was identified as the chairman of the committee of constitutional law of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. Mankovsky, according to the Bulgarian legal Journal Pravna Misul oflaimedc^nference that "it is only with the victory of the world communist system that the process of withering away of the state and law begins.") Khrushchev rounded out his caseiscussion of state functions, not organizations: "undor communism certain public functions will remain, analogous to present state functions." (The logicalto Khrushchev's state doctrine was made by the head of the USSR Law Institute, P. Romashkin, whose views are examined presently.)
Significantly, Suslov's emphasis on the continuing role of the state apparatus found its way into tho congress resolution onreport. The resolution obscured Khrushchev's opposing formulation. For example, ita passage dealing with the need to expand the activity of the Soviets, but did not broach the Issue as to whether the Soviets were state or social organizations, or both. The resolution's endorsement of the Khrushchev-sponsored proposal for changes and additions to thefollowed.
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE JURISTS ON THE WITHERING THESIS
Though he was unable to push through unimpaired in the congress resolution his concept of the role of the party in contemporary Russia, Khrushchev and certain Jurists proceeded to expand upon the Implications of his congress formulation on the withering away of the state.ay of trying to get around Suslov's opposition. Khrushchev presented the major exposition of his thesis on9 that all Soviets were "social However, the attorneys for the defense of tho old party and state were prompt to devise new arguments xn defense of the old system.
The Working Party, The Strengthened Soviets, and "Other" Social Organizations
Poetic Utopianism combinedorecast that the advent of communism was close at hand was expressed in Khrushchev's9 speech in the Kalinin electoral district of Moscow: "Communism Is noemote dream but our near tomorrow." In the same speech Khrushchev expanded upon his congress position bythatumber of functions of the bodies of the state apparatus would be transferred to social including the Soviets of workers deputies, which are among the most mass-scale and authoritativehrushchev had Included, and then in passing, only local Soviets in his9 Congress definition of social organizations. In9 be Included the whole soviet organization ln bis definition of social organons.
Possibly for tactical reasons, Khrushchev went on to voice only partine first made at the 8tb Party Congress He told the electors that "the task of the party organizations Is to assist the Soviets in their work, guide their activity, but not to take their place or to take over theirignificantly, Khrushchev steered clear of stating that the party organizations would not take tho place of statemain theme of the 8th Party Congress caveat (which had expressly defined the Soviets as state organs)ritical part of Suslov's9 Congressfor the "purity" of Marxism-Leninism for the CPSU.
Khrushchev's post-congress formula on the nature of the Soviets was reiteratedonforence of theof Law of the Soviet Academy of Science held on9 which was devoted to the issue of constitutional revision. The conforence renewed Khrushchev's congress view that the party was the highest form of socialand revivod the question of the gradual transfer of functions of tho state apparatus to social organizations. In addition, the conferees Implicitly raised the sensitive question ofew role of the party ln the revised
1
constitution. The conference roport printed in Soviet State and Law9 recognized as "unsatisfactory" tne fact that6 Stalin Constitution did notdefine the role of the CPSU but merely stated that "the leading role of the Communist Party Is the main featureocialist state." The jurists at thohowever, did not go on to propose any major changes.
Following the May conference, the questions of the role of the party and the implications of the withering thesis were given added attention ln statements by With regard to the non-ideological role of the party, Khrushchev ln his9 central committee plenum speechcomrade" who, Khrushchev said, had inquired what had happened to "party work." indicated that the theoretical work of tho party vould bo relegated to second priority while the party was engagod ln the tasks of solving the economic problems of tbo country. Khrushchev snapped
One of tbe comrades hero sentote: 'Comrade Khrushchev, why is it that ovory-one bore speaks about industry and nobody speaks about party work?' Dear comrado,actory where you aro engaged in party workaulty component while you are at that timeecture on the construction of communism ln our country, /animation in the hall7 wouldn't lt be more useful if you were engaged ln organizing people for scientific workigher standard? Party work means everyone doing his job, knowing his profession well, making good components, and assembling good machines.
In his1 CPSU Congross report, Khrushchev made explicit the proposition that Ideological tasks were subordinate to productive tasks in "party work."
Popularizing the withering thesis, Khrushchev gave particular emphasis to the transfer df state functions to social organizations throughout tbe latter half9 and For one notable example, 19 Interview published in Pravda oneptember Khrushchev, in discussing the transfer of governmental functions to mass associations of workers, pointedhe reduction in the personnel from the Ministry of Defense, eduction in tbe police personnel from the Ministry of Public Order (MOOP)eduction ln personnel from the Ministry of State Securitye then added that "more and more functions of maintaining order and administering the state are being transferred to the hands of social organizations." Later, in his major troop and military budget cut speech at the Supreme Soviet onhrushchev provided more detail on the withered Ministry of Defense of the future: Into the futuro one can predict that we can haveunits formed on the territorial principle. Tbolr personnel will bo trained in military art in their spare time while employed in production, when the need arises, the necessary means of transport, aircraft, and other military equipment will make lt possible to concentrate troops at the required place on our territory."
The Jurists' Contrasting Briefs
0 certain judicial publicistsull scale effort to refine Khrushchev's new examples of the withering away of the stato ministries and therise ln importance and function of the party and Soviets. One of Khrushchev's most obedient constitutional theorists, P. S. Romashkin the Director of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, ln an article ln his institute's official Journal Soviet State And Lawxpanded upon the party-state" views presented in Khrushchev's January and9 speeches. First, Romashkin made lt clear that the withering away
of the state meant the withering away of the state extbook entitled Fundamentals ofIne said that withering away of the "state meant
tho gradual disappearance and dissolution in society of that special stratum of people who are constantly engaged in state administration and who form the stato propor. In other words, tho wltboring away of the stateontinuous reduction of and later the complete liquidation of the stateand the transfer of its functions to society itself, that is, to socialand to the entire population. (Emphasis in original)
Secondly, after having cited Khrushchev's9 remarks on tbe withering away of the armed forces and the militia and the state security organs, Romashkin proceeded toroup of judicial publicists for "not taking into account" tho significance of Khrushchev's9 formulation on the naturo of the soviet organization.** The significance of Khrushchev's formula.
textbook" was published in9 under tho general oditorshlp of presidium member Kuusinen. Like the9 congress resolution, Kuusinen's book also contain'st Congress formulation on the preservation of the state apparatus. Romashkin did not point this out.
**He did not mention names ln scoring thesehe identified thoir work, The Foundations of theState and Law,articular page which-omitted*of Khrushchev's Kalinin remarks, onewas madehapter writtenepartment head of the Higher Party School. Whilerectified his "error" by pointing out thenature of the Sovietsoth state1 Soviet Stato And Lawcontinued on page
analyzed Romashkin, was that "the Soviets, being the elected organs of state authority, at the very sane tine are organs of social self-administration."
Ronashkin then presented the major thesis of his article. He proposed that the amended constitution should include provisions for the transfer of functions of the councils of ministers to tho Soviets.
the transferumber of functions of the state apparatus totrengthening of tho role of the Soviets and the execution by tho deputies of the Soviets of certain functions previously performed by the employees of the state apparatus.
Carried to tho logical conclusion, Romashkin's radical suggestion pointed toward the assumption by tho Soviets of genuine governmental powors.
Finally, after having again urged that Khrushchev's9 formulation on the Soviets be incorporated into the revised constitution, Romashkin broached theissue ofow role for tho party inconstitution. And unlike tho report of tho timid9 jurists' conference, Romashkin hintedajor change ought to be proposed. (In as pointed out ahead, ho bodly suggested that the functions of state agencies should be transferred to the party). In his
(footnote conTlnued from
he neverthelessuslov-llke positionigher Party School conference (discussed presently) in At that conference, Kalinichevhat the party wasdirectinghat the Soviets per se (and by implication otherorganizations, such as the party, tho statewill continue under communism.
0 article Romashkin cryptically suggested that the amended constitution recognize "the growing role of the Communist Party in the life of the Soviet peoplo and state /which/ is even more clearly expressed byumber of functions of state agencies to public organizations." (Emphasis in original) Romashkin went on to suggest that the growing role of the party and its development in the future "must be clearly and thoroughly discussed perhaps in two or even three places in thethe general introductory part, in the chapter on the USSR social system, and in tho chapter on the basic rights and obligations of citizens."
Romashkin's conclusions were particularly important in light of the fact that he was the director of thewhich was reported0 to bo workingraft of amerelyfor Khrushchev.
That Romashkin's case was polemical is made clear in comparisonoint-by-point refutation ofs view of tho withered ministries which appeared in an article by Soviet Jurist Shakhnazarov printed in Political Self-Education (August, . The jurist cautiously aaoptod the Khrushchevian construction on the transfer of state functions to public organizations and the growth of the role of the party during theperiod." But he emphatically concluded that the party's role would remain in the traditional sphere of general guidance" rather than active participation in the work of the state agencies.
rticle, which was widely circulated in Soviet party and law schools -
1 was introng del gnaw oi toe existing srare system. hree-part defense of what he called the three categories of the statejudicial, and
First, with regard to the defense ministries, the jurist pointedly cited the conclusion reached at theh Party1n the eve of World War II which provided added theoretical justification for a
highly organized state apparatus: "under communism tbe state will remain until such tine as danger of foreign aggression has disappeared."* The only early congress tbat Romashkin cited ln bis October article was the 6th Party Congress at the end of World War I, which be said foresaw the trend of the transfer of state organs to public organizations. Thus it was not surprising that Shakhnazarov, unlike Romashkin, Ignored Khrusbchev's9 remarks on tho withered defense
Secondly, ln defense of the police and Judicial ministries, Shakbnazarov constrasted the professionalIsm of tho state militia and tbe state courts with the amateurishness of tbe Khrusbchov-sponsored comrades' courts and peoples' militia. And he appeared to appeal for some ministerial control of the Irregular tribunals in pointing out what he called "serious mistakes" when the people's squads and comrades' courts acted without closo contact with the corresponding state ministries. (Romashkin chose to ignore this issue.) The mistakes, wrote Shakhnazarov, wero "due to poor knowledge of Soviet
*The lbth party congress was handled quite differently by the Jurists who supported Khrushchev's constitutional schome. For example, jurist F. Burlatsky, whose support for Khrushchev's views is discussed later in this paper, stated that "If onoareful study of Stalin's pronouncements on the question of the stato, and especially at the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU, it will not be hard to note that bo clearly had one definite politicalfind theoretical substantiation for intensifying the methods of coercion ln the period of the transition to communism, to justify the practice of mass repressions and the gross violation of socialist legality." (World Marxist Revlow,
RET
law and prove that extensive training should therofore be given all those who participate in voluntaryfor the maintenance of order."*
Finally, in defense of the administrative ministries (the statehe jurist veiled his argument by discussing only the role of the Soviets, which he was willing to regard as both state and social organizationsountermove to try to get around Khrushchev's(That is, he adopted Khrushchev's terminology but retained Suslov's conclusions.) Shakhnazarov asserted that "only an insignificant number of the more0 deputies* of the Soviets are employed directly in the offices of tho executive committees and in other state institutions." But he did not go on, like Romashkin, to conclude that parts of tho state organization ought to bo assumed by the Soviets during the withering away of the state. Shakhnazarov capped his vindication of the traditional role of the state ministries and tho old role of the party by citing the article in6 Constitution
complaint continuod to be voiced in otherjournals. For example, an unsigned article in Kom-munist of November3 concluded that it would be "rather To'ng"Historical period" before Soviet legal sclenco withered away. Going beyond Shaknazarov, the article withjustification maintained that "the entire system of soviet and economic organs will require greater attention to the legal training of workers In the administrative and economic apparatus. It is no secrot that many such workers are still somewhat at sea in legal matters, and the result ie violations of the law. it would boto make use of the experience acquired to date inist of positions for which legal training is necessary."
figure is tho rough total for all soviet doputies0 from the lowest levels (cities, districts,hrough tho higher levels (union republics,o the highest level (the Supreme Soviet).
defining the party as the "leadingthan an actual productive force in the nation. And as if to make his disagreement vith Khrushchev and his lawyers clearer, Shakhnazarov did not call for any constitutionalof the role of the party.
Khrushchev And Romashkln's Brief
Avoiding Shakhnazarov's defense of the existing state organization and adopting nuch of Ronashkin's case, Khrushchev summarized his conceptions regarding thethesis1 speechoint meeting of the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of Marxism-LeninIsm. Though he did not then express bis proposal ln the specific ternsegislating Supreme Soviet or an "all embracing" party, Khrushchov Ignored the futuro role of the state apparatus and again turned to the subject of the role of voluntary social organizations as the Soviet Union "entors While9 CPSU congress resolution hadompromise position, Khrushchev nevertheless announcod at the1 Joint mooting that "our party holds firmly to the course" of "transferring functions of state organs to social organizations." Compressing0 rationale, Khrushchev concluded that "this course, far from weakening, strengthens socialist society and is In 'line with the future transformation of the socialist state system into communist social self-administration."
