DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Sovkl Military Aid to the United Arab
Jnp-fiecrct
toe cccrjc-r-
CONTENTS
Page
I. Soviet and Egyptian
II. Magnitude and Scope of the Military Aid Pi off
Extensions and Drawings
Prims and Terms
Deliveries
L Soviet Military Technicians in the UAR
2. MiUtary Training of Egyptian: in the
of Soviet Military
Accords with
Soviet
2 Agreements
of the Military Aid
A Contribution to the Military Capability of the UAR
on thc UAR
L Defense Expenditures
Trade
to Policy Objectives ol die UAR and the
V. Outlook
APPENDIXES
Page
Appendix A. Soviet Military Equipment Delivered to the United Arab
Republic.5
Appendix B. United Arab Republic Advanced Weapons Programs . 7
iii
-fOp-SECREI
TABLE
Peg*
Estimated Value of Soviet Military Aid Extended to the 5
" 'i-
ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
Figure L
Figure 2. Selected Soviet Missile aad Ground Equipment Delivered (o
Egypt Q
Figure 3. Selected Soviet Naval Craft Delivered to or Ordered by Egypt
(photographs) 9
Figure 4. Selected Soviet Aircraft Delivered to Egypt10
Figure 5. Soviet Military Technical Assistance Providedhe United
ArabII
Figure 6 *
20
Figure 7.
88
IV
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO THE UNITED ARAB
Summary
Since the Western monopoly of arms supply to tbe Middle East endedhe USSR has extended to the United Arab Republic (UAR) military equipmentillion at Soviet listmore thanercent of it as grants and thc remainder on easy credit terms. Aboutercent of this aid has already been delivered. Although deficiencies remain, Soviet assistance has improved the combat capabilities of tbe UAR armed forces and has promoted Nasser's bid for leadership in the nonaligned world. At the same time, thc program has increased Moscow's influence in thc UAR and the Middle East generally and has served to reduce Western influence in the area. The Soviet military aid program has had importantfor both countries, and the USSR will almost certainly continue it.
In addition to the aid it extended directly, the USSR sponsored Czechoslovak extensions of million (including down-payments of jiillion) to Egypt. It also has furnished substantial military technical assistance (at UAR expense)oviet arms have been furnished under unusually attractive conditions: relatively low prices, large discounts from these prices, no downpay-ments, creditsercent interest with payment in goods, lengthy repayment periods, full technical support, and no visible political strings.
Most Soviet arms deliveries have consisted of modern equipment, including surface-to-air missileseveral generations of jet Rghtcrs and bombers, naval craft ranging from destroyers to missile-
' Tha reportroduced. Il was prepared by tbe Office of Reiearch ud Reports and coordinated with (he Office or Current Intelljgeiice and llie Office of National Ef&matet; ihc estimate? and coockraou represent tbe best Judgroect ol the Directorate of InteUigcoceof
wsy
1
firing patrol boats,ide variety of land armaments. The UAR was the first non-Communist recipient of several advanced weapons systems from the USSR.
Soviet arms deliveries have been accompaniedapid growth in UAR defense expenditures. These expenditures were mainly for (he personnel and facilities of an enlarged military establishment, since payments to date for Soviet-supplied weapons have totaled only0 million. Military expenditures have rangedercent of gross national product (GNP) during tbe pastears and haveeavy burden on the strained economy.
Military deliveries, together with economic aid deliveries andcommercial exchanges, have greatly increased the role of thc USSR in UAR foreign trade. The Soviet share of the recorded tradeof tlie UAR (which excludes most military imports) roseercent5 toercent7 and has subsequently ranged fromoercent Including military imports, the Soviet share is considerably larger.
With his improved military establishment, Nasser has acquired increased prestige and broadened his sphere of influence. His close relationship with Moscow, however, has also made the UAR almost completely dependent on the USSR for military replacements, spare parts, and technical support and, except for Afghanistan, moreon the USSR economically than any other less developed Free World country. This dependence must make Cairo at the least consider Moscow's views before embarking on ventures that might be inimical to Soviet interests.
Despite the fact that Soviet interests are not always served by Nasser, tho USSR apparently regards the benefits from its amis aid to tho UAR as worth the cost Military assistance is perhaps the most cflective instrument of Soviet policy toward the UAR, since it so closely relates to the elemental fears and aspirations of the Nasser regime. For the next several years, al least Moscow seems prepared to furnish additional military aid and to accept the complications in its foreign policy that arise from its support of Nasser, in (be largerof preserving its influence in the UAR and other Arab countries.
