NIEfr
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
6
Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy
OAHI PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by thm UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
A.6
Authontlcotod;
The following Intelligence organizations pailicipalod in Ihe preparation of Ibis etUmofa:
The Central Intelligence Agency and rhe intelligence oegonlio'Lon. of ihe Depon-menu ol Stale, Defense, and Ihe NSA.
Concurring:
Mr. Richardeputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Tfcomat I. Hughes. Director of Intelligence ond Roieorch. Deportment ol Slote lleuienanl General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Direcior, Detente. Inielligence Agency Mr. Ofivei Kaby, for Director of tho Notionol Securily Agency
Abstaining i
Mr. Chariot A. Sommee, for AtustaM GeneroJ Manager, Atomic Energy Commbuon and Mr. Wllliom O. Cregor, for Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Inresii-gation, the subject being outside al thoir jurisdiction.
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fiLCBiT-
TABIE OF CONTENTS
Foge
THE PBOBLEM 1
SCOPE I
SUMMARY-AND CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 5
I RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5
II. MAJOR EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON MILITARY POLICY 6
US Mflitiry Capabilities 6
NATO and the Warsaw 7
Tensions In the Far 8
CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING POUCY 8
Professional Miliiary Influence 8
The Resource ADocattoii bate 9
Military Research and Development
TRENDS IN FORCE
Stralegic Altack Fotces
Strategic Defensive Forora14
Ceiirml Purpose Forces 13
WITH RESPECT TO CENERAL POLICY14
Ceneral War Deterrence14
Attitude Towards Limited WarH
Wars ot National liberation
Anns Control Possibilities
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
THE PROBLEM
To review significant developments in Soviet miliiary thinking, policy, and programs, and to estimate main trends in Soviet military policies over thc next five years or so.
SCOPE
This estimate assesses broad trends in Soviet military policy and doctrine. It does not attempt to recapitulate existing NIEs oo Soviet strategic attack, strategic air and missile defense, and general purpose forces. Our most recent detailed estimates on the size, composition, and capabilities of tliese principal components and the supporting elements of the Soviet rnilitary forces are as follows:
: "Soviet Capabilities for StrategicOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATADISTRIBUTION).
Capabilities of Soviet General PurposeatedECRET.
: "Soviet Strategic Air and MissileatedOP SECRET.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A, There has been no basic change in established Soviet military doctrine or force structure, but recent trends point to adjustments in Soviet defense policy. Thc present political leaders seem more attentive than was Khrushchev to professional military advice, and they have been willing to authorize increases in both defense expendi-
lurc* and miliiary manpower. Current militaiy writingsearch fot ways lo broaden thc option* available to lhe USSR in the application oi ii. miliiary power )
hc Soviels retain their belief in lhc primacy of strategicnd defense foices, both fot deterrence and for foreign policy support. In addition, however, they now show increasing interest in improving thc capabilities of their general purpose forces lo meet conlingcncies short of general nuclear war. Wc believe this interest is in part responsive to past developments in US and NATO capabilities and to US advocacy of flexible response. Additional factors include the tensions arising from the Vietnam war and the resulting US military buildup, as well as Chinese hostility towards thc USSR. (Paras.)
harp increase in Soviet defense cxpcnditiircs is evidently to occur this year. We attribute it primarily to planned expansion innd to thc cost of long lead-time deployment programs for strategic systems which were authorized in previous years. It probably also slcms in part from some recent increase in operating costs, taduding military manpower. The Soviet leaders have probably authorized, further growth in miliiary and spaceduringive Year Plan period. We believe, however, that in the interests of their ambitious economic programs they wdl seek to limit the growth in defense spending to no more than the average rate of growth In CNP. (Pans.)
