national intelligence estimate
6
The Outlook for Sino-Soviet Rel
w by
director of central intelligence
Conairrto' fa by ih* .
united states intelligence-boardi indicated6
contents
Page
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
II. RECENT
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENTS
SHORT-TERM PROSPEClS
V. THE OUTLOOK AFTER MAO
A Radical Deterioration of Relations
Prospects for an Easing of the Dispute
Consequences of an Improvement
The Long-Term
the outlook for sino-soviet relations
the problem
to examine current developments in iho sino-soviet dispute and their possible significance for the future relations of the twostates.
conclusions
believe that sino-soviet relations will continue tolong as the maoin piao leadership group retainsbul we do noteliberate break in state relations;are apprehensive about the costs ofevelopmentcommunist movement and the chinese probably fear itson hanoi.
so, we cannot completelyudden explosiondisputeew and more virulent form in the near term.war has added to the uncertainties and the urgencydispute, tho emotions of the principals involved could come torelevance, and unplanned incidents could provokeand more forceful retaliations. moreover, the situationis fluid; it is possible that domestic requirements orcause the leadership toeverance of all remainingcontact with the ussr.
the longer term, prospects for major changes leadinga further deterioration or an easing of the dispute appear toon what happens in china after mao. the emergence ofregime even more anti-soviet than its predecessor isof the possibilities. in this event, hostility could reach newintensity. all forms of cooperation, including even thechina of soviet supplies for north vietnam's war effort might
cease. Though serious military incidents along the Sino-Soviet border are also possible. Ix>th sides would almost certainly seek to avoid war.
emergenceore flexible leadership in Pekingto some casing of tensions. Wc do not believe that anywoidd offer the Soviets substantial concessions, but incertain benefits, such as renewed economic and militaryChinese leaders might be willing to damp down thea limited Sino-Soviet rapprochement would be likely to haveeffects on the international scene since world opinionto expect active discord between the two. An easing ofcould also lead to greater Sino-Soviet harmonyiswar. assuming its continuation.
any Sino-Soviet rapprochement in either thelonger term is likely to have definite limits. We expect little orcooperation at the party levelontinuing generalof barely suppressed suspicion and mistrust. Moreover,relationship would remain highly vulnerable tonational interestsroad range of issues, and if China'sto give punch to its national assertiveness. serious troubleparticularly over the frontiers.
discussion
i. introduction
The Sino-Soviet. dispute has greatly Intensified in recent months. Peking has stepped up the frequency and fuxy of its attacks on the USSR. Moscow, which for almost two years sought to convey an image of reason and restraint in the dispute, lias since August begun to reply forcefully in kind. China accuses the USSR of acting in collusion with the US. and Moscow charges Unit Peking serves the imperialist cause by refusing to cooperate with the rest of theworld. China claims that the Soviet leadership is deliberatelythe USSRourgeois society, Moscow assorts that currentand policies in China have "nothing iu common withnd each side now publicly contends that the other is beyond ledemption so long as its present leaders'are in control.
Hostility betweeu tbe USSR and Communist Cliina has, of course, existed for many years. Serious, though concealed, differences arose even during periods of relative liarmony in Stalin's time, and open antagonism dates back at leasthe reasons for Sino-Soviet friction and for the long decline in the relationship are complex, and over theubstantial number of issues have been involved in the dispute. Underlying everything have been conflicts of national interest and ambition, someargely traditional nature, such as Sino-Russian competition in Mongolia and Korea, and others which haveargely Communist character, such as the rivalry for political and ideological preeminence within the "socialistifferent stages of internaland great disparities in wealth and power have helped to createaltitudeseneral feeling of ill will between the two countries. Doctrinal disagreements and quarrels over Communist strategy, culturaland even personal enmities (as between Khrushchev and Mao) have all played important roles. Certain key moves made in the dispute have also stimulated discord and helped to give theomentum of its own: for example, the USSR's refusal in theo satisfy Cluna's demands for the wherewithal touclear weapons capability, and Peking's decision in the same period to challenge Moscow's dominance in the Bloc.
