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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. NUCLEAR PROGRAM
II. MISSILE AND AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
INTELLIGENCE LEAD TIMES
top-SeCRET
communist china's advanced weapons program
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
sec no slackening in Peking's determination to becomenuclear power, Communist China recently conductednuclear test ut Lop Nor, and activity at the missile test rangeConstruction is moving aheadumber of majorrelated to the production of nuclear materials, missiles,and possibly submarines. Much of this activity reflectsto go ahead with programs initiated in the mid-with extensive Soviet assistance, despite theby the withdrawal of Soviet aid0 and the generalChina resulting from tlie Great Leap Forward.
the Chinese program is still in its early stages andfromse provided byoviet assistance,reliable indications of China's independent ability to progress6eld of modern weapons. In additionost of purelythe Chinese face the grim reality of China'sthat will only be aggravated by large expenditures forChina's economic and technical resources are sufficienttoward relatively narrow objectives, the Chinesenot be able over the next few years to develop and produceweapon systems in which they have shown an interest.
overall judgments contained in this estimate assumerational approach by the Chinese leadership. It isthe leadership will seriously misjudge tlie country'swill attempt too much, too fast. Indeed, amidst theturmoil in Peking, there are signseemergence offorward" mentality. In addition, there are many gaps in our
^formation and there are aspects of the Chinese program which we do not fully understand. All of this cautionsoo firm view of the regime's military thinking and the probable nature of its force goals.
believe that in their advanced weapons program theare placing primary emphasis on the development ofdefensive weapon systems appropriateegional force.the Chinese would find it necessary and desirable to solvethem would be the difficult and costly scientific, technical,problems of building this kindorce before movingthe much greater problems of developing intercontinentalWe believe that it would be several years or more beforeforce could be^julh^^oj^er^tiQp.al.
testing fission devices4hird device!
/Preliminary analysis of the third test
indicates that the deviceield ofilotonsas very heavy and large, andarge amount of fissionable material inefficiently. I
1 Therefore, some gains could have
eenrealiy.ed from the third test despite its apparent inefrlciencv. AWtOUghwe note that it was influenced by political and propaganda considerations, the test indicates that the Chineseively interest in thermonuclear development.
F. The second and third devices were almost certainly air-dropped, indicating that the Chinese can now produce nuclear weapons delivcr-ahle bv their very small force of medium bombersj
| It would take somewhat less time to develop
this warheadomb configuration, which could be delivered byr so jet light bombers.
fissionable material in all three Chinese tests wasChina's output ol fissionable material is limited, weit is sufficient tooderate test program andpermit stockpilingew weapons. The Chinese arefairly large plutonium production reactor at Yiimen, which, ifseriously wrong, will probably begin operationnbalance this plutonium output, the Chinese will probably seektheir facilitiesroduction.
believe the Chinese are workingedium-rangemissileut we do not know how far the programThe Chinese couldew available forearly7t is quite another matter, however,to series productionissile system. In addition tothat might arise with the missile program itself, there ischance of difficulties developing in the nuclear warheadwe believe that it will be at least three or four yearsmajor deployment program could begin.
believe that the Chinese plan toetas part of their initial nuclear strike force,roduction could begin as eariy asChinese have constructedlass submarine, but weno information concerning the development of aIf they areissile submarine system, it0 before even two or three such craft could be operational.
J. If we are wrong on Peking's priorities with respect to ancapability, the Chinese might develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This would require that they already have their best scientific talent at work on this program (and we have no evidence that theyre prepared to persevere in an all-out effort, and are willing toostly efforteapons system likely to have major problems of reliability, accuracy andSuch an achievement would require notable successesumber of highly complex and costly endeavors, and this projection gives the Chinese virtually all the benefit of the doubt as to their scientific and industrial potential. Furthermore, an all-out effort on an ICBM would considerably retard work on other delivery systems.
issile launching submarine is another route the Chinese might take totrike capability* against the US. although we thinkess likely choice than the ICBM. Ii the Chinese do go this route, we believe they would probablyew nuclear-powered system ratherong-range dieseluclear-powered system would divert materials and talent from the nuclear weapons program, be more cosily and complicated than an ICBM, and take longer to develop. There is little chance that the Chineseong-range bombereans of threatening the US.