D. The Soviet leaders probably expect toubstantial improvement in their strategic positionis the US during the next several years. Chief among their current strategic attackis the rapid deployment of ICRMs in dispersed and hardened silos, which will add substantially to tlie survivability and retaliatory capability of the force. Major current air and missile defenseInclude improved means of warning and control, better defenses against aircraft and aerodynamic missiles, and what we believe to be" ABM defenses under construction. Through these and otherwe think the Soviets are working lo alleviate their present strategic inferiority, and to gain greater assurance of deterring the US in the various crises and confrontations they must allow for
scottr
as they contemplate possible developments in tbe world
E. The past restructuring ol Soviet theater forces for general nuclear war has resulted in certain characteristics which could be serious handicaps in non-nuclear warfare, particularly if at allWe estimate that the Sovieis will undertake gradualin their general purpose forces which will make them somewhat better suited than at present for conventional operations. Ground units will probably tw provided willi greater tactical mobility and improved combat and logistic support, becoming more quickly responsive and better able to engage in sustained combat. The Soviets will alsoarge and versatile tactical air component. They will continue to expand their naval presence in the open oceans, and will acquire greater capabilities to move unopposed military forces to distant areas. The Soviets may regard improved general purpose forces as having increased relevance as their strategic capabilities grow, but wo do not think they expect alterations in tho strategic situation so great as to permit them to undertake substantially more aggressive courses of action.1
F. Soviet military policy will contiue to be heavily influenced by external developments. In recent years Soviet forces in the Sino-Soviet border area have been strengthened in minor ways, and weradual increase in Soviet military strength confronting China. In Eastern Europe thc USSR continues to develop the forces of its Warsaw Pact allies, despite their increasing tendency to assert their independence. The USSR is thus far disposed toward caution with respect to the present weakening of NATO, perhaps because ofover the possible loosening of constraintsevival ofGerman power. But the Soviets weigh the adequacy of their military programs primarily against US capabilities, and they
'Colonel Harry O. IVtrsoo, lor (hc Aulitanl Chief of StaffOSAF, would add the foi lowing tentraoe to (hii paiaerapa:
The uiteoiiiy wtth which the USSR fauustve miliUry rescued iod development program (he cpedBc cootent aad profjen of which ate not clearly known to theportend tu more thea ao lot* at merely lo lbSoviet deterrent posture ud ooaid wed be limed al illihtrnltratrgk mflioay podbon which the US wouldiovideac (he USSR withcrodibk first rtrtke demip limiting capablKr e> wefl OS an assured deatrttcOoa force.
'Coloocl Huty O. Petteeoo, for the AsiUUuri Chief of SuiT Intelligence. USAF, befacrcslonger (eraiornbhulSon of capaUlitJci which wouldrediblecapabilityUS force* and (hut penult lubtUouallyof
action.
will conlinuc lo be sensitive to major new developments in US military policy and forces. )
C. Within theigh level ol effort inill almost certainly be continued, despite resource allocationThe Soviets probably regard such an effort asrder to prevent the US fromechnological advantage and also to gain, if possible, some advantage for themselves, but into deploy any new weapon system they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic costs and the capabilities of the US to counter it. (Paras.
H. We do not expect that Soviet military forces will come to be structured according to some quite new and clear-cut strategicThis will almost certainly be prevented by such factors as thc momentum of existing programs, the multiplicity of claims onand the differing views of various groups as to priorities. (Para. 5)
SCCRCT
DISCUSSION
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENIS
I. Since Khrushchevs fall Irom power there hai been no basic change in cstab-luhcd Soviet militaty doctrine or in the Soviet lorce Structure,ombination of recent developments hat altered the circumstances in which Soviet military policy is formed. Khrushchev's departure hastrong leader who on several important occasions was able to impose his will on the militaryespecially in his efforts to hold down defense spending. The newscemi generally more attentive to professional advice in all Golds, and in military matters the collective may be constrained by tbe reluctance of individual members to oppose such advice without broad support from their colleagues. Al tlie same tune, developments in US forces, international tensions arising from the Vietnamese war, and the hostility of CJuna towards the USSB have provided the advocatesreater defense effort with new arguments. Thesehowever, have not removed all restraints on military spending or given theree hand in military policymaking.