TUP iPLRF
I. Soviet and Egyptian Motivations
In contrast to tbe traditional Soviet policy of fostering the growth of militant local leftwing groups subservient to Moscow in the less developed countries, the post-Stalin regime placed primary emphasis--on currying favor with the existing governments.of these countries. The first significant manifestation of this new policy was the extension of economic aid credits to Afghanistan in4 and to India in
The decision of the USSR to respond to Egypt's request for military assistance5 was part of its overall effort to expand its influence in the uncommitted states of Africa and Asia. The formation of tbe Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact5 provided an additional reason. The Soviet leadership saw Egypt as the best means ofWestern attempts to organize the Arab nations into an anti-Soviet grouping; Moscow believed thatsymbol and inspiration to Arabcould be made to serve Soviet purposes as well as his own.
Tbe USSR found inolitical atmosphere highly conducive to its plans. In Cairo's view, the formation of tbe Baghdad Pactestern attempt to weaken Egypt's claimseading role in the Arab world and to strengthen Iraq, Egypt's traditional rival for leadership in the area. Moreover. Cairo was disillusioned with the Western policy of supplying arms to Israel while refusing (as Nasser saw it) to provide the Arabs with weapons to balance the IsraeliNasser had initially sought to procure arms in the West, but he could not obtain the types and quantities of equipment that he wanted from Western countries, which were concerned withan arms race in the Middle East.
Nasser's fear of Israel was magnifiedesult of the Israeliraids on Arab territory which beganmong other consequences, these raids exposed thc weakness of the Egyptian army.esult, the army was anxious to acquire sizable amounts of modern equipment rapidly, and Nasser, fearful of losing its support and having his regime overthrown, felt impelled to turn to Moscow for suchAs Nasser saw it, the acquisition of large-scale Communist arms aid promised to strengthen his position in thc country, to project him as the unchallenged leader ol lhe Arab nationalist movement, and
3
to makeeading power in the nonaligned world. Egypt consequently signed Soviet-sponsored military aid agreements with Czechoslovakiand the firstong series of direct agreements with the USSR
4
II. Magnitude and Scope of the Military Aid Program
A. EQUIPMENT
xtension! and Drawings
hen the Erst forma) Soviet-Egyptian military aidwashe USSR has extendedillion worth of arms aid to the UAR (see theepresenting aboutercent of all Soviet arms aid supplied to tbe less developed countries of tbe Free World. This figure includes only deliveries of militarymilitary technical assistance is provided under separateand at UAR expense. Drawings have followed extensions of military aid with relatively little delay (secnd an estimatedercent of the aid extended liad been delivered by tho end
rices and Terms
The USSR has generally quoted low list prices for its arms assistance to Cairo, usually below those for comparable equipment from Western countries. -Moreover, it has discounted theseby as much as two-thirds. The military aid extended to Egypt by the USSR6 carried an aggregate list priceillion. This
* SovaM BkOiUry aid to Egypt begann tbe tense that the Kjryptun Cieebcolc-nl accordsvraf SovM-oade arms and Soviet technicalto fcrvpt beganor the pupates ol thia report, bower, the accordsS-AS are considered eitemions ot CwcboitiviV iaihe> Uun of Soviet aid. Czechoslovakia not only provided the liuaocta! dealing fmliLg> (or the tiantactionj bat also supplied the IxJY ol the;
5
sum was discounlcd
Theto be repaid in goods (chiefly
cotton) overperiod. race period of several
years wasthe repayment period was to begin.
eliveries
Soviet arms aid to the UAR has been larger in amount and more diversified than that provided to other recipients of Moscow'swith the possible exception of Indonesia. Under the various agreements the UAR haside variety of modernincluding advanced aircraft, SAM's, missile-firing patrol boats, and recent models of several other types of naval craft and of assorted ground equipment (see Appendix A* ana* the photographs.,
A substantial part of the Soviet equipment delivered to thebeen earmarked for the air force. Included in the deliveriesfighters, et medium bombers, and
et light bombers. About half of the jet fighters are advanceds, equipped with air-to-air missiles, and late-modelighter bombers, and at leas* of theombers arc configured for air-to-surface missiles. The Egyptian air force also has received transports, helicopters, and trainers as well as equipmentomplete surface-to-air missile system.