L. We believe that the Chinese haveigh priority to an effort to produce surface-to-air missilesnd that series production could begin7iven their limited resources, we think that the initial Chinese aim will be toew key targets andcattered defense against overflights. While we have no firm information on Chinese production of air-to-air missiles
or cruise missiles, we consider that such production is within Chinese capabilities.
JThc Chinese
will also almost certaintyonsiderable amount of nuclearwhich should provide us with valuable data.
discussion
After
ndbe Chineseay
fission devices in October tested their third device I
ntil our analysts is further advanced, we cannot assess with confidence the significance of the third test with respect to the level of Chinesee "believe that the device was very heavy,]
Its performance apparently was poor.
i
hinese
may have beenarger yield than was obtained. Tlie thirdthe second, was almost certainly droppededium bomber. Itdetonated at an altitude
Or^SECRET
In any case, the third test does not appear lo have direct relevance to Ihe earliest possible developmentight, compact missile warhead. Moreover, the Chinese seem to have been extravagant in iheir use of nuclear material in this lest. Although these factors suggest that the third test was influenced strongly by political and propaganda considerations, it nonetheless constitutes an initial step toward the attainmenthermonuclear capability.
Source of. We believe thatsed in all three tests was produced by the Chinese in their gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou with final enrichment talcing placetill unidentified electromagnetic separation plant. In theory, the Lanchou plant could, by itself, produce uranium ofenrichment touclear device. But because it appears too small toomplete gaseous diffusion cascade using normal size stages it would have been necessary for the Chinese to crowdarge number of small stages. It is highly unlikely thai the Chinese had the technical capability to do this during the years that Lanchou was being built. Fullyight also be produced byatch process in which the plant is operatedin low enrichmentjuid high, enrichment"
Theoretically, enrichmentould be accomplishedasprocess, but we have no evidence of Chinese capability in this field. There is, however, evidence of considerable Chinese competence inisotopeombination of lhe gaseous diffusioo process for partial enrichment and the electromagnetic process for final "topping off" could have produced material like that used in the Chinese devices.
While we are fairly confident that the enrichment by gaseous diffusion took place at Lanchou, we are much less certain of the location of theseparation plant. It might also be at Lanchou, which has buildings, power,hysical layout that could accommodate both facilities. Or lhe electromagnetic "topping" installation may be at some other location which we have not identified, although we think this less likely.
Capacity for Producing Nuclear Material At presenl, we believe that China's fissionable material production consists Only of Lanchou's oulputlus possibly very small amounts of plutonium from what we believe
to be an experimental teaolor at Yiimen. utput can only be estimated within Ihe limits of certain minimum and maximumssuming'an'chou began production inroduction of
(jkilograms per .day could have provided the material for. me three leston assumptions that Ihe Lanchou nuclearentirely devoted to Ihc gaseous diffusion process and that its entireall be "topped" in an electromagnetic plant which existsabout one kilogram per day. Electromagnetic facilities to process oneper day would have lo be large. We have not identified any suchat Lanchou or elsewhere in China. We believe it more likelythe production ofless than one kilogram, being limited
by the available capacity of electromagnetic facilities. If these facilities are contained within the Lanchou complex, plant size, electric power input, cooling capacity, and other factors would appear to place Ihe output oftilograms per day.
China's primary plutonium production center has been under construction since at8 near Yiimenemote area of Kansu Province.arge plutonium production reactor,lutoniumseparation plant,hird facility which we believemall experimental reactor andilot chemical separation plant.
