TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE 1
CONCLUSIONS.. 1
t
L BACKGROUND 2
II. THE INSURGENCY 5
IIL COUNTERINSURCENCY 7
IV. PROSPECTS 0
TABLES:
Thai Military Forces12
Major Thai Police and Paramilitary
US Forces ieU
MAPS:
Thailand: Communist Activity and Major US MilitaryacingMajor Ethnic 4
BURMA 'f""'
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V- wo ;
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MALAY*!
PfKH
V, tltia*
THAILAND COMMUNIST ACTIVITY AND
. aiUTAKv bases
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND
THE PROBLEM
To assess the threat of Communist insurgency in Thailand over the next year or two.
CONCLUSIONS
insurgency in Thailand does nota present danger to the stability of the Thai government orthreat to its control over any large section of theguerrilla forces are small and their operations are generallyto remote and relatively sparsely-populated areas.
the insurgency will probably expand furtherscope and intensity over the next year or two. Itsbe due primarily to continuing direction, guidance, andthe Chinese Communists, and to the political and economicwhich exist in certain parts of the country, especially
coping with insurgency the Thai government hasenerally loyal and contented population. Dissidence isserious problem in the most populous areas of the country.now recognizes the growing dimensions of the threatNortheast and the potential threat in the North and theand has undertaken major political, economic, andto deal with the situation.
remains to be done in terms of organization ofand in the field of political action before governmentfully effective. However,ollapse offorces in Laos and South Vietnam, we believe that theremain manageable and that over time the Thai governmentassistance will be able to maintain reasonable levels of securitvNortheast and other possible trouble spots.ong andwill probably be necessary.
DISCUSSION
I. BACKGROUND
General. Compared lo Its neighbors in Southeast Asia, Thailandodel of stability and well-being. The military oligarchy, which has ruled wilh few mtmuptionsas shown reasonable restraint and an increasingto public opinion. The large and relatively competent civil service|ohs and status for graduates of the higher educational system; there is no sizable, chronically unemployed and frustrated educated class. Theercent of Thailand'sillionpolitically passive, but thereidespread sense of national unity stemming from loyalty to theommon language and set of religious values,enturies-old tradition oi national independence. This heritage and peasant conservalisin greatly limit the appeal of alien and radical philosophies.
Rural life in most of Thailand is generally secure as well as stable. There is abundant land and no serious land tenure problem. The typical farmermall freeholder with enough toarket for surpluses, and no overly burdensome government interference. Peasant society is also free of oppressive class barriers; there is generally free movement upward for those willing and able toeligious or secular education. Thai society ia general Is charaeterired by freedom of erpresnoo and action for the individual Social reaponsibilities are carried lightly; the keynote is contentment and enjoyment-Tolerance and placidity are other Thai characteristics that serve to reduce tensions which might be exploited by disruptive political forces.
Although most Thai seem content with their existence, there are significant vulnerabilities in the situation. Most important, tho authoritarian politicalhas not developed an effective means of sensing popular grievances. There are no elected officials in the government above the level of village bradmen. and their maino represent higher authority, not to transmit petitions from below. Visits from national and provincialials are relatively rare; and the villagers are scarcely conscious of tbe government.esult,ften closer to outright apathy. Thi* indifference to the gov-emmeul isajor problem in the rich alluvial lowlands of Centralthe most populous part of tbe country. It becomes serious, however, in the mote remote and less favoredNortheast, the North, and,easer extent, the Malay South.
should be noted at the outset that the Communist movement asbad little appeal in Thailand. The indigenous Thai Communist Party,during most of its existence, probably has fewerembers.unknown leaders are either in fail or live as exiles inNorth Vietnam, or Laos. Much of the failure of the party to attract
popular support Is attributable to its essentially Chineseere arc anthniche country, and although the vast majority are well integrated into tbe society, the few among them who are Communists have always dominated the Thai Communist Party. Moreover, Ihe Communist problem in Thailand has always been much less one ofcommunism than of Communist movements of neighboring countries operating inborder regions.
he Northeast. The chronically depressed Northeast, which comprises about one-third of Thailand's area and population, is the best target forsubversion- It is largely cut off from Central Thailand by rough terrain and poor communications, while movement from Laos across the Mekong border is relatively easy. The Northeast is the poorest part of Thailand; its deficiencies include infertile soils, inadequate water control,istory of government neglect Vulnerabilities are intensified by ethnic and linguistic differences be* tween the Central Thai and the Northcastcracrs; in these respects, the latter are closer to the people in neighboring areas of Laos whose dialect and customs theyf pas' years, the Pathet Lao has sought to exploit thisby sponsoring Laotian-based separatist movements which, however, had no significant impact. The Northeast alsoietnamese refugees from. Indochina war, most of whom are oriented toward Hanoi and under the dose control of Communist cadres.
