Intelligence Report
Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian Communist6
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FOREWORD
Foreign .and Domestic Influences on the Colombian
Communisthe socond of OCTs Intelligence studies to dealree world Communist party, should be read in conjunction with!
the Del intelligence studies are aimed at situations where study and analysis in some depth seem likely to shed new light on long-standing US security problems, to give timely warning about an emerging problem, or to assist themaker in considering ways of coping with any such problems. These research papers appear on no definite schedule but ratheruitable subject happens towith tho availability of the special manpowerrequired.
Assistance in the preparation of this paper has been received from various components of the Directorate of Intelligence, notably the Research Staff. It has been informally coordinated with the Office of National Comments should be directed to the Office ofintelligence.
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CONTENTS
Pago
FOREWORD i
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS vil
I. 1
II. THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL
3
PCC Policies and
The PCC in National Politics After
Relations With Leftist Splinter
The Split in the
III. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC 13
Castroism and tha 19
PCC-Soviet Relations and the Sino-Soviet
22
Relations with 24
IV. 29
ANNEX A: The Colombian Communist Party (PCC) andCommunist Party (PCV): Aof Experiences Since
iii
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Thepecialto study foreign and domestic influences on the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) because the period covers both the rise of tho Sino-Soviet dispute and an era when the chief question for the party domestically wasolicy of violence or of orthodox politicalvia armada or the via padthe most promising road to power. With the overthrow of dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla inhe PCC found itself in circumstances soomingly conducive to growth. Like its fellow Conraunist party in Venezuela (PCV) the following year, it regained legalityrolonged period of suppression! iteputation of consistent opposition to the despised dictatorship; and it faced bright prospects of advancing its national political status through orthodox political activity. In6 the party, although still legal, was politicallygenerally as obstructive at best and subversive at worst. Its nationalwa3 largely intact and retained at least the nominal backing of the principal Communist rural and paramilitary forces;ro-Peking faction had formally broken awaynd much of the party's youth following had been drained away to this and other "ultralcfft" factions advocating the via armada.
After regaining legal statushe PCC had firmly adheredrogram which placed primary emphasis on the viar mass struggle. The party refused to alter this "soft line" in itsdespite its long and pragmatic experience with guerrilla warfare and other rural violence in Colombia and despite its influenceumber of active paramilitary forces in tho countryside. The party did make some adjustments4 to enhance the role of the "armed struggle" in Colombia in an attempt to answer the criticism of theore militant facade, and undercut the dis-sidence within its own ranks. These modifications, whichtronger endorsement of the Communist-influenced paramilitary bands, were probably more a
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matter of shrewd semanticseparture from the via pacifica.
The Communist main line of action throughout this period was toward the developmentnational patriotic front" in opposition to the National Front coalition government under which the traditional Liberal and Conservative Parties shared equally and exclusively in all elective and appointive offices. Communist success in undermining this "constitutional-ized" arrangement required that the party concentrate its resources and those of its pro-Communist allies in support of the strong but minority dissidentof the Liberals--the Liberal Revolutionary (HRL), This defector organization was just as determined0 to disrupt the National Front as were the Communists. This projected PCC-MRL alliance failed, however, because the moderatefaction of the MRL increasingly shunned overt cooperation with the Communists, and the old guard Communist leaders seemed to lack the flexibility and imagination to demonstrate to the skeptical "ultra-left" elements inside and outside the party theand efficacy of the via pacificaolicy. The secession of the hard-linersoro-Peking rival party (the PCC-ML) contrasts with the experience of the Venezuelan Communist party which held together
The foreign influences on thethe same as those bearing upon theinseparable from the domestic conflict over the via pacifica versus the via armada. The example of the Cuban revolution and Cuban stimulation of the "ultraleft" were partly responsible for the hard-liners' attack on the PCC's via pacifica line, though Colombian public opinion was less stirred by the Cuban example than opinion in Venezuela. Though both the PCC and the PCV wereoriented, the Colombians gave the USSR their full support in the Sino-Soviot dispute while thesought to avoid the issue under the guise of neutralism, Moscow gave firm backing to the PCC's program, including the attitude toward guerrillaMoscow could also be credited with substantial indirect assistance to the PCC when Castro agreed, at the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist
parties ino coordinate hi3 subversive efforts in tho hemisphere through orthodox party Peking's influence, on the other hand, seens to have consisted of little more than providingsupport for the Colombian hard-liners,
No precise and definitive assessment is nowaa to the relative weights of the foreign and domestic influences on the PCC over this nine-year period, but it certainly seems to have been domestic factors which were mainly responsible for thedevelopment in party policy Thisendoncy, reflected in the resolutions ofh Party Congress and elsewhere, to give additional emphasis to the policy of the via arirada in an apparent effort to recapture the leadership of1 the extretae left.
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SECRET
I. INTRODUCTION
This study seeks to identify and evaluate the principal forces influencing the course of the Colombian Communist Party during the period from the fall of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship in May7 to the end of the Valencia administration With this aim in view, the paper first examines the impact of domestic political events on the program of the PCC and then the relevant in international Communism.
In this examination it is useful to comparo the PCC's exporience with that of the Communist Party in adjacont Venezuela (tho PCV) during the years which followed the ouster of the Pares Jimenez dictatorship in* Both parties emerged with legal statusrotracted period of suppressionauthoritariansuppression much more severe in Venezuela, however, than in Colombia. oth parties had relatively bright prospects for improving their positions in national politics through ordinary political methods; the Communist prospects in Venezuela seemed especially bright, partly because the prevailing political climate was more radical there than in Colombia, but opportunities for Communist exploitation were plentiful in both countrioa, as coalitiontheir to restore representative constitutional government and copo with variousand social problems loft unsolved by the ousted dictators.
