ON THE TRAIL OF THE ALEXANDROVSK

Created: 12/1/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

ELEASEIA KiSiearSSl REVIEW PBOCRflM

STUDIES IN

INTELLIGENCE

A collcclton ol oiliclos on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of

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A seexesioe special shipment in the Cuban missile crisis.

ON TBE TRAIL OFXANDROVSK Dwayne Anderson

Moot often. In militaryhotographs are Studied 'with the purpose of establishing military capabilities. Barracks,and Uunchers are counted to determine order-of-battle strength. Missiles, tanks, and submarines are measured to determine theirIn one case, however, this process led to an unusualof photographs and the belated discoveryovietthat had peaked at tbe crucial juocture between the buildup and withdrawal of strategic missiles in Cuba.

Quick Bound Trip

Inong after the most critical days of the Cubantack of photographs taken in early October of Soviet naval bases in the Kola Islet arrived in Washington. One of these,erchant ship at the Cuba Okolnaya submarine missile support facility, touched off the analytic chm^.

A civilian ship at this highly secure missile installation seemed incongruous enough toheck on the Cuba Okolnaya files worth while. Photos dating back several years were reviewed. No other merchant ships were seen. No component of the VS. intefli* gence community had evidence that any cargo ships except naval auxiliaries ever put into the base. Tbe presence of this ship, the Alexarjdrovsk, was now clearly unusual and called for further analytic ixiquiry.

The date of thectober,ine of attack. This was shortly after the first deliveries ofnd MHBM's to Cuba. Could the Alcaandrovsk have been Cuba bound and could she haveilitary cargo? If so, what would the particular cargo be and why was it being shipped from this Arctic base when all other such shipments, as far as we knew, bad been made from Baltic and Black Sea potts?

Aerial photographs of all ships bound for Cuba were reexamined. No Alexandrovsk. The odds were against her having slipped through the VS. air surveillance net; three out of every four ships going

to Cuba bad been picked up. Interest in Ihe Alexandrovsk waned, and her presence at the naval base seemed likely to become just another in tbe long list of unsolved intelligence anomalies.

One routine step remained,review all the photographs of ships returning from Cuba to the Soviet Union. This was done, and eureka! there sheaval aircraft had picked her up onovember,est, traveling light and fast, as shownoreover, several interesting vehicles, mdod-Ing six missile nose cone vans, were on board (towardhough other vessels would also leave Cuba with such nose cone vans, the Alexandrovsk had been one of the first to leave- Partially opened hatches suggested that additional personnel may bave been on board, living in the taeea-deck area. Research was again stepped up.

More facts were excavated. Checks of shipping data now showed that the Alexandrovsk was an old-timer in the Cuba trade but all ber previous voyages bad originated in tbe Baltic. In further restudy of air photography of Cuban ports ft was found that she was at Marielovember. (She may have escaped surveillance oo the way in by taking an unusual, southerly course, perhaps for that veryAt Cuba Okolnaya, it was known, nuclear warheads were probably stored and serviced: tbe presence of submarine missiles was certain. Also of interest at this baseement arch building near the waterfront that very closely resembled those built near missile sites fa Cuba. Finally, newer photography of Cuba Okolnaya showed the Alexandrovsk bock there onovember with the vehicles still on deck.

CliTtONOLOCY2

Cubanof the Alexxndrovsk

Euiy August

First activity at SAM sites and

nfl> sites noted Komar-class cruise missile boats

Late

First known delivery of MIG-

ighters Ffrst activity at IRBM/MRBM

sites

Alexandrovsk arrives in Kola inlet

Late SeptembeT

First known deb very of MRBM

Alexandrovsk at Cuba Okolnaya submarine missilecJober

rriissile to launch site First knovru delivery ofet light botnbera Early October First identified flight of MICighters

Late Octobcr Ouarantinc

proclaniatron,

eneamp-

October Soviet ground force men's oocupted

Early November Soviets begin dismantling

MRBM/1RBM sites MRBM/IRBM missies

out of Cuba

ovember

Alexandrovsk probably arrived in Cuba hist before quarantine

Alexandrovsk at Marielo-vembex

Alcxaodrovsk photographed at sea with nose cone vans on deck,ovember

Alexandrovsk back at Cubabase

Deadly Burden

The schedule of the Alexandrovsk now established and allon the ship wrung out, ft remained to determineof her cargo. Inn the midst of rumors ofin Cuba, underwater launchers, and strategic weapons storedany information on hist what the Soviets bad sent in orwas sHU of. bigh^tacrcst Moreover, .rJatt^eaaathe military buildup were important in evaluating Sovietthen and

Collecting mformatioo on this particular shipment had beenanalyzing it was much more so. Lists of pUusfble and possible cargoes were prepared, measured against likely Soviet requirements, and then examined in context of what the Cuba Okolnaya base could supply. Hypothesis after hypothesis was shot down. Were the Sovietssending submarine ballistic missiles to Cuba? Unlikely. How about nuclear bombs for theombers? Also unlikely. At, one point no hypotheses were leftew, phocrdx-Ukc. rose from the analytic ash pile.

Ooe of the most plausible Dossibilities, and certainly the mostwas that MRBM nuclear warheads bad been carried by the Alexandrovsk. Evidence bearing on this hypothesis and on related questions was again sifted. Was Cubaikelypoint for MRBM equipment? Were naval and Strategic Rocket Force nuclear warheads interchangeable? Finally, were some of the basic identifications used in the analysis correct? Werenose cone vans" really missile nose cone vans? Were cement arch buildings actually meant for nuclear warhead storage? La both cases the answerualified yes.

Clearly the Soviets had Intended to send nuclear warheads to Cuba; their strategic missiles were useless without them. What was not certain was whether they actually arrived, and this question seemed worth trying to answer even months after tbe crucial October* November period. If they had not been delivered the Soviets would have bad no capability at all for attacking the United States with Cuba-based missiles daring tbe crisis, and this might have had some bearing on their abject withdrawal If, on tbe other band, thewere present, the Soviet surrender was even snore complete.

Overhead photography of Cuban installations bad shown warhead handling and storage facauties to have been constructed but could

ncither establish dot rule out die presence of the warheadsA few Soviet public statements bad implied that theyand Deputy Foreign Minister Kurnetsov said that nodwere taken out of Cuba immediately after the de^tionto remove tbe missiles. This, tf true, would fit In withthat tbe Alexandrovsk was one of tbe first ships to leavedecision. But there was do really cogent reason for believingsuUernenta,

Additional research did not resolve tbe Aleaandrovsk questionbut it' did sharpen the picture of what was and what was

not known It was dear that the Alexandrovsk did make an unusual voyage to and from Cubaritical period. She called at the probable nuclear storage facility at Cuba Okolnaya before bervoyage and again on ber return, when sheeck cargo of Dose cone vans. If the Soviets bad wanted to avoid having an incoming shipment of nuclear warlieadt monitored for radioactivity il, the Turkish or Danish Straits, the simplest way would have been to send them from tbe north. It could be concluded that themay have carried some.

Thushree months' chase which involved Intelligenceide variety of scattered sources and analytic assistance fromorganizations tn the intelligence community. The results were only presumptive, we will probably never learn with assurance what the ship carried. But the exercise provided atmall increment in our understanding of the Cuban crisis.

Original document.

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