Three developments appear to have conUibuted the most to the current sharpening of the dispute. First, China's internal quarrels have beenby the mounting violence in polemical attacks on tbe USSR and itsin the movement. The campaign against domestic revisionists and anti-Maoists, part of an apparent struggle within the Chinese leadership, has evidently encouraged comparable attacks on Mao's principal enemies abroad as welL Secondly, China's growing isolation within the Communistis now virtually without significantfrustrated andPeking, and this seems to have reinforced its determination to remain arrogant and intransigentis the USSR. Finally, the war in Vietnam hai
ry are* of dissrusion. since it involves the most fundamental oyct Commiiniit ltiategy and tactics.
II. RECENT BACKGROUND
M-ir! Soviet leaders decided latehortly alter thrirof power, that Soviet policy toward China was sorely in need ol repair. They apparently believed that Khrushchev had caused unnecessary damage to Soviet prestige and leadership of the CommtinUtit Insistence on engaging polemically with Peking and his rfiorts to commit other partiesormal repudiation of Chinese views. They did not wish to comprotmvc Out USSR's basic political and ideological position in tbe dispute, and probably had no strong exportation that relations with China could be significantlyBut tbey did hopeew approach could reveno growing support lor the Chinese within the movement and eventually help to Isolate Peking from the rest of the Communist world.
To thin end. Khrushchev's successors acted with calculated restraint,polemics, retreating from demands for an anti-Chinese internationalconference, and. in general, seeking to shift the blame for the continuing dispute onto Peking. At tbe same time, partly to disprove Chinese charges ot Soviet unrebJbiUty and softness, and partly to contest actively with Peking for influence In Hanoi, tbey abo sought to reestablish tbe USSR'sa for Asian power and publicly committed themselves to increase thrir support of North Vietnam. And, in support of this general line, they placed stricter limits on negotiations with the West andumber of cokl-war themes Into then propaganda.
Tbo ClilneM) Cornmunists seem imtialry to has* misread Khrushchev's fall from powerlow against revisionism andurther vindication of thetr own haith revolutionary line. They soon rebuffed the eflorts of tbe new Soviet leadcrship to mute polemics, and were apparenUyr theof the new Soviet tactics. They were abo unprepared for the wile* ol scOwick* they encountered abroad: for example, the failure of their droits to form an Afro-Asian front5 without Soviet participation, highlighted by the fiasco over the Algiers conference; the loss of their position in Indonesia; the charjctcrini lion of Uicir trade policies by the previously friendly Castrolackmail; and, in general, their growing unpopularity among Afro-Asian neutralists.
Theame aware that things were going against them and that some of iheir early supporters, sueh as the Japanese Communists and the North Koreans, were beginning to drift away from their camp. Rut rather than change course, they persisted in unyielding policies and insisted tliat "temporarycould not deflect tliem from long-term objectives. Even their growing vulnerability to Soviet allegations that only China stood in the way of unified Communist support (or North Vietnam did not persuade them to modify policies. Last spring, in fact. Pekingomestic line which could hardly have
been fashioned Io do II more harm in the movement or render it more susceptible to Soviet ridicule and cries of alarm. Indeed, all of the world's Communist Parties have been mystified by the course of events in China, and virtually all have been alienated by the antiparty aspects of Red Guard rampages, theof Maoist megalomania and Chinese chauvinism, and the general turmoil which seems to have swept over China.
iii. current problems and developments
8 The USSR and Communist China today find it difficult to maintain even the pretenseeaningful political and military alliance. Party contacts practically do not exist. State relations arc minimal, formal, and often not polite. Cultural contacts arc kept up, butery small scale. Trade, whicheak of overillionank to0 million last year and will probably decline even further this year. Only negligible quantities of military supplies are still shipped front tbe USSR, principally certain spare parts contracted for earlier and items of equipment which the Chinese could produce themselves or obtain ehewhere.0 Treaty ol Friendship. Alliance, and Mutual Assistance has not been formally renounced, but both sides have expressed doubt as to its continuing validity; Peking has indicated that it does not counteven necessarilymilitary assistance, and the USSR has clearly implied that in many circumstances it would not feel at all bound to extend such assistance. Tbe two countries do not even cooperate easily Or well on problems associated with the provision of military assistance to North Vietnam. Peking has in various ways hampered the delivery of Soviet equipment to North Vietnam.