Tha PCC and the PCV waro each torn with lntamal dissension over the issue of whether to pursue power primarily by overt political action (variously termed, in Latin American Communist parlance, the mass struqgle, via parliamentaria and via pacifica) or by revolution" (the armod struggle or lucha armada). On this critical issue neither partyolicy of comploto consistency. A
variety of pressures and influences gradually led the PCV to choose the armed struggle, withon guerrilla warfareven though it had little experience in this tactic or capability for carrying it out. On the other hand, the Colombian party, in spite of itsexperience and substantial assets for conducting guerrilla warfare, generally held to the via pacifica as the primary way to power.
Both parties were traditionally orientedMoscow, yet thoy chose divergent paths in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Colombian party gave solid support to the USSR and the PCV took astand in an effort to reduce conflictshard-liners and soft-liners within the party. Each party was subject to strong pressures toCuba'sofirect and an indirect nature, since Castro's to left-wing -opinion in Venezuela, and, esser extent in Colombia, was one of thofacts of life in those countries.
The Colombian party formally split inargelyesult of differences over domestic strategy and tactics, and, esser degree, over its stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The PCVacade of unity
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II. THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL POLITICS
Tho position of the PCC has been much affected by Colombia's traditional two-party system of government (now modified by the agreementipartisan National Front) and by the extensive
rural violence which has troubled the country
for nearly two decades.
Since its formal establishmentho PCC has been severely limited in influence by this two-party system, under which Liberals andhave monopolized power byprocedures throughout most ofh century. Tho nominal membership of these two parties has included the vast majority of the people cutting across all class and regional lines of the country) each, in this sense, hasruly national party. Liberal andaffiliation, which is generallyrather than based on clear ideological conviction, ind of religious fervor, sometimes transcending loyalty to the nation. The political monopoly of the Liberal and Conservative parties explains in part the weakness of tho Communist Party and other minor parties.
Partisan attitudesradual breakdown of constitutional government in the, marked particularly by the serious rioting in the capital8 (the Bogotazo) and therural strife known as la violencia which began after that date and still continues, greatly diminished since then. This highly complex phenomenon of rural unrestbe attributed to any single cause; itscenters have been continually shifting and much of the guerrilla activity has always been apolitical and little more than organized banditry. During theuralwas largely motivated by the deep hostility between the Liberal and Conservative parties, including family and clan vendettas. Inyears, the causes have been primarilyand social, including robbery, land seizure,
and protoction racketeering among the peasantry. Banditry hasull or part-time way of lifo for many of tho elemonts participating. political motives are still present, and arc seen especially in conflicts anong local caudillos to maintain their spheres of dominance and in *efforts to block the re-establishment of departmental and central government authority.
A number of peasant leaders in various parts of the country have been pro-Communist and in varyinghave followed the guidance of the party. In some rural enclaves, such as Viota and Sumapaz,leaders have exercfaed direct control. Some of the largest active or partly active guerrilla bands have been under tho sway of Communist chieftains or tended to adhere to the party line. In recont yoars, the party's role in violence has been publicized by government counterinsurgency campaigns whicharge degree on the centers ofrural paramilitary strength. The PCC, however, although consistently attemptino to exploit la vio-lenci a, has notey factor in promotinq vio-
The PCC was outlawed during most of theof Rojasut rogalnod its legal status under the provisional military junta and seemed prepared to exploit the social, economic and political problems confronting the subsequent elected government--and in particular the weaknesses inherent In the newly devised National Front.
Under this arrangement, the two traditional parties agreed to share equally and exclusively all elective and appointive offices at local and national levels for sixteen yearsj that is, for four terms beginning8 and ending in The presidency was to be alternated between them every four years. No one could hold any governmentalwithout some acceptable version of tho Liberal or Conservative label. At the conclusion of this agreement, which was incorporated into tho the parties presumably were to resume competition for political offices.
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Tho National Front was bornecognition by both tha Liberals and the Conservatives that thalr deep-rooted animosities had to be bridled] that they had to live together peacefully in order toan effective, stable administration and avoid another doso of dictatorial rule. In many respects it appeared tolausible method for re-establishing representative government, restoring economic and political stability, andipartisan program to reduce rural violence.
All othor parties wore frozen out by the National Front agreement. The Communists, because of theright-center orientation of the two majorwore reduced largely to working with radical minority elements of the Liberalstudents and organized urbandevelopwhich mightignificant influence on national politics. The Communists, nevertheless,cartain opportunities from inherent weaknesses in tha Notional Front. Tho fundamental defect was that tho Liberal Party clearlyajority of tho electorate, and many Liberal elements weroor openly opposedelf-denying bipartisan peace treaty. Moreover, tho divisions existing within each of tho traditional parties placed additional strains on the arrangement which the Communists wereosition to exploit. The PCC apparentlythat dissolution of tho National Front might lead to military intervention, but thought theroood chance that it wouldew order in which Communists could participate directly andreater role in national politics.
Tho National Front's weaknesses were apparent even before the inauguration of the first Liberalunder Alberto Lloras Camargo innd in0 the liberal Party split. Alfonso Lopez Michclson, sonormertrong, minority Liberalwhich eventually adoptod tho name Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL). At least until2 it was strongly pro-Castro in its leadership, anti-US in many of its policies, favorable toward cooperation with the PCC in elections and otheractivity, and adamantly opposed to the
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National Front. These policies, which paralleled those of the PCC, suggested the makingsowerful "national patrioticfront." At the height of its powerhe MRL, with the backing of the Communist and pro-Communist vote,ajor challenge to tho viability of the government in this year, Lopez ranrotest presidential candidate against Conservative Guillermo Leon Valencia and won almost one fourth of the total popular vote. In addition, the MRL substantially increased its representation in Congress, many of theseseats being filled byand pro-Communists under the camouflage of the MRL label.
Leader of the MRL, the minority Libo
Poity Faction which cooperated withPCC.
Factionalism in theParty proved to be an even greater limitation on theof the National Front. The Conservativas, traditionally
hostile toward any kind of cooperation with thewere even more seriously divided than the Liberals. Actually, several autonomous organizations known as the Ospinistas, Laureanistas, Alzatistas, andderived from the names of the principalincluded under thelabel. After Rojas Pinilla returned tond organized his followers under thePopular Alliance (ANP)till another so-called "Conservative" faction entered thelists.