2 Among the military, discussion continues regarding the fundamental premises and practical implications of the roasting force structure. No Soviet military writer questions the preeminent importance of stralegic attack and strategic defense forces, but there has been increasingly open criticism oidiscrimination against the general purpose lorces as having created an undesirable imbalance in Soviet militaiy capabilities. Some important military loaders; have apparently begun to appreciateuclear stalemate between the US and Ihe USSR requires consideration of tbe possibilityonventional conflict between nuclearontingency hitherto dismissed as certain to escalate immediately into general nuclear war. Some writers have eventlie possibility of limited nuclear warfare. In sum, the growing nuclear deterrent power of both the US and USSR iseappraisal of the role of Soviet general purpose forces, and tho current trend of the discussion indicates an increasing senseeed lo End ways to broaden the options available to the USSR in the application of its military power. Although the established military doctrine and tbe actual force structure continue to emphasize theof nuclear warfare, wc believe (lint this (rend in Soviet nulitary thinking presages greater attention to improving and diversifying thc capab&ties of the general purpose forces
e interpret Soviet announcements with reference to6 budget andive Year Plan as public signalsxamination to strengthen
Soviet military power. We calculate that Soviet military expenditures continued to rise slightly in5 and thai thoy will increase more sharply'
These increases are attributable primarily to substantial growth in expenditures
ace detailed dbouasion one.
5
fornd for the deploymenl of long lead-time weapons systems. ICBM and AHMut they also include an increase in thecosts of Soviet lorce* attributable in part ro some increase in military
44) we estimated tbe total military personnel strength of the Soviet armed forces tooillion men. Wc now estimate thc present strength toillioneither estimate is based on direct and conclusive evidence, each mustalculated approximation. We arc confident that some increase has occurred during Ihc interval, but arc not able to measure it in precise terms.
believe that these recent developments, taken together, pointadjustments in Soviet defense policy. We do not mean by this thatany drastic near-term changes, or that henceforth Soviet militarybe structured according to some quite new and clear-cut strategicwill almost certainly bc prevented by such factors as the momentumprograms, (he multiplicity of claims oo resources, aad theof various groups as to priorities. Rather, weariety ofto improve Soviet capabilities to meet non-nudear as well as
fl. MAJOR EXTERNAL INRUENCES ON MILITARY POUCY
US Military Capabilities
US capabilities, as assessed by thc USSK,ey coosideration in the formulation of Soviet military policy. In our view, the Soviet objective has been both toredible deterrent in the face of growing US strategic attack capabilities and to matntairi and strengthen the military buttress of Soviet foreignajor element of their policy for many yean has been to braid strategic attack and defense capabilities so as to achieve forces which couldirect threat to tbe US and its allies and could defend the Soviet homeland against Western nuclear attack. To this end. the Soviets haveariety of forces to hold Western Europe hostage for US good behavior. They havea strategic defense effort several times greater tlian that of the US. They have developed on mteroontinental attack force, first with bombers, then with ICBMs in soft sites. They are now deploying hardened and dispersed ICBMsapid pace fn the evident capectation that tliese systems, supplemented by missile submarines, willignificant retaliatory capabilily.
With respect to general purpose forces, the USSR and its alliesormidable capability for combat in Central Europe, bul Soviet military writers have shown concern about the capabilities of NATO to wage conventional as well as nuclear warfare. The past restructuring of Soviet theater forces for
'Theae finura do not aacande aa ucertain raambrr ofXWOX)In the military eauUbhrrMnt anden In mditarirod locality local eat rubordlrute ro Die Ministry et De/enie.
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w" ha. resultedfo.ce characteristic, which
MM beandicaps in non nuclear opcr.lioni. partkulariv ,faliCombat and servicenrcfor larCcrarserahoru. Wc bdWover these sort, of
uari resporrrive to lhe US advocacytrategy of aexible response. Al the same time, .he US bu.ldup caused hy lhe wa. in Vietnam, evenresents no dnect threat to lhe USSR, has served to reinforce those in Iheniloa^ eattbliuWnt who. even under Khru.hehev. had urged the importance of maintaining large general purpose forces, though for quite
ons,de.at.on of present and prospective US military capabilities willtoey factor in thc development of Soviet militaiy policy. This doe, no. mean lha. the Soviets will attempt to maid, the US program for program. Rather, the Soviet eflort will be designed lo counter USand if possible totrategic advantage, taking into account relevantnd political considerations. Wo expect lhal theSoviet concern with defensewmeland and the associated pre-occupation with contiguous as opposed to more distant areas will continue to weigh heavdy in Soviet strategic planning. and this may lead Soviet parsers to decisions different from those which US planners would have made in likeevertheless, wc believe lhat Soviet doctrine, force structure, and weapons programs will continue to be scnsilivc to major new developments in military pobcy and capabilities.
