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CENTRAL FFICE OP NATTOHAL ESTIMAIES
6
SFECTAL MEHORAKTXW SUBJECT: Syria's Radical Future*
SiaWARY
the past two decodes, Syria's conservative and middle-of -tbe-road political elements have been rendered powerless, and the crrrry, desninnted by rcdically- oriented officers, has emerged as the sole arbiter of politics* The present radical military regime is una table, as any foreseeable successor is likely to be. Theis oneuccession of extremist military governments, end thero is seme chance of domestic rebellion by minority groups.
On *fche whole, we doubt the Corrm mists will come to dominate Syria. We -think it more likely that, over time, there will emerge in Syria an ideology that combines cotaajnism and many of the accepted tenets of Syrian nationalism.
Syria will probably try to maintain its roccX relations with Moscow, but the latter, while finding Syria's radicalism on the whole favorable, will be" careful. In its dealings with erratic and unstable Syrian regimes.
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of national Estimates and coordinated with tho Office of Current Intelligence ond the Office of Research end Reports in the Directorate of Intelligence.
approved for release
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DISCISSION
1. The unsuccessful ottompt by Syrlon Ccoaando Chief Sella Baton to seize control In rfcraecua early in Soptenfccr narks the Latest in the long series cf coup attempts Which hove enlivened Syria's two decodes cs on independent country. Vhen his nxrve foiled, Botuo, aof tho Tsruza slnorlty of southeast Syria, fled with thirty or more easociates to
press tS)
Ho.turn asserted that Syria hodQ Soviet satellite. Sato nupport for his ossartlone con be dravn frco the extrene left rndical tone of the Damascus gc-vornment, from
revolutionary" peorsocnel from state-evned businesses, end from strong Soviet rropngondc support of the Domnncufl rogine. In fact, however, the situation Is fer boto cosmlicotedonfrontation between Ccoxiunists and catVCcamunlste, vith Major Hntum on tho side of tha angels.
2. Eatumrocinont amber of the military Junta vhlch soized povar in Damascus on S3 February. The Junta
represented the radical wing of tho Baathhich had itselfuccessful coup d'etat early Thoughivilian political organization, the Booth by thead cone to the conclusion that the use of nilitary force vas the only feasible route to power. But this roc-ant extensive reliance on army officers, thns facing the Baath leadership with the problem ofparty discipline over military figures who had the force to contest the party's Irishes.
3. The period from tha first Boo thi at coup ino the second in6imeos tent struggle for decdnnnce between the ccderate and radical factions of the party. On the whole, the moderate faction predominated. It included party founders Afloq and Bitar, the military strongman Amin el-Hofiz, scoe other nrUitary officers, and probably the majority of tha civilian party members in Syria. These men recognized the
I The Arab Socialist Resurrection (Booth) Partyr/rranidol structure with leooer organ!actions electing higher ones. Party elections are normally froo, and open discus si on of issues is permitted, but momboro ore expected to abide by policy decisions reached by duly coristituted party bodies. The party is pen-Arab; each Arab cxruntry leegion of the Arab notion, end the party therein ie headedegional Ccraannd. These are in turn subordinate to the htational Ccrrsand. The latter is elected at general party congresses, hut has traditionally been dominated by Syrians. The present National Ccmmand was elected5 oaa consistsordanian,erson from tha Arabian Peninsula,audi.
dangers and dirflcultiea Inherent in Implementing the Booth's socialist doctrinei, and hence moved veryin enforcing nationalization, especially in agriculture- The radical ving, composed principally oi* activist army officers, urged rapid endsocialitntion ond centralization of eeonomic affairs. Itontrol of the Syrian region's partyation in The moderotoe. In control of both goverment end rfationnl Ccsmind, then dismissed .the rndlcal-dominated Regional Command. The latterfs response was the6 coup.
km Once in power, however, the roll cols themselves proved torn by factional rivalry. Even before ths shooting stopped onebruary, En turn became ccrnrinced that hisigues hadsupport from him in the hope that he would be killed in the fighting with President Bnfiz's bodyguards. These morserrferings owe little to ideological differences
, something to
animosities between Syria's various religious sectsSunnis, Alcvitea, ond-roat deal to personal rivalries
' Syria's population Is TO percent Sunnl (Orthodox) Muslim.
Tbe Alcvitea account forercent end live in the mountainous coastal area. The rruzea of southeast Syria ore about three percent. Various minor Muslim ond Christian cxaanunlties mukc up the remainder of the population.
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and lust for power. The regime continues to style itself Baathist and to insist that it is the legitimate Arab resurrection movement, but in fact, ltilitary regime.
Daring its first six lunths in power, the radicalroved on several fronts to broaden its base of support. It tried to speed up the pace of agrarian reform; it ecdeavorad to win moderate Baathists to its cause; and it allowed Increased freedom- for the Syrian- Cccmunlst Party. It also sought support from the USSR. It had little time, however, to devote to these rnrrsuits, ao its major energies were spent on factional intrigue and maneuvering for greater power.
The events6 appear to have ended an era which began with the first eoup d'etat In those years, conservative and moderate power Tias been progressively debased and the army has emerged as the sole arbiter of politics. The traditionally powerful landlord-aerchont families wore largely finished politically6 or so. The ccdorato politicians who werehance at governing Syria by tho army after the breakup of the UAR showed little ability and leadership. In sum, both conservative and middle-of-the-road political forces have been rendered powerless, if not wiped out.