The "Convergence Thesis"
ively conference held1 at the Higher Party School ln Uoscow, Romashkin,Khrushchev's renewed position, rounded out his0 Soviet State And Law casoajor exposition of his radical views on constitutional changes. Romashkln's presentation, some parts of which were reported inof History CPSUnd other parts" in SovieT State And Law, included his earlier
premisesithering away of the stato mount the transfer of state ministerial functions tohat the soviots, as social organizations, would assume traditional state functions. At tho1 conference, the conclusion of his argument was the transferred ministerial powers were to be assumed by the party organization.
First he argued that there woulddrawingof Soviet, party, and trade union work" which would resultnew type of multipurpose organization for administering the affairs of society." Then tho "new multi purpose organization" was defined: "it is especially important to koep in mind an organization such as our party whose very nature reveals many features of the future of the communist system of organizing society." Thereforo, according to Romashkin's rationale, the party would become the "multipurpose organization" or "all-embracing social organization" in the life of the future Russian society. Romashkin concludedook Into the distant future: "when the consciousness of tho entire people is raised to the level of communist consciousness, the need for the existence of the party will disappear, and it will gradually be dissolved in the peoplehole."
Romashkin's thesis that tho party would boInto an "all-embracing'v organizationogical expression of Khrushchev's efforts to turn the party's attention to the practical matters of administration and economics.
The Higher Party School conference was significant not only ln that it revealed Romashkin's fulls, which Khrushchev atd Congress later endorsed, but also int exposed the state bureaucraticto Khrushchev's anti-mlnlutorial effortst discloseduggestion made att Party Congress
REGRET.
to Increase the numbers and powers of permanentof tbe Sovietsontroversial constitutional matter.
With few exceptions, those supporting one or more of four measures to strengthen tho ministries or, at the lower levels, executive committees were administrative workers.** The four measures this group suggested were
^Permanent (or standing) commissions of tho Soviets are agencies of tho two houses of the Supreme Soviet USSR (the Soviet of the Union, the Soviet of Nationalities) and tho lower-level Soviets. Tho permanent commissions continue to work between the biannual soviet sessions. In theory, the powers of the commissions arc impressive: they are chargedlaborating and giving first consideration to draft statutes that are introduced at sessions of the Supreme Soviet,hecking the work of agencies subordinate to tho Supreme Soviet,ln tho Implementation of acts passed by tho Soviets. In practice, however, the commissions and the Soviets have been virtually ignored by the Council of Ministers which, ln conjunction with the party's central committee, carries out the bulk of state legislation. As examined presently, the issue of granting greater juridicalto the permanent commissions is one of tbe main constitutional Issues lo present Kremlin politics.
supporting tho state apparatus wore tbe A. Denlsov, chairman of the Law Commission attached to the Council of Ministors USSR; N. Smirnov, chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad Soviet; P. Spiridonov chairman of the executive committee- of the Khoynikskly Rayon in Belorussia; A. NiklfornoV, deputy chairman of the executivo committee of tbo uoscow City Soviet, and F. Kalinychev, department head Higher Party School. Those supporting stronger Soviets included the following: Mr. Georgadze, Secretary of the Presidium of tbe USSR Supreme Soviet, N. Starovoytov, division head of tho Presidium of the RSFSR Supremo Soviet, B. Samsonov, deputy to the USSR Supremo Soviet, and Jurists P. Romashkin (footnote continued on
ncrease restrictions on soviet deputies, ransfer soviet Jobs to tbe executive committees, ncrease the size of the executive committees,nsure the future existence of the ministries (that is, "retainommunist society"). The group supporting one or more of three measures to strengthen the Soviets were generally associated with the soviet system. The three measures suggested weressume functions of ministries or executive committees, ncrease soviet control over the ministries or executive committees,trengthen the soviet organization by adding permanent commissions.
d CONGRESS AND THE PARTY'S TRADITIONAL ROLE
Khrushchev's renewed efforts01 to resolve in his favor the critical constitutional question on the future diminishing role of the state bureaucracyetback1 with the incorporation of the traditionalists' position ln the new party program at thed Party Congress. Khrushchev countered bynew" state constitution to incorporate the "new features" that building communism supposedly necessitated.
(footnote continued from
U. Akhmedov and A. Nedavny. Two state workers, Nikiforov and Spiridonov, reasoned that the expansion of authority of permanent commissions would somehow allow executive committees to concentrate on solving "fundamental USSR Procurator Rudenko (the USSR's Chiefat the Nuremberg war crimes trials) supported greater controls on soviet deputies while alsocertain legal violations of executive committees.
rSEGREX
The Old Paxty Organization
The convergence of the party organization with the other social organizations was the crucial element in Romashkln's thesis. And Khrushchev, in his1 speech atd Party Congress, appeared to have accepted much of his lawyer's thesis in asserting that during the period of the change of the existing system of governmentocial-selfhe party organization itself reveals features of the future statehe party must set the example,odel in developing the very best forms of communist public-self government"), hat the party organization would be modified while party Influence wouldhe apparatus of the party agencies will steadily shrink while the ranks of the party activistshat party activists would increase their participation in the opera-tlbn of the Soviets, the trade unions and other social organizations.
Tho Romashkin "convergence" thesis, howovor, did not appear in the party program, the document whichtowo decade blueprint for building asociety "in the main" in the USSR.
The Old Party Tasks
Khrushchev onctober ignored and Suslov onctober praised the program's formula on the creation of the material-technical basis of communism as the "main economic task" of tho party. Khrushchov viewed the creation of tho basis of communism as the main task: "the Party first of all will direct the efforts of the Soviet people toward creating the material and technical base of
Khrushchev explicitly subordinated traditional party Jobs to the tasks of building communism. The party, he said onctober, "has based its policy on aMarxist-Leninist foundation and has subordinated
SECRET-
all Its theoretical and ideological-educational activity to the solution of specific tasks of communistTho congress, hovever, gave the traditional ideot-logical tasks the dominant emphasis. Even the congressctober) on Khrushchev's report placed Ideology over practical vork:
Further Improvement and Intensification of ideological vork constitutes one of the Party's chief tasksostprerequisite for success in all its practical activity. (Emphasis ln original)
Tho Old State Agencies
In hisctober speech Suslov, vaunting that un-
disclosed "difficulties" ln vorking out the thooretical portions of the party program had been surmountedfirmly presented the Stalln-Chesnokov-Mankovsky view that the state system would be strengthened during the "new stage" of Russia's development. At about the same time, Romashkin (read Khrushchev) reiterated his caso on the liquidation of the state apparatusaw journal article explicitly pegged to the theoretical portions of the party program.
Romashkin,ctober CPSU
Law, October
speech
away of the state means thefirst, tbo gradual disappearance of tho noed for state coercion toward tho members of society. Socondly, gradualand dissolution of the special class of persons engaged inadministration.
"The process of withering away of tho state will signify the gradualof tho organs of state power into organs of social solf-administra-tion by moans of the further development of socialist democracy, which presupposes the active participation of all
Romashk in (cont inued)
Consequently, withering away of the state renansreduction and later the complete liquidation of the state apparatus and theof Its functions to society Itself, tbat Is, to social organizations, the whole collective."
Suslov (continued)
citizens in the management of the state and control of economic and cultural construction, improvement in the work of tho state apparatus and increasing control by the people over its activity."
final draft of the party program set off Suslov's above position in bold face type In the Russian text. Khrushchev's (and Romashkin's) formulation that the Soviets were both state and social organizations was also included, but, as jurist Shakhnazarov had demonstrated in it was possible to adopt Khrushchev's terminology while retaining Suslov's conclusions.
Unlike Khrushchev and tbe party program, Suslov ind Congress speech failed to mention the Soviets. At9 Congress Suslov had referred favorably to the Soviets and the permanent commissions of the Soviets. His silence at1 Congress on the issue of the soviots* role followed tbe public exposure of Khrushchev's formula on transferring functions of the state apparatus to tho Soviets and other social organizations. In short, Suslov's new tactic in defense of the old system was to slight the Soviets and to uphold the viability of thestate ministerial systemart of his protracted strategy for the preservation of the party's traditional political role.
Notwithstanding Suslov's exclusion of the Soviets in1 scenario, the party program included aon the authority of the Supreme Soviets and the permanent commissions of the Soviets to check on the activity of the several Councils of Ministers. Thein the party program, recently paraphrased by Brezhnev and Podgorny atd Party Congress6 (see ahead,, read;
"SEGREJL
Every deputyoviet must take an active part ln state affairs and carry on definite work. The role of the permanent committees of the Soviets is Increasing. The permanent committees of the Supreme Soviets mustsupervise the activities of agencies and economic councils and contribute actively to theof decisions adopted by theSupreme Soviets.
However, systematic supervision of the activities of tbe party organisation rather than the government ministries appeared to bo the critical issue in Suslov's congress defense of the <xIsting institutions. And1 Congress dofense on this issue seemed to be directed toward pro-congress proposals to sot up an agency empowered to chock on the activity of both the party and statoproposals with which Khrushchev and presidium member Mikoyan Identified themselves at the congress. Theagonoy, as originally proposed in the party pross, would havo had tho authority to investigate the activity of high-level party and state officials. Suslov's view on the issue, as cited in juxtapositionomashkin quoteas for "increasing control by the people over Its /the state apparatus Vfor"control" over the party apparatus. Tho agency (later named the Party-State Control Committee) was not explicitly endorsed ln the congress resolution.
The State of tho Whole People
Both Suslov and Khrushchev atd Congress endorsed the formula that the "dictatorship of thehad fulfilled its mission (buildingnd that the dictatorship of the proletariat had been transformed into the "state of the whole people" (whoso mission was to build "communism"). But tho two speakers promptly drew contrasting conclusions from tho aboveof state formulas. Suslovhat
the state apparatus during the period of the "state of the whole people" would in effect be Strengthened and thatour state is called upon to organize theof the material and technical base ofhrushchev heldhe state and economic apparatus of the "state of the whole people" would in effect be diminished through "voluntary participation in thatand through the assumption of state functions by the party and Sovietshat the party was to organize the creation of the material and technical base of communism. In addition, Suslov's remarks on the change in terminology wore dovold of the effusive praise that Khrushchev gave to the substitution of formulas (the transition to the state of the whole people isact without parallel lna most important milestone").
The party program endorsed Suslov's conclusions on the "state of the whole people."
The New Constitution
Khrushchev, who was assigned71 plenum the task of reporting on the party program atd Congress, dutifully fulfilled this task in hisctober report on the program by briefly mentioning the program's incorporation of the SUBlov thesis on therole of the party. hile bearing responsibility for the state of work on all sectors of communisttho party organizations must at tho same time not supplant the stato and public agonclos"). But in Khrushchev'sctober central committee report to the delegates ofd CPSU Congress ho ignored the party program's compromise inclusion of Suslov's formula on the correct role of the party as well as Suslov's view on tho future role of the stnte-bureaucracy. In fact,onh deleted any reference to the state's role ln his concluding remarks on the "chief tasks" of building communism.
However, Khrushchev did not get bis positionsondorsed in the party program. Accordingly, he turned his attention to another"new" USSR constitution. And in the context of presenting hisrationalization for tho party's existence, in hisctober speech Khrushchev made tbenew" constitution which would reflect "changes In the life of our country" was in the process of being drafted:
Over tho past quarterentury, since the present Constitution of the USSR was adopted, there have boen big changes in the life of our country. The Soviet Union, hasew stage of itsand socialist democracy has risenigher levol. The nev Constitution of the USSR that we arc beginning to draft must reflect the new features in the life of Soviot society in the period of tho full-scale building of communism.
Tho opposing faction scored again: like Suslov, thoctober resolution ignored Khrushchev's remarks on the "new" constitution*
THE "PRODUCTION PRINCIPLE" AND THE CONSTITUTION
Following his second congress setback for his own particular party platform, Khrushchev, in his sustained efforts to "modernize" the CPSU, turned from theparty program to the promulgationewto sanction the new forms and methods allegedly needed to build communism. (For apparent tactical reasons, he initially appeared to settleew basic law which would have been little moreedraft of the party program.) However, Khrushchev's long-range view ofparty reappeared2 as heonsiderable effort to move ahead on the final draftingewwhile at the same time promoting the "economics over politics" formula for party work. Thistheoretically substantiated, so the Khrushchev forces argued,ewly "deciphered" passageenin("Tho Immediate Tasks of the Sovietegarding the practical role of thethe doctrinal underpinning for Khrushchev's long-standing efforts to place the party officially on the "production" principle.
The production principle, as some Soviet spokesmen pointed out later, was intended to bo incorporated into the now constitution. Other spokesmen adopted new tactics to sustain the traditionalists* opposition. And following the2 Cuban missile crisis, Kosygin and Brezhnev exposed their dissimilar views on tho project.