Ihis last facility, which may have begun operation abouts probably for investigating Ihe problems of operating the larger plutoniumreactor, judging from its size, it probablyesigned power level of betweenegawatts (thermal) and,y-product ofoperations, could produce plutoniumate rangingew toilograms per year, It is unlikely that the upper limit would be reached so long as the small reactor was primarily engaged in experimental work. We believe that the large reactor, which appears to be in the later stagesraphite-moderated, water-cooled plutonium production reactor. Tbe reactor design appears to show definite Soviet irtfluencc, and the outward appearance of Ihe reactor building is very similar to one of the Soviet reactors at Tomsk, Its size and the estimated capacity of the cooling towers indicate lhat the large reactor is designed to operate ategawaltshe status of construction apparent in6 photography leads us to believe thai, if the Chinese encounter no great difficulties, it will probably begin operation in the first halfe calculate that this reactor willapacity to produceilograms ofear. However, considering the problems involved in starting andew reactor, it is likely to be three years or so after operation begins before production reaches this level. During the first year of operation, production of plutonium could be On the orderilograms.
We have identified no facilities in China for producing lithium highly enriched in Ihesotope or for producing heavy water from which
" ECfifJ
deuterium is obtained. Neither of these processes require distinctive facilities and such facilities might escape detection, especially if production wereelatively small scale.
Other Nuclear Facilities. We havearge complex undernear Koko Nor in Tsinghai Province which we believeuclear weapons research, development, and production facility. Construction has obviouslyigh priority, elaborate security precautions have been taken, and some of the installations in the complex resemble Soviet nuclearand production sites. From outward appearances the complex is nearly completed. The complex appears to be capable of handling more fissionable materia) than can be produced in Chinese facilities known to be in operation or under construction.
We no longer believe that the nuclear complex at Pao-t'oulutonium production reactor. We now think itacility foi research and development on metallurgical and chemical operations involved in handling and fabricating nuclear materials.
Future Nuclear Weapons Deoelopment, From the foregoing it isthat we do notirm basis for estimating the level of Chinese technology, howrogram can be supported or what types of weapons havcjhe highest priority.
|That the second and third devices were almost certainly auoioppWlthat the Chinese can produce nuclear weapons deliverable by their very small number of medium bombers, and they may now beewif the production rate of fissionable materials is in the middle_or upper part of the range discussed aboye._
iear or two after such testing began, the Chinese could
ew missile warheads which, with the re-entry vehicle,ounds. Thus, if testing begins soon, they could havesuch warheads byl would probably be another yearChinese could begin turning out warheads in larger numbers. Thisa bomb configuration with about the same diameter could be readyand would weighO0 pounds.omb couldby theet light bomber, of which China has.
17t[
II. MISSIIE AND AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
We are Still unable to assess with much confidence the nature, pace, or stage of development of Chinas missile and aircraft delivery systems program. Although the program was no doubtevere blow with the withdrawal of Soviet technicians inhe Chinese continued to work hard in the missile field, even in the period immediately following the Soviet departure. We have good evidence of programs in progress on medium-range ballistic missiles (MHBMs) and surface-to-air missileshere is also some evidence of work on air-to-air missilesnd they are nowactory probably designed to produce medium jet bombers. During Ihe period when they- were getting Soviet assistance, the Chinese were apparently also interested in submarine-launched missiles, coastal defense missiles and guided missile patrol boats, and tactical land-based ballistic missiles, but we have little or no recent evidence of active programs in these fields.
Medium-flange BaUistic Missiles. The Chinese carry out missile flight testing at the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Hangeonstruction al the rangehead started in theith Soviet assistance|
|Thcrc is evidence
ot further. but wc believe brings were sporadic and
their number limited. Activity at Ihe range appears to have been acceleratedntercepted downrangc radio communications appear lo be centered in. areas. However, we have not yet identified any down-range facilities.