NATO and lhe Warsaw Pact
a Originally the Warsaw Pact was an imitative Soviet response to NATO At that time the East European member govenunonfa were completelyto the USSR, but their armed forces were hardly reliable or nuitaruv cuective Irom the Soviet point of view.
V.doaicalfy. while the East European Communist ria.es have been show-ing an increasing tendency to assert their national independence, the USSR has been showing an increasing tendency to rely upont European armed forces to perform important muiUry tasks in the evenl of war in Europe and lias been contributing to thc improvement of Uwir miliiary effectiveness by providing more advanced weapons andIhis trend mayoviet need to placate East European nationalismesire lo develop the Warsaw Pactolitical as well as military bond. It may alsooviet desire to counter past improvements In the NATO general purpose forces fn Central Europe. especiaHy those of West Cermany. *Thc trendIUarked with respect to Poland. East Germany, and Chechoslovakia, which have most to fearevival of Cerman nationalism. If present trends toward autonomy con-,hcP"<* onventional nuhraryj
orcaa la
ehertuled lor compleeon io July.
power, and are thereby disposed toward caution.
Tensions in the far East
ncreasing tensions in the Far East also give Soviet planners occasion to reconsider miliiary policy. The war in Vietnam presents to thccularly difficult political dilemma with military implications: how to tender military aid to an embattled fraternal state, as is politically imperative In the contest of the Sino-Soviet struggle for Communist leadership, without becoming involvedirect military confrontation with the US. Thisggia> valed by the need to consider the difficulties and dangers which tbe USSR would face if tbe war should developirect conflict between tbc US and China. Finally, thc USSR's own political conflict with China and the developing Chinese nuclear capability give reason for worry about the future. We beheve that these considerationsactor in the increasing Soviet interest in improving and diversifying the capabilities of general purpose forces, and that over the period of this estimate they may lead to some readjustment of Soviet forces.
If Sine-US hostilities were to break out, the USSR would probably seek to avoid any military action whicli. in its view, involved substantial risk ofS-Soviet conflict, bui It might feel conslrnined to offer the Chinese such military assistance as an augmentation of Chinese air defense capabilities. At tho same lime, thc USSR would seek to convince the world of an imminent danger of nuclear general war. In thb, the object of Soviet policy would be to limit the Sino-US conflict and to end it as quickly as possible by political means- However, if the war continued and the existence of aregime in China were jeopardized, the USSR would be under heavyto become more directly involved In the conflict.
Quite apart from apprehensions regarding involvementino-USthe Soviets have reason for concern regarding the security of the long Sino-Soviet border. In recent years Soviet forces in tbc border area have been strengthened in minor ways. Wc expect this tread to continue and gradually to add up to an appreciable increase in Soviet military strength confronting Chin*.
III. INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS AfTECTING POUCY Professional Military Influence
Soviet military establishment remains under the firm control ofand state We do not foresee the developmentowerful directon internal politics or foreign polios'. Barring tlie rise of another
dominant poliiical leader in llw Khrushchev tradition, however, we believe thai professional military advice will continue tolnmg influence on Soviet
iy policy.
ithin the nexl live years or so llw present aging miliiary chiefs willbee believe that the influence of their prospectiveis already felt in the inner circle of thc General Stall and isactor in the present inioretl inroader range of military options. In general, we would expect these new military leaders to be somewhat more flexible and less fettered by past doctrine than the present marshals, but any prediction of how this nesv group will behave when they attain top responsibility would be uncertain at best.
Tho Resource Allocation Issue*
hc growth of thc Soviet economy has slowed in recent years. The drain on the economy caused by defense expenditures cannot be determined with precision, but the demands of modem military and space programs upon high quality human and material resources have clearly contributed to this slowdown.