Situation on the Border. Tension has existed along thesince at2 (when0 border tribesmen instirred up by the Soviets, emigrated en masse to the USSR).Moscow has undertaken some modest reinforcement of its militaryforces in regions near China, especially opposite Sinkiang andIt has also stepped up its military assistance to Mongolia andbegan the construction of an air defense system in that country.have apparently begun to give some attention to air defenses inSinkiang bordering the USSR. They have also sought to impose stiffgoverning tbe use of border rivers and have apparentlySoviets along the land frontiers as well.
of the Communist Movement. Sino-Soviet rivalry withinCommunist movement is still bitter and intense. The Chinesevilify the .USSR, and define their views as "universalhethe Chinese to discredit themselves in this way and try, for the mostto block Peking's maneuvers. The character of thishas changed greatly over the past two years. The USSR mustwith the split, partly because of the maneuverability it gives partiesanxious to avoid Soviet domination, and partlyumber ofa neutral posture in the dispute, including, most notably, the North
Vietnamese. But while Moscow was confronted only two years agoeriouslo its leadership, today ithina which can count on full support only from Albania, the Communist Parly of Newandful of tiny splinter groups,mall number of front groups which are obviously Chinese controlled.
Impact Of the Vietnamese War. The Soviets have increasingly sought to use ihe Vietnamese war as an issue against Cliina. They have cliarged, for example, that Peking's failure to cooperate had prolonged the war byquick end" io USnd they have employed their aid to North Vietnameans to increase their influence in Hanoi at Chinese expense, and in tliis they have apparently had some success. But while thus offering (Ite Soviets an effective tool to use against the Chinese, the war also tcuds to limit the USSR's maneuverability In the dispute. Moscow must contend with Hanoi's refusal to choose sides, which means also that North Vietnam islo accept Soviet political guidance on the conduct of the war,,Chinese control Over direct land and air supply routes to North Vietnamactor limiting Soviet influence in Hanoi.
The eventual outcome of the war will clearlyajor bearing on the further course of the Sino-Soviet quarrel The Soviet attitude toward the war appears to be mixed. The effect il has had In Imposing strains on American resources and burdens on American relations with Europe and friendly countries elsewhere must be seen as advantageous. On Ihe other hand, the Soviets are aware also thai the situation carries some risk of direct confrontation which, in that area and under present circumstances, they must wish to avoid. For (hem. (lie optimum outcome would be one which,olitical process perhapsa negotiation, gaveood prospect of achieving lis aims in South Vietnam and thusajor reverse on US policy. Evidently the Soviets do not think that the moment lias yet come when they can set incenario which would aid in this way. But should they be able to, in the face of continuing Chinese oppositionolitical solution, they wouldajor blow al Peking's influence among the Asian Communists which would also go far lo reestablish Moscow's ascendancy throughout Ihe Communist movement.
For their part, the Chinese apparently wish for the present to see Ihe Vietnam struggle continue. They see itrime examplepeople's war"
waged against their main enemy, US imperialism. They hope for an outcome which would support their claim thai this Maoist strategy is essential to revo-lulionary advance and al the same time diminish Soviel claims to giveguidance to the revolutionary struggle.
IV. SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
clear pattern emerges from the most recent developments in ihemutual expulsions of the few remaining students, ihe Chinesethe Soviet Embassy in Peking, the exchanges of diplomatic protestrising pitch of invective, and tlie hints from both eapilals of growingover the transshipment of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam. Ordinarily,
an accelerating deterioration of relations such a! this might be expected to leadomplete and final break, Neither China nor the USSR, however, has allowed matters to get completely out of hand,
Peking seems willing to run the risk oformal break inrelations, but seems reluctant to take tbe final step itself. It almostwants to avoid the onus for doing so. It may, in addition, wish tootal rupture becauseoncern that this would complicate the Vietnamese war awl relations with Hanoi, and, perhaps, becauseear that Hanoi, if forced lo choose, might align itself with the USSR.
The Soviets probably hope toormal break in stale relations. They probably find their presence in Peking usefulumber of veryreasons, including the maintenanceistening post They may also feel that ihe continued show of (he Sonet flag provides some encouragement to any elements in the Chinese Party which oppose present Maoist policies and some opportunity for contacts with such elements if future conditions permit. More important, they continue to be impressed with the probable costs ofa break in terms of iheir relations with other Communist parties.