New Project, Old Polemic
sense of urgencyew constitution combined
with reiterations of Khrushchev's line on the transfer of state functions to social organizations was initiated in Izvestiya--the government newspaper edited by Khrushchev's son-in-law,early as ecember Izvestiya editorial reprinted Khrushchev's1 remarks on the needew constitution which had been deleted ind Congress resolution. Immediately following the remark on the constitution, Izvestiya added the sensitive matter of the transferral oi state jobs to social organizations:
REGRET.
The question naturally arises of theand adoptionew Constitution of the USSR, which,. Khrushchev said in the Report of the CC-CPSU at the XXII Congress of the Party, should reflect new characteristics in the life of Soviet society during the period of the full-scale construction of Communism. The Party and Government in the future also willourse of transferring an increasing number of state functions to social organizations.
"Rushing Ahead" was the title of another Izvestiya commentary onecember which, at first glance, seemed to sustain Izvestiya's case for the need toew-basic law. However, theby jurist Shakhnazarov, the lawyer who had carefully rebutted0 Khrushchev's view of the withering away of the statedefended the Stalinand arguedew basic law ought to "perfect the whole state organization." Shakhnazarov, after scoring Stalin's abuses of6 Constitutionhe fruit of the collective creativity of ourrote thergued that6 Congress "largely restored the Leninist norms of party and stato life." Shakhnazarov then gave only passing attention to the issueew constitution and offered the comment that the state-orientedin1 party programremarkablebasis for the country andewnd unlike the Izvestiya editorialecember,made no reference to transferring state functions to social organizations as the Soviet Union "rushes ahead" toward communismew constitution.
Khrushchev's Constitution Commission
In the wake of other judicial polemics on the subjectew basic document, Khrushchev5 April2 session of the Supreme Soviet again ventured into the realm of constitutional law. He announced thathas outlivedhat "It does not correspond to its present stage." Declaring that "nowew party program has been adopted, we feel that every condition exists to tackle the draftingew Soviet Constitution."
SECRET-
He went on to assert, however, that the new constitution "should embody in fullhohich have been reflected and developedCPSU Program." He did not take the occasion to reiterate his view of the long-range role of tho party; in fact, he did not even mention the party in hispril speech. Nor did Khrushchev Indicate that the constitutional project should rush ahead with any great urgency. Rathor, his somewhat uncharacteristic remarks on the new project were an expression of hope that the draft law would
Comrade deputies,xpress the satisfaction of all deputies of both chambers of the Supreme Sovlot of the sixth convocation that this Supreme Soviet in its present compositionill draft, discuss with alT the people, and adopt the new constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Khrushchev remained discreetly silent on the fact that work on the draftew constitution, which he referred to inad boon progressing for at least two years. And he explicitly avoided tho disclosure of any specifics of the new constitution in telling thethat "for the time being it would be premature to specify ln detail what the new constitution should look like." Butroad generalization he went on "to define briefly the main tasks of the futurehich Khrushchev said "will be to reflect the new stage in the development of the Soviet society and state; to raise socialist democracytill higher level; to provide evon more solid guarantees for the democratic rights and freedoms of the working poople, guarantees of tho strict observance of socialist legality; tothe conditions for transition to communist social self-administration." However, he may have been publicly hinting that radical changes in the existing system were to be incorporated into the new constitution. Ho said that tho Soviet people in creating the new constitution were "pioneers of new forms of state and sociale did not call for The transformation of tho oxlsting
1
"SE CR E
"parliamentary" system into one granting express powers to an independent executive branch, eports (which are examined presently) held thateffort to pioneer newthe effort to convert the Soviot leadership structure to "something like" thetrongdating
Abundant signs in March and2 of other high-level opposition in arriving at more immediate policy decisions (particularly those relating to resource allocations) may, in part, explain Khrushchev's public avoidance of particularly sensitive party-state matters in his2 speech. The postponement of the April Supreme Soviot fromh tod suggested that the leadership had had difficulties in agreeingingle program for the soviet delegates to approve.
Following the speeches on Khrushchev's report, which added virtually nothing to his cautious remarks, the Supreme Sovietesolution creating acommission consisting ofeputies of the Supreme Soviet, most of whom were leading party officials, under Khrushchev's chairmanship. The chairmen of the nine sub-committees, which made up Khrushchev's newcommission were not disclosed at this time.
(One of the subcommittees, apparently at Khrushchev' request, dealt with foreignt the April session, Khrushchev complained that "the present constitution does not define the principles of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union" and that in tho current period problems of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and of the struggle for peace have acquiredimportance." Therefore, Khrushchev concluded, as jurist Romashkin had done in0 Soviet State and Law article, that "the new constitution should clearly formulate the basic principles of the relations of our state with other states." Domestically, constitutional incorporation of foreign policy principles may havefurther theoretical justification for Khrushchev's efforts to further his particular proposals. But the net effect of2 Soviet foreign policylate
October failure to keep offensive missiles deployed into another check on Khrushchev's long-range view of the "new Party." The next time Khrushchev talked about the needew, the report of his remarks did not include any mentioneed for the inclusion of foreign policy provisions in the new law.)
Cuba, Tho Constitution, And Kosygin
In the summers Khrushchev was rushing ahead with his domestic efforts to place the party on the "production"than the ideological basis assigned in the partyofficials ofinstitute hinted that the new constitution would bo moreegal accommodation of the new program.
In an2 soviet state ana Law nfiimo,
st F. M. Burlatsky was less definite with regard to the dateew law, but he indicated that thewould involve important alterations in the state apparatus. Burlatsky wrote that "within the next few years we are going to have toewhis forecast followed his Khrushchev-like formulation that under the state of the whole people the statewould be subject to the increasing enlistment of the "masses" into the management of state jobs.
Unlike Burlatsky, Kosyginifferent formuli for the development of the state of the whole people in2 Kremlinfirst major presidium address in the wake of Khrushchev's failure to redress the
?>ECREF-
SEGREX
strategic balance by Installing offensive missiles ln Cuba. Kosygin, commenting on the establishment of the natorial-tochnical base for building communism, seemed to betray his position on the state organs by not only pointing out the role of the state, but also by listing the state before tho party: "the leading placo ln the activity of the state and the Communist Party /in the construction of communism7 is taken by the development of the economy."
Accordingly, Kosygin made no reference to theaway of the state, no roforence to the rolo of tho Soviets, and no reference to the related constitution project. One month later,f
ihe refuseduggest1
any Time period ror THB projocTeVcompletion of
it ii wns possible to predict the approximate date ior tne new constitution to go Into effect, Kosygin would only answer: o, it is really too early." Kosygin's particular case for the preservation of the state agencies was reflected2 Pravda editorial"Constitution Day" which pointed out in the con-toxt of recalling the establishment of Khrushchev'scommission that the CPSU Program called for "improvement of the work of the state apparatus."
Kosygin, tho party's chief economist, failed to speakentral committee plenum In rate..November con-corned with "The Development of the Economy of the USSR and Party Leadership of the National Economy." And Suslov, tho party's chief ideologist, at the same November plenum referred only to tho necosslty to struggle for tho purity of Marxism-Leninism.
Tlu> Creation of the Productjun-Oriented PartyePlenum
Khrushchev's proposals for change in the basis of party activity and organization in the summerhe shock of the missile crisis and wero adopted at
SEGRET.
2 Central Committee plenum. The decisions, whichajor landmark in7 tonewn official recognition of the party's chief role in productive functions of the nation, eorganization of the party and lower-level soviet apparatus into two parts, one concerned with industrial affairs (mainly urban based) and the other with agricultural matters (ruraln effort to strengthen direct supervision and control of the party over the state agencies through the formationombined Party-State Control Committee (headed by KGB Chief Shelepin). (Some articles on this committee hadarty control function as well, but the November plenum did not explicitly define this controversial purge power for Khrushchev's new committee.)
And Khrushchev at the November plenum again made his position clear that the matter of economic production was the party's main task: "by concentrating attention on the main thing, namely questions of production, the Party organizations will be able more concretely to deal with organizational and ideological-educational work which is directly bound up with both industrial andproduction."
Ideological work of this nature was expressly emphasized by the chairmanody ostablished at the2 plenum, the Ideological Commission of tho Central Committee headed by secretariat, member (and Khrushchev protege) Ilichev. On the eve of the2 plenum, Ilichevengthy Kommunist "No.article repeatedly attacked unnamed party theoreticians who "cling to yesterday's theory." And unlike Suslov atd Party Congress, Ilichev in discussing the party program did not assert that the creation of the material-technical bases of communism was the "main economic task" of the party. Rather he first cited the main theme of the "recentlyrticle (first announced in Pravda onaid to have been drafted by Lenin:
Usually with the world 'leadership' or 'direction' there is associated primarily an activity which is predominately or
CRIL 7-
even purely political. Yot the very basis and the very essence of tho Soviet regime and tho very essence of tho transitionapitalist societyocialist one, consists in the fact that political tasks and problemsubordinate place to economic tasks.
Then Illchev judged that Lenin put questions of the direction of the economy in the center of all the work of the Party "and consequently also in the center of its scientific-theoretical activity." And as if to make his theoretical differences with the traditionalists even clearer, Illchev went on to assert that the party's dominant role in"is all the more justified under present conditions."
Khrushchev's November victory was substantial: the party's basic structure was transformed from1 party program's territorial-production basisasis that was mainly production-oriented. And the newly established Ideobgical Commission was headed by an obedient theorist ratherersistent critic.
But his victory was not sustained as the post-Cuba crisis reaction began to consolidate, and as individual presidium members began to play politics with the production principle and the constitution.
Brezhnev and Kozlov On The New Law
Divcrgont handling of tho production principle and the now constitution project was displayed in2 by two leading contenders for Khrushchev'sapparent" Kozlov and Brezhnev. Shades of variation between the two of the offlcacy ofNovember plenum decisions was not startling. (Kozlov lnecember speech ath Italian Communist Party Congress said that tho November plenum "generally outlined" the measuresto the period of constructing communism. Vith regard to features of the same period, Brezhnev in hisecember Izvosllya article said the November plenum
"outlined concrete ways.") But the interesting variation between the two, and between Khrushchev's constitutional jurists, appear to have centered on the sensitive question of the constitutional incorporation of the party's2 production principle. Khrushchev's jurists, inRomashkin and Mnatsakanyan, discussed thein terras of the2 plenum decisions in law journal articles3 (examined presently). Kozlov at the Italian Party Congress did not link the two projects. Brezhnev in bis Izvestiya article juxtaposed, but did not link the party's new prime task with the USSR's new law project. For example, Kozlov told Italians that
we are striving to draw all the builders of communism into the administration of the economy, of culture, and of all the affairs of our all people's state. The more perfected forms of democraticfostered by life will be legally reflected in the new USSR Constitution which is being worked out now.
And Brezhnev revealed to Izvestiya readers that
the decisions of the November plenum have embodied the collective wisdom and experience of the party; theypiritenuinely creative Leninist approach to the solution of problems in the further development of socialist society. The enormous changes which have occurred in Soviet society, in tho development of socialist statecraft, will be legally endorsed in the new USSR constitution.
However, Brezhnev's failure to link conclusivelyecisions to the new constitution appeared toarticularly shrewd maneuver in the unsettled Kremlin politics of the immediate post-Cuba missile crisis period. That is, Brezhnev'slaced himomewhat different constitutional position from Kozlov (in addition,
segret
Brezhnev, unlike Kozlov, cited Khrushchev' 2 cryptic remark on pioneering new forms of state and social systems)topping shortull commitment to the Khrushchev-sponsored position for constitutional accommodation of the production principle. Brezhnev, like Suslov atd Congress, also referred to the party program's appeal to improvo the work of the state apparatuseference conspicuously absent in Khrushchev's2 remarks on thend to strengthen "popular control" over the activity of theparty and (As pointed out ahead, the position on greater control of tho state apparatus was reiterated by Brezhnev during6 party congress.)
THE INTERVENTIpN OF THE PRESIDIUM OPPOSITION
While Khrushchev was able In the immediate post-missile crisis period to push through his plans to place the party on the production principle at the2 Central Committee plenum, his project for adefinition Of the production-oriented party of the future made little progress throughout mostn fact, during the five month period following the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev's decentralizationfrom his7 "theses" on the ministerialsuffered setbacks. And Khrushchev's efforts to impose additional controls on party functionaries through the newly established Party-State Control Committee were frustrated; an3 Party-State statutelimited the role of Shelepin's committee to the state administrative apparatus.
In the midst of other setbacks and other high-level disagreements, Khrushchev inenewed his effortsew basic law. Presidium opposition to hiswas manifested.