IS. Our analysis indicates that during thehe Soviet gross national product (GNP) increased by about one-third (only half the increase of the preceding eight-yeare estimate that during thc same period total Soviet defense and space expenditures increased aboutercentower rate than tlie growth ofut. within this total, expenditures for defense research and development and for space programs more thanhe difficulty of holding down defense expenditureseriod of rapidly ad-vancing technology and attendant increasing weapon systems costs is well illustrated by the strenuous efforts Khrushchev had to make in order to limit the constant tendency of military expenditures to increase.
e calculate that5 total defense expenditures were aboutHUon rubles, approximately nine percent of CNP* Of this total, aboutercent was for the operational strategic attack, strategic defense, and general purpose forces, aboutercent was for thend space programs, and aboutercent was for command and general support Tlie large growth infor strategic forces andn recent years was achieved
'The average age ol the active Soviet man ball i, now
calculations upon which die following dueuaion ii based are of course subject to considerable uncertainties. In general, we arc more confident of ihose relating to putthan of those rclab'ng to the present and thc future. Nevertheless, we believe those calculations adequate to support general observations regarding the betid In Soviet defense eipciditurcs and tbe resultant resource allocation problem.
ire unable to diiunguuh between Soviet expenditure* fornd for space programs.
level of expenditures representslight increaseur present
7 billion rubles. Isillion rubles higher than our previous estimate for that year. The change ii largely attributable to an upward revision of our estimate oi (he number of dvOlaot employed In thc Soviet defense establishment
SCCRCT
iii part by holding down expenditures for lbc general purpose forces, bol never-tliclcts flu* general purpose form absorbed about one-third ol lo(al defense
expenditure*
the basis of present indications wc calculate that total0 mayuch nsillion rubles. Even if Ihets less than that, the rale of growth will clearly exceed that of theyears.
A rate of growth In Soviet military expenditures as large as that estimated6 cannot be long sustained witlMut creating critical economic problems. The current Soviet Five Year) contemplates an economicequivalent to an annual avenge rale of growth in CNPercent-Foe various reasons, including the present diversion of scarce high quality human and material resources from productive use to military programs, we believe that the actual rate of economic growth is more bldy to average four-five percent. If that should prove to be the case, and if military programs are based on the assumptioneven percent rate of economic growth, they would absorb an even greater snare of resources than had been anticipated.
In these circumstances the new Soviet leadership would have to face up to the same problem which confronted Khrushcliev: how to control defeasein Ihc interest of economic growth. Thc leadersliip could of course yield to the argument of military necessity, maintain the planned rate of growth in military expenditures, and accept thc economic consequences. Wc Iscucve. however, that tlie leadership would be likely to seek to limit the rate of growth in defense expenditures to no more than the average rate of growth of GNP, if necessary by curtailing or stretching out military and space programs, thus exacerbating the competition between military claimants. In any case, tbebetween civilian and military claims willontinuing issue in the USSR, and present decisions will be subject to revision in the light of economic performance and changing defense requirements.
AAilitary Research and Development
high level ol effort in Soviet defense research and developmentcertainly be continued. The Soviets probably regard such an effortin order to prevent the US fromechnologicalwould impair the credibitiiy of the Soviet deterrent and also to gain,some advantage for themselves. Most Soviet research anddirected toward the qualitative Improvement of existing types ofbut they are alsoroad range of advancedpotential miliiary applications. The Soviet leaders would certainlyexploit any significant technological advance for political or militarybut in deciding to deploy any new weapon system they would havethc prospective gain against tlie economic costs and the capabuitiesUS to counter ft.
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he USSR has orbitedand communication* satellites and is probably developing other military uippoit systems Throughout the period nf tlie estimate, new military space ipjJicataoni will be uiUoduced a< Soviet technology advances and as rcqwitemcnti lor such systems arc dcwJopcd. Wc believe thai Ihc Soviels will cxpciiincniariety of space systems which could bc used for military purposes, that they will employ tlwse systems which can be economically and militarily justified, and lhat some military role for man in space may emerge by lhe end ol the period, particularly as the ability to operate manned space stations
IV. PRQBABIE TRENDS IN FORCE POSTURE
c can make estirnates of Soviet force posture now and for the next few years with relative confidence, those for thc period live to len years in the future must be highly tentative. Tlie Soviet planners themselves may not yet have set clear force goals for thc periodven if they have, it seems certain that such decisions will be modified repeatedly in response to changes in military teolinology. in lhe balance ol Soviet forces, in US forces, in resource availability, and ln Uie general Soviet view of world aflairs.