2lj
photography gives us some addi-
lIHOTiYiatiOri; pictures Of wha
probably an MRBM were takcn|
we cannot establish with anv
when testing began tohinese-fabricated MRBM rather than missiles provided by the USSR before
The most lecent development at the lest range is workew launch complex. Started in the fall5 and still in an early construction stage, this facility is unlikely to be completed beforet appears designed toifferent, larger, and more complex system than the one now being tested. Construction is not far enough along for us to assess fully theof thisll we can say at this time is that it may be the first sign of an important new developmentrogram relating to missiles or space, and may prove to have an important bearing on some of the judgments made in this estimate.
Chinas ballistic missile research and development effort and suspectfacilities are located in the Peking suburbs. Work on theacilities at Ch'ang-hsin-tien may have begunumber of buildings in the area were complete. Static test stands were built later and testing of some kind of missile engines began byowever, the third major test stand was not structurally complete until well3 and may not have been fully instrumented for operational useudging from the layout and the size of the rocket engine test stands, this complex appears suitable for developing engines for ballistic missiles of MRBM or larger size.
Facilities apparently suitable for missile airframe production are locatediles to the east, at Xanyuan on the site of an airframe repair andplant9 and3 Ms floorspacc was expandedquare feet During the later portion of theeet highuildingayeet high werethey would appear suitable for hydrostatic and dynamic testing, and possibly for vertical checkoutomplete missile We have no information as to the nature of equipment installed in this plant, and we have no firmthat It Is toallistic missile manufacturing facility.
The only firm conclusion that we can draw from the above evidence is that the Chinese haveery high priority to their ballistic missile effort. It is noteworthy that testing activity at the range and large scaleefforts continued during the confused and depressed period of the. But beyond this, we confront serious difficulties in assessing lhe current status of the program. Broadly speaking, the available data permits three Interpretations.
Given the apparent priority, the Chinese could be well along in theof an MRBM. It is possible that the Chinese were able to make static tests of components of their own missile in2 and to begin test firing at tlie range inf the acceleiated pace of range activity4 is evidenceuccessful test program, the Chinese couldew MRBMs ready for deployment7
Although somewhat less likely, the rate of progress could have been slower. While some buildings were complete at Chang-hsui-tiene do not
know how much activity was going on inside at this early date. The known difficulties in the industrial sector, and in other high-priorityprograms, raise questions as to whether the Chinese could have fabricated all the components for their own test missiles as early2 It is
not certain lhat they would have chanced testing at the range before full systems static lasting could take place at Ch'aug-lisin-ttcn. On this basis full systems flight testshinese-fabricated missile might not have begun before45 at the earliest. If this were so, the missile now under development probably would not be ready for some time, perhaps not
Finally, there is an outside chance that the testing activity at the range has notissile syslem planned for deployment. Rather, thismay have concentrated On Ihe study and exploration of Ihe problems of missilery, mainly using equipment supplied earlier by the Soviets with the gradual introduction of more and more Chinese components. The Chinese may-have been using this experience to design andissile adapted to their own specifications and requirements.
The successful development of an MRBM-sized booster would provide the main component necessary formall earth satellite into orbit Theretrong likelihood that the Chinese, for reasons of prestige, will divert hardware from their weapons program as early as they can in order lo put something in space.
Sur/ace-to-Air At writes. Beforehe Soviets provided thewith about ten sets ofurface-to-air missile equipment which, if standard Soviet practice were followed, would have includedissiles. We believe the Soviets also gave thetart on the technological base for future domestic development. We have no evidence whether the Soviets have or have not supplied any additional SAMs or related equipmeni since then; indeed, the lack of expansion of the number of occupied sites argues againsl this. While we have observed overrepared sites, only aboutozen of the siles are believed to be occupied with equipment al any one time.
SAM pad modification has been carried out at one of thend D/ training sites at SCTMTR and the instrumentation has been extended. Wethat one or more industrial facilities at Taiyuan may be involved in the program (especially production of solidacility underal Hu-ho-hao-t'e may alsoolid propcllant plant.
We have no evidence that the Chinese arc producing and deploying SAMs. This could be due lo lack of sufficient priority. However, in view of the serious deficiencies in China's air defense, wc believe that the Chinese are working hardAM program and the slow progress lo date probably reflecls trouble in some phase of design or production. Even so, the Chinese may beewype missiles, and we consider it reasonable to Oxpecl series productionomplete SAM system witiiin theonths.