f> The North. Another area for possible Communist subversion Is theand heavily-forested North, which borders on Burma and northern Laos and lies close to China. The inhabitants of the North includeill tribesmen who are by nature independent, nomadic, and have little loyalty toward the central government Many of tbe bill tribes have been hostile to the govemmen* over curbs on their opium growing and their slash-and-buru agriculture. CWnese Communist agents have been attempting to exploit this sentimentrs.
The Meo ere the largest tribal group in the North. They number0 and mini of them live near the Laotian border. The Meo of Thailand, like those of Lam. have considerable paramilitary potential. In recent years, the Thai government with US assistance has been carrying out civic actionto gaff* their confidence. The0 Lahu comprise anotherpwell mainly near the Burmese border. The Lahu are capable arxJ experienced guerrillas, and are tbe most hostile to government authorityhe northern peoples.
Tbe securW* situation in the North is further complicated by the presencea ns and Karens who arc in rebellion against the Government of Burma; many
'The presentboundary wu established in tbe lah century at whichFrench succ-*Wully demanded that Thai sovereignty stop at the Mekong River. Asih.-the Mekong watershed were split, tbe larger number ran lining under
Bangkok's admirri-wt'on.
of these move back and iorth across the border. Some Shan dissidents and other hill people have thrown in their lot with bands of Chinese Nationalist {KMT) irregulars who live and trade in the Bunna/Laos/Thailand injunction area and occasionally skirmish with the Burmese. The presence of these irregulars and the fact that they occasionally cross into China could ba used by Pekingretext for Involvement in northern Thailand. On the other hand, the presence of ami-Communist Chinese in this remote and sparsely-populated area has some favorable security aspects.
South. In the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, anMalay-Muslims are the predominant population group. Theirto Malaya, reinforced by prolonged neglect by thestimulated considerable separatist sentiment Both the Thai andhave tried to minimize frictions, but Communists and otherfrom Malaysia have capitalized on anti-Thai and pan-Malayincrease their own followings in the area. Far the mast part, this effortconducted by the Communist Party of Malayahich isethnic Chinese, and its Malay irredentist front, the NationalSouth Thailand. The paramilitary arm of the Communist effort is aforce driven from Malaya in the; it is tightly disciplined andand finances itself by extorting funds from wealthy rubberand Chinese merchants. It claims to be prepartng only toMalaya and has not initiated active insurgency against the Thaihas it as yet had much success in recruiting large numbers of loin Iinto lis paramilitary foaroations.
the Mid-South provinces adjacent to the Malay South, relativelyethnic Thai Communists have been active in propaganda,training, but have avoided terrorism. There is no substantial evidencebetween these Thai subversives and the Communist ChineseIn die Malay South.
II. THE INSURGENCY
The Communist subversive campaign inongstanding one but first became significant1 when Pathet Lao territorial gains tn Laos opened the way for the Communists to establish guerrilla bases in the Northeast Small Communist groups entered the country, concentrating on organizing party cells and indoctrinating villagers. They played an local grievances, particularly government neglect in the Gelds of health and education, and promised remedial action. Thai youth were recruited, sent to Laos or Communist Cbfua for in-docrination and paramilitary training, and returned to the Northeast. There wereewourevennd five In the first halfuring this three or four year period, liowevor, there were no guerrilla raids and contact with Thai security forces was avoided.
In4 andwo organizations based In Peking werethe Thailand Independence Movement (TIM) and tho Thailand Patriotic
Frontnhe TIM announced its subordination to the TPF, which Pelting described as "the nucleus of the united front" against the Thai government. The TPF is probably intended to be the political arm of the insurgency, much as the National Liberation Front is for the Vict Cong: the TTM may become the action arm. Both groups are led by relatively unkown Thai political exiles in China.3
The shift in tactics lo an active insurgency in Northeast Thailand inrobably reflects in part Peking's response to Thailand's growingin US military operations In Vietnam and Laos. The Chinese sought to underline their threats with respect to the consequences of such involvement for the Thai and to compel Ihe US to divert military resources to the defense of Thailand. At the same time, Chinese propaganda attempted to persuade the Thai people that (heir government, acting as an American puppet, hadendangered their tranquility.