The Centralized Ministries And Stalin's State Theorist
In the midst of high-level policy disputes over Khrushchev's handling of Cuba, China, resourceand deStalinlzatlon, Khrushchev's2 ministerial victories encountered significant setbacks, within the first three months
One setback dealt with the downgrading of thestate committees. 63 edition of Vedimostl, the official journal of the Supreme Soviet, carried the unheralded January Supreme Soviet decrees which announced the disestablishment of Khrushchev's
state committees as Independent agencies.* Tho bulk of the stato committees were subordinated to tbo USSR State Planning Committeethers to tbe USSR Council of National Economy (USSRorganizational scheme whichtep toward the one advocated by tbe "anti-party group"
Five daysostwar stateondorsed the unheralded yedlmosti centralization announcements in an article in KommunleT (sent to press on. In thethe article, Chosnokov suddenly chose to digress from his main theme, the2 plenum decisions, to state that the economic and political life of the nation "requires the maintenance and perfection of Chesnokov, before returning to his main theme,rack at alleged negative tendencies in Khrushchev's decentralization scheme in the context of praising tbe USSR Council of National Economy and Gosplan.
Tho measures outlined by the Party also Increase the operational smoothness of all echelons of tho national economy;
This announcement Included those state committees formed at the Novemberelectrical, light, and food Industries. Later ln January and3 many independent state committees established in the years following7 decentralization "reforms" were alsofishing, fuel industry, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, chemical Industry, automation and machine-building, professional-technical education. The subsequent growth of the Gosplanalone reportedly has been phenomenal. According to Soviet economist Liberman in an Interview printed in Komsomolskaya Pravda onhe number of of-T'icial "posTFIoni in the planning bureaucracy has increasedactor "In due course the number of such positions has grown" exclaimed the economist.
they perfect centralism as dictated by the organized and planned character of economy and society. Thus, theof the sovnarkhozes will undoubtedly facilitate the overcoming of provlncial-lstic tendencies which are more strongly pronounced ln the small sovnarkhozes. The creationSSR council of national economy willore flexible form of coordination of the current plans of economic construction and of theleadership of the fulfillment of the annual plansationwide scale. Tbe transformation of the Goskomsovlet /State Economic Council/ into Gosplan, Handling long range planning, willa more thorough and better grounded elaboration of long-range plans for boosting the national economy andwill facilitate the compilation by the Union Republics, the localagencies and the sovnarkhozes of their own plans within the framework of the national plans. (Emphasis ln original)
Following the January-February reverses, another setback for Khrushchev's long standing decentralizing efforts arrived on3 with tbe formation of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR Council of Ministers and the subordination to the Supreme Economic Council of Gosplan and USSR Sovnarkhoz. The SupremeCouncil was granted clear powers enabling it to move into any economic area to fulfill its plans. And the Supreme Economic Council was headedan, armaments minister Ustinov, whoso3 appointment received little praise from Khrushchev.
The Return of the Lawyers
In the latter part ofIs, well after Khrushchev had held on to his leading position in an
apparent struggle with Kozlov (whon3 and died last year) and Suslov in the monthsthe Cuban missileconstitution project again surfaced ln articles by Jurists endorsing and opposing Khrushchev's institutional efforts.
One Soviet. Hnatsakanyan in an article in Problems of History CPSUade more ex-plicit the conclusion drawn by Romashkiniscussion of the constitution project and the2 party decisions3 Soviet State And Law article. Mnatsakanyan held that the concept of Khrushchev'sprinciple would be incorporated into the newwhich, the author declared, "will be adopted in the very near future." Mnatsakanyan went on to mako it clear that the new constitution would "consolidate" the "recent measures" which, he later explained in his article, were embodied in the decisions of the2 plenum regarding "the reorientation of the party organs of the republics according to the productionand the creation in the central committee of the republic communistureau for industryureau for agriculture."
The next major article on constitutional themes did not draw this connection. It made the traditionalists' classic argument of linking the defense of ministerial system with the viability of the Stalin Constitution. The article, written by Jurist M. Piskotin, appeared in Kommunistigned to the pressnder the pointed title of "development of democracy and improvement of the state apparatus." Piskotin, like his colleague Shakhnazanov in0 Political Self-Education article, praised6 Constitution forremendous role" In the life of the nation. Piskotin ignored the three-year-old subject of the necessityew constitution, and as the title of his articlehe enumerated the powers of the state ministries: "the main responsibility for the management of state, economic and cultural affairs rests in the statend he applauded, as had Kosygin on occasion, the quality and quantity of the state technicians: "in the various state administrative organs, both central andast army of specialists is at work."
Constitutional accommodation of tho partywould provide the basic statutory authorization for Khrushchev's solution for the role of the party in the nation's contemporarynot mentioned in Pravda's3 "Constitutional Day" editorial, but theecember editorial did not go on, as it had ino recall the party program's explicit position on the expanding role of the state apparatus.
The Return of the Constitution Commission
Likeecember Pravda editorial, Khrushchev did not recall the program's position on the critical matter of the role of the state at what was called the next "regular" meeting of the constitution commission ona. (This was the first meeting on record of the commission since its foundation in)
And unlike his report before the2 Supreme Soviet session, Khrushchev at the4 meeting specifically brought up the matter that the new"must fully reflect" not only the party program but also the role of the party and social organizations in the building of communism. According to
hew iuiure rwis "oi cne grate, ne xoia xne commission members that "the new constitution must fully reflect the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU Programommunist society, of the role of the people's masses, the communist party, arid social organizations in the building of communism."
Signs of Resistance to Khrushchev's Constitution
While Khrushchev may have renewed his formeron the party, at least five indications that all had not gone well at the mid-July meeting may be tallied.
One: Khrushchev's speech was released In aformsign which in his case generallythat controversial issues were not resolved. 4 example of this was hismajor speechate September party-government meeting which, according to post-coup reports, contained radical suggestionsuggestion toro-consumer policy similar to the one advocated by Halenkov in the early post-Stalin period) that were not acceptable to tho leading group.
of Khrushchev's
abridgedb JUiy noscOw radioirtually identicaluly Pravda report) appeared to qualify bis comments by noting that he made only "preliminary observations" on the principles for tho new constitution. This qualification appeared to bo particularly curious in light of the fact that work on the project had been progressing for over four years (It took Stalin less than two years to enact his basic law) and in light of the fact that two yearshrushchev had "defined tho main tasks of thobefore the same commission.
urious modification with regard to theissue of the military authority of Khrushchev was exposed in the Uoscow press three months before the commission met. Khrushchev's lofty military title "Supreme Highublicly introduced by Defense Minister Malinovsky at1 Party Congress and roiteratod in his4 Red Star article pegged to Khrushchev's birthday, was deleteoTin Pravda's4 reprint of Malinovsky's article. Pravda roforrod to Khrushchev as "comrade" rather than "Supreme High Commander.")
Throe: Eight days after the constitutionalmet, prominence was given in Pravdaeeting of the rarely publicized "Presidium" of the Council of Ministers. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers, formally established two days after Stalin's death was announced, had boen given virtually no publicity following the purge of its original members (Malenkov as chairman, Bulganin, Uolotov, Beria and Kaganovich as first deputy
chairmen) under Khrushchev's aegis. In addition to tho political significance associated with tho ministerial presidium, Pravda's4 reportorlal action was ln tacit contrast with Khrushchev's deerophasls on the policy-making role of the state apparatuseparate entity. (It may be significant to regard to the elevatdon of the public status of the Council of Ministers that on the day before the constitutional commission met, Mikoyan, the presidium member who had given Khrushchov no noticable opposition on the former's constitutional efforts, was shifted from the Council of Ministers to the Supromo Sovietonuly by Brezhnev who returned to full-time party work.)
Four: Lack of agreement may also serve to explain the fact that reports of tho subcommittee heads were not released, even ln summary form. Almost all subcommittees submitted reports, Pravda noted, and for tho first time, the names of seven subcommittee heads woro disclosed:
ion
Political and Theoretical
Questions Questions of Public and State
Structure State Administration, Activities
of tho Soviets and Public
Organ izat ions Economic Questions andof the National
Economy Nationalities Policy and
National State Structure Science and Culture, Education,
and Public Health
(not revealed)
Voronov
Brezhnev
Kosygin
Mikoyan
Yelyutin
(Minister of Education)
Policy and International
Relations People's Control and Socialist
Law and Ordor Editorial Sub-commission
Shvernik
(not revealed)
secret
Suslov, as the senior theoretician of the party andember of thoman constitutional commission, wQuld have been the logical choice for the subcommittee chairmanship of the important subcommlssion of General Political and Theoretical Questions. In light of the paramount importance of that subcommlssion, lt may be noteworthy that the session was calledime when Suslov was out of the country. (He was in Paris as the head of the Soviet delegation to the funeral of French party leader Thorez.) Thus it was Khrushchev whothe principles of the draft constitution and the expected presentation of the subcommlssion on "General Political and Theoretical Questions" was not mentioned in the report of the meeting.
Two weeks after Khrushchev's theoreticala Suslov-style refutation of the bases of Khrushchev's constitutional theory surfaced in the party's majorjournal. The refutation appearedpeech which secretariat member Ponomarev reportedly made4 session of the Academy of Social Sciences butpublished in an issue of Kommunist sent to the press on speech, publisheo' by Kommunist with "certain additions" which were not disclosed (and which raised the question as to whether the additions originated at theuly session of the constitutionalcored the Chinese Communist rejection of1 CPSU program and attempted to refute the basic reasons for tbat rejection. Ponomarev's refutation, however, carried implicit criticism of Khrushchev's view on the withering away of the state. For example, Ponomarev openly agreed with what he called the statement by tho "enemies of the CPSU Program" who say that due to the Imperialist threat the socialist countries must strengthen the state. (This was somewhat reminiscent of Suslov's9 assertion that due to the threat ofattack, "the state is Ponomarev gratuitously added that the threat of imperialism necessitates "heavy expenditures /on the part of socialist countries/ to strengthen their defense He made no reference to Khrushchov's3 and4 appeals for reduced defense Ponomarev concluded with the non-committal
statement tbat the threat of Imperialism "must not be allowed to be an invincible obstacle to the construction of communism." Later in his article he made the weak argument that "critics" who regard the "construction of communism impossible as long as imperialism continue to exist" lack faith in the Soviet people.
Functional differences with regard to Khrushchev's view of the correct rolo of the party were then drawn by Ponomarev. Ponomarev chose to cite1 partyposition that the construction of tbe material-technical foundations for communism is regarded as the main "economic" task of the party. He made no reference to Khrushchev's long standing view that the task ofngfoundations of communism was the party's "Chief" task.
Differences with regard to the amount of timo it would take toommunist society were also drawn by Ponomarev. Ponomarev choso to report thatwould not be realized1 (the two decade refer-once In1 party program). Ho said that at the end of the twenty year period "our society will be very close the implementation ofprinciple" of communism. Khrushchev in his1 congress report went to some length to explain why it would take as much as two docaded "toommunist society in its basic outlines."
Finally, Ponomarev reiterated Suslov's position on the "state of the whole people." Employingd Party Congress definition of the state-formula Ponomarev in Kommunist pointed out what he said was the
Mobvdous fact'th&t'the power ofhas increased
greatly with the growth of the dictatorship of the proletariattate of the whole people." Khrushchev atd Party Congress had forecast that the state would wither away under tho state of the whole people. At ;the4 meeting ho ignored the future rolo of the state apparatus in urging that the new basic law "must be theof the socialist state of the wholo people whose aim is the buildingommunist society.")
I KnTUe'flCneVg poeTic support tot tne Turnover
was suggestedis particular interpretation of the turnover ruleis supportmond-Bient" made ln tho final draft of the statutes dealing with the qualified electorate. With regard toKhrushchev ln his1 Congress reportransparent effort to exempt himself from the electoral proposal pointedly commented that "in rejecting tho cult of the individual ve do not in the least eliminate the question of developing leading party figures andtheir authority." The matter of strengthening authority was not included in the remarks of Kozlov, vho had been glvon the task at the1 plenum of reporting on tho statutos at tbe congress. In bisctober statute report, Kozlov merely noted that the statute "docs not deny the importance of the role played by experienced party workers who enjoy highent on to state thatore or less stable group of leaders it is not possible to ensure continuity of leadership, the transmission of accumulatednd then paraphrased the statute's provision on theof the law to "leading party members"; Party officials may, by virtue of their recognized authority and the high order of their political andabilities, be elected to executive bodiesonger period." With regard to the keyubstantive change in the wording in the final draft of the statutos merits consideration: the final draft alloted the responsibility of determining qualified party leaders,meeting, conference or Congress." The original draft of the statutes, publishedad maintained that the "consideration of theand work qualities of an individual" would be the decisionparty organization." Tbat Khrushchev was identified with tho change from "party organization" to "meeting, conference, oras hintodecond remark, also Ignored by Kozlov, made in hisctober
peech. After commenting on the permissibility of strengthening tbe authority of qualified party officials, Khrushchev stated tbat "what is necessary is thatParty figures be promoted from the Party masses by virtue of their talent, their political qualities and their qualifications and that they be closely tied with the Communists and the people." It is possible that Khrushchev bad his7 presidium anti-party group experience inwas one subject ofnd wanted to Insure legally that there would be no repetition oflose call to his powern short, Khrushchev's presentation on the "succession statute" suggested that he had more strengthider party forum than in the small presidium. In this light, lt may not be surprising that Khrushchev enthusiastically endorsed the provision which was incorporated into the now party statutesecisionartysuch as the presidium, relating to the succession issue would oxplicitly be subject to review of the larger party massesmeeting, conference, orn addition, the party program gave rather substantial attention to tbe electoral role of the party masses which appeared to fit in with Khrushchev's expressed Interestider electoral base to strengthen his own authorityis his presidium associates.)