Atr-ta-Air Missiles. Wc believe (hai llie Chinese have atimited number of hcal-seeking air-to-air missiles. It is likely that2 Soviet delivery ofo China included atew such missiles (ATOLL,he Chineseimilar US missile inS. The SCTMTR airfield has facilities believed to be air-to-air associated and these were expandedighter activity involving that airfield4 possibly Involved AAM testing and/or training. While we have no firmregarding Chinese production and deployment of AAMs, we consider that production ofeapon is within Chinese capabilities.
Missile Submarine. Betweenndhe Chinesea submarine identical in outward appearancelassWe believe that some of the components were supplied by llie USSR. We have no firm indication of any further production of this class of submarine,
lass submarine is designed to launch. ballisticwhile surfaced, but we do not know whether the Soviets provided such missiles. We have no evidence of an active Chinese program loissile for this submarine,ere is tenuous evidence suggesting that Soviet naval missile experts were in China90 and some of tbe unidentified activity at the range may involve the testing ofissile. If an active program is underway the Chinese are probably capable ofa suitable missileuclear warhead by
Snort-Range Ballistic Missilesc have no direct evidencehinese program to develop tactical land-based ballistic missiles. We believe lhat the Chinese received someile range vehicular mounted missiles prior tond tbat they carried out testing or training exercises with Ihcmllhough recenl construction activity al one of ihe launching Sites al SCTMTR could indicate an interest in developing an SRBM, we do not have the evidence to makeonnection.
ir-to-Surface Missilese believe the Chinese have no air-tc-surface missile capability at this lime. Although some of the original facilities at SCTMTR airfield suggest that an ASM program was at one time contemplated, no more recent indications ofrogram have been identified- Theprobably could, if they chose,ennel-type ASM systemruise missileange of. and designed toigh explosive warhead) without much difficulty.
oastal Defense Missiles and Guided Missile Patrol Boats. Sovietin therovided the Chinese with some cruise missiles whichange of- or so andigh explosive warhead. Three sites have been identified; oneraining and development center, one .ancoastal site, andecently constructed coastal site. We feci that the Chinese couldruise missile without much difficulty and Iheir obvious interest in coastal defense makesrogram likely.
TOPTKftET
At least one Soviet OSA-class and one KOMAR-cIass motor boats have been sighted in Chinaut we have no evidence of Chinese production of either type In the Soviet Union, these craft carryerodynamic missilesigh explosive warhead andange. Wc have no evidence of the development or productionuitable missile, but we believe that both are within Chinese capabilities and the Chinese have small craft which they could adapt as launch platforms.
Aircraft Nuclear DeliOerij Systems.iatus of several years caused by the Soviet withdrawal, the Chinese have resumed production of military jet aircraft. Thev arc producingFARMER) jet fighters at Shenyang and appear ready to produce eitherrFISHBED) at Chengtti. While jet fighters can be used to deliver small tactical nuclear weapons, we doubt that the Chinese intend to utilize their fighters for this purpose during the next few years.
The Chinese bomber force consists olr so obsoleteBULL) piston medium bombers, twoBADGER) jet medium bombers, andBEAGLE) jet light bombers, all provided by the Soviets. The resumption of construction at the Yenliang plant near Hsian, which we believe was originally planned for the production of therobably indicates that the Chinese intend to produce this aircraft. At the present rate ofthe facility should be completed in6 orroduction could begino moreew could be deployed9hile Chinese plansuclear capability for this aircraft areit couldelatively large nuclear deviceistanceroviding an interim weapon system pending further missile development.
iii. considerations for the future
General The Chinese seem to be pressing ahead on an ambitiously wide front. They are not only working on various aspects of missilery and nuclear weapons, hut have in hand vigorous aircraft, naval and ground forces programs as well. While Chinas economic and technical resoiuees are sufficient for progress toward relatively narrow objectives, the Chinese almost certainly will not be able over the next few years to develop and produce all the weapon systems in which they have shown interest and on wliich they have done some work. They are no doubtost of technical problems, not only in the more esoteric aspects of theory and technology but also in the Ordinary industrial processes that are required to supply large quantities of basicThese unsolved problems probably account for much of the uneven progress apparently present in Ihe Chinese military program.