In the summerhe guerrillas began to meet government security patrols with armed resistance. Later in the year, government patrols alsoseveral guerrilla camps, and there werelashes between Thai police and small bands of insurgents. The number of terrorist attacks on government officials, village leaders, and police informers also increased sharply; there weren the last halfn late November, the Communists further intensified the campaign, carrying out the first of several attacks on government personnel and minor outposts. The pace was stepped up again during tbe first half6 and Communist attacks included well-planned ambushes of regular army personnel. Other regions of the country also reported some degree of Insurgent activity during tins period, but aboutercent of all types of incidentsin the Northeast
Peking's role in Thailand is now almost certainly more important than that of either North Vietnam or the Laotian Communists. The Chineseeadquarters for the TPF and the TIM. They provide ihe principalsupport for these organizations and arrange their appearances atleftist conclaves. The provision of military equipment does not yet appear toajor element In Peking's support, though large Chineseof Thai currency in Hong Kong5 suggest the possibility of heavy financial aid There Is evidence, however, that many insurgents have received training and indoctrination, If not weapons, from the Chinese. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao roles in the insurgency are probably important mainly in terms of providing paramilitary ffaining and small arms.
Although ads of violence and terrorism are increasing sliarply inNortheast, the guerrillas are still concerned to secure and develop theirbase and they continue to emphasize mdoctrination, organization, rccruit-
eading leftist politician who was Prime Minister of Thailand, has lived as ao eitle tn China torecade. However, his name bat not been linked with any of the CJiinese-ipOneo-ed revolutionary organiiattons and there are reports that he has rejected Communist efforts to useht* connection.
tog, and training. Estimates of the size of the guerrilla force in the Northeast rangeew hundredhousand, primarily Thai nationals; the largest bands operate in the Phu Phan Mountain area northwest of Savannakhet. There is no evidence that organized Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese, or Chinese units have joined the guerrillas, though some foreign advisors arc probably present. Some guerrillas reportedly carry only Iwmemade weapons, but most appear to be supplied with light infantry weapons generally available in the area.
III. COUNTER INSURGENCY
The Thai government has moved to reduce existing vulnerabilities,in the Northeast. Creates! emphasis is on programs of short-term impact designed to combine positive political, economic, and social improvements with measures to protect the villagers against terrorism. At the same time, the government continues to improve its security forces to cope with the budding guerrilla warfare.
The political development aspect of Thai plans stresses governmentwith the people. Programs are underway to increase local participation in government and make fundamental improvements in provincial and local administration. Socio-economic programs focus on community development projects in the fields of health and sanitation, education, and roadbuilding. Longer range projects include many in these fields plus ambitious plans for tha development of local resources. However, it will be some time before most of these programs have any appreciable impact on the populace.
Thai programs also aim at more effective police and intelligenceimproved border surveillance, and the creation of special pararrdlitary units and mobile strike forces. At present, primary responsibility for internal security in Thailand lies with the National Police. As presently organized,the National Police cannot efficiently combat the glowing subversiveIts main weaknesses are the generally low quality of its leadership and personnel, its inadequate size, and the fact that the responsibilities of its several components are poorly delineated, resulting In poor coordination and excessive duplication.
Among the components of the National Police, those most directlywith countcrinsurgency are the Provincial Police, the Border Patrol Police, and the Special Branch The primary function of thenan Provincial Police force is the maintenance of public order in rural areas, but it is badly understaffed as well as inadequately trained and equipped for counterinsurgency operations. Units at the village level are often too small and sparsely distributed to be of any value against armed subversives. Perhaps its most serious disability is its widespread and deserved reputation for high-handedness and corruption.
an Border Patrol Police force (BPP) is organized, trained, and equippedaramilitary force. It is also experienced in civic action programs, particularly in the North. The BPP is fragmented into small, widely-dispersed platoons and thus is vulnerable to guerrilla attack. Subordinate to
thenan Police Aerial Retnforoeottntighly-skilledgroup designeduick-reaction strike force. Special Branch, (he police intelligence arm, is ihe most competent and professional of all llieof the National Police. Its Division VII, withen, isfor countasubvenive intelligence operations in the border areas.
