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LBj LIBRARY Msi.daiory Review
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Situation in Panama
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate) of7
i.nteljjgence memorandum
Situation in Panama
Summary
US-Panamanian relations areew and crucial stage. Maneuvering forlections already has started in Panama, and the canal treaty negotiations with the US are the major issue. As political activity picks up during the next few months. President Robles will be under increasing pressure toanal settlement early enough to submit it for ratificationpecial session of the National Assembly before its regular session begins At stake are the political fortunes of the oligarchical parties which make up his coalition To protect the interests of these parties Robles needs an accord to strengthen their chances of competing with the popular Arnulfo Arias, leader of the Panamen-ista Party. Panama's elite families will go to almost any extreme to prevent Arias' victory. If thebreak down orerious Impasse, the Robles government will probably try to protect itself bythe blame on the US.
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intel-
ligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and with the Clandestine Services.
For more detailed information, see Intelligence Memorandum "Factors of Instability inssued by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence
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with the US, and this attitude will probably continue as long as he feels the negotiations are progressing satisfactorily. Robles cannot, however, always control some of the more unscrupulousin his coalition. As elections approach, these men will be tempted more and more toationalistic stance and exert pressure on the US to speed up the negotiations.
most recent example of thisearly Decemberinor incident at theRio Hato training area. anamanianaircraft made an emergency landing atand the pilot alleged that he was "detained"personnel. Panama City news media, largelycontrolled by government officials and members
of the oligarchy, termed theiolation of Panamanian sovereignty and unleashed an emotional, anti-US clamor which quickly evolved into criticism of the US role in the treaty talks. One paper,considered Robles' own mouthpiece, went so far as to question US good faith in the negotiations. Most media portrayed administration leaders asew, vigilant, and forcefully patriotic stance in relations with the US.
US officials in Panamaover the growing emotional atmosphere toForeign Minister Eleta, the pressure campaignsubsided. It was too late, however, toinitial imageS violation of Panamaniancreated in the minds of the public. Theaffair undoubtedly added more substance toPanamanian nationalism which increasinglyUS presence in the country. Extremist-ledhave already staged some "sovereignty"and more can be expected with themonth of the anniversary of the riots ofgovernment security forces probably will becontrol demonstrations1 January, there
is always the danger that an incident could erupt
One member of the Panamanian negotiating team, Diogenes de la Rosa, seriously doubts that an agreement can be reached7 and warns against speculation about timing. De la Rosa recentlyource believed to be reliable that,raft treaty is signed, Robles should allow the public to discuss It and "blow off steam" for at least six months before attempting ratification:. Some Panamanian
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officials, noting Robles' lack of popular support, hla dependenceenuous coalition In the assembly, and the approaching political campaign, believe it advisable to defer efforts toettlement until after8 elections in Panama and in the us.
however, la firmly convinced thatnow has the political strength toas long aa the draft treaty iahat It is in keeping withaspirations. Host of Robles*onths in office have aimed at holdingtogether In anticipation of tha In recent souths bis bloc In tbehas picked up two additional deputies,the administrationotes toor the The government alsoosfortable margin
on all assembly committees. It ls not clear, ap- parently even within the government, whether the canal treaty will requirelspla majoritywo-tbirds majority in the aaaambly alnce the constitution is vague on the exact procedure to ba followed. Evenwo-thirds approval la needed, Robles' paper strength would be aufflcient. The President, however, cannot always count on bla doputlea to vote with the administration. Furthermore, legislators will have their ears attuned to tha tenor of public opinionreaty ls submitted.
treaty draft will have to beopublic befora it goaa to tba assembly. coalition baa most of the news sediaand if there is time to wage an intensivecampaign tha ground may be cut froa underby the assembly will depend greatly on thein Panama City, since tba assembly issusceptible to public pressure. 7
it rejected an agreeaent toyear extension of us rights tollltary basea wheo an extremist-led mob0 thraataned to atom the assembly building.
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Most observers believe the Robles government has lost considerable support in the past two years and is further weakened by the scramble among the elite families who will be seeking powert is far from certain that these powerful vested interest groups will be able to unite behind one candidate or, even if they do, that they can keep Arias from winning
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destined to solve Panama's problems. Charging that the oligarchy fraudulently deprived him ofrias has vowed to call his supporters into the streets to oppose any treaty, regardless of content, negotiated by the "illegitimate" Robles government. Arias is the most popular political figure in Panama, especially among the urban lower classes. Few observers doubt his ability to lead his followers into the streets on an emotional issue and seriously threaten the Robles government. The timing ofove could be linked withalready under way, with an assessment by Arias that Robles was about toanal settlement with tho US, or with an effort on Arias' part tounfavorable provisionsdraft treaty."
how far Arias is in fact willinganal agreement is anybody's guess. not appear to have made up his mind on anycourse of action. If Roblesreatynot submit it for ratification, Arias mayrun in8 elections in the hope ofgovernment candidate on tho treaty issue.
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the other hand, Arias is convinced that the oligarchy will never allow hita to win an election, and, atears of age, he probably has one more chance at the -presidencyecure .place in Panamanian history.
13. While constantly attacking the government, Arias has carefully avoided any direct criticism of the US. Through intermediaries be has indicated to US officials that he is prepared, once in power, to settle the canal issue. Some observers believe that Arias* sentiments toward the US have "mellowed" with age, and that he is the only political figure in Panama with enough popular support to feel he can .risk the concessions necessary to get'US acquiescenceanal accord.
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Original document.
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