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Developments Following the UN General Assembly Resolution to Terminate the South-West Africa
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION TOTHE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA MANDATE
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable development', particularly reaction! of key countries, following the recent UN Ccueral Assembly resolutionSouth Africa's mandate in South-Wcst Africa and placing the territory under direct UN responiibility.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6 UN Ceneial Assembly resolutionAfrica's inaiidaic in South-West Africa and placing thodirect UN responsibility has set the stage for athe UN and South Africa. Talks through diplomaticproduce some new South African proposals, pet-haps leadingplan by which Pretoria would continue to adounistcr theUN supcrviiioo. But it is highly unlikely that the Southagree to give up administration ol Ihe territory or to acceptof itse believe tho African statesfor nothing less than tho ouster of South Africa from )
believe it unlikely that the Security Council wouldeconomic or military sanctions against South Africa.tli* Security Council did adopt mandatory economic sanctions, itthat all Luipoiiaiit countries would effectively enforce If all South Africa's major Uadlog partners cooperated in
Thornai L.he Pin* Irer lligei.eetncuili. fXpaitnwnt of Stale, brlievn that It i> peviWe that the South Afifc-.ru might accept Kuno uVgno of Uf*t tlelrof South Wett Atilrra, although Le agieet that the triune, are agairut eueh an aum^iuiut
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applying economic sanction* oveTa protracted period, tills might bring some rrrodibcation in South African attitudes. But in this case, we think it more likely that the South Africans would become even more intransigent.
C. We farther believe that any attempt forcibly to dislodge South Africa's Itold on South-Wcst Africa wouldajor militaryeven if hackedecurity Councd resolution orUniting forresolution of the General Assembly. It is virtually certain that none of live major European poweis. including the USSR, would provide sufficient financial or military force to oust South Africa from South-Wot Africa. (Poms.
DISCUSSION
I.SOUTH-WEST AFRICA ISSUE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
October lOffi, the UN General AwfnblyesolutionAfrica's mandate in South-West Africa nnrl making the territory aresponsibility. The resolution also established an Ad Hoc Conuniti.eeAfrica to iceotnrntnd practical infant to administer the territoryindependentr. and lo reportcrxia) Asseintly special session byKor the next few months, the matters of principal importance will boof tt* Mack African states, the weak of the Ad Hoc Committee, aadof South Afiica. Al! of initial maneuvering draws, lo IUN will Iacc the problem of how. in fact, to icnajve South-West AfricaAfrica's fursdJetion- At tlili puiM. the positions of the permanentcf the Security Council and of certain other interested countries wlfl gain
Afikon Reactions
rot toon black Africans South Africa Is ihe leal larger. SouthAYcst Africa is important primarily asmeans of bringing US and UK power lo bear on South Africa. Ihe black African stales, already frustrated and bitter over liteof numerous past UN resolutions, will seek to apply new pressures to precipitate a
Ust step, the Africans will almost certainly seek an early lest of South Africa's intentions with regard lo tho Cenrial Assembly resolution. The Africans are aware that in older to obtain tho widest possible backing for their cause at the UN, they shouldase suited to UN procedures Tbcrcfoie, they will probably press the Ad Hoc Committee toolitical mission to South-West Afiica or. altoostivcly. lo South Africa. Ihe Afrkrns alrrosl certainly calculate that Pretoriause toN mMon even lo enter the territory and lhat this wouM snake morehowdown between tho UN and South Africa at ihe. time of Ihe special session Even if the South Africans wereloN groupisit the mandate,esture vsould fall far short of satisfying the Africans who wan* to separate South West Africa from South Africa's orotic).
Afrrto* Reoctions
rime Ministereath and Vtaalcr'i succession have not altered South AfsicVs basic intransigence on tho South-Wesl Africa issue. Retention ofrr it ory is icgarded by most while South Africans, regardless ofatter of national ptcsttgo and as necessary to tho security of their country. The International Cotiit of Justice (ICJ) decision in0 dil-
missingase biought by Ethiopia and Liberia* was seeai by Iho South Africansindication of their legal and moral position. Hence, they were offended to have tlie US and UK Com uruenis endorse the proposition that Pretoria hat forfeited Its right to ihe mandate. Ihe Fact that the UK and France failed to support, and the US voted against, South Africa's position In tho General Assembly has contributed further ty the beleaguered slate of inind of the South African white*
ithout yielding any of the substance of their position, the South Africans are unlikely to take provocative action if they can avoid it. New to the Job and aware of theotstcr is likely lo act cautiously in foreigne has allowed Southepresentativesittle more Freedom of action than they had under Vcrwoerd, and this has given Ihe appearance of some flexibility, their responses, particularly the Foreign Minister's, to tho recent Crncral Assembly debates on South-West Africa have been moderate.the South African! have misgivings over their growing isolation from the1 West, and Ihe govunmefd Iropcs lo Veep lines open lo the US and remain on good terms with (be UK, if possible.