Finally, one late4 Uoscow datelined Western news item, citing "reliableeported the story, which also appears plausible, that thecommission sot up2 toow Soviet constitution had been deadlocked over the issue of"something akin to the American presidential
anti-party group" in the presidium7 had voted to oust him, and only later in the presidiumdid they agree to Khrushchev's request to bring the matterurriedly called session of the party's central committee.
1SEGRET
NEW LEADERS AND OLD PROBLEMS
ear after Khrushchev's overthrow, his successors abolished the fallen leader's majorchanges. First2 restructuring of tho party and later7 decentralization of industrialwere revoked. The regime returned to the status quo ante institutionally. The party withdrew to its sphere of political-ideological leadership, the state apparatus regained its prerogatives as the economic manager within the system.
The resegregation of party-state functions along traditional lines however waseflection of the balance of forces within the coalition that overthrew Khrushchev than the coherent platformominant and unified ruling faction. The new institutionalwas not stable. Not long after the dust offall had settled signs of conflict overroles began to emerge among the leaders.
Suslov took his usual part as the protector of the ideologically-oriented party leaving mundane tasks to state Institutions. Brezhnev initiallyacker of the return to the traditional concept of the party but as time went on gave increasing stress to the legitimacy and necessity of the party's involvement in the economic sphere. Thus he began to movo in the general direction Khrushchev had gone but was careful not to associate himself with the discredited Khrushchevian formulas on the production-oriented party. Here Brezhnev entered into competition with Kosygin. Kosygin sought toorking principle of mutualbetween party and state marking out the realm of economic-industrial management as his quasi-autonomous jurisdiction. With Podgorny's shift to the Supreme Soviet another dimension of the institutional rivalry entered the picture. The movement aimed at expanding the powers of the Supreme Soviet began to be vigorously promoted and the idea of putting teeth into the Soviets as the controller of the ministerial apparatus of the state was pressed.
In connection with this issue various alliancesdevelop. Podgorny's personal Interest inrole of the Soviets vas obvious. Brezhnev seonedalong with the idea not so nuch to boost awhom he had gained tho advantage but rather asof diminishing Kosygin's state apparatus. to betray his distaste for expanding thoand other high-level figures indicated theirto curbing the state apparatus. Suslov andkin while apparently not objecting toof the Soviets' role continued to concentrate
on the concept of the ideological party.
As these cleavages developed, the projecta. new constitution once nore grew in Ihile tbe debate over institutional roles
continued among the Jurists following Khrushchev's fall, the constitutional project was soft-pedalled during tho first twenty months of the now regime. However, soon afterd Congressreplaced Khrushchov as head of the constitutionalthe quostion. His move on tho project is likely to sharpon tho Internal conflict ovor tho institutional issue as various elements seek to incorporate their positions into tho regime's basic law. The following pages detail the development of this issue since Khrushchev's fall.
The Restoration of the "Pure" Party at the November
The intensity of tho reaction within the regime to Khrushchev's effort to transform the partywas registered almost Immediately after his fall. In November,onth after his fall, tho Central Committee convened and liquidated2 bifurcation of tho party into industrial and agricultural committees on tho "production" principle
Curiously, presidium member Podgorny'sovember report at tho plenum calling for the uniting of industrial and agriculturalcoblast and kray party and soviet organs was nover published.
But Pravda on the next day reported and commented on the decisions of the plenum, and made it clear that the production-oriented party was an error of thepast:
Replacing the territorial-production principle of party organization with the so-called production principle objectively ledonfusion ofrights, and obligations of party, soviet, and economic organs and pushed party committees into replacing economic organs.
them:" (Emphasis in original) Brezhnev And The Silent Constitutional Commission
Following the plenum, the traditionalist lawyers promptly clarified their earlier abstruse opposition to Khrushchev's view of the party. Two Jurists, V. Kotok (head of the law institute's department of theory of governance and constitutional law) and his assistant V. Uaslennikov, reiterated and added to the above Pravda indictment by charging84 Izvestiya article that the2 reforms not only pushed party committees into replacing economic organs, but also intofor soviet organs. The two jurists then cited the full 8th Congress testament on party restrictions on Soviets and state bodies which Khrushchev had avoided inaneuver in his constitutional campaign. Kotok and Maslennikov wrote that "the 8th Party Congress indicated that one should never confuse the functions of party collectives with the functions of state organs, such as Soviets. The party must carry out its decisions through the soviet organs within the framework of the Soviet Constitution. The party strives to lead the act'i'vites of the Soviets and not replace
On Podgorny's recommendation, Brezhnev was selected
at an4 session of the Supreme Soviet as Khrushchev's replacement for the chairmanship of the
xnax Tne new bovxenr
constitutional commission. The new chairman apparently adopted the policy of calling no public sessions of his commissions. Brezhnev's early reluctance to presswith any noticeable vigor on the project during the early post-coup period may well have been due tohe effortew constitution was personally identified with the man he had helped to ousthat the project was an effort to incorporate Khrushchev's highly controversial views of the long-range role of the party into the basic law of the land. (That the new constitution was regardedKhrushchev project" and Identified as such within Communist circles was made clear ln5 comment I
Ito tho offoct1
pet project" of Khrushchev's and that
cuusinucxun was a'
this explained why the project was not proceeding very rapidly ln tho USSR.)
That Khrushchev's effortsew constitution wore deempbasized by the new leadership was again made clear in tbe Pravda editorial on Constitutionhe editorial bad nothing to say about preparationsew basic law. The editorial reiterated Suslov's view on the expanding role of the stato apparatus and went on, without naming Khrushchev, to praise the decisions of tbe4 plenum, which oustod him, and the4 plenum, which revoked hisBchcme. On the next day, in an even moro pointed attack on Khrushchev's view of the party, an editorial in Pravda reiterated the position voiced around the.time of the November plenum that "the essence of the Leninist style of party lies ln the fact that this guidance is not administrative but of the supreme, political type. The party exercises political guidance over all stato and public organizations. But it does not assume their functions, the functions of direct management." (Emphasis in the original) imilar position was promptly adopted by the now head of the Institute of Law.
Romashkln's Conservative Replacement And The New Debate
V.oviet Jurist who replaced Romashkin as Director of the law institute in,ajor exposition oi his pro-ministerial views in the early5 edition of Kommunist. The article first set out to clear the nev diroctor, who wasember of thean constitution commission, of any pro-Khrushchev!an legal views. It praised the October ouster and the November decisions on tho production principle, criticized "artificial hastening of theaway of theuestioned tbe worth of comrades' courts (which have received abundant criticism in the post-Khrushchevnd urged that the stateshould closely supervise all social organizations which assumed former state functions. Chkhikvadze then presented his explicit defense of the state apparatus by first stating that the state is the "basic tool in the organization of the building of Communism." econd assertion followed that "tho period of expanded Communist construction is accompanied by the ever growingof administration." This pro-state position was then repoatodly bucked up with the theme of the importance of efficiency and professionalism inodern, complex state.
*Chkhikvadze was an activo member of the editorial
board of Soviet State And Law fromo tho end ofwhich time Romashkinember of the board. Romashkin was dropped from tho editorial board by the6 edition of the law Journal. His last article in the law journal appeared in the3 edition, and it discussod the constitutional project in terms of the production-oriented party.
Conservative constitutional views were not reflected5 Soviet State And Law article by the chief editor of that journal, A. Lepeshkin. Lepeshkln, while pressingtrengthened state system in the now constitution, posed tho radical suggestiononuine choice of candidates in tho Soviet elections." Lepeshkln boldlyus that
as Is well known, the Soviet election law does not limit the number of candidates proposed as soviet doputies. Meanwhile, the practice of elections for the Soviets of all levels has boen formed inay tbat only one candidate, for whom or against vhon the votersiven electoral okrug vote, is on the voting list for deputies.
Numerous articles and suggestions of our readers raise tho question of thoof leaving on the ballot paper not one, but soveral candidates proposed by the voters for election to one vacant seatoviot deputyiven electoral okrug. Of course, theof any electoral system is notonly by the number of candidates put on the voting list, that is ono or two. Nevertheless, this isroblem of minor importance and its correctunder our conditions Is of greatfor the development of theprinciples of the Soviet electoral system.
Lepeshkin, whose radical electoral remarks were widely circulated in the Western press in late* was replaced as chief editor of the Journal by the earlyS edition.
At about the time that Lepeshkin presented his radical electoralejoinder to the constitutional position of the new director of the law Institute was presented ln an early5 Kommunist article by V. Vasilyev. Vasilyev guardedly introduced his rebuttal with the comment that "one should not go to extremes /with regard to theover the functions ofconomic organs, adopt administrative methodsenterprises and organizations under the Jurisdiction of economic organs or Interfere in the managerial activities of their leaders." Nevertheless, vasilyev emphatically endorsed the Khrushchevian policy of "recont years" of transferlng administrative and economic state functions to the Soviets.
In recent years, the Soviets have started solving more and more problems which in the past were mainly the responsibility of the executive organs. The Soviets have been more active in supervising the fulfillment of resolutions. Tbein the permanent commissions has expanded. Some local soviots haveto their commissions manymatters.
The new director of the law institute had referred tothe role of permanentut only parenthetically and thon in tho context of describing an assignment given by tho Acadomy of Sciences which called
zorza's Manchester Guardian article for "Election Reform's "For Russians? Voters May Get Choice of Candidates." Sovlot voters did nothoice in the6 elections.
upon tho law institute toanual dofining the legal activity of the Soviets. And unlike the new law director, Vasilyev pointed out that the Soviets, which he regarded as all-embracing social organizations, should closely supervise tho administrators. Vasilyev criticized soviet deputies who "fail to give the executive organs tasks" after having presented his constitutional thesis:
It Is the Soviets who set up theapparatus. Directly or indirectly, all state organs receive their power from the Soviets. The representative organs havo great facilities for influencing tho practical work of the executive; apparatus by directly participating in the work
Finally, Vasilyev praised the role of thevolunteers. While he noted that voluntary workers sometimes duplicate the tasks of formalhe emphasized that "the more activo thoy /the volunteers/ are, the better." Unlike law directorVasilyev lauded the scope of volunteer-soviet activity:
Voluntary deputy chairmen of exccutlvo committees of village, settlement, rayon
ih Eommunlst referred to tho role of vulun-teors in the same slightingmanner that he had referred to the rolo of permanent commissions. Praise for thoof volunteersommon themo in the Juridical modla prior to Chkhlkvadze's replacement of Romashkin as director of the law institute. For example, tho head of tho constitutional law department (sector) of theV. Kotok, emphasized the case for replacing tho paid staff of executive committee departments with unpaideers1 Soviet Stato And Law article. tho change in law institute directors, Kotok and his assistant Uaslennikov did not return to this point in their4 Izvestiya article.
and city, voluntary departments of executive committees, groups ofinspectors and instructors, voluntary councils at rogular departments andmany voluntary publicIs far from the full list of ways ln which tho working people participate ln tho work of the sovlots. The soviet actives now number aboutillion people. This cloarly marks the Soviets not only as government but as social organizations as well.
In short, the constitutional debate continued, though with far more limited terms of reference. And the former terms dealing with tho role of the party were obliquely raised ln March by the new First secretary of tho party's central committee.
Brezhnev's Dalliance With The Production Principle
During the porlod between tho revocation of tho "so-callod" production principle5 central committee plenum, Soviet theoretical and judicialwere careful to define the party's task in thelife of the nation as "guiding" or "leading." One leading theoretician who had fully supported Khrushchov's subordination of all party tasks to productive work-secretariat memberremoved from the secretariat at the5 plenum.
While carefully emphasizing the "guiding androle of the party, Brozbnov in his5 plenum speech on "urgent measures for the further development of Soviet agriculture"omment reminiscentassage in6 Congress report on thofactor of party work in tho economy.
Khrushchev,6 report ath farty Congress
"The workeading Party worker should be Judged primarily by res suits obtained in tbo development ol the
Brezhnev,5 Contral committee plenun speech
"Constanto lncroased agricultural production should be tho determining aspect ol tho work ol Party bodies.
months later Brezhnev referred to the party's role in Industrial production Is tbe same vein.
In short, Brezhnov was echoing the general outlines of the former Khrushchevian lino and indicating that the party did not plan to hand ovor its authority in the economic sphere to the state.
