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CENTRAL BLLIOGKCE AGEIOT
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SUBJECT: OOWfJHIST RKACTIORS TO CER-AX* US COURSES OP ACTIOI
THE ITOBLEM
To estimate tho probable- reactions of Bortb Vietnam, China, and the USSR to the following air champaigns against Horth Vietnam!
I. HASED STEP-UP HI US ACTIONS COfBETIKO OP
A. Airatrilce* againstodem industrial targets in aorth Vietnam, followed by
B. Mining of aorta Vietnamese harbors to prevent:
use of deep-draft ships only
use of both deep-draft and shallow-draft ships. In both cases, we assume Intensive armed reconnaissance against LOCs and transport targets, followed by
against the leveeo la the Redfc41oued hy
ettacks against thethe elrflelda and certain minorond miscellaneous industrial and
XX.ROGRAM OPYS BOMBING TOOI3TICiOUTB? ABU TH) IK SOaTBHtt BOBTH VIETffiH, ABU IA06,
Bone of the above vould call for the use of nuclear weapons or for alratrlkea any closer to tho border of Communist China than at present.
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DISC03SI0H
I. beaonckrHASED STEP-UP IN US ACTIONS General Considerations
1. This program vouldrogressive, vigorous and clearly apparent escalation of the US boshing of North Vietnam. Tbe Communists and the world at large would be convineod that itasic change of US policy and objectives, especially if the moveii were initiatedime vhen there seemed to be movenent toward negotiations or compronlse. The Communists vould thus be reacting not only to each specific action, but also to the general change in US posture. Hence the next four paragraphsCommunist reactions to tha pro gran in general; the later pedographs deal with specific points involved in each phase of the program.
Throughout tho campaign international opinion would be an important general factor. It may be taken for granted that there would be an accentuation of Cccnuniet propaganda about the
Inhuman nature of the US aation. Receptivity to such charge* would he increased in the non-Coanamlst world; the more ao ae there would be growing elarw over tha poaalble eoopanaion of the wax to Chin* and even the USSR. We think It certain ther soma other country, vould bring th* Batter to th* Ul, vh*r* the US would be severely and extensively criticlaed and perhaps fonaaliy eeaururad.
3. Cceanmiat reaction* vould bo largely Influenced by th* condition of China, th* *tat* of Sino-Soviet tensions. Berth Vietnam'* Judgment of Its own capabilities, and tha military and political situation in South Vietnam. Toextent, the Conrrunists, especially Hanoi, might also be Influenced by th* oanner in vhich the US conducted the cajspalgn, it* duration, and any political novae by th* US that voold accoopany it.
a. Tho physical aa veil as th* political effect* of tho esnpaign would be cumulative. A* the impact of each successive stag* became fully apparent, Moscow, Peiplng, and Hanoi would bo continually rev1ovine theirctiona, and US intentions. We cannot say at which point, If any, aooh of them might feel compelled to reconsider basic policies andnd they might reach different estimate* at different stages.
5- Tho major que at Ions are these:
a. Would tha program constrain North Vietnam to negotiate or otherwise to end the fighting? Obviously it vould make it increasingly difficult for north Vietnam simply to persist in its present course. The Borth Vietnamese leaders would bo concerned over the increasing destruction of their country and tho effect of this on their people, end they vould be increasingly apprehensive that theould invado the North. More immediate factors in their decision would be the course of nilitary and political developments in 3outh Vietnam, and their estimate of the condition and policies of China: on the one hand, whether the Pelplng regime appeared stable enouch to rely on for loi^tarai assistance, including the transit of Soviet aid; on the other, whether Hanoi was becoming dependent on China to tho point of political subservience. We cannot say vlth much confidence what conclusion Hanoi vould draw frcn these factors. Hanoi might decide to take whatever political steps it deemed necessary to halt the bombing. But in the near tern we think it more likely that the North Vietnamese vould decide to continue the war.
thl* program brine CocuamlBt China or theboth Into open military conflict with the US? We thinkare fairly confidant with respect to tha USSR, but not aowith respect to China. Reasons of seography andrule out the intervention of alfsilf leant Sovietin Southeast Asia. As for China, that countrytate of disorder that Its reactions are largely let we do not believe that China would ester theground forces In Southeast Aala, or even with its airfrom Chinese bases. ajor exception toituntion in which China believed tho Sorthwas disintegrating or that an invasion of north Vietnam
the need to cooperate in further aupportcraw the USSR and China cloeer together! We dothat the movement of tho Vietnam warew phaseto Improve relations between Moscow and Felplng. US effort may impel the Chinese to sooewhatthan heretofore In seeing that Soviet suppliesto Borth Vietnam, since neither of thorn wishes to appear
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responsible, for impeding that flov. But 3lno-Soviet differences arc so deep and relation* so abraalvo that at best serious delays In shipments vlll probably occur.