ft In these circumstances, Pretoria will probably avoid bringing troops into the territory, which would violate the terms of Ihe mandate. Nor do we think that South Africa will annex South-West Africa or begin to cany out the Odccdaal Commissioa recommendations to establishhich would serve chiefly to inflame many UN members. But it will almost certainly tighten its already potvcriul grip on South-Wesf. Africa bytegra'.ing scene of the. territory's administrative and financial institutions with those of the Republic, by increasing tho police force, and by gradually introducing aUc-ngc Internal security measures in tlic tcriitoty. None of tho skirmishing In the UN will have much effect on Ihe situation in the barren reaches of South-Wwt Africa. There is little likelihood of significant political action by nonwbitts, both because of tribal disunity and light security contols. Externally based nationalist groups will probably attempt lo Infiltrate guerrillas, but there is little doubt that South African security forces can deal with any threats that arise.
The South African Government would prefer to remain In the UN. It will bo likely to do so atntil Ihe Genera! Assembly has acted on tho Ad Hoc Committees report, and Ujood that time if possible, depending oatuic of any Security Council action. South Africa wo*jfd alrriost certainly leave the UN if sanctions of anyc voted, or at Ihe first sign of enforcement arfon. The government would do soatter of rwtioo.il pride, and would have broad public support.
Indeed, the South Africans are increasingly confident of their ability to rttjo outaiticnhrly in view of the failure of snrKtions in Southern Rhodesia, nnd because of their own steadily growing self-su'Eciency. Moreover, they have considerable confidence In their ability to stave off the imposition of
' SeeS'lEtfi, TiobaUe fteperouisiom ofSvutb-WYst AfricauoeECRET.
jodieeie. because otheralvj suffer fturn ll-em They can retaliate cconomkaHy against the UK.i wellby action against the small, [wc slatci of Botswana and Lesotho, andeucr eatcnt Swauland. which aie virtually economic hostages to South. Africa and for which the UK feels rcspousibility.
TalVa though dipiWaticay produce some new South African propOAilt, perhaps leadinglan by which Pretoria would continue tothe tcniloty under UN supcivicion. But It is highly unlikely tliat the South Africans wilt agree to give up adininislialion cf the territory or to accept UN supervision of Itsrj believe the African states will utile fx nothing less linn the Ouster of South Africa from South West Africa.
Sometime after Ihe Ad Hoc Committee reports lo Ihe General Assembly, il will have probably become apparent that thr re was-scant hope of negotiating South Africa out of South-Wot Africa. The General Assembly thenall upon the Security Council to compel compliance with the Assembly's earlier decision lo strip South Africa of its mandate. In this arena, the reactions of the major powers would be of crucial hnrroctance since they would be called upon to deal with the key questions concerning theontrol is to befrom South Africa: who It to administer Ihe area ooce the UN obtains control; who it tothe adnunbtraoonr'
II. IHE SOUTHWfSf AFRICA ISSUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL A. Reactions of the Pern-oncnl Members of tho Security Council
of tbe permanent memhets of the Security Council willto avoid or at least to minimize its direct entanglement in thisand will strongly resist new and potentially .cipftuive commitmentt toor to Ihe African cause. Oo the other hand, each will ttriv* to avoid,possible, giving offense to the Africans. Some of tbe peirnarrentseek whenever possible lo aiOtd vetoing African-backed proposal!in tho Security Council will depend in pari on Ihe circumslancesmoment at the UN, positions taken on earlier resolutions, and theof the ttsolution at hind, as well as cc^iidcraUocss of natio.nlapart from those in play at the UN.
*Mr. Tbomsi L. Hughes,sreelor of Intelligence anJ rUwiTeh, IVputincui ofaver (Kit it is povlble that the SouUS Africans mightome degree of UN suptMiIcithai* adetMnitam of Seuth-VVesI Afrfca. although he agrees that the cbaacrta arsaepsssetrti. Kc behoesa uftwUd South African coneeasiora Ono'cnr, trc-iMntoight alteet thenits prOjiin tfie riMmale.