On tho more radical aide of things, the experience of the Booth itself has been that the military estar^inboerit vlll ultimately control the party. In practice, tbe ailltory has shown Itself increasingly radical In outlook. .
7. developments in Syria's basically agricultural economy have logged behind the radical trend In political matters. Although they wore displaced pollttenlly, the trndlUonnlly powerful great familieseasure of exxxxxklc influenceins. Moreerchant-entrepreneur group of loss prominence continued to control much of Syria's agriculture and trade, and to prosper from it. Sporadic efforts to trnnoform the economy frota private enterprise to socialism started during the UAH period vith the confiscation of the largest agricultural holdings and continued with, the nationalization of industry and most of the export trade after tho Booth came to power. Those measures were tampered by ihe influenceore of conservative extalnlstrotorsj who remained ln- control of tho control bank, and by the government's reliance on former landholders and Industrial managers to run their former properties and businesses. esult, the economy has cane through the past decade in remarkably good shape; economic growth has been interrupted mainly by tbe effect of the region's notoriously fickle rainfall.
8. The radicalism vhlch Is la tho ascendancy In Syrha disjointed sort of thing. Bo single party political grouping can be said to represent it. That portion of the Booth party in Syria vhlch supports the present regime probably nusbero only several hundred people. The Cocrmntst party is larger, but available evidence indicates that it is ill-represented in the Syrian military establishment. Tho Junta's members ore for the moat part in their thirties and early forties, products
The Cotlook
9. ostion in regard to Syria's future then is not vhother it vlll bo moderato or radical, but what will be tho kind and intensity of its radicalism. In the first place, tho longevity of the present regime is dubious. There are serious animosities existing among some of its principal figures, almost ony one of vhcoi might seize on opportunity to assert his primacy.
In addition, there are almost certainly Baathist officers loyal to the ousted pan-Arab (National) Party Ccannnd who are conspiring to restore "legitimate" Baathist rule. Also, despite the Booth's efforts to purge the Syrian Army during its years in office, there are probably pro-Basserlsts end other potential opposition elements within the Syrian Army with their eyes fixed on the Presidential
10. In any ease, it seems likely that no successor regime would he ruch more stable than that presently in office. It Is conceivabletrong ran might emerge at the heed of tha Syrian gcrvern&ant and hold office for on extended period, but
evelopment are poor. Tho prospect, therefore, iseries of military grivernments succeeding one another at Irregular intervals. There is some possibility that raaneuverings ond purges in the military establishment may serve to trigger Internal rebellion by, say, thor the Alowites. Tho farmer. In particular, hove traditionally been willing to rosort to arms. Again, we cannot discount the possibility that the rank and file of the army may lapse into Indiscipline and unreliability.
although this is hiCbly speculative in view of our very limited knowledge of enlisted men's attitudes. All things considered, however, we think the chances ore against Syria slidingtate of anarchy.
11. Some rnHeals prooilnent In the present regime have announced their intentions to reshapo Syria's economy along more socialistic lines. In particular, they are punning for the distribution of land to peasants ond tho replacement ofmanagers in industry. In its effort to mobilize domestic support, the present regime might embark on Justesty program of socialization, which could inflict serious damage on tho economy. However, it is ot least as lliely that political maneuvering will keep the regime so occupied that the economy will continue to operate largely on its own as lt has In the past. While shortages may appear and unemployment probably will Increase, economic troubles probably will not be critical for the government of the day.
13. Internationally, Syria will probably improve its already close relations with Moscow, on which it depends for all its military supplies and for substantial economic aid. The strideot anti-Western positions whicheature of Syria's public
posture will almost certainly contlnae; thoy will in the great majority of Instances be parallel with thooe of Moscow. The Soviets will probably find Syria's radicalism on tho whole fovorcule to their interests, bat they will probably exercise caution bocnuee of the erratic and unstable nature of prospective Syrian regimes.
13. Such conditions offer obvious opportunities forC-xxsunists. While the present military Junta inlikely to be chary of granting much leeway to anynot under Its control, the Ccamtunlstswin favors by giving it needed support. Inthe Coantunlst Party of Syria (CPS) is likelyln size and izi
Its loaders may come to halleve that tho party could, on its own, seize control of the government and make aa effort to do They win certainly endearor to Infiltrate the army in any case. On the other hand, the Syrian Coezaanists maytrategy of supporting any regime in lnmaocus whichenerally radical point of view, while resisting too close an identification withovernment, believing that it probably
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would not lost long end would eventually discredit itself and all Its backers. Th.ua, the Syrian Coramiciat Party would try to establish ties with willing leftist listeners, and to attract qs much popular sytspatby as possible. In time, this could result in the developmentocal Ideology in which Ccraauniem end. entry of the accepted tenets of Syrian nationalism hod become identical. The net effect of this development wouldationalism more noisily pro-Soviet thaneneral
to adept social and economic schemes based on
Ccoominlst models,rowing emotional identification vith the Ccpzaunist Bloc.
lfc. Itoo early to soy whether tbe CPS leadership has chosen either of these alternatives. On balance, however, we believe they are more likey to follow the latter course than to make en overt effort to seize power- They probably do cot hovo enough members in the army or the government veil enough placed tocranunloup feasible. H
15. S> Syria sought to encounter graving Communist
Btrength by seeking ond getting union vith the CAR. The erc-riJnent failed* but Nasser stilleasure of popularity among Syria's lover classes. There is some possibility that similar fears in the future might stinrulate an effort by anti-Cczzsunlst officers to reconstitute the UAR.
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Original document.
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