Strategic Altack Forces
e believe that for at least the neat several years the Soviets have settled on ICBMs as thc main component of Iheir intercontinental attack capability. Apparently recognizing tlie vulnerability of their operational force, the Soviets are now deploying ICBMs in dispersed and hardened silos,apid pace. This important program will add substantially to the survivability and retaliatory capability of the strategic attack forcesreatly in creasing the number of aiming points, most of which will be hardened.0 Ihe Soviets may alsoobile ICBM systemurther means ofortion of their force. Wc believe that they will continue to emphasize qualitative improvements in their ICBM forces. Within the nexl five years they could begin incorporating multiple warheads or penetration aids Into their larger ICBMs.
he Soviet MFUIBBM force continues to remain virtually static in both level and structure. During the past year the Soviets displayed two new mobile missile systems which probably have at least medium range capabilities. The deployment of such new mobile systems may become (he preferred Sovietto the problem of concealing the size and location of their MR/IRBM forces and thereby protecting them bom nuclear attack
he Soviets willanned bomber force, but we believe that its importance will continueiminish in comparison to (he ibategic missile forces they are now building The Soviets probably will pcrinit their heavy
ere detailed ducurrtoo al obi rofefeer, *ee NIKS. "Soviel Capabilidei (or StrategicOP SECRET. RESTRICTSD DATA (LIMITEDnd Die foiiheomuu;o* scheduled for
bomber forces to decline gradually through attrition over the next five years; they arc likely tosodemixed medium bomber force of somewhat smaller than present size."
he Soviet missile submarine force continues to grow with thc construction of cruise missilo submarines, lhe cruise missile submarine force was initially designed to counter naval task forces, but, as the number of such submarines increases, some are likely to be targeted against land targets. The construction of ballistic missile submarines stoppedhe capabilities of Ihe existing Soviel ballistic missile submarines are limited by the small number of missiles carried and by other technical characteristics, but they arc increasingly used on patrol in thc northwest Atlantic and northeasl Pacific. We believe that lhe Soviets will construct an unproved class of ballistic missile submarinea larger number of missiles, but as yet wc have no firm evidence of it. In any case, missile submarines will continue to be an important element in the Soviet nudear retaliatory capability.
Strategic Defensive forces
he Soviets continue lo commit considerably more resources to air and missile defense than does thc US. Their rweoccupation with defease evidently led the SovieU to begin deploying, al Uaungrad, an early ABM system which was later cancelled For the last four years the SovieU have been building what we believe are ABM defenses around Moscow. These defeases could probably achieve an initial operational capability as earlyut we think that it would lake another year or so lo complete all of the units now under construction. We do not yet know the perfotmanee diaracteristics of this syslem or how it will function. We believe lhatS the Soviets could deploy ABM defenses for someoreasuarter of the Soviet population and more than half of Soviet industry.oviet decision to continue the deployment of ABM defenses to other cities is bound to restomplex set of factors such as the capabilities of their ABM system againit future developments in penetration aids. US reactionshe Moscow deployment, and the costs of additional deployment in relation to the protection it is likely lo provide.
hile the USSR hasormidable capability against aircraft attacking at medium and high altitudes, its air defense system Is still susceptible to penetration by stand-off weapons and low-altilude tactics. The Sovicls probablyuantitative reduction In tlie US bomber force over the next ten years,harp qualitative improvement as new US sysiems are introduced.
u Colonel Harry O. Pattetoo, for the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, USAF.elete the last sentence aod subsitute the following:
Tho Soviet, wiU maintain iheir heavy bomber force at close to Its present strap*ombination of efforts to extend tlie Uie of current bomben, by continued production, and by likely mtroducriooouow-oo bomber. While tbe number of medium bomber* may decline somewhat, the USSR will continue- to nseoernte the force andollow-on me drum bomber in the
To mcr* tliis challenge, they are improving llieir warning and control systems, continuing the deployment of new high performance, ail-weather interceptor aircralt. andew defensive system in lhe northwestern USSR. We are as yet unable to del ermine withwhether this new lyilem is designed toAM. ADM. or dual-purpose system. Wc believe that it is capable ol functioningAM systemange several times that of thend that it alsoimited capability as an ADM system. In any case, we believe that its main utility it likely to beong rangehatever the function of this new system, wc believe that the SAP, probably will continue as the principal SAM system In addition, weew SAM system for low-altitude defense to be introduced within the next five years.
