CENTRAL IRTELLIOEICE AOBHCY
57
SUEJECT; : REACTICKJOSSIBLE US ACTIOS
TEE PRCBLKM
To estimate probable Coanunist and Free World reactions to the deploymento Thailand.
ASSUHPTICIIS
The Thai Covernnient ccneents to the deployment and publicly announces tha move when actual operationa commence.
The deployment would beapao, would take place during January, und would Initiallyircraft. The buildup would be pr ogre salve; by spring or early summer aboutould be stationedapao*
Juat prior to the public announcement of tho deployment, the U3 would, through diplomatic channels, explain tha purposes of the moveargo numbar of friendly nations* Tba US would notdirectly inform the Soviet Union, but it would be expected that word of tbe deployment would quickly reach then. It ismoreover, that an explanation of tbe move might be conveyed to tho USSR privately. There would be no special communication with CooDsunist China on the subject.
In explaining tbe rjurp^aa of tbe novo, both in publicand private background briefings, the US would emphasize that the move entailed no change in tha pattern2gainst targets In South Vietnam and against the Ri Gla pass area in Korth Vietnam and against targets near the ME. However, er^icryment against other targets in Korth Vietnam would not be specifically excluded. The US vould also make clear that thearose from the increasing demand2 operations in South Vietnam* The US, however, would reiterate that it sought no permanent military bases In Srjutheast Asia. The US vould alsoprevious policy statements to the general effect2 operations In the Vietnamese var are confined to conventional veapons. Finally, the US would state emphatically that thein no way changed the basic policy of not threatening tho regime In Horth Vietnam and China.
THE ESTIMATE
Cciammist and Free World countries vould benot only to the fact of deployment, but to tbethis signalled another escalation of the war. It wouldbelieved that the ultimate US purpose was to usea wider variety of targets in North Vietnam. USthat its intention vas more limited would probably have
Initial effect on such beliefs.
military opinion would recognizeubstantial reduction in US reactionSouth Vietnamese targets, which vould enhanceaxibility
of ground support cpcrotlonu. At the Race time, such opinion would probably calculate that concern over possible losses to SAMs andould deter tbe US froa extensive usever North Vietnam.
3, ublic announcement of the deploymentould focus attention on tbe general subject of US bombing and might stimulate new Initiatives and pressures to cease all bombing of North Vietnam, tony noa-Ccassunlst countries vould Interpret the move In light of their own preccncelved notions about US policy; that Is, many countries expect the US to escalate because of domestic politics aad would tend to exaggerate the significance of2 deployment,
I*. Adverse reaction In the Free World, however, would die downime if there ware in fact no change in US bombing policy. Tbe subsequent buildup ofo tbelevels would attract little attention so long as the target pattern was not changed.
5- Tbe US move would create no great difficulties for any of the allies contributing forces In Vietnam, and some would be
pleased. But some LB allies, especially Id Europe, would be ln-
to believe that
ore dangerous
It Is highly unlikely that any ally would abandon the US, though sone would question the wiadon of tbe action.
6, Hie specific tlniry- of the US move could have some Ifore phased Into Thailand before tbe end of Tet her* would be greater criticism than thereafter; many Free World countries have some lingering hope that this holiday period may yet bring some turn toward The US move would be widely regarded as designed to block any such progress. Jtoreover, if such intermediarieshant bad not completed their approaches, the U3 would be vulnerable to criticism for undercutting their efforts. Thus, we boliove
the deploymentould be less vulnerable to criticism if It case after the Tat period, orhant and others had clearly failed in their efforte to promote negotiations,
Communist Reaction. Connuniat propaganda would certainly exploit the deployment anew phase of aocalotion. The Horth Vietnamese and VC have already predicted that the U3 willn Thailand and have warned of countermoacures. They would try to arouse world opinion against tha US In order to
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try to deter any usegainst Borth Vietnam, aad also In an effort to genorate pressures against the bcobIng of north Vietnam In general. The Ccenunlsts, of course, would be looking for any exploitable incidents; oca such possibility would be any overflight of Cambcdlo. Pelting and Hanoi night issue 8oca pointed warnings to Bangkok, but we doubt that they vould make any openente to undertake specific action*
8* The current Crectunlst campaign denouncing ThailandS puppet would be stepped up and vould be more widely believed. Hanoi and Peking might strive to increase the insurgency inThailand, but wo do not believe that. In the near term, they can substantially raise tbe pace and scale of subversion above that already In existence. They night attempt to sabotage an American base. Including the oneapao.
9. Worth Vietnam. Hanoi would of course be concerned over tba Increased flexibility of response the US vould acquire against targets in South Vietnam. In addition, Hanoi would almostprepare for the possibilityould be used againat critical targeta in Horth Vietnam. To this end it would seek to strengthen further its air defenses and would press China and the USSR for additional equipment. And perhaps, Hanoi might counter
0
tbe US move by publicly acknowledging that certain Communist countries vere providing "Volunteers" for the North Vietnamese air defense system. It is possible that the Horth Vietnamese might attempt some drastic retaliation that would escalate tho war, but we think this unlXtely.
10. Chinese Reaction* Peking has not reacted much to the userom Guam. Tbe deployment to Thailand wouldifferent matter; the activationS heavy bomber base on the Asian mainland would add to Peking's sense of encirclement and further persuade China of US hostile intentions. Peking would almost certainly continue strengthening air defenses in South China end, if needed and requested, would deploy more eir defense troops to Horth Vietnam. Peking might announce that it
had already stationed forces in North Vietnam. We do not believe, however, that Peking or Hanoi would consider the situation critical enough to call for overt intervention of Chinese combat forces.
11. As for the impact on the current political struggle in Peking, the US deployment could aggravate tension over policy issues. We do not believe, however, that it would play muchole in tbe leadership crisis in China and would almost certainly not prove decisive in tipping tha balance to one faction or another.
12. The- USSR, ftoacov, of courae, would denounce tbe US for intensifying Its "policy of aggression" in Southeast Asia, Though tbe Soviets would probably not regard the deploymentajor departure from previous Ana ri can policy, they wouldfeel obliged to manifest their displeasure by words and actions calculated to cause deterioration at least in theof Soviet-Aaarican relations. They would renew pledges of support to Hanoi, and might respond in soma demonstrative way to requests for more aid in air defense. This would probably notore overt Involvement of Soviet personnel.
Original document.
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