PCC Policies and
Throughoutyear history, the PCC has been strongly oriented toward Moscow and responsive to theof the CPSU and the twists in Soviet international
Stalin to
policies. The old guard leaders were products of the era but had little difficulty in giving lip service denunciation of the "cult of personality" under the do-Stalinization program, while in fact carrying on party business as in the days of Stalin. Gilberto Vieira White and his group had seized control of the party7 from the then Secretary General,after his expulsion by Vieira,plinter party which has persisted in tho region around Barranqullla but has nevererious threat to Vieira's leadership. As Secretary General, Vieiravirtually unchallenged in his dictatorial control over party policy at least until the Sino-Sovietbecame public and tho Castro revolutionarybegan to have an impact on Colombian radicals.
pre-empt
A shrewd interpreter of the Colombian political scene, Vieira developed skill over the yearsarty bureaucrat and manipulator of the Centralt too. In contrast to the party situation in neighboring Venezuela, Vieira's control faced no serious competition from younger dynamic leaders possessed of strong follow-ings within the party ranks and in* clined toward experimentation with radical programs. Moreover, Vieira managed to avoid exile or imprison-
ment, either of which would
Socrotory General of the
paved the way for others to his position. His long tenure thus provided continuity of programs, but meant conservatism and even stagnation. The clandestine opera* tions of the party had been limited and ineffective during the regime of Rojasnd even the Communist guerrillas were used only to maintain the status quo in the areas where the party exorcised strong influence, such as Vlota, Sumapaz and northern Tollma. The objective oflegality wasrime consideration in party policy.
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In Its personal characteristics the CCPhad little to attract help from anyone outside the party who might be interested in disrupting the National Front. At least to the Colombian public, the Communist leaders were notably lacking in dynamism, imagination and political opportunism) they seemedto receive their modest stipends, occasional junkets to the bloc countries, and such limitedsubsidios and other suDport as might fall to their lot.
The principal Colombian Communist policyirm and unconditional advocacy of the primacy of tho via pacifica, or parliamentary struggle. The party did accept the armed struggle under appropriate circumstances in designated local areas, butthes ands it insisted that the political consciousness of the workor class had not matured to the requisite level fora general revolution.
Ao tho principal action for developing tho party's mass strength, the PCC has on more than one occasion7 called for the organizationgreat patriotic front of national liberation." At the time the party reacquired legal statusieirathat communists would have to emerge from their cocoon of isolation, cast off their dogmaticand work with any group opposed to the National Front. At the 9th Congressha partythe MRL as tho principal vehicle for this
On the critical issue of armed strugglo thostatements up5 were ambiguous andsomantic modifications of its traditional theme of "self-defense" by the peasant masses whereby tho oppressive actions of tho "oligarchic"forces. owever, the PCC formulated what it claimed tonique policy which it hoped would satisfy those who were clamoring for action and yet not risk the party's legal status. The political resolution of the party's Tenth Congress in6 stated:
In Colombia there is opening an originalway, based on the use of all mothods
and forms of mass struggle, combined according to concrete local and general conditions. guerrilla war is one of the highest forms of mass struggle and only prospers and grows where it is linked with the masses. At present, although peasant guerrilla war is not yet the principal form of struggle it is becoming more important every day.
In this "uniquehe PCC recognized that "tho guerrilla movementart of the combined political situation" and that "itsshould be analyzed in relation to this over-all situation." The party further asserted thataction "tends to promote and create certainand indispensable factors for the emergent triumph of tho revolutionary situation int defended its ancient policy of self-defense of the rural masses asnd as havingvigorous guerrilla movement wherever the official forces in cooperation with the Yankee military had waged war against the masses in tho countryside."
The PCC in National Politics7
When the PCC regained freedom to operato overtlyts political position and prospects were better than at any time in tho past decade, but less favorablo than the PCV's in Venezuela when the dictatorship was ovorthrown there. Unlike their comrades in Venezuelahe Communists could take no credit for helping overthrow the hatedregime, and they were excluded from office by the provisions of the National Front.
The party did have substantial support in thelabor movement, among university students, and in the various intellectual classes. Even among the students, however, the CommuniBt potential was markedly less than in Venezuela, where the universitywas concentrated in the strategically located Central University in Caracas. Colombian students, being dispersedumber of universities in Bogota and in provincial cities, have been moreto organize for large-acalo demonstrations and
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have been generally less inclined to challenge the government on purely political issues than students in various other Latin American countries.
On tho other hand, the party had one asset which was unique among all Latin American Communist prolonged experience in rural violence (la violcncia) and guerrilla warfare,nowl-edge of the problems connected with coordinating scattered paramilitary groups of leftist andorientation. However, not until Castro hadsuccessfully the application of guerrillamethods in Cuba did this Communist paramilitary strength assume special significance in party eyes.
Despite the icany deficiencies in partythe serious domestic problems confronting tho National Front and the divisions within thatgave thohance to expand its national influence. In the MRL and the "national democratic front" the Communistsromising means ofthese divisions, and0 they estimated their prospects for disrupting the traditional two-party system in Colombia to be the best in the entire history of tho party.
These prospects depended, however, onasic unityumber ofleftist elements. Thore was some reason for the PCC's optimism until the endhen serious dissension began to plague the MRL, and various pro-Communist leftist elements began to challenge the PCCfs line on the via pacifica. These elements were much influenced oy Cubanand by Chinese revolutionary ideology (as will be discussed later) and with qood reason the Communists publicly blamed the "Chinese partyprivately the "Che Guevaraof the Cubanprovoking theon the via pacifica which absorbed the party's attention.
