66
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
6
Warning of Soviet Intention to Attack
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
,
Authenticated!
Executive secrete
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Coatwd in br (he UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Ai indicated
6
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of Ihh estimate:
The Ce*vi.ol Intelligence Agency ond iho inicUigento organiiaiiom ofod-menl*CC< ond the NSA
Cortcurrirtg/1
Dr. R. J. Smith. Acting OA MemberB
Thomoi I.ho Director of Intelligence and Keworch, DeportmaM of Slate
Vice Adm. Rufu, I. Taylor, for the Director, Deferue Intelligence Agency U. Generol Morthall S. Carter, Director. Natlonol Security Agency Dr. Chorles H. Rekhordt, for the Aubtant General Manoger, Atomic Energy
Comrnliiioo
Abi!-lining.
Mr. Sam Papich, for lhe Aiiinont Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, rhe Hibject bewig outtlde of hit furndk'k*.
CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBI-KM
SCOPE NOTE
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. THE NATURE OF THE WARNING PROBLEM
The Pioblcm of Collecting 5
The Problem of Interrelation 6
Communication of Warning 7
OF THE LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL 7
Soviet Decisioneriod of Calm 7
Soviet Decisioneriod of Tension fl
Level of Intelligence Alert a
EXPERIENCE IN RECENT CRISES 9
Berlin]q
Cuban Missile10
OF VARIOUS SOVIET ATTACK11
"Maximum Surprise Allack
Maximum Weight Attack12
A Combination of Surprise and12
CHANCES OF WARNING13
VL FUTURE TRENDS13
VII. WARNING OF SOVIET-INITIATED HOSTILITIES IN4
WARNING OF SOVIET INTENTION TO ATTACK
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the warning which the intelligence community could provide of Soviet intentions to initiate either general hostilities against the US or hostilities limited to Europe, and trends in these warning capabilities over the next five years or so.
SCOPE NOTE
The main topic of this estimate is similar to that of its predecessor.arningoviet attack on the US. In responseequest from US policymakers, we also consider theof warning of Soviet-initiated hostilities against US and allied forces in Europe- This is not to say that wo believe that either form of attack is probable; on tho contrary, as other NIEs indicate, wethem highly unlikely.
We emphasize that the subject of this estimate is strategichat which intelligence might provide prior to an actual attack. Il is to be distinguished fiom tactical warning which might beby such means ns BMEWS, DEW line radars,ndicating that an attack has been initiated.
For tlie purposes of this estimate It is assumed that duriDg the period under consideration no US-Soviet agiccincnt on arms control orof mutual inspection will be in effect.
TS OOOPi'tM-
2
CONCLUSIONS
basic problems for intelligence, as it lelates to wantingattack, arc to collect indications, to interpret themto comniunicate the findings promptly and cogently to theNo single source of information can be exclusively reliedmust be based on constant examinationide rangeactivities, in an effort to detect and identify significantnormal behavior.
is not likely lo be either complete orthe USSR to prepaie to attack the US, some of thealmost certainly be susceptible of detection by one orBut even when increased Soviet readiness is apparent, itdifficult to know whether Moscow means to attack, to takerisis, to deter, or to be prepared to defend andthese reasons, the political climate will continue to be ain our analysis.
chances of providing warning of an ICBM attackachieve maximum suiprise would be virtually nil. The chancewould Increase as the planned weight of attack increased,be better than even in the caseaximum weight,In any case, intelligence could almost certainly give noof an intention to attack. Intelligence is not likely toof probable Soviet intent to attackew hoursattack, if at all. Warning of increased Soviet readiness,ttostiblc intent to attack, might be given somewhat earlier.
the Soviets sought to maximize surprise in an attackthey couldevastating first strike with MRBMswhose final preparation for the attack would not bepresent collection means. However, wc believe that theexpect US retaliation and would probably make many ofdefensive preparations as in the case of an attack on themight be detected.
1 IWr Admiral Eugene B.y, DSN, tin Aniitanl Chief of Naval Operation* (InlelliDepartment of tbe Navy,hat any genrm] hottiliuo bunched by the Soviet* agattxt the US or NATO daring the neil Eve yeanalmost certainly be initialed byannram weight, all-outnd hew* Out the chance* of providing warning would be better than era*.
