JORDAN'S ARMED FORCES

Created: 1/17/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Intelligence Memorandum

JORDAN'S ARMED FORCES

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence7

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Jordan's Armed Forces

Summary

The turmoil stirred up among Jordan'sby Israel's raid on three Palestinian towns on6 has underscored the decisive importance of Jordan's armed forces in sustaining King Husayn's regime. The amy was first the humiliated victim of the Israeli assault and then was called upon to put down the ensuing Palestinian demonstrations against the regime. Thesehaveevere strain on the army'sIn Itself as an effective military force and haveuestion as to its reliabilityolitical instrument. The future security of the regime will depend largely on Husayn's success in retaining the loyalty of East Bank urban and northern elements who have acquired increasingin the armed forces. The bedouin, whohave been dominant, eclining but still key factor. The Palestinians, who comprise two-thirds of the population, have been deniedof power in the military and, because of their general antagonism toward the regime, will continue to be viewed with suspicion.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

Tho Armyilitary Force

Jordan Arab Army ts the linealof the bedouin Arab Legion which wasorganized, and subsidized by thethe mandated territory ol Trans-Jordanwar l. it fought sell against Israel lnWar ol nd denied thecontrol ol Jerusalem and theplateau. The creation of Jordan, 9 armistice,erger ofwith Trans-Jordanrastic change character of the Hashemitc monarchy. Itswas tripled by the addition of themore sophisticated Palestinians, whoof their subordination to aregime.

the upsurge of pan-Arabthat developed ln the , diroctwas eliminated. King Husayn and thewho were trained ln BritlHhnevertheless, have perpetuated theand techniques developed under Their pride ln tho army'silitary force apparently ismost of the east Jordanians, whoroupin it. This pride remains one ofpresent strengths.

is

superior in quality, unit o

any other Arab army.

Jordan's army, ifirm policy decision to fight, probably could hold parts of the Vest Bank agninst an Israeli attack hort time. It would beerious disadvantage if the Israelis also ustained airagainst the defending Jordanian force.

4. The army's assets include mobile, fairly up-to-date equipment, its small unit training Is good, and its individual itoldiers are rugged. It is hampered by its small size, has had insufficient

combined arms training, lacks experience in air-ground operations, and does not have an air defense

rhe

logistical snor'tcomings would limit its effective period of full-scale combat operations to about one week.

Morale and discipline were good until Israel'sovember raid. The humiliation and resentment among all ranks over that debacle was accompanied by widespread criticism of the defense policy and leadership of the King and his senior army leaders. esult, the low morale ofarmed forces constitutes their most serious present weakness andajor concern of the.

Jordan's armed forcesersonnel strength5 of whichre officers

he army has traditionally been aorganization, but during the Palestinianin late November, when theagitatingarger role in defendingBank, the governmentecisionconscription. Nonetheless, it isconscripts will be carefully screened ineliminate potential subversives, arid that the

8. The over-all military budget for the last nine months6illion. This wasercent of the total budget and eight percent of the gross national product. US aid is provided under the Military Assistance Program, and tie UK also provides some assistance. Equipment procure-aent plans and the programmed expansion of the army's force level have created financial problems

which are complicated by tho fact that payments due Jordan from the Cairo-dominated United Arab Command (UAC) are in arrears and arc not likely to beunless thero ia an improvement in inter-Arab

relations.

9. Jordan has successfully resisted pressure from the UAC to procure Soviet arms and. encouraged by the recent US decision tonow shows every intention of adhering firmly to the position that it should continue to seek arms and equipment only from Western sources. The army's US-supplied equipment Includes medium tanks,mm guns, antitank weapons, small arms, trucks, and armored personnel carriers. British equipment includes light artillery pieces, armored and scout cars, Bnd Landrover

The air forces has mostly obsolescentHawker Hunter Jot fighters but soon will have partquadron ofs. The remainder of the squadron will be received later this year.also has an option to buy two1 squadrons. The Coast Guard has equipment largely of British origin which haa been acquired through purchase or aid since Three US patrol cratt were purchased

Leadership of Jordan's armed forces is nominally vested in the commander in chief, Field Marshal Habls Majalli, but ho hasigureheadeorganization5 stripped him ot most of his authority. Tho reorganization involved the dismissal, over his objections,arge number ot uneducated and incompetent officers and lmprovod the morale of younger, better-trained officers. It also paved the way tor the developmentore effective, modern fighting force.

The effective head of Jordan's armed forces Is the army's deputy commander in chief, Major General

Sharif Nasir

13 Major General Amir Kharamash, chief of staff of the army, shares effective power in the army with Sharif Nasir. year-oM Kiammasb is Jordan's most experienced aod best-traineain modern weapons and tactics andespected at all levels in the army.

The Armyolitical Instrument

whom theorces, gory come

Khamroatih is the archtype ot officer upon regime is increasingly dependent for rid reliable leadership of the armed Ho and most of the officers in this cate-from towns in the northern sector of the Bant Bank. roup they are balanced against the tribal-oriented bedouin from the central and southern areas on the East Bank who have been the traditional supporters of the monarchy.

IS, Bedouio still comprise abouthird ol the army. More importantly, they make up aboutercent of the personnel Ln the two armored brigades and aboutercent of the royal guards key units Id the army from theof the regime's Houurity. In tour ot theegular infantry battalions they constitute rc-iKM:ercent of tho total complement- Personnel true

the urban and northern areas of the East Bank are aboutercent of the army's total strength. Thus, Eastorare numerically predominant in the armyhole, though altogether they arehird of the country's population.

16. The Palestinian two-thirds of the populace is represented by onlyercent of the armed forces* total strength. Most of these are in the technical services; there are fewer in the artil-

none arc in the arnorcd units.

would like to win the allegiancePalestinians, and he has made efforts to doendeavor probably is futile, however, sinceof them he ls an

' The

King's hopes for appeasing the Palestiniansa sharp and perhaps permanent setback when the ovenber Israeli raid discredited hispolicy toward tha Israelis.

19. It is not uncommon in the Middle East for armies to seize power after defeat on theanderiod of internal unrest during which civilian authorities have relied on armed forces to maintain themselves in power. This

Palestinians' demonstrationsKing in the wake of tho Israeli raid forceduse army troops against them. Although thebeen called upon to suppress civilthe past, in this instance the action wasunpopular among many of thetogether with thalr dissatisfaction overinefiectivencaa against Israel, grumbling.

has happened In boih Syria and Egypt, for example. Armed coups also have occurred when popularcan find no peaceful means ofhange in the regime. Present conditions In Jordan are somewhat dlflerent, however, Jordan's defeat by Israel onovember was sufferedimited engagement and the subsequent unrest has subsided. Moreover, the Palestinian portion of the populace in Jordan which is acutely dissatisfied has been denied direct access to key posit lone tn the army from which it could move most offoctively

against the King.

20. The regime's security, thus, la largely dependent on the continued loyalty of the armed forces as they aro now constituted and on itsto radical appeals for the overthrow of Husayn. The bedouin, by and large, svem certain to stand firm for the King. Tbe real key may well be lo tbe army's East Back urban and northern clemeots which have asuupcd increasingly responsible in the military hierarchy. The King'sthat Jordan had to have new equipment in order to satisfy his army's demands for modern arms wasesponse to this group.

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