Evincing his earlier cautious and evasive approach toward making final2 party production principle,Khrushchev ln6 Congress report-preceded bis above remarkraditionalist position that the party must "coordinate and guide" the work of state and social organizations in the countryside. Brezhnev limited such party work to "organizational and economicideological work was ignored. Ideological work was briefly noted in an earlior remark by Brezhnev on the broader thomo of the party's nationwide tasks, but it was then listed last: the party has "the special responsibility of steadily improving organizational, political, economic and ideologicalrezhnev also claimed that rural party bodios "must stop giving preemptory orders and bureaucratic instructions, and stop exercising petty tutelage and usurping thoof the managers and experts of collective and state farms." But he went on in his plenum spooch to urge an increase in the role of the party and tho numbers of full-time party secretaries in the collective and state farms.
A second example of tho party's role in production was signaled at tho March plenum by promotion of defense expert Ustinov to the party secretariat and presidium,
and his concomitant resignation from Kosygin's Council of Ministers and the Supreme Economic Council. Ustinov's party promotion, coming in the wake5 conversion of six key state defense committees intouggested that Brezhnev's party control over the critical Soviet industrial sector would be
In short, Brezhnev seemed to be leaving open the question of the party's assumption of economic tasks. The question was again raised at the September plenum.
Brezhnev The Party, Kosygin The Stato
Reminiscent of his2 state-oriented position on constructing communism, Kosygin atlenum declared that "the successful completion of the program of building the material and technical basis ofill largely depend on how effectively they /problems of industrial management, planning and production/ will be solved." The solution, confidently announced Kosygin in hiseptember plenum speech, would be approached by the full reestablishment of theinisterialtarget of Khrushchev's early "thesis" and later constitutional efforts. As in2 speech, Kosygin at the5 plenum again presented his position on the state's role in the construction of communism. And while he pointed out the role of the party in the practical affairs of the economy (industry in thise again listed technicalfirst: "At the present time more than two million expertsigher or secondary education are employed in industrial establishments. There are more than four million communists working in industry." rofessionalism"
artial rehabilitation of Marshal Zhukov surrounded the5 reestablishment of the7 system of defense ministries.
segrex
ln the whole state apparatus was the main subject5 article in Soviet State And Law by Jurist M. Piskotin, who reiterated much of his conclusionsthe efficacy iable state apparatus presented in his earlier discussed3 article in
The emphasis on the state-oriented approach toward building communism in Kosygin's speech was downplayed In Brezhnev'septomber report before tho plenum. Brezhnev again referred to tbe party's role in economic production while reviving his2 position on greater party supervision of the ministries. "The extension of tbe powers and autonomy of industrial establishmentsenhances the role and responsibility of the local Party organizations, that is, those of tbe units whose role in production isaid Brezhnev oneptember. While again ignoring "ideologicalrezhnev maintained his carefully evasive position on the "production principle" by Immediately stating thatproblems wero subordinate to the "prime task" of educational and organizing work.
Other shados of hiB predecessor's more sharply drawn views on the stato bureaucracy were cast in his5 plenum speech. For one example, Brezhnev, after scoring "bureaucratic exercises" In certainstate ministries, wont on to forecast that the Kosygln-sponsored managerial reorganization alone "will not eliminate these /Bureaucratic/ shortcomings. Weontinued Brezhnev,and persistent effort by the administrative apparatus /Kosygin'sut above all by Party and mass organizations to educate people and weed out irresponsibility, rod tape,behavior." art of the weeding-out process, Brezhnev suggested that
highly competont and experienced Party workers should bo recommended for the office of secretaries of the Partyof the /Hew7 ministries. These committees sEould periodically Inform the Central Committee of the
MB?
CPSU about the work of their about the steps they take to improve the operation of tho ministries in question.
In another contrast with Kosygin, Brezhnev did not specify the role of the state in his plenum formulation on building communism: "As we steadfastly enhance the role of the Party in communist construction, we must nevor forget that this calls for hard work by everyabove all the Soviets, the trade unions and the Komsomol."
Following Brezhnev's September emphasis on the party's role in state affairs (and following histo Podgorny's Supreme Soviet Presidium in earlyn article ln Kommunisty the first secretary of the Bashkir Oblast, Z. Kuriyev,upon tbe theme of the party's activity in running the state. After repeated assertions that party organs must not take tho place of state and economicNuriyev finally got to the nub of his presentation in concluding thatituation builds up in which the party organs are obliged to intervene in the activity of the economic organs." This extraordinary admission was combined with Nuriyev's insiutenco that party members mutst study both Marxist-Leninist theory and economics and modern techniques of production. With regard to economic activity, Nuriyev posited thatdirecting and leadinguperior position to the state. He declaredhere is no "sign of equality" between party and economic activity andhe party organizations "in no event" shouldubordinate role with respect to the economic or state organizations.
Kosygin's emphasis on the state's role wasby state theoretician Chesnokov ln the next Issue of Kommunist.
Disregarding the particulars of the party's role in statehesnokov formulated addedargumentation for Kosygin's September managerialin an article in Kommunistike jurist Shakhnazarovhesnokov predicated his defense of the existing state apparatus on the theoreticalofh Party Congress concerning "the development of the socialist state." Chesnokov, like law institute director Chkhikvadze, presented hison the preeminent role of tho state in building the bases of communism:
The task of creating thefoundations for communism is carried out with all the domestic functions of the socialist state, rb above all, its economic-organizational, cultural-educational, protection and strengthening of public ownership functions.
That Chesnokov regarded these tasks as solely residing in the state apparatus is strongthened by the fact that the author made no reference to the role of the Soviets or permanent commissions of the Soviets in tasks ofthe foundations of communism." Chesnokovrief reference towithering away of state functions "which have served theirut he failed to point out with any precision what the withered functions would be. Chesnokov flatly asserted that "the role of the state system will predominate and cannot but predominate over tbe tasks of withering away of the state." hat in the building of communism the state
'Chesnokov said only thatactivities of the state "are developed" by tbe party on the basis of moderntochniquos.
SEfSREJL
would be "fully retained, furtherike Ponomarev ine emphasized the remoteness of realizing the "higher stage" of communism. Chesnokov vent on to identify tho oppositionevisionists" who "are" (present tense) belittling tho role of tho stato apparatus:
he imperialist propagandists proclaim the "theory" according to which the USSRew privileged class, namely the white collar workers and tbe intelligentsia, representing theme* dominating class served by the socialist state. imilar slander has boen, and Is, adamantlybyTrotskyites who shriek about the distortion of the socialist state and its transformationureaucratic organization. All these forged theories wero picked up by the revisionists whose chatter of stateism or of the possibility of astate, abovo all classes, are used to conceal their belittling ofrole of the socialist state in the building of socialism and communism.
In short, his state-oriented argumentation changed little since its employment undor Stalin lnearly 'fifties. Even the old terminology was employed by Chesnokov as bo ro-examined thefficial Soviet state formula.
The Dictatorship of the Proletariat
Praising the abandoned concept of the "dictatorship of thehesnokov in Kommunist devotedattention to tho similarities between that state formula and Its surrogate formula, "state of tho whole people,'*
introduced at1 Party Congress. With regard to1 Innovation, Chesnokov further identified thoas "thoso vto claim /present teuse7 that tho
state of the whole people is different, not only in form but in content as well, from the state of theof the proletariat, that is, that it Is an entirely new state." Stating that "we cannot agree" with those who claim that the two state formulas are different, Chesnokov went on to conclude tbat the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state of the whole people "are essentially the sane state at various developmental stages"." His premises werehat "all" foreign functions of the.proletarian dictatorship are the same in the state of the whole people,hat the "basic" internal functions are the same. Chesnokov routinely explained that the proletarian dictatorship "eliminated thehich in turn eliminated the need for coercion. But, he immediately countered, "this does not mean, that there is no longer any need for any coercion whatsoever." He stated that the law would continue to punish violators and citizens wholack of discipline" through the state court system. Thecomrade courts were ignored.
Chesnokov's public apologia on the viability of the former state formula was, reportedly, later followedelated briefingember of the centralapparatus, f
But at least three subsequent Indicationsassertion that the "state of theluriuuia was at least being officiallythe formula was not mentioned atdt was deleted ln6 Hay Dayand Brezhnev introduced the termpeech (examined later) following the congress.
1SEGREX
rp
D CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME SOVIET'S EXPANDED ROLE
Prior to the congress three important legalsurfaced: 5 central committee plenum transformed tho Party-State Control Commissionsystem of people's5 Supreme Soviet sossion called upon the Council of Ministers to respond to formal interpellations,ertain soviet jurists made explicitof which wore voicod by Brezhnev and Podgorny atdstrengthen the Soviets and the permanent commissions ln their relation with tho Council of Ministers.
One: People's Control
Inecember plenum speech, Brezhnev suggested that the Party-State Control Committeeat the November production plenum, formally limited to the state apparatus3 statute, and Ignored at the5 managerialtransformedsystem of people's control." The new control bodies, Brezhnev emphasized, "do not control the work of partycommandment that seemed to roprove unwarranted control activity on tho part of its predecessor. The charge that the PSCC was involved in control activity in the party apparatus was not explicitly drawn by Brezhnov. Nor do we have any evidence that the PSCC actually strayed out of its3 statutory limitations into the party's sphere of activity. However, in light of Brozhnev's public reference ton the work of the PSCC and in light of Brozhnev's caveat relating to the proper sphere of activity for people's control, it seems reasonable to suggest that the potential threat of such independent activity on the part of the PSCC may have been ain the reorganization. At any rate, the reorganization seems to have been directedemoving any remaining legal ambiguity relating to the activity of tho party's own control system,iminishing the personal authority of the chairman of the PSCC, Shelepin, who in
fact was removed as head of the PSCC as well as from the Council of Ministers in
The Brezhnev-sponsored maneuver related to the constitutional question in the sense that the PSCCa Khrushchevian attempt to bring under the direct control of one party-run agency related functions of both party and state apparatus.
It does not appear that tho party apparatus gave up significant control prerogatives over Kosygin's statein the reorganization. However, tho statutory powers for people's control have apparently not been publicized and any final Judgment on tho state authority of the new control mechanism cannot be drawn. But two developments suggest that the state activity of the new agency is not radically different from its predecessor. Most of the high-level PSCC officials were simplyto similar positions in people's control committees, though most lost prestiguous positions of party secretary and deputy premier of republics and union-republics. And tho reported size of the people's control, six million according to Pravda onndicates that the now agency has assumed the mass state character of its predecessor.
Two: Interpol1at tons
An unusual display of Supreme Soviet authority over the state's highestCouncil ofwas revoaled the day afterecember party plenum adjourned. ecombor session of the Supreme Soviet, several soviet delegates revived the virtually dormant provision in6 Constitutionhich hold that USSR ministers must reply to questions of members of the Supreme Soviet within three days. deputies addressed threefor the Council of Ministers' views and proposalsonproliforation of nuclear weapons and noninterference in the internal affairs of states, he West Germanreparations for the second conference of Afro-AsianForeign Minister Gromyko, who dutifully rospondod inecombor speech before the Supreme Soviet. (Foreign Minister Gromyko submitted to interpellations regarding Bulganin'sproposals at the7 Supreme Soviet session
a time whon Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Bulganin, was being publicly slighted and his subsequent decline was being rumorod. Khrushchev replaced Bulganin in8 and unveiled his own major disarmament proposal, "general and completen the fall of the next year.)
This unusual parliamentary gesture was accompanied by the eloction of Podgorny, on Brezhnev's recommendation, to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. And in light ofnd Brezhnev's subsequentproposals atd Party Congress (examinedfor greater Supreme Soviet control over the Council of Ministers, Gromyko's response to formal Interpellations seemed to mark moreymbolic gesture of Supreme Soviet authority over Kosygin's state apparatus.
Three: Permanent Commissions
At least four jurists in the post-Khrushchev period have popularized the cause of granting greatersupervisory, legislative, executive, andthe permanent commissions. In offectof the four jurists appear to be aimed atthe long-abused article ln6 Constitution granting the legislative power to the Supreme Soviet. For example, jurist A. Makhnonko in the5 edition of Soviet State and Law urged that the supervisory and Juridical powers of the permanentbo extended by ordering the procurator-general and the supreme courts to report not only to the supreme soviet presidiums of tho various republics but also to the sessions of the respective commissions of tho Soviets. (In the4 edition of the same law Journal, Makhnenko pressedroater legislative role for the permanent commissions in drafting bills.) Jurists M. Binder and M. Shaflr ln tho law journal's5 edition, first noted that "over the last few years" the Khrushchov porlod) the permanent commissions of the various republic Supremo Soviets have become more active ln tho
actual administration of the economy. Binder and Shafir then went on to proposehe scope of economic questions handled by the republic supreme Soviets should be extended, he Soviets should be granted enhanced control over their administrative organs (thehe procedure for examining tbe drafts of the state budget and the economic plan should be improved in favor of the Soviets.