3
llic eventonventional at lack on Westernof warning would be minimal if lhe USSH elected not loils farces in East Ccriminy in advance. However, if thelo build up forces in (he GSFG, this and other morepreparations would probably become known to Westernthough it might be difficult to inteipret their significance.plans would piobably become known to at least some of itsallies, and wc think the chances are good that we wouldknowledge of Soviet intentions.
the next few years, the continuing shift from bombersas the primary arm of Soviet strategic attack forces willour ability to monitor tliose forces. On the other hand,collection systems and processing techniques willus to observe and analyze more types of activity on abasis. On balance, we do not look for much change inof intelligence to provide wanting of Soviet attack onor on Western Europe.
BW
4
NOTE
The key problem raised by ibis estimate is iho impact of advancednotably the ballisticSoviet attackand the accompanying cfTects on the Intelligenceability to give warning. Not only is warning time reduced, but some of the indicators which were considered mostew years ago. such as deployment of significant numbers of LRA aircraft to staging bases, may no longer be so relevanttrategic attack. Indicators of tho readying of missile forces would be much harder to detect, and if ihey were discernible at all, would offer much less lead-time As Indicated in this estimate, the Intelligence Community is aware of the need for special techniques devoted to collecting,and correlating information about Soviet activities and behavior. In addition lo the pursuit of existing methods, it is actively seeking ways to develop and exploit new technology for warning purposes. Its efforts include development of new technical collection systems and constant attention to keeping the list of indicators up-to-date and to making the warning system as responsive as possible to present and future needs.
5
L THE NATURE Of THE WARNING PROW EM
Ihe Problem of Collecting Indications
The dealestfSoviel iiatcntionltack would come from duett access lo dependable sources of Information on the proceedings of Ihe highest level Soviet decisimvmuklng bodies. Hut such ncccss is highly unlikely, and if ever achievedisk rsposuie ond elimination before tbe ctillcalf warning arrived. Moreover, informationmgle highly placed source would always have to be questioned and cross checked by simultaneous observationariety ol other nclivilies, especiallyailer so villi as warning.
In theso circumstances, warning must stem from the collection andof informationide range of Soviel activities and behavior. Comldor-iuj- the extensive Soviet effort to prevent lhe collection of vital Information about lite USSR's military capabilities and activities, even indirect evidence of Sovietand preparations will always be incomplete. Nevertheless, were the USSR lo prepare to attack Ihe US. some of the preparations would almostbe susceptible of detection by one or incnc means Those items of infix ma -lion would nol necessarilyoviet intention to attack, since they may also bo consistith an inlontlon toliflcr standrisis, lo deter, or to be picpared to defend and then retaliate. Thus, tlie warning problem Is one ofuantity of fragmentary information, of evaluating andit In ordei lo reach judgments ul>out lhe USSR's intended course of action, and ol piescnllng these judgmentsonvincing manner,
cope with the warning problem in these terms, the US Intelligencehas developed techniques for collecting, evaluating, andabout Soviet uelivltiei and behavior.airof some norms in Soviet behavior has bnen acquired, and ais now applied lo the problem of discerning apparent abnormalitiessignify Soviet preparations for war. This effort has includeddetermine wliot general and spcciBc preparations Iho USSR might makeinitiating hostilities, to identify those preparations most susceptible tointelligence, to direct collection assets towards promising sources olmid to establish special channels for tlie rapid transmission andof Information which may be pertinent to the warning problem.ofimpossibility of predicting in advance prrxisely whatbecome apparent should the Soviets decide to attack, warning couldderived automatically from cabling or even improved mcclianlsms. Itbe lhe end productrocess of reasoning from evidence lhalbe regarded as complete or completely unambiguous, it will thereforeJudgment of probability rather than an unequivocal warning of Soviet intent
to attack-
'I. Indh Jli>nii might be found in any ot allide variety ofhum specific Soviet prcparalkaulrikc lo apparent rrungn|-titrate.s in tbe area of physical activitiesiii ignite has bat been ible to maintain uutcilLtncc and to rrxogni'cihl
in m. al preparations iirnlcri.il in some lime befoto the initiation of waroiler Ihe longest potential lead-time for warning, but in mofct cases would pn mil only the most general conditions nbout Soviet leadineMi. It would borly difficult to derive conclusion* about lhe pace of lhe picpitration? and ihr timing ol lhe intended attack. Indications of bit minute Sovietwould bo much more significant, ImiI many of these final preparations would be undertaken so close to lhe launching of (he attack Ihal there would be little lime to obtain the information, lo assess it, and to communicate warning to deohion-making officials. Hence, tlie most specific warning which might be given by intelligence on tbe basis of Soviel physical preparations would probably conic dangerously close to the moment of attack.