The dissension inside the MRL, partlyto the issue of armed struggle and indirectly to foroiqn influence, was mainly caused by conflicting
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personal ambitions among the leaders. One group,art of this mavorick Liberal organization, was the undisciplined "Youth of the MRL"ounded and led by ex-Communist Luis Villar Borda, whoroponent of lucha armada for Colombia. Other pro-Castro MRL factions included thegroup of Alvaro Uribc Rueda and the clique of Camilo Aluma in Cali.
But it was Lopez who held the support of the majority of the MRL He moderated the party's policies. Among other things, he rejected Cuban-style revolution as applicable to Colombia and muted the party's pro-Castro propaganda output. More important, he Fhied away from enteringormal alliance witi. theadvocated by some radical elements in thehe did not eschew informal cooperation with the Communists or reject their electoral support. (His influence on the PCC contrasted with that exerted by theally of the Communists in Venezuela, where the Castroite Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) was more committed to the armed struggle than the PCV itself and pushed the PCV in thatopez' position in refusing formal alliance with the PCC did, however, provide the pro-Chinese minority in the PCC with further ground for insisting that the via parliamentaria would never bring theto power in Colombia.
The MRL, which had reached its high point ininfluence in the congressional and presidential electionsared very badly in tho elections of earlyin part its internal The majority Lopez faction of the MRLseriously considered returning to the regular Liberalove which would strengthen theFront and the Liberal administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, inaugurated in Since the Communist via parliamentaria was directly tied to the destinies or the MRL as an opposition party, the PCC prospects were similarly reducedew low by6 electiondecline which had been under way during the previous two years. The PCC apparently had only limited influence remaining
among some of the radical cliques of the MRL and their pro-Communist leaders.
Relations with the Leftist Splinter Groups
The Communists' problems were compounded by sterile battles with organizations which should logically have been natural allies in developing the united front tactic against the government.umber of radical leftist groups of limited strength were formed in Colombia to promote urban and rural violence. Most of them wore inspired by the Castro revolution and the Chinese line on wars of national liberation; their leaders maintained liaison with the Cuban and Chinese governments and probably obtained some financial support in those capitals. Some of these groups were led by apostate Communistsexample, Luis Villar, Alfonso Romero Buj and Pedro Abellaafter beingfrom tho PCC, had siphoned off manyyouths and sympathizers to build the new organizations. They also occasionally attempted to recruit among pro-Communist guerrilla bands. The PCC eventually branded most of these groups as "charlatans, false revolutionaries, and ultra-leftists."
The first of these subversive organizations to launch into the armed struggle was the Worker-Student-Peasant Movementnitiallyin9 under another name. Cuba supplied training for the key loaders and also some financial aid. Antonio Larrota, one of the founders, had just returnedong sojourn in Cubaevolutionary protege and agent of the Castro regime. Eduardo Aristizabal and such other MOEC leaders as Eduardo Arismendi and Pedro Abella also found encouragement and sponsorship in Havana.
The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR) likewise had the blessing of Castro, who sent it funds through Gloria Gaitan and Luis Emiro Valencia. It was organized in2
by renegade Communists and native Marxists to promote the armed struggle, and tried toall the small revolutionary groups and to enlist some active guerrilla leaders under the FUAR banner. These offorts wore largelyhowevor, and most of tha Cuban subsidies appear to have been squandered or to have beenby the less idealistic members. The FUAR dissolved itself
Like the MOEC and FUAR, the National Liberation Army (ELN) was inspired and financed in part by Havana. The ELN, initially the paramilitary arm of the Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movementas engaged in limited guerrilla action. It was responsible for the attack made in5 on the town of Simacota in northeasternattack which may have been directly financed by Cuba, since the ELN leader, Fabio Vasquez, is known
to have been in Havana in
Leader of ths ELN, Iheupported Nurioool Liberation Army .
The short-lived United Front, established4 by theCatholic priest Camilo Torres Restrepo to promote revolutionary change in Colombia, also seems to have been largely inspired by the Cuban example. The United Front gained some popular support and hence roceived qualifiedfrom the PCC. However, Torres was killed when hisunit was engaged in action with Colombian military forces in His activitiesextensive eulogies from the Cuban propaganda machine,special praise from Castro for his choice of the "path ofi but there is no evidence that Cuba financed them.
;r"'
r ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP OFV:: COMMuTJ 1ST--AND /'PROi- COMMUNISTPRC AN2ATXONS'
ComuniVt Tarty CPCC)lO.OOO ::>
Less31 '
Movement - (MOEC)
ront for -Revolutionary
outh oRttfb LiberaltfdnswMcwoment -
uefTillasi
IhactiVc..^
1'KCOO
nactive -
Excludes youth auxiliary
The Split in the PCC
The major blow to the PCC came when the party split in4 over the armed struggle issue and the Sino' Soviet dispute. Tho splintor party formed by theand expelled leaders called itself the PCC-Marxist-Leninisthus laying claim to the mantle of "true" Colombian Communism. This revolt cost the regular party prestige, tho loss of anumber ofmany partydisruption in its national organization.
Although the PCC-ML attempted to proselytize among the pro-Castro revolutionary organizations.
its inspiration and ideology were largelyby China. After the Havana Conference of Latin American parties int which Castro implicitly abandoned his "neutralism" in the Sino-Soyiet dispute, the PCC-ML turned hostile toward the Cuban regime. It alleged that the Cuban leader had fallen prey to thend had transformed himself into an enemy of "the working class and the Chinesend hence of the Communist parties of the world."