It cause the Soviet* to preosure Horthsees* sort of approach to tb*hich vould end th*eafearraesswjfit the Soviets would feel over their inabilitynorth Vietnam, and the Increased risks involved inaid, vould probably dispose thenore activepeace thanave been willing to undertake so far. At
some stage, they might org* Hanoi toolitical settlement. Tat, tha Soviets vould probably also be unwilling to run tbe poUUoal risk of putting serious pressure on Hanoi, say by making theiraid conditional on moves toward negotiations.
It cause the Horth Vietnamese to reactuntried enterprlaeaattacks on US carriers, oron airfields or other targets in South VlotnamT Webecause tha chances of substantial success would beInS carrier, sad tha affect of suchprobably not be thought worth the cost which night beUS retaliation. Tat the possibility exists, snd the odds
vould rise In the Inter stages of tho UB air caiapslgn. At acme point the Borth Vlatosoes* night feel they had little left to lose.
Borth Vietnam retaliateajor Invasionor South Viet nan? rWbenly not, aolnly because the fearInvasion of Borth Vietnam vould stillotentthis attitude might char-go if Hanoi coos to believe thatinvasion vaa tho inevitable climax of ths bombing campaign.
it cause the Soviets to react by vigorousagainst UB interests elssvfcere in th* worldI Of coursetoward th* US vould harden. However, there are in fact
few places where the Soviets could exert such praaaures. They would be unlikely to do so In Berlin; this would undercut the general policy they have been pursuing in Europe, especially toward Prano*. Moreover, they would aee considerable advantages to be gained in Europe and elsewhere by exploiting; antipathy to the US actions and emphasising that the US was rookies* and aggressive.
COTJRSB Ai Air Strike* AgOlnat Major Industrial Targets
Grnarol. Tha Cccxwnlata hare apparently been unsure whether the OB planned to intenaify the bombing campaign or to keep It limited. The alrstrikes would conYlnce them that the US had opted for escalation, though they would still not be sure of how much or how aoon. Since many of these targets are in heavily populated areas, the attacks would probably involve greater destruction of civilian life and property. Hence, in anticipation that such themes would be echoed by ncert of the free World, the Coasaunlste would denounce the US move by stressing the civilian nature of the targets and the civilian casualties.
Borth Vietnam. Borth Vietnam has probably already dlaoounted the effect of an attack on tha country'a Indus-trial
base, in large part because industry is not essential for the country's survival. Moreover, Hanoi would aaouatealmost certainlythat increased Imports from the USSR and Communist China could provide the auppliea to sustain tha war effort. Borth Vietnam, nonetheless, would probablyaximum air defense effort, and this could substantially increase the air war over Borth Vietnam.
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andR. This particular action by thonot cause any alcnlficent change In Moscow's or Pelplng would be willing to add to lta logiatlotroopa already In Borth Vietnam. Both China andwould try to compensate for the losses suffered byby providing military and econoclc aid. But howcould be provided would depend on how soon the USmining, aa well aa on tha political and physical problemaacross China.
COURSE B: Mining of tho Harbors
The throe Corsnunist countries concernedthe miningajor escalation of the war; this mightstage at which they concluded that the US had abandonedan early negotiation and waa intent on increasingeven at substantial political cost to Itself. see this course of action as particularly alarming to much
of the Free World and vouldpecial effort to exploit adverse reactions. It ia probably at thl* pointB condemnation of the US would be Bought,y neutrals or by the USSR and East Europeans.
Borth Vietnam. Tho oinlng vouldolt to Hanoi, even though It has already anticipatedoselblUty. It has little capacity to deal with tha mines then*elvee. But the sain concern of the Borth Vietnamese leaders vould be to aaintain the flow of essential ailitary and econonic goods; they would probably eatIdat* that they could do so, although with far more difficulty and diaxuption. If tho mining vere effoctlvo against some or all ahsllov-draft as veil aa deep-draft shipping, then tho greatly increased burden placed on the rail linos would make thorn highly vulnerable to airatrikas.
It Is possible that at this point, Hanoi would decide that It simply could not absorb the US movesajor It might try to nine the Tonkin Oolf. And the VC would probablyustained effort to close the channel into Saigon.
China. To help maintain the flow of supplies, China would probably add to ita troop* In Borth Vietnan sad perhaps announce their presence. But the Chinese leaders would seek to shift to the USSR the chief responsibility for coping with th*
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specific lo sue of mining. Polplng nifdit bIbo undertake sccio demonstrative jdlitory novemeotn in South China or alone the Taiwan Strait, or offer to Bend around trcopn to Sorth Viet nun.
x3- Tha USSR. The raining would be particularly finning to the Sovieto, who last year movedons of goods to Borth Vietnam by sea. They would bo onbarroeoed by their inability to prevent or counter the US nova, but we bellovo they would be unwilling to take the risks involved in committing their own ships and aircraft to on effort to reopen the ports. They could attempt on airlift, but tho quantities of supplies that could be airlifted would be email. Thus, alsoet all deliveries, edlitary and civilian, would be at the BUfferance of Peiplng, particularly if the mining made It lcfeealble to land seaborne carcoos by lighters and email vessels.
ll*. in these circumstances, tho Soviets would oo at peine to blame the ChlneBo for any obstruction of shipments across China. They vould probablyoken nutsber of "volunteers" to North Vietnam if Hanoi asked for them, and they might be willing toHanoi with new forms of military, floating mlnoe and cruise missiles (land-based or on Komor boats) whioh
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could appearirect responas to the US einiog. By these means, they vould seek to licit their loss of influence in Hanoi.