n addition to these preparations. Intelligence might acquire evidence of Soviet activities which did not In themselves increase military readiness but which Iho USSH might undertake prior to the initiation of hostilities. Some examples arc abnormally heavy censorship measures, changes in clandestine agent operations, urgent and simultaneous recall of key Soviet personnel in Western countries, and unusual restrictions on foreign nationals in lhe USSR. While such evidence might strengthen the warning derived from analysis of military pi epilations, it would notonvincing basis forhe absence of Indications of increased readiness to attack.
Ihe Problem of Interpretation
Inarning judgment. Intelligence must evaluate physical prep-atalions and other activities in the conical of the Soviet political posture. This context has lo do with the stale of affairs within the Soviet Union as well as the way the USSR is conducting its International affairs at the time; the vigor of ils challenge lo the West over various issues, the apparent degree ofof the Soviet leaders to various positions, and the political climate in high Soviet and Eait European circles. While lhe political context introduces vital evidence, II also adds complications lo the warning problem. Soviet foreigninitiatives, actions, and positions nro themselves often difficult lo Interpret. Fur example, Inur assessment of (he considerations that would deter Soviel policymakers from deploying offensive nmsiles to Cuba was both logical nnd erroneous. Nevertheless, evaluation of the political posture,though it may be,ital ingredient in lhe interpretation of physical preparations, particularly with respect to reaching judgments about lhe Soviet intentions fluey may signify.
It is evident from the foregoing considerations lhat warning Is not likely to be either complete or unequivocal The more indications collected and
TOP SfXRET
7
recognired liy iiilclligciicc. and the moae compicheinivepicture ol Soviet capabilities nnd behavior available to mlcllignicc, tlie better would be the basis for judging tin; Soviet course of action, liut (he sum of the available indications and knowledge would almost certainly not be conclusive as to Soviel intentions. Therefore, even under the most favorable circumstances, it is likely that inlelli-gene* could only arriveudgment that the proUbility of Soviet attack was high. Some indication of the form, scale, or lime of attack might be ascertained from tbe character and pace of Soviet preparations, but here too there would be uncertainty.
addition, at any given point in the enemy's course of preparationthe Intelligence Oommunily is likely to beange ofjudgments as lo the portent of enemy activities. This likelihoodenhanced by the recognition that our data arc iocumplrte aodandeneral awareness of the consequences ofIn these circumstances, the warning formulated bybo equivocal or clouded by the statement of differing views.
if unequivocal warning of attack cannot be given, warnings ofof certainty couUasis for critically important USor intelligence decisions. Preliminary warnings might be adequatethe belief that tlie USSR was prepared to take new risksrisishence the US should, for example, intensify diplomatic moves, placeforcos at one or another stage of aleil, or redirect intelligenceSuch actions might lead theo abandon its plan tothis case, warning would have accomplished its fundamental purpose,
Communkofion of Warning
process of warning is complete only when warning judgmentsintelligence are accepted as valid by decision-making elements ofwarn big judgment which Is not believed by responsible policy officials Isaj no warning at all. Since the postulated Soviet decisionost portentous one, tbe US policymakers would rightly insistjudgments as to tho degree of likelihood of attack should be wellIntelligence must, therefore, communicate its findings as lucidlycogently us possible.
II. EFFECT OF THE LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION
Soviet Decisioneriod of Calm
Is possible tooviet decision to attack the US. made wellThe Soviet leaders might conclude lhat they hadtechnologicalilitary superiority over Ihe US so decisivepermit them to defeat Ihe US without receiving unacceptable damageor they might conclude that the US was planning to attack thelhat their best chance of survival lay in attacking first.