Army involvement in counlenubvcrsive operation* is nol now,role increased markedly3 with the beginning of impletnenlationsecurity programs. Mobile Development Units (MDU)army personnel were assigned to civic action projects. The Army'sCenters began to provide regular patrols in sensitive bordermilitary establishment alsoocal militia-type organizationcurrent strength ofen. Ihe Volunteer Defenseupporting role io counter-insurgency operations. Since latemilitary help became essential to the police, the Army has becomeingly important in anti-guerrilla operations, particularly thoseon insurgenl base areas. Most Tliat officers and non-com* involved inprogram have received spedaU/ed training conductedby Ihe US and. in general, the Army has performed creditably
The sudden upsurge of an aggressive guerrilla moventent in5 led to other important changes in Thai counterinsurgency operations. To help remedy llie serious deficiencies In coordination between the many civil police, and military units working against theounter Subversion Opera-lions Center (CSOC) was established in Bangkok in December. CSOC has exceedingly broad powers and Is designed to act as both intelligence andcenter of the countcrtuliversion effort. It relies on Information provided by regional Joint Security Centers and tbe individual intelligence services. Deputy Prime Minister Praphat, Thailand's strong man, who fa concurrently Corrunander-in-Chiel of tho Army and Minister of Interior, commands the CSOC His deputies include top level leaders of the military and polio* establishments.
To carry out itsin the Northeast, tbe CSOC hasighly mobile field command, designatedCombined Police and Militaryt Mukdahan on Iho Mekong border opposite Savaimakhct The total complement ofen including airborne, special forces, and support elements; the commander may also draw upon other military and police forces in the area.ppears to have theresponsibility for finding and destroying the Insurgents in Ihe Phu Phan Mountains and surrounding districts. Similar commands will probably be established in tbe Northeast and elsewhere in the country. The CSOClias improved coord inaOMi among the Thai security servicea.
Many other modifications of the existing Thai cowiterinsiirgency structure are underway. The BPP, for example, is lo be augmented, in part by elite units from other forces, and reorganized to permit the formation of Mobile Reserve Platoons, small highly mobile strike forces. The Provincial Police force Is also
being restructured, but mainly lo increase its tiaditlonal law enforcementThere are also proposals for the establishment of locally-recruited police forces at town and village levels. Census/Grievance Teams and Peoples Action Teams, oo the South Vietnamese pattern, are also being considered for the Northeast.
n Ihe Malay South too. Thai security forces are moving to cheekactivities. For years, the Thai dragged their feet on Malaysian requests for joint and sustained operations against the well-entrenched Communist Chinese in the border provinces. The Thai were suspicious of Malay motives and inclined to view the problem as primarily one for Kuala Lumpur so long as the insurgents remained relatively passive. However, Indonesia's pievious exploitation of pan-Malay sentiment in tiie region and tlie recent ujisurge of insurgency in the Northeast have changed the Thai attitude. Inhailand and Malaysia commenced combined operations against suspected insurgent bases in the South. Results thus far have been meager, but operations continue.
many recent Thai moves to twister their tountcrinsurgencydeep and genuine concern over internal security problems on thetop government leaders. Nevertheless, Thai politics are such thatare not likely lo he completely objective in evaluating each newthe countermsurgency package. For example, the Army, whichgovernment, is traditionally suspicious of any move that tends torelative power of tlte police. The frequently corrupt policethe close scrutiny of its financial operations which oftenUS assistance programs. Civilian ministries sometimes resistand political programs tbat threaten to diminish their particularactivity. Another problem is the understandable tendency of aregime facedecurity threat to focus on tasks ofto neglect positive efforts to gain popular support.
IV. PROSPECTS
Communist-supported insurgency In Thailand docs notresent danger lo the stability of the Thai governmentear-term threat to Its control over any large section of the country. The guerrilla forces are small and their operations are generally confined to remote and relatively sparsely-populated areas. Moreover, the government is receiving count ^insurgency assistance from the US and cooperation from experienced Malaysian forces in the South.
Nevertheless, the insurgency will probably expand further in geographic scope and intensity over the next year or two. Its growth will be due primarily to the continuing direction, guidance, and support of the Chinese Communists who themselves have many assets in the struggle. In the North and Northeast, China has relatively easyBurma andthe scene of guerrilla operations. In these regions, and in tho Malay South as well, there are
lilical and economic vulnerabilities susceptible to exploitation but not lo quick governmental remedies. For several years, without major hindrance, (lorn-muntits from China, North Vietnam,co have propagandized andin Ihe Northeast; and tliere may be severalhousand, or more dissidents currently being trained and equipped in Communist territory. The Chinese may also seek to utilize some of the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Thai, speaking various dialects, who live in southern China, andietnamese refugees in Northeast Thailand.