Even the timing of the rift was tied to theover armed struggle. In one of its initialthe PCC-ML denounced the old guard central committee leaders for not adequatelya]or bastion of Communist guorrilla strength in Marquetalia, after the government forcesizable campaign there in4 to eradicate The PCC-ML insisted that
Marquetalia must be the beginning of the war of liberation in it is necessary to substitute the revolutionary principle of active guerrillas for the false and conservative principle ofany peaceful method,rincipal form of taking power, is definitely out of the question in Colombia; parliamentary and legal resources, together with other forms of mass struggle, can only be used asand complementary aspects of the principal form ofuse of Theleadership [of the PCC) is mistaken in its
The top leaders of the PCC closed ranks in the face of the party revolt, and admitted that theroots of their problems "originated in the sub3ectiye concessions which the party has beene extcemist tendencies of the so-called iett. They denounced local extremists and openly accused Peking of being the inspiration and major cause of dissension within the party. But even though the split had come largely on the issue of the lucha
armada, of which Castro was the best known Latinpractitioner, the PCC leaders not only refrained from condemning the Castro regime for promotinq revo-
.vj.iik iui pjiiiiMiirK]adventurism of the left, but actually praised the Cuban socialist experiment and its significance for the Communist movement in the hemisphere, although they were rathor noncommittal when relating tho Cuban revolution to the armed struggle in Colombia. This
P
ropaganda treatment of Cuba derived from the PCC eadera' consciousness of Castro's ties with Moscow and of his appeal to various leftist elements in Colombia rathor than from any possible enthusiasm of their own for imitating his rise to power.
The PCC's extensive experienco with guerrillaand the phenomenon of rural violence (land its involvement in various attempts to combine-scattered guerrilla groupsoordinatedprobably led to an awarenoss among tho PCCthat Castro's guerrilla successroduct of unique conditions and circumstances ratherniversally applicable experience. The decimation of the resources of the Venezuelan Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left wan additional confirmation of its belief.
PCC antagonism toward the ultraleft promoters of the lucha armada was expressed frequontly both before and aftor tho party split. While the PCC-ML was slinging epithets ot the old Guard, such as "Xhrushchevistraising Castro to tho rank of "No. he PCC wasthe pro-Chinese as "anti-Soviethe verbal conflict assumed some of the features of the Sino-Soviot disputeeapot, but was limited to the issue of armed struggle and particularly guerrilla warfare.
h Congress of the PCC in6 formally stigmatized the PCC-ML as "traitors who have danorted the great party and who pretond to carryevolutionevolution without Marxism-Leninism." ey resolution of the Congress stated!
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Tho party must pursue its firm ideological struggle against the disastrous 'ultraloftlst' tendencies, which are characterized by empty revolutionary phraseology without foundation in Colombian reality; against the dogmatic thesis that tho via armada is the only form of struggle worthy of revolutionaries,in practice by passive opportunism before Yankee imperialism and its oligarchic-militarist instruments; against the depreciation of the just struggles for the worker masses and toward the political activities which canthem in overt and legal form.
By Communist definition the "ultraleft" thus included not only the party traitors and defectors but the pro-Communist splinter groups seeking to launch tho lucha armada. Occasionally, the PCC singled out specific names in its counterattacks against these groups, always reserving specialfor the apostate Communists who went to Peking in search of aid.
The renegade priest Camllo Torres was described more sympathetically by the PCC leadership, which, nevertheless, lamented his departure from thoparliamentary path of his United Frontto join the luchadeparture made without "consulting" the PCC. Tho sacrifice of his lifeuerrilla actionaliant and heroic deed, but this is not the principal form of struggle for the majority of the Colombian people."
Criticism ofowever, haa been muted since6 as the PCC has bean making tentative efforts to collaborate with and gain control over the violence-prone ELN and MOEC. In retrospect, the Tenth Congress may have markod the beginningow PCC policy phase which willomewhat greater emphasis on armed struggle without necessarily abandoning tho over-all precepts of the via pacifica policy.
III. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC
Varied foreign pressures on the PCC, when seen against the backdrop of domestic political factors, have also contributed to dissension in the party. The example of the Cuban revolution, in combination with tangible Cuban aid for programs of violence, stirred the splinter groups of the "ultraleft" to actions which opposed the efforts of orthodox PCC leaders to promote the mass struggleational patriotic front. These groups also found supplementary encouragement from Peking and, at least until the PCC split and the Havana Conference of Latin American Communist partieshe Cuban influenceacted as an indirect stimulus to the pro-Chinose hard-line elements within the PCC.
Castroism and the PCC
In many parts of Latin America the principalof the Cuban revolution was its provocativefor radical leftist elements. Colombiapecial case, ranking high on the Cuban priority list for external subversion, probably second on the South American continent only to Venezuela. Moreover, theColombian guerrilla band3 of Communist and pro-Communist orientation undoubtedly made the target more attractive to the Cubans. Castro himself seemed to regard Colombiapocial way. He had been in the country at the time of the bloody Boqotazo of8 andersonal friend of Gloria Gaitan, daughter of the leftist liberal leader Jorge Gaitan whose assassination had touched off the rioting. Yet it was probably Che Guevara,rincipal architect of Cuban subversive policy in Latin America, who was largely responsible for Havana'a decision totho PCC and turn to the militant leftist groups to promote rural and urban violenco in Colombia.
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Duringeriod, the MOEC, PUAR, ELN, and JMRL were the principal recipients of Cuban aid which was dispensedporadic, poorly planned, and largely ineffective manner. Direct cash grants probably totaled loss0 but political and guerrilla
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training, propaganda subsidies, and travel for members of these organizations probably cost Cuba several times that amount. In addition to tangible forms of aid, all of these groups were the beneficiaries of stimulation and guidance from Cuba; and sooner or later, all of them, with tho possible exception of the ELN, fell out with the PCC over tho letter's program of mass struggle.
The PCC was well aware of Cuban relations with the leftist groups in Colombia. Castro's cash grants to the FUAR, for example, were public secrets in Colombia, only the specific sums being in doubt. The PCC had good reason to resent this Cuban meddling deeply. As previously noted, Castro's aid went in many cases to men who had been expelled from the party. In addition, the PCC feared the government might charge it within the subversive activities of theseorganizations and suspend its legal status.