General Purpose Forces
radual transition to improved types of Soviettank, and airborne divisions significantly stronger in personnel andand logistic support. Creator tactical mobility and flexibilitybe provided by the more loutinc availability of helicopters.will Improve the capabilities of these divisions for sustainedany circumstances, and will make them more quickly responsive toother than general nuclear war. They imply some reduction inof divisions unlessver-all personnel strength of the groundincreased. The competition for resources considered ino limit any Increase io the size of the ground forces, and over themay result In some reduction. For the near term, however, we think that
the Soviets have probably determined to maintain tbeir forces at about the
present level
USSR will continue to maintain Tactical Aviationersatileof both air defense and giound attack missions. Continuingis bringing new-generation fighter bombers and aU-weabicr fightersbut about half of thc aiicraft of Soviet Tactical Aviation ore stillA significant development over the past year has been thenewer model fighters to thc Far East Militaryevelopmentsignal the beginningove to improve substantially tlie fightingof theater forces in that area. Ihe current Soviet interest inpurpose forces is likely to cause some postponement in the declineof aircraft in Tactical Aviation which we formerly estimated.could accomplish this in part by delaying the phase-out of older aircraft.
"Lieutenant Ceneral Joseph F. Carroll. Director. Defense Intelligence Agency. Major Ceneral Johnavis. Assistant Chief of Stall for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and Major General Jack E. Tttomaj. Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. agree that the many uncertainties itcmiaiog from analysts of available evidence do notonfident Judgment as to tbe designed capabilities of the now defensive systcmt being deployed in northwestein USSR. On balance, however, considering all tbe evidence, (heyore Hely that tbe systems being deployed at these (Re* are primarily for defense against ballistic missiles, with an eddiooaal eapabully to defend against high Bytaj, supersonicvehicle*.
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3 there huajor eflort to improve the operationalof tlie Soviet Navy, particularly for operations outside local waters, 'llie USSH hasairly constant late of submarine construction and has also undertaken construction of missile aimed surface ships. Wc expect operational and material improvements in Soviet ASW forces, but wc believe that the capability of the Soviet Navy to conduct open ocean ASW will remain severely limited for the next several years.
resent Soviet capabilities for airborne and amphibious assault remain tied to support of Eurasian operations, and the new naval infantry is evidently being trained and equipped to fight on the Banks of larger land formations. The expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet and the development of very large transport aircraft will improve the Soviet capabilily to move military forces to distant areas. However, thc Soviets do not as yet appeare developing thc sea and air combat escort capabilities which would make possible long-range military sea and airlift against the oppositionajor military power.
V. IMPLICATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL POLICY General War Deterrence
onsidering the prospective development of all their military forces, we think the Soviet leaders expect toubstantial improvement in theirstrategic positionis the US during thc next several years. We do not believe that they would expect to achieve such military capabilities as would make tlie deliberate initiation of generalational course of action. Rather, we tfunk they are working to alleviate their present strategic inferiority and to gain greater assistance of deterring the US in the various crises andthey must allow for as they contemplate possible futurein the world situation."
ssuming continued development of their strategic capabilities along present lines, the Soviet leaders might come to feel that the USSR had gained greater fieodom of action than it has had in the recent past- In theseimprovement in the capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces for non-nuclear contingencies would have increased relevance. Bat we do not believe that the Soviets expect to alter the relations of military poweregree which would permit thorn to undertake substantially more aggressive courses of action Moreover, we believe that non-military factors will continue to weigh heavily in their decisions concerning acceptable risks and levels of tension.