In ihe Malay South, it will be dtfficull complelely lo dislodge the ethnic Chinese insurgents. In ihe North, the insurgency potential among the tribesmen has scarcely been tapped. Another Communis! udvanlage in ihe near-term is that it will probably Im- some time before Thai security forces master the techniques of couateriraurgency and civic action and remedy their existing organizational weaknesses
The presencearge and growing US base structure in the Northeast can also be exploited liy the Cocnraunists to gain adherents. There are0 US servicemen, primarily air force personnel, stationed in Thailand, most of them in small towns of Ihe Northeast. Several hundred are In Hangkok daily onisits from South Vietnam. While there hasemarkable absence of iocideuts between US troops and the Thai population, some friction is probably inevitable. As the US military presence grows, io will Ihe possibilitiesotentially troublesome anti-foreign sentiment. Tbe Chinese Communists lay great stress on the theme that Thailand is "occupied" by the US and itsere puppet. The villagers of the Northeast will be less receptive to these charges lhan the educated and semi-educated youth in Bangkok where nationalism has greater meaning.
Over the next year or two, we do not believe that the insurgents will be able to threaten die tenure of the government In Bangkok or its hold on any large and well-populated region of the country. Cavtmaeot cxMmtxractaan, coupled with the generally unfavorable attitude of tbe bulk of tbe Thai populace toward anti-national movvsnettts and radical change, is likely to prevent it In the Northeast, expansion of the insurgency will be handicapped by the lack of cover and concealment in Ihe relatively fiat and open terrain whichmuch of the region. The Southern insurgents arehinese movementalay-Muslim setting and lack access to any Communist-con-trolled territory. In the Mid-South, insurgency on any appreciable scale is not likely to develop. In the North, the Communists are probably not yot prepared for any large-scale insurgency.
Even so, lite increase in Insurgent activity that can be anticipated, par-ticulaily In the more rugged districts of the Northeast and the North, may be costly to the government. Substantial resources will have to be allocated to the security forces, and programs designed to ameliorate the grievances of the people ln the Northeast and elsewhere will be Impeded. As the insurgents
gain in strength and experience, tbey are likely to attempt to Iiarass and sabotage Vietnam-connected military operations and this could force further allocations of Thai resources to Internal security programs.
Coniingeneies. This estimate could be signiGcandy affectedin Laos or Vietnam. If Thai and US combat forcesm ground warfareos. the Communisis would have much tostepping up their terrorist and sabotage activities along Allied linesin the Northeast and from infiltrating larger forces.
of hostilities In Vietnam on terms favorable to the USnot leadlackening of Chinese efforts to foster theBut it would dishearten the insurgents, make local recruitingand encourage the Thai in their campaign of suppression.setback in Vietnam might cause the Chinese to expand their guerrillaThailand in an effort to recoup some prestige, they wouldroom likelydie situation as requiring fundanteutal revisions in strategy and to turn
to -the longer term task ofore substantial revolutionary base in
Thailand.
f the Vietnam war were settled on terms favorable to the Cornmunists, the morale of the insurgents and the receptivity of the villagers to theirefforts would improve. The Tlmi leadership would undoubtedlyThailand's international stance. The politico-military elite would remain opposed to Communist control over Thailand, whether imposed tluoughor Invasion. But whether Thai leaders would decide oo even closer ties with the US or on military dissociation and movement towardmore neutral position would depend heavily on the ciriiimstartces surrounding the Communis! nieces and the nature and extent of the support the US was prepared to undertake
he Longer Term. So longegime ln China is com mitt od to Mao's revolutionary strategy, the Chinese Communists are likely to persist in their efforts to keep an insurgent movement alivo and active in Thailand. From Peking'shai government which permits US military bases on Its soil is an intolerable neighbor and must ultimately be displaced. Peking also sees Thailand as another point on its periphery where US power caa be engaged at small risk to China through the devicenational bberationt is possible that the Chinese will have some success over the years in turning the mountainous portions of tho North and Northeast into havens for the-lr guerrilla bands, and that terrorism and sabotage will become commonplace ha such areas. Thereood chance, however, thai Thailand can confine the active insurgents to such areas where they would noterious threat to Thailand's political integrity though they would, of course,ostly nuisance and an ever-present ally for any anti-regime or anti-US political elements in Bangkok.
TABLES
MILITARY
Army0
Nttvy0
j0
Air0
THAI POLICE AND PAHAMILTTARY
Border PatrolO
Volunteer Defense Corps
4SL800
C US FORCES IN
Army
Navy
Air Force
H<70
Original document.
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