Nevertheless, the PCC's public position toward Cuba, as expressed in party statements and propaganda, was invariably eulogistic Tho Communist press in Colombia gave extensive coverage "in defense of" the Cuban revolution and government, callod for solidarity with Havana against theraisod Castro's achievement as an example in the construction ofand even acknowledged that Cuban experience had been incorporated into the tactics of the "self-defense" guerrilla organizations in Colombia. The party probably spoke with greater sincerity in its repeated endorsements of the decisions taken at tho Havana Conference, at which the Cubans agreed to curb their scatteredefforts in Latin America and coordinate their activities through orthodox Communist channels. The PCC gave similar unqualified approval to the Havana Tri-Continent Congress in6 which called for active "solidarity" with Latin American revolutionary movements.
Despite such public praise, there nevertheless is reason to believe that the PCC was sharply critical and resentful of Castro's "extracurricular" subversive antics in Colombia. Top PCC leaders inhen discussing the problems arising from the ultra-leftist groups which followed the "Cuban and Chineseeportedly stated that the "Guevara faction"
in Cuba openly bached revolution in Latin America through groupB other than the Communist parties. Pedro Abella of the MOEC and Luis Villar Borda of the jmhl, both ox-Communists, were pointed up as examples of ultra-left leaders who had used Cuban and Chinese aid to corrupt the Colombian Communist Youth. Tho PCC is reported to haveetter of protest on Abu 1in Cuba and to haveeply from the Cuban Communist Party promising appropriate action. At about the same time,ircular from the Brazilian Communists inquiring about attitudes onatin American Communist conference tothe Sino-Sovietthat it approvedeeting but not in Cuba. The PCC pointed out that participants in any meeting in Havana would be restricted in their discussion of "certain actions of Cuba" against other parties in the hemisphere.
The PCC had leornod, apparently just before sending this letter to the Brazilian comrades, that Che Guevara had been disparaging its position and policies, eetingolombian Communist delegation in Havana, also attended by ex-Communist Luis Villar Iiorda, Guevara reportedly had insisted that conditions were ripe for revolution in Latin America. He notod, however, that In many countries,Colombia, the Communist Partyindrance torogram; and he added that tho PCC would lose popular support if it continued to act and thinkpassive" manner.
After tha Havana Conference of Latin American parties, tha Cuban regime apparently altered itspolicios toward Colombia and conformed to its agreement to work through orthodox channels. The Cuban-financed Slmacota incident which occurred in5 seems to be an exception. It was probably too well advanced to be stopped by the Cuban regime. the ultraloftist Colombian leaders are believed to have lost their Cuban subsidies and other support. The Colombian Communists and the Cuban leadors also probably reconciled some of their differences on armed struggle in Colombia andoordinated approach to thio facet of the PCC program at the Tri-Contlnent Congress in Havana early in
There is some evidence that the rapprochement was based, at least in part, on the PCC's greater willingness to support armed action in Colombia beginning possibly in The Cuban Government has not abandoned its preference for the lucha armada in Colombia. In his anniversary address onastro praised the Colombian guerrilla movement and indirectly borated tho PCC leadership and its policies.
The extensive Cuban propaganda coverage on Colombia is almost entirely devoted to the Communist-influenced guerrilla bands and their activities. For example, Havana radio disseminated the decisions of the "Second Conference of the Southern Guerrillahich was held "somewhere in the forest" in the spring
For its part, the PCC has faithfully carried out the bargain reached at Havanahich required that the Latin American parties give ample expression of "solidarity" with the Cuban regime. However, solidarity is probably still defined by the party as it was when Secretary General Vieira wrote, in an article in Problems of Peace and Socialism
Our solidarity with Cuba can best be. shown by propaganda and explanation and carrying out extensive work among the masses to explain the results of the Cuban revolution.
PCC-Soviet Relations and the Sino-Soviet Dispute
The PCC has traditionally displayed an unconditional adherence to Moscow; hence, its early endorsement of the Soviet position in the dispute with China merely reflected historical consistency. The Colombian party's response included periodic homage to the Declarations of Moscow7 recognition of the CPSU as tho "vanguard of the Communist and working classand ample condemnation of the "divisionist Chinese leaders." The story is accurately and succinctly outlinedASS dispatch inescribing an interview between CPSU Central Committee Secretary Suslov and Colombian Secretary General Vieira: "Once again the complete unity of views of the CPSU and the PCC was affirmed on the problems examined."
Vieira has long been regarded by the Kremlin as one of the most trustworthy of the Latin American Communist leaders. He has attended almost all CPSU congresses and other key international Communist meetings over the past several years, including the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist parties in4 and the subsequent gathoring in Moscow. He has mado other special trips to the Soviet capital, presumably toPCC policy. For examplo, he was reportedly there in4 at the time when the party had split and the pro-Chinese elements were organizing the PCC-ML. Other PCC leaders, such as the late Piliberto Barrero and Jose Cardona Hoyos, have also been held in high regard by the Kremlin.
In the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Colombian party held firmly to the Soviet line in contrast to the evasive "neutralism" of the generally pro-Soviet party in The PCC gave unqualified and regular praise to the CPSU as the vanguard of the international movement, the savior of world peace, the defender of peacefuland the genuine fount of Marxism-Leninism. It just as consistently upbraided the "Chinese leaders" with such epithets as divisionists, schismatics, tools playing into the hands of the imperialist camp,of artificial revolution, and Maoist deifiers.
The PCC's formal commitment to the CPSU side came at the 9th Congress1 and was reiterated ath Congress in Similar resolutionsthis position were adopted at variousplenumo of the central committee. In addition, the party followed the Soviet lead at international meetings, such as those held in Moscow?0 and at the East German Party Congress in Berlin
In return for the PCC's stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the CPSU has backed the PCC in suchmedia as TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow, Pravda, and Izyestia. Ample space "has also been allotted to the Colombian party in Problems of Peace and Socialism.