The UAR navy, which originally consistedew old British destroyers plus some obsolete patrol craft and auxiliaries, has received
lass destroyers, and Koniar-class guided missile patrol boats, chasers, minesweepers,otor torpedo boats, andvessels and landing craft. Equipment for the armymedium, and heavy tanks; some self-
propelled assaultarmored personnel carriers; and
artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and mortars plus large amounts of electronic equipment, vehicles, and small arms.
B. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The relative complexity of thc modem weapons systems received by the UAR hasigh degree of skill to operate and
*d the docuiooo in this subsection include deliveries of Cwcboitovak- and Soviet-nudeunder tbe OxccboAtvjk-Epptian accords.
7
GQMglDEHTIAL-
t
maintain the equipment. Consequently, the USSR hasarallel program of military technical assistance.gyptians departed for military training in the USSR, and an annual averageoviet military technicians have been employed in the UARhe total cost to the UAR of the technical services, training, travel, and maintenance associated with Soviet military technical assistance during this period iso have beenillion. Such assistance generally has not been covered by credits but has been provided through separate contracts and paid forurrent account basis.
oviet Military Technicians in the UAR
The estimated number of Soviet military technicians employed in the UAR rose from5 to as manyn recent years (seebe number decreased toowever, largely because of reduced activity in the construction of SAM installations. The services of these technicians have cost the UAR anillionncluding aboutillion
11
llie major function of Soviet technicians in the UAR has been to train Egyptian personnel and to serve as military advisers. Courses have been esUblisbed on the operation of armaments ranging from small arms to aircraft and navalith recent emphasis on SAM equipment. Soviet officers also serve as instructors in the major military academies and schools of the UAR. For example, the Senior Military Staff College, established in5 near' Cairo, is staffed exclusively with Soviet militaiy instructors, and IV Soviet naval officers are attached to the UAR Naval Academy. In their capacity as advisers. Soviet officers have played key roles in die modernization and reorganization of the UAR military establishment
Soviet military personnel appear to have maintained generally cordial relations with their Egyptian counterparts, in spite ofEgyptian irritation over tlx- arrogant conduct of some Soviet officers. Soviet military personnel apparently have not engaged Iff overt proselytizing of Egyptian personnel, and in any case theirto do so has been orcrnnscribed by Egyptian security officials.
ilitary Training of Egyptians in tho USSR
gyptian military trainees are believed to have departed for the USSRomparedeak1 (seeAR military trainees were in the USSR at the endhc total estimated cost of this training to tho UARillion. At thc recent rate of new departures, the annual cost totals aboutillion.
In the early years of thc program, training courses were generally for less than six months and wore designed to familiarize UAR per sonnel quickly with the Soviet equipment which was then beingIn the, however, thereradual changeore comprehensive program requiring longer periods of training for more sophisticated weapons. Under the now program. UAR staff and line officers through the rank of general have been trained in the USSR. Many high-ranking UAR officers, for example, are sentour-yoar training program lo the Frunze Military Staff College, thc senior Soviet military school in Moscow.
Extended Soviet training of Egyptian personnel has provided thc USSR with valuable opportunities for indoctrination. Many company and Geld grade Egyptian officers have had little or no contact with Western military methods, their whole military experience having been with Soviet equipment, training methods, and military doctrine
1?
III. Chronology of Soviet Military Aid
A. SOVIET-SPONSORED ACCORDS WITH6
Nasser apparently took the initiative in the kaleidoscopic series of developments leading to the initial arms deals with Communisttries. In5 he contacted the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt concerning the purchase of arms from the USSR and received an affirmative reply. The USSR even offered to allow Nasser to conclude tiae agreement with Czechoslovakia or Poland if he was concerned about the political ramifications of dealing directly with Moscow. Nasser temporized for several months, however, while he sounded out the United States on the availability of arms and pondered the possible impactommunist deal.
After receiving what he considered to be an unsuitable offerUnited States, Nasser decided to conclude an arms agreementwhich was in effect acting as an intermediaryUSSR. The first Communist arms agreement with Egyptonollowup agreements werewith Czechoslovakia in5 and Aprilagreements togetherdownpay-
ments ). Although the precise degree of Soviet involve-
ment in these transactions never has been determined, it seemsclear that the USSR provided overall guidance in thc discussions and arrangements. Czechoslovakia, however, supplied the bulk of thc equipment and provided the financial clearing facilities.
