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m FOROMMITTEE
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REFERENCE: DCI Memorandum toommitt dated6
proposal thnt CIA deploy the OXCARTioav3 to acquire urgently needed photographic coverage
ofhina and North Vietnam was made to this Commi.^ee on 28 6 and was discussed again onay. It was decide- that further action by the Committee should await the completion of certain tasks, namely: (a) an analysis- quantitative capability of various photographic collection
(b) an analysis of the quality of the covorage whichsets might obtain, eview of the political i" tlv.is of Japan to OXCART deployment, and (d) thenho. posture in the event of various contingencies arising from the OXCART deployment. These tasks have now all been completed.
believe there is substantial agreement that
v..ereontinuing urgent need for high resolutioncoverage of selected targets ln South China and
North
nas oeen cmnriy demonstrated
rnar satellite photography, by itself, cannot meet this need, re is also agreement on the fact that the OXCART vehicle
add significantly to the photographic collectiont> and that its contribution will increase steadily as c wc .ther Improves lator this summer.
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3. In addition, there is agreement between theof Staff and CIA in light of experiencethe past three months that thewill
not meet the need for coverage of South China and thatnow turn to the OXCAKT for primary coverago withas feasible in lightly defended areas,
x* is my understanding that the JCS and CIA are also in substantial agreement that current coverage in North Vietnam has been inadequate; however, the JCS feel that presently available JCS assets can bo tasked to provide more ofuired data base coverage in North Vietnam and they have Recently directed priority tasking to that end. The next few months should indicate whether adequate coverage of Ncith Vietnam can be obtained by these means or whether supplemental coverage by OXCART may be desirable.
view of the foregoing developments and ofnow existant,ow modify this proposalfollowing recommendations:
That we deploy the OXCART to Okinawa beginninguly so aa to have it in place and operational by mid-August when the weather will begin to improve,
That we decide now that OXCART will be committed as required to obtain photographic coverage over South China and in other areas in China whereannot penetrate,
That, at the same time, we hold the OXCART in readiness to obtain photographic cover-ago of targets in North Vietnam, if required.
proposal is responsive to theneed for photographic coverage of South China and In this connection, It is my understanding thatForeign Intelligence Advisory Board hasthe status of our existing reconnaissance coverage
of North Vietnam and South China and is of the opinion that,trictly intelligence point of view, the OXCART should
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be employod in these areas- My proposal likewise is also consistent with the realities of the bad summer weather which has closed in since our original discussion. The proposed schedule provides for an orderly movement of the OXCART to Okinawa in advance of good weather and affords an adequate
opportunity
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W. F. Raborn
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SUBJECT: : CTICSSOSSIBLE OS COURSE OF ACT!OH
THE PROBLEM
To assess the principal reactions in ConamniHt and non-Coaamnist countries to reconnaissance over China and North Vietnam by OXCART vehicles based in Okinawa.
DISCUSSKffl
1. China. We believe that the Chinese would quickly acquire
knowledge of the operation. Mission aircraft would almost certainly be detected by Chinese radar and, by virtue of speed and altitude, ba identified as the new and advanced type of aircraft announced by the Presidentit. The chances are good that Chinese agents on Okinawa would become avare of the operation and that Peiplng would quickly relate the new overflights to the base at Kadena.
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ChineBe would of course try to destroy thetheir failure to do so, and given their practiceverflights, they would probably notspecial attention to this operation. Furthermore, in thiskind of pressure they might try to apply to Japan or to anyvhich might have afforded assistance would be of thesortif any at all.
situation would be quite different if an OXCART aircrafton Chinese territory. Such an incident vould be the occasion forpolitical and propaganda campaign, particularlyivefell into Chinese hands. In dramatising the affair, Pelpingto persuade the world, including the American public, ofand of the reckless aggressiveness of US policy. They wouldwhat resources tbey had to mobilise public opinion in Japan andagainst US control of the latter island and against tbeUS bases In Japan itself.
h. It remains to consider how the Chinese Communists would Interpret US intentions in the light of this overflight. The Chinese reaction* would be related to the presence of large US ground forces in South
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US bombing of North Vietnam, and apprehensions regarding tba possibility8 attack on China itsalf. Tbe Chinese, lo theirhave been stressing tbe danger of such an attack. Although they may Indeederies of actions and reactions ln Vietnam and elsevbera which would lead in timeino-US war, they probably do not expect it to occur at an early date. Their apprehensions regarding the likelihoodS attack on China may grow or diminish depending upon developments between now and the time tbe overflights begin.
5. Upon detecting OXCART intrusions, there is some chance that Peiplng vould conclude that tbe US, in unveiling an advanced system at thia time, vas seeking target intelligence which it meant to use at an early date. This chance vould be greater if tbe program began intensively,arge number of overflightshort period, or if it began concurrentlyajor expansion of US air attacks upon Northn tbe other hand, the Chinese have become accustomed to frequent probes of their air space by different vehicles, and they are aware thatln their own defenses have increased the vulnerability of older US
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systems. We conclude that, barring the special circumstances mentioned above, the Chinese would soon come to regard thia vehicle, despite Its advanced character, as another stageontinuing US collection program, with no special significance for broader US intentions. Thus ve think that these missions vould not lead tbem to take any drastic new military action.
Vietnam. The DRV is already subjected to heavy USand reconnaissance. It vould attach little extra significanceOXCART operation.
USSR. ariety of its own sourcesphotography. Intercepted communications, and possiblythe Soviets would quicklyairly complete pictureoperation. They would probably reinforce any Chinese orpropaganda campaigns built around the downing of anprimary ooncern In this regard would be to forestall uso ofover their own territory. They might make privatethe US stressing tbe seriousness with which they vould view anyInto Soviet airspace, but they would almost certainly not makeof China tbe occasionajor crisis in US-Soviet relations.
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