15. The Soviets vould be likely to strike- back at the US in thoir bilateral relations, severely reduoinc what regains of carnal contaotB on other issues. They vould focus their propogonda end diplomatic campaign to get US allies in Europe to repodlato the UB action. They miatit also make other tanaion prcaaotlng geeturoa. Tb* vigor of tbe Soviet reaction vould bo strengthened if the mining operatlona resulted in some sorious classic8 bo Soviet ahlpe. However violently they reacted diploomtically, ve think there Is some chance that the new situation produced by the mining would lead the Sovietsore active search for way* to limit the risks of confrontation.
COURSE Cl AttaelM on tho Hod River Delta Lerooc
The Cofaminists would estimate that world opinion would be peculiarly aensitlvo to US attacks on thi* target, and they would make an intense effort to exploit this sentiment vigorously
in every sort of forum, claiming that the civilian population van the prime victim of the UB action. They vould aloo probably sstl-mate that the DO vould be unable to inflict andestruction of tho levee system ao extensive aa to placeburdena on tho Borth Vietnamese aconooy. Unleee and until thin eetinBte van proved to be vrong, the likely effect of attacking the leveee vould be to stiffen tba Comnunlst vill to resist.
COURSE D: Unlisdted Attacka Against the Transportation System, Airfields, and Certain Other Targets.
17. Borth Vietnam. rincipal object of the preceding actions would have been to increase Berth Vietnam'a need for supplies from outside the country, and to concentrate the flow of these supplies to the land routee from China. Hence the chief importance of thattacka would rest on bow successfully tbey interdicted these routee. In consequence, Borth Vietnam vould have toajor effort (including Its remainingIf any) to defending then. However, successful and sustained US attacks on the olrflelde would almost certainly soon force the remnants of tho Borth Vietnamese air foroo to seek refuge in South
China, though It ia pooa1bio that they vould be expendedesperation attack acalnat US carriers or US baoeo in South Vietnam. Civilian air operatlona In Saigon might be subjected to VC attack.
Apart from providing sanctuary for Borthand supplies to Hanoi, China might be asked to allowaircraft to operate from Chinese bases. Ue haveestloated that China, recognising the risks Involved,
would prohibit such action. If eireumstsaeee were normal In China when the assumed situation arose, we would still make such an estimate. ariant of this could minimize the direct dangers to China. For example, fighter aircraft might return to Borth Vietnam if and when the airfields were repaired, and then begin some limited defensive operations. By repeating this process, tbe Communists couldemi sanctuary in China.
would be arsatly concerned over the abilityBorth VletrtBmasa Government to survive. we havethat if the collapse of Borth Vietnam seemedwould almost certainly intervene In the war, thoughonlyubstantial occupation of Borth Vietnam, And this
still aeeoB likely, assuming that China atlllovemocnt capable of taking such an action.
20. R. By this tine, the USSR vould already have been caught in the crunch of hoping to find aoae vay to end tho war without losing Hanoi to the Chinese in the process. With Increasing vigor, the USSR would probably urge Borth Vietnam'a leaders to seek peace, but If Hanoi persisted, we believe the Soviets would abide with the North Vietnamese decision.
SI. north KOrea. Borth Korea la one area where the Comounlets could try to relieve the allitary pressure on Hanoi. North Korea would be concerned that the lackigoroua military responoe in Southeast Asia could affect its own future security, nevertheless, we think it unlikely that North Korea would be willing to reopen the Korean war either of its own accord or at Moscow's or Peiping'a urging.
11. REACTIONS TO AH ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM Of EESSCAIATTOri BT
RESTRICTING US BOltBXNG TO SOUTHERN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS
22. North Vietnam. The timing of the US actions and the circumstances in which they took place could be of considerable
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importance. hanoi and peiplng might attribute the shift toopinion and to domestic us criticism and see it as confirming their view that the us vould not persistong struggle. on the other hand, if the moves occurredime when hanoi hod hintedillingness to talk, hanoi might interpret the moves response and an attempt to move toward negotiations.
23. the ussr. the soviets would probably be more diopoaed than hanoi to view the us move as an effort to bringettlement, and far less likely to considerark of failing us resolve. accordingly, they would probably advise hanoi to probe the us position, looking toward possible negotiations. however, the ussr would not be likely to put much pressure on hanoi to respond.
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Original document.
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