A further deterioration of relations appears to be the most likely near-term prospect in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviets for their part will wish to exploit what they perceive lo be growing Chinese weaknesses. They may. for example, state publicly what they have already suggested privately: the Mao-Lin Piao regime is abandoning communism and becoming, inascist dictatorship. Some rive in the frequency, though probably not the magnitude, of incidents along the Sino-Soviet border also seems likely. Continuedassociated with the transit across China of Soviet supplies for Vietnam seem almost certain. Forced reductions in the size of diplomatic missions are possible. Rut we do noteliberate formal rupture in state relations between the two countries; the Soviets will probably remain generallyabout its possible costs in the movement, and the Chinese willcontinue to fear its possible impact in Hanoi.
The Soviets are genuinely concerned about the trend of events in China. They also wish to capitalize on Ihe apprehensions of others andnsure China's isolation in the Communist movement For these reasons, Moscow wfilcontinue to seek some form of international Communist condemnation of Chinese extremism and obstructionism. But the Soviets know that many parties, though hostile to Peking, would not favor an international conference explicitly called for lhat purpose, or any enterprise which threatened to expel the Chinese from tbe movemeni.
A further intensification of'ihe dispute is not itself likely to alter China's bellicose international stance or its foreign policies generally. It might, however, have some effects on ihe USSR's foreign policies. Wc do not believe thaiSino-Soviet friction automaticallyommensurate Soviet effort to improve relations with the West. But, as China has become more and more
isolated and discredited, the Soviets have become less sensitive to Chinese accusations and pnrhapv tens responsive to Chinese pressures for mibtaucy. Since August, for example, there haveimbcr of signs that the USSR has become more intesestcd in some movement in its relations with the US. In any case,imple matter of prudence. Moscow's inclination to avoid crises in the West would probably be reinforcedear of possible major difficulties In the East.
cannot completelyudden explosion of the dispute intoand even more virulent form, even in the near term. Tbe Vietnameseadded to the uncertainties and has no doubt increased the sense ofwith the contest. The emotions of tho chief actors in thecome to have even greater relevance, and unplanned incidents couldeven greater hostility and lead to new forms of mutual retaliation.the internal situation in China is fluid; it is possible that domesticor pressures might cairse the leadership toeverance of allvestiges of contact.
V. THE OUTLOOK AFTER MAO
for significant changes in the Sino-Sovietradical detertoratlou or an easing of dieappear to rest inon what happens in China. We cannot foresee, however, wliat isto emerge hum the present turmoil in Peking, nor can we estimateof possible developments.
A Radical Deterioration of Relations
emergence after Maohinese regime even less flexible andthan itsertainly one of the possibibocs- Sucheither for its own purposes or because of miscalculation,ead with the USSB- The ways in which thb could be done,consequences of such an act, ore beyond counting. Hostility soto leadeverance of all forms of cooperation concerning Vietnamone possibility. Serious military incidents along the Sino-Sovietalso possible, but both sides would almost certainly seek to avoid war.would be constrained by its mibtary inferiority and tbe USSR byover tho military and political costs.
Prospects for an Easing of the Dispute
present Sovietany likely successor* toto Peking for urmeovemeots ta tbe Sino-Soviet relationship. Tbey area mind, and see oo need, for any substantial changes in their ownthus convincrd that most of tbe movement toward compromisefrom China, they surely do not expect this from the existing ChineseThey may calculate, however, that tbe successor regime will bemen less anti Soviet than Mao. Tbe Soviet leaders may even beUeve that the
ET
present radical course of Chinese policy will hasten the day when there willeaction against tbe radical Maoist line.
Slwuldeaction occur. Moscow might then hope for some kind of grand Communist unity under Soviet sponsorship, but ii almost certainly would not countestoration of the close relations it enjoyed with Peking in the early and. The Soviet leaders probably would try, however, toew leadership In Peking lo end Chinas overt anti-Soviet campaign and its competition with the USSR in the Third World, in Vietnam, and in the international movement. As part of this program, they almost certainly would offer the Chinese economic aid.