The Chinese have gone to considerable effort to import from the West some materials and equipment that would be useful in their weapon Moreover, they will benefit considerably from the pioneering work done
14
byuch of which is available in open literature. Nevertheless, as the Chinese forge ahead on their own they will encounter more and moreespecially since the Chinese programorced-draft effort restingery limited scientific, technological, and industrial base. But it is difficult to judge how much our basic calculations of the time required to develop and produce various kinds of military hardware should be adjusted to take account of these weaknesses. In any case, the Chinese are likely to resort to some expedients and makeshift adaptations for which US, Soviet, British, and French experience is no precedent, and which will accordingly be hard for us to detect or predict.
Never beforeation as industrially backward and so near the margin of bare subsistence attempted such an ambitious advanced weapons program, and the Chinese leaders, though they have clearly demonstrated theirto subordinate civilian economic needs to military programs, cannot ignore the grim race between food production and population growth. As the Chinese reach the stage where they can begin production of weapon systems in large quantity and as they strive to make further advances, they will discover what far wealthier and more highly developed countries have learned: that progress in modem weaponry almost invariably isteeply rising cost curve and requires ever broader scientific and industrial bases. In short, the intensifying competition for resources between the military and civilian sectors of the economy and among various costly weapon systems will confront Peking with progressively more difficult choices.
What the direction of choice will be is still obscure at this early stage of the Chinese program. We know that the top Chinese leaders are eager to provide China with the trappingsreat military power and are determined to show the world that they can succeed despite Soviet perfidy, but this does not necessarily mean that they will opt for spectacular achievements of dubious military value at the expense of other military programs. Similarly, theleaders must take into account that the more resources they commit to obtaining early results, the less there will be available for engendering the scientific, industrial, and general economic growth required toodem military establishment over the long haul
Another factor that will affect the balance struck between the short and the long term is how the Chinesetrong Asiatic regional force as against an intercontinental strike capability against the US. The Chinese leaders almost certainly aspire eventuallyapability to threaten the continental US with nuclear weapons, but whether or not they will rush aheadostly effort to achieveapability at the earliest time possible is another matter. They might see the advantages gained in terms of prestige and psychological and political impact as outweighing the disadvantages ofery heavy priceeapons system that would have problems of reliability and accuracy and
be vulnerable to the massive and far more advanced defensive and offensive potential of the US. On the nther hand, the Chinese might be more concerned with weakening the US military presence in Asia and establishing Chinese preeminence in the area.
ll of these factors will be weighed by men who arc influenced to an extraordinaiy degree by political and ideological considerations and who do not have at their command staffs of scientific, military, and economic planners with experience and expertise in the intricacies ofalancedweapons force. Thus they mightprobably wouldmake the same decisions asS military planner under the same set of circumstances.
t is possible that Ihe leadership will seriously misjudge the country's capabilities and will attempt too much, too fast. Indeed, amidst the current political turmoil in Peking, there are signseemeigenceleapmentality. By undertaking nearly simultaneous programs toumber of defensive systems, several systems for strategic attack in the area, and the beginnings of an intercontinental capability, the regime might so stretch ils resources as to endanger all progress.
We cannot rule out the possibility of some such ovcrambittous effort, but wc think it more likely that for the'next few years, at least, the Chinese will place their main effort on the development of certain weapon systems which are appropriate lo the defense of the mainland and to military operations in the Asian area. Wc believe they arc working towardegional nuclear force and that il will eonsisl initital'ly of MRBMs, medium bombers, undew missile-launching submarines.