TOP 5tXHI.f
ecision made well in advance would give lheung period lo prepare, lo adopt measures of maximum secrecy, and to mount large-scale effortseceive the- US a? to Soviel intentions. On tlie other hand, it would give flic US Intelligence Community time loroad range of information which might progressivelyeaningful pattern. Initially at least, such preparation* as were detected would probably not have an emergency character and would piobably be regardedormal development of Soviet military capabilities. At some point, however, the Soviet actions might be recognized by intelligence as variations from normal patterns of activity, either by analysis of the prepnialions themselves, or by the discovery of unusual Soviet secrecy or deception attempts. This would alert intelligence and would cause it totbe accumulated indications. As the lime of attack approached, actionsast minute character might be observed which would increase our ability lo give warning.
can also conceiveoviet decision lo attack on very shortin the absence of any external atmosphere of rising tensions. Such amight stemear that the US svas about lo attack the USSRsome irrationality within tlie lop Soviel leadership. In cases of thispiop.iiations would be minimal and the time available for theirbe very short. The chances of svaniing might rest lieavity on thethaioviet militaryhemselves surprised, would fail tosecurity measures.
Soviet Decisioneriod of Tension
Another range of circumstances underoviet decision lo attack might be laktn would involve responses to international crises or local conBicls which neither the USSR nor the US intended should lead to general war. The Soviet leaders might come to believe that an actual or threatened intervention in the USSR's sphere of vital inlcrcst could not be countered by limited means, or that the USSR had become engaged beyond retreat in some area where the Western Powers would be prepared to risk general war. In rather-case, the Soviet leaders might decide lhat general war was inevitable and lhat they Should Attack fust.
Either situation would almost certainly be accompaniedery high degree of political tension, which would in itself alert intelligence and could give rise to preliminary warning. Hosvevcr, the time period overrisis reached an aenle stage could vary considerably, and this would affect the ability of intelligence toeaningful pattern of indications. If the crisis developed rapidly, and if Soviet military readiness was already advanced or if the Soviot leaders decided to attack with only minimum preparations, the indications obtained might be few. If, on the other hand, (he USSR took longer to prepare and position its forces, further and more specific warning might be obtained from lhe pace and nature of the Soviet preparations.
inising tuition,o and variety of datarise, (nil the difficulty of interpreting than would likuwitc increase.Soviet activities, intelligence would have lo iciognize that lhehe carrying out military preparations, not on the basisirminitiate general war, but for purposes of deterrence or in Older todefensive readiness nnd its ability to retaliate should the US attack,the significance of the USSR's political and propaganda activities in thiswould bo extremely difficult. The importanceorrect US estimatepoint would be very great, yet it would he particularly difficult toan estimateeriod of tension.
Level of Intelligence Alert
significant effecteriod of tension, as it applies to thewould be the effect on the Intelligence Community itself. Sincea product of judgment, there are vai iablc human factors which must beaccount Alertness would vary depending on the manner in which thelis intensity, and its duialinn. There are many ways in whichand effectiveness of intelligence increases under crisis conditions.field reporting and intelligence analysis become sharply focused onsituation, resources of Hie Intelligence Community are more closelyto deal with the crisis, and intelligence is increasingly disposed locurrent evidence indicates hostile intent. On the other liand,ong sustained crisisigh degree of tension, keybe subjected to fatigue and strain. If, at one stage or another,warning judgments bad been made, intelligence might be moregiving new warnings and decision-makers about accepting them.
risis situation arises, Ihe volume of information increases markedly, thus confronting intelligencearge number of reports, many fromidentified sources of uncertain reliability. There is also an Increase in Ihe number of reports from sources of known reliability. In these circumstances, information channels are likely to beith resulting delays in the transmission, receipt, and assimilation of data. Analysts and policymakers alike will be inundated with material requiring leview, evaluation, and decision. However, it is not possible for intelligence to suspend judgment until moreand satisfactory evidence becomes available.ariety of reasons, intelligence warningseveloping crisis may be expressed with less confidence and hence be less credible to decision-makers.
III. WARNING EXPERIENCE IN RECENT CRISES
ince Ihe last National Intelligence Estimate dealing with the subject of warning, the Berlin crisis1 and the Cuban missile crisisave given us concrete examples of the type and nature of some of the steps the Soviets might take in preparing to attack the US, At the same time, these crises have demonstrated how Soviet security, concealment, and deception practices can obscure our vieweveloping situation. It is important to recognize, how-
oll) (Vic situations the Sovietrobably fell far short(Un, Mc shouldin case ihey were lo deckle to male full scale.tiom for conflict with Ihc US. and lhat therera clement of Muff in their aitioni In both crises.