Finally, and on the evo ofd Party Congress, juristutafyln in an issue of Soviet State And Law (sent to the press ontressed the need to give greater legal powers to the permanent commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Its relations with the USSR Council of Ministers. First, Kutafyin posed the problem; the Council of Ministers' virtual disregard of the proposals of the Supreme Soviet's permanent Advocating actual legislative activity on the part of the Supreme Soviet, Kutafyin wrote that
According to the practice which hasthe Supreme Soviet USSRthe decision of those questions /The proposals of the soviet permanentto tbe discretion of the Council of Ministers. ore correct procedure would appear to be one in which tbey /the proposals/ would be decided ln principle by the Supreme Soviet USSR
Then Kutafyinemedy by which the regulatory and procedural relationship between the Council of Ministers and the Supromo Soviet and its standing commissions would be strictly established. The Jurist specifically urged the adoption of five measures which, conceivably, would provide the mechanism to enforce the permanentalready impressive paper powers (described on: establishhe duty andof tbe permanent commissions to send to the Council of Ministers proposals without waiting for theof the next session of tho Supreme Soviet, etter "forms and mothods" for tho permanent commissions in the
implementation of soviet proposals, he duty of the Council of Ministers to consider the proposals of the permanent commissions and to inform the commissions of the results of such consideration within specified time limits, he duty of the Council of Ministers to assist the permanent commissions in doallng with agencies subordinate to the Council of Ministers, he duty of the Council of Ministers not only to communicate to the permanent commissions concerning the results of ministerial considerations, but also toeport on those problems directly to the Supreme Soviet.
Kutafyin also proposed that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet be given precise regulations and Juridically defined procedures in dealing with thecommissions of the two supreme soviet chambers, the Soviet of Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.
In contrast to the appeals of the above fourlaw institute director Chkhlkvadze andlaw oxport Kotok in an article in Kommunlst signed to the pressade no reference to the need for permanent commissions for theave short shrift to the role of the Soviets, nd flatly asserted that the "state retains its leading role" over socialon the basis of1 partydefinition, over the Soviets. The two loadingalso reiterated earlier views (including Chesnokov's) on the necessityiable state apparatus. And tho two Jurists employed the traditionalists' classicof defending the party and state provisions of6 Stalin Constitution. Affirming thatllots the "leading and guiding role" to the CPSU, the two lawyers linked party "purity" with Chkhik-vadze's earlier expressed proposition on the valuetrengthened state apparatus:
In its activities the party proceeds from the fact that the Soviet state is the main tool for the building of It /Tho party7 displaysconcern for increasing tho power of the state, for tho systematicof the principles of Soviet
democracy, strengthening socialist law and order, improving and bettering tbe state apparatus.
Divergent handling of this state-orientedvas displayed during and followingd Party Congress.
The Congress Proposals For Parliamentary Reform
Permanent commissions were the principalsubject atd Partypril) this year.
Brezhnev and Podgorny gave considerable emphasis to the subject of the strict accountability of theapparatus to the Soviets and the permanent Along the line of his2 Izvestiya argument (and the positions taken by jurists Kutafyin, Makhnenko, Binder and Shaflr) and in reference to the interpellations issue, Brezhnev in hiseport emphasized that "reports of the USSR Council of Ministers at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet should become the practice." Going beyond Vasilyev's5 Kommunist position, Brezhnev suggested in his6 report that greater ministerialauthority within the Supreme Soviet "possibly could be assisted by formation of new permanent commissions in the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet."
Brezhnev's remarks on increasing the number and powers of the permanent commissions were warmly endorsed by Podgorny two days later. Stressing that the Soviets "must fully utilize the rights they already enjoy in accord with the Constitution" and complaining that "the possibilities and rights granted to them by theare far from being fullyodgornythat "the Central Committee's suggestion to expand the practice of hearing government reports at sessions and to create permanent commissions in both chambers of the Supreme Soviet is fully justified."
The net effect of the Brezhnev-Podgorny Supreme Soviet "reforms" wouldo Increase the role of the Soviets in the early stages of the legislative processo impose added tasks and control measures on the ministerial apparatus, headed by Chairman of tho Presidium of the Council of Ministers Kosygin.
In defonso of his apparatus, Kosygin in hispril concluding speech at the congress held that the early stage of tho legislative process vould reside wlth-in the ministries, and that the Supreme Soviet's role vould be to consider the plans which had been worked out in tbe government organs.
The State Planning Committee of the USSR, the ministries, the Council of Ministers of the union republics, and the economic and planning bodies must work out tho five-yearth targets for every year and, what is of particularmake it known to evory enterprlso. This now five-year plan must be ready within four or five months, then it will be submitted to tbe session of tho Supreme Soviet of the USSR for consideration.
Significantly, Kosygin in hispril report at the congress Ignored the suggestions of Brozhnev and Podgorny to increase the powers of the Supremo Soviets in its relations with the Council of"roform" which would do little to enhance the independence of Kosygin's bureaucracy. Kosygin also Ignored Brezhnev's suggestion (endorsed by Podgorny) toystem of "elective collective farm cooperative"reform" which, if everould do little
pril Congress resolution instructed tho control committee "to examine" the proposal to set up "collective farm cooperative bodies." The cooperatives, an Issue disoussed9 agricultural plenum (with Podgorny and Polyansky indicating their favor of the bear some resemblance to tho kolkhoz unions which existed during the.
segret.
to enhance the authority of the newly recentrallzed Ministry of Agriculture under Kosygin's Council of Ministers.
Two organizational "reforms" associated withand relating to constitutional issues were rovorsod on Brezhnev's recommendation atd Congress. The delegates to the congress replaced1 turnover ruleague reference to the "principle of systematic renewal" in the party election statute. And in gestures apparently aimed at separating the new leadership from titles associated with Khrushchev, tbe congress delegates voted to change Brezhnev's title of "first secretary" to "general secretary" and tho presidium was renamed "politburo,'1 the originalitle under Lenin aod Stalin.
An "Original Version" Of Lenin's Economic Testament
While dissociating himself from titles and certain statutes sponsored by Khrushchev, Brezhnev did not choose to dissociate himself fully from certain "positive"of his predecessor's party production principle. Thus Brezhnev in his congress report did not criticize the production principle in his black list of "negative phenomena" that supposedly had been retarding theof the national economy. He pointed toward "faults ln management and planning, under appreciation of self-financing methods in economics, incomplete utilization of material and moralnd so forth. (By way of contrast, Suslov5 Sofia speech Judged that the "so-called" production principle, among other phenomena which arose during the Khrushchev era, had "inflicted great harm" on the nation's economic and political life.)
Following the congress, Brezhnev's line of argument was cited in the context of tho "originalthe "newlynd presumably disreputedof the recently neglected Lenin document that was popularized2ike effort to substantiate Khrushchev's view of the productive party. Somewhat similar theoretical
segrezl
substantiation for Brezhnev's congress argument was drawn2 April Izvestiya article by the Chairman ox the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, P. Pospelov, who wrote:
Lenin's opinion on the place and role of economics and economic policy in tbo construction of communism is especially valuable for the practical work of the party. In the original version of the article "The Immediate Tasks of the Sovietenin reveals the determining significance of the economic policy of the Soviet state, Now, be pointed out, "it is not politics but economics which is acquiring primarily significance." In accordance with this view Lenin moro than once warned against the mere giving of commands, and against the danger^ Of tho predominance over economic methods of an administrative approach to the management of the national economy. ommunist is anaught Lenin, "his first duty is to beware of an enthusiasm for giving commands and to be able first to take into consideration that which science has already worked out, to ask first where we haveistake and only on this basis to correct what has been dono." In another' place Lenin warned: to separatefrom politics is the task."
Lenin pushed economic methods of leadership to the foreground. of these methods in tho past was also ono of the reasons for certain nogative phenomenon in tho development Of tho national economy which were mon-tioned directly and openly ln tho report of tho Central Committee of the XXIII Party Congress which was given by Comrade Brezhnev.
SEe&ex
ZD
The "newly deciphered" version was cited by Ilichev in his2 Kommunist article (examined on pages, which translates that Lenin wrote "political tasks and problems holdubordinate place to economic tasks." Pospclov's "original version"that Lenin wrote "lt is not politics but economics which Is acquiring /priobrotaet/ primaryhe terminology in the "original version" seems tomore closely to the current state of Brozhnev's cautious approach to the production principle. That is, "economics" could be In tho process of acquiring primary consideration ln Brezhnev's public formula on tho role of the party though lt Is not firmly "held" in explicit primacy over ideology.
Following the congress, Brezhnev ln June returned to the subjectorking party, ignored partywork, and followed bis production-oriented commentsurprise announcement concerning an old project.
THE "BREZHNEV CONSTITUTION"
The oldadoptionewrovlved by Brezhnev in his6 Moscow election speech. And old, though less controversial themes on tho party and"workingtrengthenedBrezhnev's reference to the new basic law, which he confidently indicated would be adoptod
Other more controversial themes on tho party and state from the Khrushchev period have not been touched upon. For example, the current constitutional dialogue undor the new leadership is silenthe program to transform the ministerial, "parliamentary" systemystem granting greater power to an Independentbranch,he explicit subordination of ideological tasks to economic tasks in party work, he formula
on the withering away of the state apparat and theof state tasks by other organizationsbe "convergence" of all social organizations, including the party,ingle "all-enbracing" organization. Although the apparent shelving of these acreIssues vould presumably facilitate tho passage of the constitutional project, disarray in the leadorship with regard to Brezhnev's relatively cautious line on tho respective roles of party and state is as visible as tho previous opposition to Khrushchev's more radical posit ions.
The "Genuine People's State"
ove that could be linked with tbo reported reexamination of Khrushchev's state formula, Brozhnev announced0 Juno electoral speech in the Kremlin that
All the best that the practice of state building has produced in our country must be summed up ln tbe new constitution of the USSR, which will crown the majestic half century course of our country, of the first genuine people's state in the history of mankind.
If the "genuine people's state" was intended as aof Khrushchev's formula, lt may conceal someon the party-state issue that were associated with Khrushchev's definition of the "state of the wholeor example, Brozhnev followed his announcement on the now constitution of the "genuine people's state" with an unusually clear description of tho economic tasks of party members.* Discarding bis March and5
omewhat similar tack in his2 Izvostiya article (discussed on) ln which he proceeded his remark on the new constitutiontatement endorsing the decisions of the2 "party production" plenum.
performances ln circumlocution (and approaching the candid level of Bashkir party chief Nuriyev's5 Kommunistrezhnev ignored theof party ideological work and flatly told his electors that tbe party Is called upon to "formulate the basis of the country's economic policy, tbe main principles and methods of management and to put these Intoater in his speech he provided an example of rank and file party members putting into practice CPSU economic decisions:
Communists, like all other Soviet people, work in enterprises, on collective farms, at building sites, and in Institutions. If they enjoy any privilege it Is the pr ivilogo of shouldering the mostof serving as examples, and of being in the vanguard. In short, what we mean is what in the war years was oxprcssed by the slogan "communists, forward." this means working selflessly at the building sites of communism, being equal to the demands life makes, doing everything to fulfill completely the decisions ofd Congress of our party.
"Working selflessly" to fulfill the decisions ofd Congressormula that still fell short of fullof Khrushchev's party production principle. That is, Brezhnev did not go on to explicitly subordinate ideological work to the practical tasks of buildingthough ho did not discuss tho former task in his election speech.
Brezhnev also did not reiterated Congress suggestion for strengthening the permanent commissions of the Supremesuggestion, incidentally, which had been dclotod ln6 congress resolution on Brezhnev's report. However, Brezhnev, like the adopted congress resolution, urged in his election speech that the role of the Supreme Soviet be raised and that the scope of sovlot activity be expanded.
Going beyond Brezhnev's election remarks on the sovlets, the party's paper Pravda editorialized onune that the continued rise in the role of the Supreme Soviet "has been posed by tbe partyrimarynd that the Soviet's rolo meant the resolution of state matters was made explicit on the day df the elections,une, ln another Pravda editorial: "The Party is tirelessly concerned ovor the /sovletsVc.growlng role in deciding state questions." In conspicuousin close similarity wltb Kosygin's election remarks on tbe subject of thegovernment's paper Izvestiya ignored tho subject of raising the role of the Supreme Soviet in its editorials on the same two days. And ln an apparent retort to the party editorial's view of tho role of the sovlets, thoune governmentthe same voln ofpril congresstbat the Supreme Soviet wouldctivity relating to the new five-year plan, rather than be more actively Involved "in deciding"eshenim) such questions, as in Pravda'sune editorial. Iavcstiya'sune editorial further belittlod that such state questions "will face" tho Supremo Soviet delogates.
Prior to Brezhnov's election speech, high-level Supremo Soviet delegates presented thoir post-congress, and dissimilar, views on the role of the party, tbe role of the sovlets and the role of the state apparat in their respective "campaign" speeches on the eve of the Supreme Soviet elections.