Vieira's speech atd CPSU Congress of March and6 was well publicized. At that time, he lauded the CPSU as the builder of socialism andcoexistence and the defender of "world peace." He
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then outlined the decisions ofh PCC Congress indicated thatew and original revolutionary" path was opening up in Colombia, based on the use of all forms and methods of struggle of the masses, among them armed struggle. But he admitted that the struggle would be "long and arduous* and that the PCC "cannottill strong and cruel enemy with mere ultra-revolutionary phrases." Acknowledging the CPSU as "the vanguard detachment of the internationalnd "the glorious Cuban revolution as our greateste then denounced "the stubborn campaigns to downgrade the indestructible work of the Soviet power and the schismatic maneuvers against the Communistmovement."
Relations With Peking
The militant Chinese advocacy of wars of national liberation was an inspiration and moral comfort to the various elements both inside and outside the PCC who insisted on the armed struggle. 1 when the PCC had unequivocally sided with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the party's problems with the pro-Chinesebegan to multiply, particularly when the latter began to seek material aid and guidance from China. The attitude of the radicals within the party is clearly reflectedetter to the central committee written by Carlosormer candidate member who had been expelled from the party3 and wasop leader of the PCC-ML. Arias denounced the party's arbitrary handling of
The Sino-Soviet problem which you /the central committed had tried to conceal against allhe treason which you will commit by supporting nonrevolutionaries in the comingistory will decide who and how many are to blame for delaying the Colombian revolution and who scourged the revolutionaries of the PCC. The people already know who insults the revolution and the Chinese leaders; wHohe^revolutTonCuFarT leZHors; who refers to Venezuelan revolutionaries as
uJvonturers; and who insults Ihe real Colombian revolutionaries.*
Arias further noted that the central committee had not only expelled him from tho party but, in the same session, had also "condemned Mao Tso-tunq and the Chinese Thisplendid task which North American imperialists are probably applauding."
The Chinese sought to inspire the ultraloftist groups and the dissident elements within tho PCC in an attempt to promote tho armed revolution in Colombia and tothe policies and prestige of the orthodox party. Travel of pro-Chinese leaders to Peking was heavy and included representatives of the MOEC, fuar, JMRL, and the PCC-ML. Pedro Abella, Luis Villar Borda, Loon Arboleda, Pedro Vas-quez Rondon, Eduardo Aristizabal, and Manuel Manotas Manotas were among thoso who went ro Chinatheo prosent their plans "to the Chinese and to obtain assistance and guidance. After the PCC-ML was formedowever, the Chineselimited their paramilitary training, financial aid, and other support primarily to thisand to the MOEC.
China's aid to itsin Colombia seems to have been niggardly. Although some of the travelers to Peking may
tew
have received small cash grants, the one regular sourco of financing has been through the NCNA agency in Bogota. The amounts paid in salaries and for other services to the local Communist NCNAare not believed to0 per month.
Although the PCC attempted to prohibit theof Chinese propaganda in Colombia3 and expelled the pro-Chinese NCNA employees frcsa tho party, the latter still retain their agencyand apparently still receive the small monthly payments. Thero is some ground for considering the PCC-ML tooorly disciplined party, not in close touch with Peking, since its two factions havefor control of the NCNA agency and the agency has remained independent of both.
Peking's premises to its sympathizers in Colombia for propaganda support, scholarships, paramilitary training, and other assistance have probably been far more lavish than the actual cash outlays. Peking has disseminated sporadic propaganda in support of the PCC-ML, branding tho "orthodox" loaders "revisionists" and endorsing the "revolutionary struggle to seize poweratriotic anti-imperialist popular The Chinese have also financed guerrilla warfare training and "scholarship" programs, reportedly in North Korea and Vietnam as well as in China.
The PCC response to Chinese collaboration with its enemies has been sharp. Top central committeewell aware of the travels to Peking of such "traitors" as Pedro Abella (and the purpose of suchre known to have discussed in4 the pressures and problems which such activities were placing on the party. Besides trying to stop Chinese propaganda emanating from the NCNA office in Bogota, the PCC also attempted to stifle party discussion of the Chinese line and of Peking's position in thedispute. Chinese sympathizers were threatened with expulsion.
Whether Vieira and his colleagues exaggerated tho Chinese responsibility for the PCC's internalis debatable, but they certainly sought to link the pro-Chinese dissidents with the "ultraleftwho insisted on immediate revolution in Colombia. Vieira wrote5 that such groups had seized upon the false and misleading Chinese position to attack the PCC and its proqram.
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The PCC's general sensitivity to the effectsthe party split was illustrated by its4 articlo in El Tienpo, the leading daily of Bogota, which had described the expulsion of leaders from the party, the splits in regional Communist committees, and theof the PCC organization* In its rebuttal in Voz Proletaria, the party insisted that the great majority of members had remained loyal to thePCC, attacked "the methods of the Chineseand charged that the principal objective of the deviationist "ultrarovolutionaries" was totho PCC rather than the truereactionary national forces and Yankee imperialists."
IV. ASSESSMENT
During the period under review7he PCC managed to maintain its legal status and the unity of the old-line leaders headed by Vieira. It kept the party organization intact and retained the loyalty of the majority of the rank and file membership as well as its influence over traditional rural enclaves and the principal pro-Communist paramilitary loaders in the The close ties with the Soviet party were challenged onlyew defectors.
Balanced against these accomplishments, which were largely holding operations, are the substantial reverses to Communist strength and potential into the party's outlook as late The program failed to prevent an internal split or to satisfy the demands of the radical leftist groups who were inclined to pursue the armed struggle.
During this period, foreign and domesticon tho party were intertwined and, of course, reacted on each other. Ho firm conclusions areabout their relative weights. Nevertheless, the developments rehearsed in this paper do suggest certain very tentative generalizations on how these influences have operated in the case of the Colombian party.