A successor leadership in Peking might be interested in an improvement of relations, but wc do not believe that any Chinese regime would be likely to offer substantial concessions to this end. Mao's pcisonality certainty played an Important role in setting the tone of the Sino-Soviet polemic and his views also contributed lo the substance of the dispute, as did Khrushchev's. But Mao's departure from ihe scene and his replacementore flexiblewould not heal all the wounds or remove basic issues. The Chineseas ajustgenuinely io feel that it Is (he aggrieved party in the dispute and that it has been the victimouble-cross, specifically, the USSR's failure to fulfill promises to give China extensive technical, economic, and especially military assistance. More important, any conceivable newui Peking is likely to retain strong feelings about Chinese nationalcultural and Ideological superiority, and perhaps racial superiority as well. Divergent Chinese and Soviel national interests are likely toource of friction and distrust for many years to come.
Consequences of an Improvement
Nevertheless, we believeuture Chinese leadership mightamping down of the dispute andesumption of some forms of cooperation wiih Ihe Soviets. It might sec benefits, fox example, in aof Soviel economic, technical, and military aid programs. It might see some virtue in attempting to revive the credibility of past Soviet commitments to defend China. And it might be willing, in exchange for such benefits, to reduce polemics and to agree to cooperate with Ihe USSR in Vietnam if the war was still in progress.
Such an agreement might even Include harmony among Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi concerning overall strategy and the question of the war's continuation or settlement If, in these circumstances, the decision were made to continue the fighting, Hanoi would benefit from the establishment of Sino-Soviet cooperationumber of ways. Il would probably receive military supplies somewhat faster and perhaps in greater quantity; the establishment in China of supply bases for Soviet materiel, for example, would expedite shipment and perhapsan Improvement in the mix of weapons delivered. reater degree
of unity would give Hanoi'* politwal statements and warnings somewhat more force than in tbe past.
ery limitedbetween the USSR and Cwnmunnt China would be bach/ to have an eScxi on th* international scenehole. World opinion has come to expect active discord between the two. and world politic* rests in part on the assumption of its continuation. The changes in opinion and politics which would probably How from any such adjustment in the Sino-Soviet relationship, however, arc not easily foreseen. They might be subtle and verylow renewal of conBdenoe within tho Communist movement, for example,rowth of anxiety in Europe alxnil the USSR's Intentions In the West, now thai its frontiers in the East were more "swum" Or Ihey could be more substantial, as in Vietnam, and perhaps as in India, which might fear that any trend loward Sino Soviet harmony would seriously llirealcn it* security interest. Some ofould probably be present even lliough, as we believeimited rapprochement failed to hide aO evidence of continuing basic differences and clashes of interests.
Ihe long Term View
ver the long term, lo thn extent that China proved successful in realizing economic, technical and mihfaiy progress, Soviel fearstrong China on lis holders arc likely lo grow. Tht- prospectowerful Cliiua is probably some way off in Soviet calculations, ami would not. in any case, necessarily prevent Moscow from seeking lo normalize, relations. But It would serve, we think, to limit tho USSR's mclinalion to consider China as an ally and to reinforce other alternatives in Soviet foreign policy. These alternatives will probably include cODlimiing interest in good relation* with Japan and India, as potentialto Chinese influence in Asia, and. overore urgent interestuiopean settlement.
n Ihe Chinese side, while change* in the regime and its policies may produce an iolerest in normalizing relattons with the USSR in order lo obtain econornic and military assistance. Peking is not likely to be willing lo pay muchrtMioal price for such aid. Il almost certainly would not accept Soviet leadership in the world Communist inovenient. renounce its Iradilioru) interests In border areas, or forgo its claim*eading role in both Asian and world affairs. China's requirements, political and economic, are likely lo cause any non-Muoist accessor regime lo look to Japan and the West as ihe major source of (he necessary capital and technology for China's development.
.'II. Tims, while we Imlleve lhal (ho Sino-Soviet relationship could OODMe characterized by improved slale-lo-Htutc relationshipselaxation in the billet ideological struggle, we expect little or no positive cooperation nl the party levelontinuing general atmosphere of barely suppressed suspicion and mistrust Moreover, the relationship would remain highly vulnerable to clashes of national interestroad range of issues, and if Cliina's power begjn to give punch to its national anrrtiserious trouble could develop, particularly over the fronliers-
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