Attitude Towards Limited War
hc improvements in the Soviet general purpose forces which we have estimated above will make them somewhat better suited than at present to conduct conventional operations. This Is not to imply that the Soviet leaders havo decided to prepareeliberato conventional assault on Europe under
" See USAF ioomme lo
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tlie umbrella of nuclear stalemate Their estimate of Western ca]Mbilitlei and determination will almost certainly continue to deter them fromourse. Though the Soviets want to build more flexibility into their forces and to be able to respondumber of contingencies, we estimate that they willlo pursue their aims by means short of open warfare againsi the West
hile Soviet military theorists Iiave now come to speak of tbe possibility of conventional conflict involving tlvcir own and Western forces, Ihcso references are couched in general terms. Considering (he timing of (his renewed interest in conventional warfare, wc believe that it is in largeoviet reaction to the US posture of flexible response, ftegardlcss of what Soviet military writers say in Ihe abstract, we think the most critical factors, governing Soviet decisions in respect of limited war will be the carr^rrnstances prevailing at thc time, and especially the USSR's estimate of the dangers of escalation. We believe thc Soviets will continue to recognize that any such conflict with thc West, particularly against NATO in Europe, would carry thc grave risk of escalationeneral nuclear war. Should the Soviets nevertheless become involved inonflict, we think they would seek to limit its scope end duration and would vigorously attempt through political means to resolve the issue.
tho same general reasons, we consider it highly unlikely tliatwould initiate the use of tactical nuclear weaponsimitedWestern forces. If the Western powers were to do so, we believeSoviets would probably not escalate to general war. but that theylikely to retaliate in kind while seeking to bring tbe conflictuickpolitical means. Nevertheless, inapidly moving situationof miscalculation by cither side would be great
Wars of National Liberation
of national liberation" continue to be regarded by the Sovietsrelatively safe, and often providing them with opportunities lomfluence. However. Soviet support for such local struggles need notdoes not go beyond political support. The USSR has providedin selected cases, such as Vietnam, but always in ways whichSoviet commitment. In view of the Sino-Soviet spur, the encouragementwars, particularly where China may become the chief beneficiary, maybe in the Soviet national interest We believe that tbe USSR isselective in supporting "wars of nalionalnd lhat itlo exhibit great cautionirect confrontation with the US
Arms Control Possibilities
the present and prospective balance of military power, mutualprobably will seem attractive to some elements in Moscow.measures could be viewed botheans of reducing the economic
15
way of improving
lhcelative mihtary position. However, progiess in this field has comeirtual standstill Thereariety of reasons for this, snduding the war in Vietnam and Soviet insistenceon-proliferation agreement bar West German participationany new Western nudear sharing arrangement In any case, progress toward mtemaUonal arms limitation agreements is likely
CENTRAL INTlULlG-NCE AGENCY WSStMIN.-TiON NOTICE
H for me inlcmaonic ol iv raopierl and of ee-ioni under hrt (wriidktionerd lo know bam Additional oimntiai duieminotion nay ba ouiboiiiad by Iho
ol Intelligence ond RaMatch, lor ihr Deporitneni of Siqio
bector, Defense In'eilige-ce Agency, for lhe Office c/ lhe Secretory of
Defense ond( iSa Join) Oner* o' Staff C. Ajiiitont Chief of itnff (or Intelligence. Department of lha Army, lor tha Dc pa'I riant ol lb* Army
cL Am.ii ant Chief ot Naval Operation!or lhe Deportment ol lhe Navy
Auluan' Chief ololligence. USAF. for the OeocrtrrieM of the Ak Forc*
f. D'actor ol Intelligence. AEC, for the Atomic Energy Conwnitiion
Direclor. FBI lea- th* federal Bureau of InfMhgcnOn
. fw the No?;ornil Security Agency
of Centrol Reference, CIA. for ony athar Deportment orThb document may be raaaaoad. or destroyed by burning in ociordanca vith
document .hooldbo destroyed, rciurnedhe
applicable security rteu lot tons, or returned to the Cenlrol Inletf-genCD Agency by arrangemanl with lhe Office of Cent-olCIA.
DtSTHIBUriON:
WhMo Houso
Nattonol Security Council
Deportment of Stole
Department of Defame
AhMnlc Energy Commliibn
Federal Bureau of IrrvMiigation
Original document.
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