Considering the location of likely targets and taking into account the desirability of having flexibility in choosing areas for deployment, it seems likely that the Chinese wouldissileango of atiles. Furthermore, the longer the range uf the missile the more leeway the Chinese would have in adjusting to any difficulties Ihey might encounter inight, compact warhead, since it is possible, within limits, to trade range for warhead weight and size. As stated inhe Chinese couldew MRBMs as early7ut we doubl that the Chinese intend to attainoken deployment for psychological effectew such MHBMs. Their investment in missile and nuclear facilities indicates an ambitious weapons program. We believe this program includes the eventual deployment or at least enough MRBMs to cover major military bases and political targets in the Asian area. The number of launchers, sites, and missiles required would depend not only on lhe number of targets but also on such factors as the range,and accuracy of the system, and warhead yields. We lack the data to make any useful projection on the possible numbers involved but they certainly would he of such an order as to require production line facilities and the attendant skilled manpower.
16
Chinese would probably encounter major difficulties in moving from the fabrication of developmental missilesroduction and deploymentof thi* magnitude Before doing so, and in view of the economic costs and the tcchniml considerations, they would wish to be certain that the missile wasroven and reliable. In addition to problems which may continue to arise with the missile itself, there may also be delays and difficulties in the nuclear warhead program. Wc believe the net result of these various factors is likely to be that the Chinese will not deploy MRBMs with nudear warheads tn large numbers for at least another three to four years.
A Chinese medium bomber would almost certainlyopy of tbehough obsolescent,omber would eitend the range of Chinas nuclear strike capability and have useful non-nuclear applications as well. We believe lhal the Chinese are unlikely lo go to the expense of developing an intermediate-range ballisticarticularly If they are successfulile MRBM and if Iheyedium bomber force, sinceeapon would not cover enough new targets to make Ihe effort worthwhile.
If the Chinese do altempl to develop an early capabilityissile carrying submarine. Ihey will almost certainly uselau ai the platform. This submarine has, at best,arginal capability for threatening the west coast of the US, and thus the Chinese probably would not developystemong-range strike capability but. rather, as part of their Asiatic regional force. It would be at0 before even two or three such craft could be operational
If deployment of SAMs begins in tbe neat year or so. it is likely to be based largely on the Sovietystem, the introduction of substantialor rncdificattoru would probably require considerably more time. In any case, large-scale deploymentAM systemery cosily undertaking, and, given their limited resources, the most the Chinese can probably do in the neat few years isew key targets andcattered defense against overflight* of their territory.
he Longer Term. Wc believe that the Chinese arc urilikcly to make an all-out effort lo develop an ICBM until ihey are further down the road
towardegional nuclear force. If we are wrong, and if the Chinese have already put their best scientific talent to work on an ICBM. China's first such missiles mighi be ready for deployment, Such an achievement would require notable successesumber of highly complex and cosily endeavors, and this projection gives the Chinese virtually all the benefit of doubt as tu their scientific arid industrial potential. Furthermore, an all-out eflort on an ICBM would considerably retard work on otherystems.
issile-launching submarine is another route the Chinese might take totrike capability against the US. Altlwugh it is possible the Chinese might decideong-range dlesel submarine, we think it more likely that they would tryuclear-powered system.uclearsystem would have some advantages with respect to survivability, it would divert materials and talenl from the nuclear weapons program,ore cosily and complicated program than an ICBM, and take longer to develop. We believe it is highly unlikely that the Chinese would be capable ofsimultaneously high priority programs for both an ICBMuclear submarine capability. Of the two systems, wc believe the Chinese would choose the ICBM for their first intercontinental slrike capability.
e believe there is little chance that the Chinese envisageong-range hoinbereans of threatening the US.eapon sysiem would be extremely costly and vulnerable to US defenses.
IV. INTELLIGENCE LEAD TIMES
ririauy, inu Chinese win almost certaintyonsiderable number ot nuclear tests, and the data collected from these will add to our knowledge.
TOr"3KfiET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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