Borlin
lie military and political measures which the USSK loot In the summer and fall1eriod of two years or so during which Khrushchev liad repeatedly jmted hit intention loerlin settlement on his terms.1eries of Soviet statements and actions made It clear lhal Iho USSR would seek loettlement that ytar, US intelligence aware of tho possibilityonfrontation, was thus more than normally alort'to any Soviet preparedness measures, and collection and analysis resources were geared lo the possibility that the USSR might resort to force to achieve its objective. In this atmosphere of crisis, many items of information were collected and clovely analyzed which,eriod of lesser tension, might liavo gone un-detected Or been subjected to less intense review.
uring the weeks preceding and following tire closing of the Berlinrocr* onugust, tliercopious How of infoi niation (andconcerning increased security measures, military ciercism in Eastern Kmopo and Ihe Soviet Union, mobuizalion and reinforcement plans, covert troop movements, and various other steps of the type which we would expect i0 see taken in an initial buildup for hortihties in Europe In general, the tinwhneu of collection and evaluation of the information received concerning thesewas good. In part because many of the USSR's moves were overt or publicly announced for political reasons.
otable exception, however, was the dosing of the Berlin sector borders. Despite tho extensive Western intelligence access to East Berlin and East Ccr-many at tlie time, and despite our realization of the acutenesj of the refugee problem, there were no specific indications lhat Uie sector borders would be closed as abruptly and in the manner they were. Particularly noteworthy from Ihe standpoint of warning Is the fact that the movement of Soviet and East Ccr-man troops lo positions surrounding the city, and of East Gorman troops wilhiu East Berlin, were made so suddenly On II andugust lhat their uxlent and significance wore not perceived until after the sector holders were closed. This action attests lo the security of high-level Communist decisions andthe Communist ability lourprise move without the Weil gaining any specific warning, even in an area of priority Western intelligence collection nitivily.
Cubon Missile
U Unlike the Berlin situation, in which the US was aware of an impending confrontation, the Cuba situation did not become acutely critical until ourctober el overy that strategic missiles had been deployed and launch facilities were under construction. Tbe large Soviet shipments to Cuba before
bEOIiST-
date liad, of course, been otiserved.o intensive iul< Il.gcnce collcclion nnd analytical efforts Sizable movements of passenger vessels were also noted. However, tbe Cuban situation was generally regarded as one In which lhe Soviets, by providing Cuba with defensive weapons, sought to deter the US from attempting Castro's overthrow, rather than Joirect strategic threat to the US itself.
n addition to information concerning developments in Cuba, wc alsoariety of indications concerning military activities in the USSR itself. These dkl not. however, point to any significant deployment of Soviet combat troops to Cuba, and Indeed Soviet security wasffective that no reports wereconcerning the movement of tioops or military equipment to Soviet ports for such deployment. In short, intelligence was not able at the time tothe interrelationship between activities observed in Cuba and those to the USSR sufficiently to permit warning of the full extent of Soviet readiness to confront the US with the Cuban missile challenge
3
warning purposes, our general conclusions fiom the Berlin andare:
Intelligence Community's state of alert and its evaluation ofcontextery Important bearing on the promptness ofon Indications and tlie interpretations placed upon them.
the Cuban crisis, intelligence was unable Jo determinedegree of
c Tho US probably canigh state of alert or combat readiness of national or Soviet forces in Eastern Europe when this alert is widespread, d. The Soviets are adept to deception and their security is highly effective.
IV. EFFECT OF VARIOUS SOVIET ATTACK STRATEGIES Maximum Surprise Attack
The principal means of concealing prepaiatioiisaximum surprise attack would be the maintenance of seemingly normal patterns of activity,totrategic attack forces themselves (ICBMt, long-range bomberand missilef the initial Soviet strike was carried out entirely by ICBMs, our ability to derive warning from the activities of these forces would bo minimal. The Soviot ICBM force is permanently deployed and Is maintainedigh state of readiness. Final readying activity would not be extensive and would nol be detectable by pretenl collection means.