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he USSR Since Soulh-WST Africa isiting lo thoin . > Africa.lio cheap, the
USSR and its alliescontinue lo opto the iuue to lockhe African posit .on at every opportunity. The USSR rt on record at the UN favoringCouncil action if nece**ary to take away the mandate,dopted this position NmtMdv, Propaganda statements apart, how-cvrr, ihe USSR to date has acted with considerable restraint in this mailer, and we think it would ptelci that tlie Africans cope with the South-Wesl Africainside (lie Organisation of African Unity (OAU) And there are limits on how fat Iheiipand to go on behalf of tl* Africans, particularly In ti* UN.
e think the Soviets will not tale the lead in any proposed Securityaction. Above all. they will seek to avoid being uianeuveicdosition 'where they would be the decisive force, or where ihey might have to cast the dccWve vole. They would, however, go along with economic sanctions; on the calculation that ihis would make considerable trouble for the West and vny little for themselves. They would readily suppott diplomatic sanctions.roposal lot military sanctions cameote in the Security Council, the USSR might End it expedient to support it, despite its record of opposition lo UN peacekeeping forces. Moscow's past opposition In UN peacekeeping forces has been based on Ihe ptoposition Ihsl the Ccneral Assemblyuthority lo initiate military action; Moscow has not denied that the Security Council has such authority. In tl* unlikely eventN force is author red by Security Council action, it is possible Ihal the USSR might offer token financial or material support, but It would be highly unlikely lo provide military manpower.
IS. Notionalist China would almost certainty suppott almost any Africanbecause it needs African backing oo the question of Peking's membership in tbe UN.
o. Altitudes of Other Interested Stoics
ojltigtff. Salaiai tan be counted on to excitisc prudence In conducting Poi in gal's policies with respect to the South-West Afiica problem. Ksseotially, of course, he hopes tliai portugal't ovnx-as provinces. Angola and Morambicjuc. can avoid being cauglit up in the dispute. They can do so unless tho UN should undertake toaval blockade against South Africa. In that event, Safe/ar would probably cooperate with South Africa, for he would not wanti-lack African state Imrncdiately south ol Angola. However, ho would not do so blatantly. Salarar is probably cuufidcut that bo could carry oo low-Vey reoperation with Sou'h Africauch fear of inter ft rence from tl* UN. since any baaekade or sanctions agatnst Mo/arnf-to/te and Angola would have achsrie effects on neighboring Malawi, 'Zambia. Congowart-land, and Southern Rhodesia, all of which depend In largo rneasuro on trarssport routes through these territoi le*.
Security Council ond Ihe Block African Nolions
Many members of the Security Council are likely toraduatedbeginning with limited political sanctions agaimt Pretoriaresolution to withdraw diplomatic chiefs ofollowed by communications cutoffs, voluntary trade sanctions, selective mandatory sanctions, and the like. The Africans will be impatient with this approach. They would demand at least selective economic satxtJons to begin with {most likely an embargo on oilhey would probablytrong etfott to apply full sanctions against South Afiica. By achieving suppoit for any kind of economic sanctions the Africa<xi ss-ould hope to commit others iirevocabh/ to their aide.
Paitly for this reason and partly because the Africans are well aware of thevcalncssos, they would probably scuttle any Security Council attempt to turn over the South-Wesl Africa Issue to the OAU, as the regionalconcerned. Nor is there morelim cliance athat they would return the problem to tho 1CJ, as the UK and France would like.
Despite ihe factors mentioned la the preceding paragraphs militating against the Imposition of mandatory economic sanctions by the Security Council, wo cannot ciclude the possibility that over time some of the attitudes of the permanent members may be modified. UN consideration of the South-West Africa issue willrolonged process,ingle decisive confrontation, and the development of the Khodcsian situation may make it more difficult for certain UN members to vote against sanctions.
of Sanctions
tho Security Councilesolution imposing economicSouth Africa, it is unlikely that all important countries would effectivelythe measure. Ihe South African economy is sufficiently strong toImpact In many ways, probablyrotracted period of time. If allmajor trading paitncts cooperated in applying eeonoiTic sanctionsprotracted period, this might bring some modification in South Africanin this case, we flunk it mora likely that the South Africans would become
If economic saiistionsImposed, and it became clear that South Africa remained essentially unshaken, tho Africans would then cooeeutrate their efforts On gaining Security Council support for military sanctions against South Africa. Faihite to win Security Council backing for criilitaiy satictioris might lead the African countries to picss for General Assembly action. Should the Security Council fail to agree on military sanctions, two thirds of the members of the General Assembly could lecotnmtnd collective measures, including the use of
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armed force, similar to<esolutionuring the Korean crisis inhifaction, touevtr. wuuM icnjuke wen* vol alien to Ihe longs tanling j" blcm of financing UN iieaeeheeping oretahont. and il would'he necessary lo overcome Soviet and Itesch objections lo General Assembly effuils lu establish mtlit-uy forefs. More-over, il would requirr active support by at least one major power.
e believe thai any atlenvpt fatibtyouth Africa'i hold on South-West Africa wouldajor rmliliry effort, even if batknlecurity Council rrsotulioei orUniting for reacc" revolution of ihe General AsscintJr. It ii virtually certain that none o( Ihe major European powers,tine US&R, WuuU piuixJc auCcknl tnaricial ororce lo ouit South Afflra limn South Wert Africa.
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