The PCC was run throughout this period by an old guard leadership whose ownon the key issue of the armedto have accorded fairly well with the Moscow line; if Moscow had favored intensifying the armed struggle, there might have been some test of their allegiance. The party's formal split4 over the Sino-Soviet dispute of course reflected its previous support of Moscow's side in international Communist meetings, as contrasted with the "neutralist" position taken by the Venezuelan Communist party; but it alsoreflected somewhat less flexibility in the PCC leadership at dealing with party dissension. The PCV,
plagued with more serious internal conflict over the armed struggle issue, did stay together
The Cuban influence on the PCC was indirect and in one senseomestic influence than aone, in that ittrong appeal (though, as time wontiminishing one) to the radical leftist opinion in Colombia/ and Havana subsidized to somothe splinter groups which competed with the PCC for leftist support. This situation was reflected in thettitude toward the Castro regime. The PCC split4 came largely over tho issue of the armed struggle, of which Fidel Castro was the hemisphere's leading exponent, but it was Peking that was publicly blamed by the PCC leadership; Cuba, both on thatand subsequently, was praised. Castro's known alignment with Moscow would of course have made it embarrassing for tho PCC to be publicly critical of him, but his Moscow tie did not prevent the PCC from being critical of his regime4 communication to Brazilian Communists.
The extent of Peking's actual influence inCommunist circles has been very small, despite the readiness of tho proponents of the armed struggle to invoke Chinese idoological support.
Domestic, rather than foreign, factors seem to have been mainly responsible for the6 development in PCC policy: eappraisal of party policy on the lucha armada in an apparent effort to recapture the leadership of tho oxtrerae left throuqh more tangible support and guidance for the guerrilla forcea. The propaganda facet of this modified policy appeared in the resolutions ofh Partywhich recognized that the armed struggle was the "principal form" in certain local areas and that guorrllla warfare hadnow stage" of It is similarly reflected in the PCC's formation6 of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forcesgeneral staff- for coordinating rural Communist subversion; the FARC has issued an opento membership for all leftist guerrillaactive or in process of being organized. The reported Communist liaison with the ELM and theCommunist attitude toward this organization's
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guerrilla activity also suggest increased emphasis by the PCC on this aspect of its program. In addition, there is evidence of closer cooperation between the PCC and the Cuban regime since the Havana Conference in4 and particularly since the Tri-Continent Congress ins partly revealed in Cuban and Colombian propaganda and in the appointment of Central Committee member Manual Copeda Vargas as permanent PCC representative in Havana.
Tho changes of6 probably do not add upasic shift in the PCC's long adherence to the primacy of the via pacifica, but they doreater sensitivity to domestic pressures and possibly some increased tactical flexibility.
Foi
Dieosm
I. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS AND INFLUENCES
status
Public andstatus after overthrow of dictator
Party; regained legal status after ouster of dictator Rojas Pinilla,etained legal status throughout period
Little change fromperiod; limited national influence;atmospherecompared to Venezuela; strongopportunity through cooperation withLiberal faction, MRL, and other leftist groups
; regained legal status after ouster of dictator Perez thesuspended political activity of party andally. Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR),
Highly favorable; party hadpublic credit for contributing to ouster of Perez Jimenez; strongorientation of all political groups; united front in labor xovexent; potential close allies for PCV in factions OfAction Party (AD) and Democratic Republican Union (URD)
A-l
So Foreign
program
emphasized primacy of via pacifica; rejected lucha armada "as principal form for entire country; certainto defend pro-Communist guerrilla forces
Via pacificaith increasing use of violenco; lucha armada became principal formnitialon urban violence;, emphasis on the "prolonged struggle" through guerrilla warfaro
Impact on top leadership
Central committeeclose-knit unity in support of via pacifica
Serious divisions over lucha armada; 1eaders shifted in attitude over thebut no overt split; MIR ally split
results
split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese organizationsunning battle with other radical groups favoring lucha armada; split in youth auxiliary
Principal leadersparty and MIR ally seriously divided internally and betwoenpartyassets sharply depleted; national organization.
cooperation with MRL for political and eloctoral action; MRL factionalismeffectiveness of front tactic2
Marxist, pro-Castro MIR; pro-Castroof URD;orfrom otherelements.
for conducting guerrilla war
strong; party had long experience with rural violence andwarfare, enclaves of rural support, and varying control over several active guerrilla leaders.
Negligible; peasant support limited; no trained leaders in guerrilla warfare and no experience with this form of
A-2
Ho PSYqign Dimeem
FCC
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES
orientation
Pro-Soviet
on Sino-Soviet dispute
pro-Soviet from the outset; condemnation of Peking
Sought to avoid the issue under guise of neutralism; followed Cuban stand; refused to criticize tho
impact
PCC relations with the leftist groups favoring the lucha armada; contributed to uTssen>.ion inc KKL
Strong, dominant, and direct; equally strong on MIR and otherprobably largely determined thoof the lucha armada
relations and attitudes toward Cuba
Cuban aid
eulogistic; privately resentful and critical
Ineffectual shotgun approach to radical leftists favoring guerrilla warfare and violence;hallenge to the PCC program of via pacifica; Cuban propaganda inriticism of party leaders
Close; party sensitive to Cuban views and guidance
Substantial training, propaganda, and other aid; assistance granted PCV allies provoked noin party
influence
to party split into pro-Soviet andarty blamed Chinese for its troubles with the ultra-left
Limited; PCV lucha armada programwith Peking revolutionary line, but Cuban example predominant
A-3
Fb^&ign Dieecm
sKCfurr
PCV
aid
Party relations with Peking
financial and training assistance, to PCC-ML and to ultra-left leaders) Colombians often took initiative in seeking aid from Peking
Hostile
Considerableand propaganda support; negligible financial assistance; some training and guidance
Friendly; occasional liaison
relationi with Moscow
PCC-PCV relations
Party completely servile to Moscow throughout period; reciprocalfrom CPSU
Propaganda support for the PCV lucha armada and other "difficulties; party concerned by the Venezuelan program; occasional liaison; some operational assistance
Strained by Sino-Soviet dispute; steadily improving since Khrushchev's political demise4 and Havanaof Latin American parties
Party absorbed in its own problems and hence littlewith PCC;from Colombiantheory to justify guerrilla warfare; radical MIR elements conducted liaison withfaction and other lucha armada leftists in Colombia
Original document.
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