If the Soviets chose to add more weight to the initial attack without unduly jeopaidiiing the chance* of surprise, the role of Soviet Long Range AviationA) could be restricted to use of'those heavy bombers which could
top occfitr
um luxl froms without prior main ten ante standdowji amineeding to stage through Arctic bases. The bombers could take off so as to penetrate the DEW line shortly alter the 1CHM attack. While (lie flight al some of the bombers northward might be delected, it is unlikely (hat any warning judgment would be based on this indication alone.
o believe lhat. if the Soviets were seeking to maximize surprise, (hey would not deploy numbers of submarines until after the ICBM attack wasAt present, the few Soviet missile submarines on Atlantic and Pacific patrol stations aie generally not deployed within range of potential US targets but patiol within two or three days transit time of potential launch areas.
if they sought maximum surprise, the Sovicls, anticipating USwould piobably take some preparatory steps in other elementsmilitary forces than those participating in the initial strikes. Suchinclude: readying air defense forces, deploying groundutting naval elements to sea, deploying tactical aircraft tomoving key military command elementslternate sites, etc. Inwc believe that the USSR would undertake some measures in thofield to provide some protection to its key personnel. Some ofmight he delected but, in tho absence of indications of unusualthe strategic attack forces, might be evaluated as exercises.ood chance lhat Moscow would attempt lo deceive us by aiinouiicingwere exercises.
Maximum Weight Attack
trike in which weight of attack was paramount, thehave toood many steps to enhance the rcadiuess of theirLHA aircraft, including some medium bombers, wouldaintenance standdosvn of several days piobably would beSome of the aircraft prol>abIy would be staged through Arctic bases.submarines would probably put to sea and head for launch positionsUS. Various other elements of the military forces would be broughtreadiness and necessary deployments carried out,ear simultaneous attack in Europe, This range ofgive intelligence its best chance of detecting enough indications toa high level of military preparedness was bemg achievede USSRrender some judgment as to the probability of attack.
A Combination of Surprise and Weight
could of course be various levels of attack falling betweeu thesurprise and the maximum weigh! types. In these cases, the indicationsattack probably would be random and imprecise, but in general,wuuldetter chance of providing svarning than in the casemaximum surprise attack.
,rrfll'l _
CHANCES OF WARNING
Because ol out limited ability to provide warning from observing tlie activitieshe various Soviet strategic attack foices. it is likely that suchas wo can provide will be basedombination or series of indications stemming from nctivltlcs within various other elements of Soviel political and military power. So far as military activities aie concerned, wc are more likely to detect events in Eastern Europe and the western USSR than those which occur elsewhere.
The degree of validity accorded to indications by intelligence and by policy officials would also depend on the extent to which these indications were plausibly explicable in terms of Soviet courses of action other than an altack on the US. II warning were derived solelyixture of indications from, say. foices in Eastern Europe, civil defense, and partial mobilization, it would in theory be no less valid than warning derived from observed preparations of bombers and ballistic missiles. The latter would be more specific and dramatic, but would be less likely lo be available in time. Tlie former would be more likely to be timely; il would also be more ambiguous. But analysis of indications in all these categories might permit intelligence to give nrccessive vrainings withconfidence.
Tlie chances of pioviding warning of an ICBM attack designed lo achieve maximum surprise would be virtually nil. lhe chance of warning would increase as the planned weight of attack increased, and would be better than even in the caseaximum weight, all-Ouln any case, bitelligenco could almost certainly give no firm warning of an intention to altack. Intelligence is not likely to give warning ol probabU Soviet intent lo attackew hours before lhe attack, if al all. Warning of Increased Soviet readiness,otsible intent lo allack, might be given somewhat earlier.
TRENDS
ver the next few years, the Soviets will come lo rely even more on ICBMs for initial attack. They will probablyattern ol routine submarine patrols in potential launch areas off the US coasts- The net effect will be to reduce still further the likelihood of our providing warning based on theof strategic attack force elemenls.
e believe, however, that we willairly good capabdity to monitor activities of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in forward Eastern European areas, Wo can likewise probably continue to monitor activity within the Soviet
A&aaral Eograe B. Fh*ley, USN. the AstUaat Out! el Naval Opc/atfaaa (iMelli.epartment of the Navy, befiewi lhat any (timid hortlrtM launched try the Soviet)Ihe US Ot NATO during the next five years would almoit certainty bo initiated bymaximum wd^it, all-outnd lienor that Uie chancca of providing warning wouldbelter than even.
iop orcm:t
strategic defense force at aboul our pusjenl level. The advent of an AUMand defensive! system within the USSH may offer another source ofHowever, sve caimiit assess value for warning until we know more about the ncifornvmee char act eristics' and operational techniques of the system.