The Post-Congress Views of The Oligarchy
Podgorny inune Bolshoy Theater election speech endorsedmore of jurist Kutafyin's6 Soviot State And Law proposals on Increasing tho.powers of tbo permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet. Podgorny enumerated one Interesting case study on the rolo of tbe permanent commissions in making corrections in the budgets and economic plans submitted by the government apparatus to the sovlots. The example Podgorny chose
*5EGRET
to Instance bis point on the worth of the permanentwas, curiously, deleted in both Pravda's and Isvestlya's lengthy accounts of his speecFI Tne excised passage, which harks back to the role of the commissions during the Khrushchev period and implicitly argues that the Supreme Soviet isrubberarliament, was included in the live domestic radio version of's address:
Let us take the discussion about national economic plans and budgets ln the permanent commissions and at bossions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Each outline in the plan, each figure ln tho budget, is most thoroughly weighed by deputies. They analyze them, locate new reserves, and Introduceproposals.
For example, during the past four years the'corrections in economic plans and budgets adopted by the Supreme Sovietroposal of permanent commissions and deputies made It possible to increase production of consumer goods ofto tbe population for the sumillion rubles.
Both papers, however, reportod Podgorny's remarkshe responsibilities of soviet deputies in verifying the implementation of adopted lawsis pointodto the rights of the Supreme Soviet's permanent to examine the activity of the state bureaucracy:ermanent commission hoars reports from ministries and government departments, shortcomings are disclosed, and recommendations aro claboratod for overcominginally, and In apparent referonco to the5 managerial plenum, Podgorny proclaimed that the increased responsibilities growing out of the "extensive rights" granted to production enterprises and branch ministries would be accompanied by "lncioasod control over the actions of managerial bodies by Soviets and their deputies."
Shelest, who wasull member of the presidium inarmly seconded tbe soviet proposals of his patron,. Podgorny. (Shelest ln hisarch congress speech also seconded the collective farm cooperative proposals of Podgorny and Brezhnev.) Shelest, who Inucceeded Podgorny as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, also echoed much- of tbe republic-level parliamentary reform proposals urged by jurists Binder and shafir in their5 law journal article. Thus, Shelest told Kiev electors6 that
Currently tho role of the Soviets of workers deputies is being particularly increased ln the solution of tbe tasks of economic and cultural construction, ln questions of planning, financing, and housingand in the management of local industrial enterprises and of public and cultural services for tbe population. The Soviets of workers deputies are faced with great tasks in the furtherof organizational work, lntbe responsibility of Soviet deputies and functionaries before the peoplo, in activating the work of sessions and permanent commissions, and in the strengthening of and strict adheronce to socialist law.
In contrast,n his election speech in Moscow's Bolshoy Theater on the next day renewed the state-orlonted approach of jurists Chkhlkvadze and Kotok in ignoring the subject of Increasing the role of the Soviets and the issue of the Soviet's permanent commissions. In fact, Kosyginosition on the role of the state apparatus as strong as Chesnokov's5 Kommunist presentation on the5 plenum.dec is ions.*
Kosygin,to the numerical growth in the state militia, paraphrased Chesnokov's5 Kommunist rationale on the need for organs of coercion; Kosygin said "it would bo incorrect to think that slnco communism will finally lead to the disappearance of state organs of coercion, ono need no longer bother about strengthening public order."
Thus, Kosygin, after asserting that the CPSU considers the strengthening of the Soviet state "ofeference to5 September managerial plenum in predicting that
many legislative norms of economicwill be revised and will be made to correspond to the new system of management of the national economy. This will raise and strengthen legality and discipline and will insure the introduction of state order in all sections of the state machinery and the economic management of the country.
Unlike Podgorny, Kosygin did not go on to state that the Soviets and their deputies would increase control over the actions of the state machinery. And unlike Brezhnev's election remarks, ignored the subject of the working party member,ssorted that the role of the party was to "lead andtronger pitch for the role of the expert in building tho bases of communism than he had in6 congress speech: at the Bolshoy, Kosygin said that the "working class and tho scientific-technical intelligentsia of the capital steadfastly stride in the vanguard of the struggle for Implementation of the plans of our party in the creation of the material and technical base of communism."
Suslov in his 7Leningrad eloction speech once more emphasized the need for an ideologically pure party. He reiterated the principal points ln Kosygin's election speech dealing with the needtrong state apparatus, but also endorsed the Podgorny emphasis on the Soviets, though withoutpecific comment on the issue of permanent commissions. Suslov, like theune Pravda editorial, asserted that the CPSU "attachesimportance toincreasing role of the Soviets"ormulation not broached in Kosygin's speech on the next day) and he emphasized the role of people's control (an organization ignored in Kosygin's speech) and the soviet deputies in verifying the implementation of adopted laws.
Ia sun,6 electoral presentationthat he had modified hisongress vlows on the role of tbend would now again support measures to strengthen the authority of the sovlots as long as tho party's traditional role would not become contaminated ln tbe process. In this latter connectiond Congress adopted more restrictive partyentrance more difficult and expulsionaccordod with Suslov's Insistence on the purity :of party
Polyansky,,irst deputy chairman of Kosygin's Council of Ministers, in the abridged (and only available) version of hisay election speech In Krasnoder also praised the rolo of the Soviets. And ln addition, Polyansky who was elevatod to his current ministerial post after the5 plenum, may have previewed Brezhnev's later reference to the "genuine people'solyansky told Krasnoder oloctors that7 revolution laid the foundationgenuine people's rule" which, heexplained, was represented by the emergence of the Soviets. omewhat similar vein, Suslov
example, Suslov in his last election speech,2 in Saratov, ignored, as he had in1 Congress presentation, the subject of Increasing the role of the Soviets.
statutes, in addition, call for party expulsion of those who violate either tho statutes or the party program,rovision reiteratedravda article on the day preceding the Suslov speech. Tho provision, lncidently, could be invoked as basis for expelling Khrushchev from tbe party. After his fall his party reform was picturediolation of the party statutes. Further, his view of the production-oriented party was out of tune with the more traditional definition of the party retained in1 party program. See also with regard to the latter point.
referred to "genuine socialism" before commenting on the rolo of the Soviets.)
Mazurov, in hisay election speech in Minsk while referring to the Supreme Soviet in standard terms as the "supreme organ ofid not single out the sovlets for' praise or suggest that there was any need for an expansion of their role. Like Kosygin, Mazurov, whoirst Deputy Premier inmphasized the role of the state apparatus in state policy. Mazurov again ignored the role of the Soviets in an awardspeechune in Fergana although one of the subjects of his speech was tho Supremo Soviet elections. Mazurov has been closely associated with the restoration of tho centralized ministries aftor Khrushchev's fall and, in fact, introduced Kosygin's managerial proposals toSupreme Soviet.
Shelepin inune election speech in Leningrad did not touch on the organizational status of the Supreme Soviot. His only specific reference to tho future role of the sovlets was the non-committal statement that the soviot deputies have "an important role" in the sphere of housing construction. (Shelepin had also slighted tho role of tho Soviets in his last2 in Tashkent.) With regard to the role of the party, Shelepinike1 Chesnokov position (see pagetalin Constitution, held that tho party is "the political leader and the leader of our society andstate", unlike Brezhnev's election, remarks ond Party Congress, Shelopin said that tbe decisions ofd Congress would "strengthen the party even more in the organizational and ideological-politcal sense" and will "strengthen discipline."
Politburo member Voronov, the chairman of tho Council of Ministers of the largest republic (the RSFSR) and, under Khrushchev, tho chairman of the importantsubcommission on "questions of public and statemphasized the role of state ministries ln the abridged (and only available) version of6 Novosibirsk election speech. In fact, his election remarks onefficacy of Kosygin's September
MET
anagerial reforms were much more categorical than Kosygin's election comments on the same subject. Voronov asserted that the September decision to transfer to new methods of planning and management of industry is the "decisive factor" for the fulfillment of the five-year plan. Voronov, however, did note in his5 speech in Kirov that the decisions of Brezhnev's5 agricultural plenum "impose even greateron Party and Soviet organs for the organization of affairs."*
*Prior to the5 plenum, L. Kulichenko, the chairman of the permanent commission for agriculture of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet spelled out the powers of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissionsis Voronov's RSFSR Council of Ministers. Closelythe description of the existing powers of the Supreme Soviet permanent commissions given in jurist Kutafyin's late6 Soviet State And Law article, Kulichenko proclaimed1b Izvestiya article that "extensive rights and powers have been granted us /the RSFSR Supreme Soviet permanent When necessary, we have the right to invite to the commission meetings officials from the ministries and from stato committees created under the Council of Ministers RSFSR, not only to invite them, but also to hear their comments and to recommend that theyarticular measure. The commission may submit itsto the RSFSR government and initiate proposals aimed at improving agricultural production." If accepted, the Brezhnev-Podgorny proposals to increase the powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissions willike effect on the republic Supreme Sovietin relations with their respective councils of ministers.
Pelshe, elevated to the politburo atdlnune Riga election address asserted that the Soviets now are "bearing complete responsibility, are
being increasingly exacting toward all economic Pelshe, however, also indirectly noted thepowers of the Council of Ministers inoint Central Committee-Council of Ministers decision relating to state farms.
*The views of KirTTcnko, tho remaining full member of the polltburo and (prior to the last congress) tho first deputy chairman of the recently abolished RSFSR Bureau of the central committee, on the subject of the role of the sovlets were not included in the accounts ofune Sverdlovsk election speech in TASS, Pravda, Soviet-skaya Rossiya, Izyostlya, and Pravda VostokaT The full text of his speech,une Sukhimi speech of secretariat member Ponomarev, have not been made By the author's account, Ponomarev and Kirilenko have not placed themselves on record regarding the issue of increasing the role of Supreme Soviot permanentin their published speeches during the now leadership period.
The election speeches of certain candidatemembers of the polltburo* also reflectedover the party-state-soviet issue. For example, trade union leader Grishin inune Orekhovo-Zuyevo election speech, emphasized, like Podgorny and Shelest, the increasing activity of the Supreme Soviot. Grishin confidently asserted that "the role of the USSR Supreme Soviet will bo raised even higher on the basis of more active work by the deputies, the formation of newthe intensification of Soviet legislation, and the verification of the execution of the laws." Georgian party leader Mzhavanadze inune Tbilisi speech,Shelepin, skirted the question of the institutional powers of the Supreme Soviot stressing rather thefunctions of that institution. He told his Georgian electors that the deputies must "propagate the policy of the Communist Party and soviet government and organize tho masses to implement this policy," At the same time,
he concentrated on the concept of the party as the incul-cator of ideological discipline in Soviet society as he has in the past. He asserted that educating Soviet people in the spirit of "ideological fidelity to communism is the most important and primary objective in our ideological work." imilar vein, he told delegates tod Congress onarch that the "party will not tolerate the slightest deviation from the principles of Marxism-Leninism" and he told Georgian communists on5 that "Stalin said accurately and graphically, 'Our partyortress, the doors of which open only for the The ideological chief of the centralDemichev, speaking to Moscow voters onay warned of the corrosive influence of alien political ideas, and the party's task to educate citizens "inspirit." Demichev, like Brezhnev in hisspeech, linked the party with "other socialn early Khrushchevian formula (examined on) which had concealed an effort to transfer state functions to the party organization. With regard to the subject of the Soviets' activities, Belorussian party leader Mashorov inune Minsk election speech differed from the approach taken by his republic party predecessor, Mazurov. Masherov concluded that the party "attaches enormous attention to enhancing the role played by tho Soviets."
Conclusions
The drafting and adoption of the new constitution could well actatalyst bringingead theamong tho leaders over institutional Issuesin the election speeches.
Tho pattern that hassinced Congress showsf the eleven full politburo members, onlyPodgorny, Shelest, Suslov,on record explicitly supported the program to increase the role of soviet deputiesikely constitutional "reform" issue), and only the first three of the above five have specifically endorsed the proposals to augment
the activity of the permanent commissions,hat three politburo Shelopin,been silent on the proposals to increase tho role of thehile the remainingVoronov andln the past commented favor-ably on the role of Supreme Soviet deputies, theird Congress views on the subject cannot be ascortained vith any degroo of accuracy.
The question of the relationship between the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, while important (and controversial, as the above pattern suggests) isovershadowed by the vexatious problem ofodern role for the CPSU. The solution of thisissue stands as the touchstone for significantreform in the Soviet Union. The notionorking party has been progressively refined in Brezhnev's public remarks sinco the ouster of Khrushchev. But to repeat, Brezhnev's remarks stop short of his predecessor's sweeping and highly contentious approaches toward aof the long standing questions regarding the correct role for tho party organization, tho stato bureaucracy, and the soviet parliament in the life of contemporary Russia.
At this writing, the constitutional project seems unlikely to "ploneor" any basic institutionalwithin tho Soviet Union's labyrlnthino governing structure. As yot no loader, Including the General Secretary whose strength has steadily increased, either soems powerful onough or ready to forco through major changes. The best any leader might hopo for, it would soem, would bo to introduce formulations in tho newwhich ho could uso to justify political programs now only in embryo.
In the meantime, Kosygin continues to givoof defending the integrity of his stato base ofthe eveodgorny-chaired Supreme Soviot
(currently scheduledugust)
Original document.
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