he political environment obtaining at the time is. and will continue toritical factor in our analysis of indications. Depending on the circumstances, it could strengthen or impede the warning judgment. T
J
Because of the strict contiol exercised by Communist governments on official US representatives abroad, we anticipate little improvement in the ability of such sources to contribute to the warning problem. Well-placed clandestine sources could materially contribute to Ihe determination of Soviot intent But (heyarity within Communist countries, and wc cannot count onource becoming assailable and being in place when needed for the purpose of warning.
ft is likely that improvements in intelligence collection and data handling systems will enable us to observe androader spectrum of activityore timely basis. In some cases,onsiderable period ofof these systems and analysis of tho data collected must be undergone before wc canull appreciation of the benefit to bo derived from theseNevertheless, warning judgments will, of necessity, remain tlie product of examinationide range of indications. On balance, we do not look for much change in the capability of intelligence to provide warning of Soviet attack.
VII. WARNING OF SOVIET-INITIATED HOSTILITIES IN EUROPE
If the Soviets sought to maximize surprise in an attack on Europe, they couldevastating first strike with MItBMs and IltBMs whose final preparation for the attack would not be detectable by present coUcction means. However, wc believe that the Soviets would expect US retaliation and would probably make many of the same defensive preparations as in the case of an attack on the US. with essentially the same chances of detection and warning.
In the eventonventional attack on Western Europe, chances ofwould be minimal if the USSH elected not to build up its forces hi East Germany in advance However, if the Soviets undertook an advance buildup, this and other inoTC extensive preparations wouldcome known to Western intelligence. In addition to activity in GSKG Itself, we wouldeinforcement of the lines of communication through Poland andmilitary requisitioning of rolling stock and other forms ofonsiderable increase In tbe movement of supplies from thoightening of security measures, stepped-up civil defense
The danger that warning might not be given would arise, in our view, not fiom failure to detect many ol these measures but from the difficulty ofIheir significance. In these ciicunis lances, thu likelihood of warning ofns well as the timelines! of any such warning, would depend on the extent and speed of the buildup ond lhe variety of other factors discussed in this estimate. For example, if the Soviel pieparations were undertakeneriod of relative political calm, ami graduallyeriod of months, they might be regarded onlying-term increase in capabilities. If undertakeneriod of rising tensions,airly large-scale augmentation of Soviet forces in East Germany might be misinterpreted as defensive, or as Intended to deter the West tlirough political pleasure.
Finally, the last minute movement of troops into offensive positions could be masked ns an exercise. Soviot military doctrine stresses the desirability of thus disguising preparations for attack, lite scale of logistic preparations will always bo higher for combat than for an exercise, but the facts may bo very difficult (ui intelligence to determine. Accordingly, the charscei of timely warning will be heavily dependent on whether tlie scope and significance of earlierIsave been recognixed and reported at potentially offensive in nature. If not. warning that an attack may be imminent is much less Lkely. particularly under the rigid security measures which tlie USSR may be expected to employ.
Tho chances of obtaining indications for warning are enhanced by tlie growing independence of the East European states in both political and military matters, and by their demands for more discussion and mutual agreement on Warsaw Pact planning and the lole of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. The USSR could not mount an attack on Western Europe without the knowledge of at least some of its allies. The Part forces would lave to have some role is theonly the maintenance of internal security andsome knowledge of large-scale and unusual military preparations and troop and supply movements could not be concealed from many East Europeans. We think the chances are good that through such channels we svoold get some knowledge of Soviet intentions.
In considering the problem of warningoviet attack limited toinal cniitlonary note should ho emphasized. Given the. likelihood that the Soviets would take preparatory steps to ready the USSRetaliatory attack by the US. it would be virtually impossible to Judge whether these preparations indicated an attack limited to Europe or an attack directed against tbe US.
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When ihiiliteminotad oveneoi. ihe over wot redpienii may retain iteriod nol inof one year. Al the end of thH period, lhe document should ehhe. be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or per-minion ihould be requeiled of the lor.ardlng ageixy to retain rt in accordance wilh2 June IM3.
d. The Ale of ihhhenseparatelyin. leu iWd bed.
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Whit. House National Security Council Deportment of Stat. Department of Defense Alomic Energy Commission lederot fcxeou ot Irrigation
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