The first Communist arms shipment arrived in Egypt only aafter the5 agreement. By the fallet
jet light bombers Sfcoruy-class destroyers,otor torpedo boats. Deliveries of land armaments included medium and heavy tanks, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers, and substantial amounts of artillery, rocket launchers, radar, and comniuoications equipment. Hundreds of Egyptians were sent to the USSR and Eastern Europe for military training under these agreements, and by the fall6 several hundred Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish rnilitary technicians were present in Egypt.
The rapid delivery of Communist arms maderograms the most disorganized and wasteful of the entire series arranged with
car -
IQP-GCCIKT "
Cairo. Czechoslovakia and thc USSR paid insufficient attention to the absorptive capacity of the Egyptian military establishment and delivered too much equipment too quickly. The Egyptians could not possibly assimilate such sizable amounts of modem arms without extensive training and support programs to accompany them.when the joint Bribsh-Frcnch-lsraeli attack was launched inhe ineffectively used and poorly dispersedequipment suffered extensive destruction. Approximately one-third to one-half of Egypt's Conimunist-supphed aircraft wereand about one-half of its ground equipment was eitheror destroyed. Subsequent delivery programs were planned much more carefully in the light of these early experiences.
B. DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENTgreements
In7 the USSR signed its first direct arms agreementof aircraft,
naval craft, and ground equipment under this accord replaced many of the losses of the Suez debacle. At the same time, planning began for the reorganization of Egypt's armed forces along standard Soviet organizational and operational lines. Shipments of modem equipment continued8 and included new all-weatheret fighters, transports,4 medium tanks, and improved artillery and mortars.*
Ansigned
largely for replacements, spare parts, ammunition, andand another accord for equipment and technicalconcluded During
everal additional agreements.
were signed. Included in these transactions werefor the installationomplete surface-to-air missile system in the UAR as well as for the supply of modemet medium bombers, advancedet fighters.urbopropeavy helicopters, and Komar-rlass guided missile gunboats.
During these years the reorganization of thc Egyptian military establishment along Soviet lines was completed, whichhift from the former British brigade pattern to thc Soviet regimental-divisional system.
tho formation ol the UARyria was required to divert nuw Soviet aims shipments to Egyptme ol lu recently acquired SovietirxiudlfigLo*i. aod armored personnelto Egypt.
Id
/
Inuring UARTWenseMmisfer Atrnrsvisit to Moscow, the USSR and the UARilitary aid agreement
Air and naval equipment covered by this accordadditionalet fighters andssaultW-dass submarines, and additional Konwr-class missileforces equipment included antiaircraft and4 medium tanks, and other armoredair-to-air, and Styx cruise missiles for die Komar-classalso were
greement!
In4 another delegation headed by Dcfcnso Minister Amir traveled to Moscow andew military aid agreement, tbe exact content and terms of which still are not known. On the basis of the list of items offered by the USSR, followup action by UAR inspection teams, and the magnitude of subsequent deliveries, it is estimated that tie agreement
providedajor reequipment and modernization program tor the UAR. New items covered under this accord included newer modelet medium bombers (equipped withet fighter bombers, MIG-2IFL hmited all-weather fighters, nussUo^quippedlass submarines, Osa-class guided missileersnen-class patrol5 medium tanks, andrmored personnel carriers. Except for theomber, none of these items bad yet been supplied to non-Communist countries.
The USSR began to implement4 accord early the following year. At leastoviet freighters delivered militarySAM equipment and Mi-6the first halfhe pace of deliveries quickened in thc second half of the year,Egyptian entreaties to the USSR to expedite shipments ofDeliveries of theL limited all-weather fighters began innd at leas. of these aircraft had arrived by the endf the newer modelet bombers were delivered inaising to the number of these aircraft in the UAR. Other aircraft deliveries included additions'ssault transports, bringing UAR holdings of such aircraft to
After several years of relatively small deliveries of navalassistance for thc Egyptian navy increased substantiallythc UAR'slass submarines were ex-'
ofelicopter! hit peaU> increased the UAR's airlift capability, and it Is now estimatedroops could be airliftedingle operation.
15
joS-opener
changed for modified versions, which arrived innd more of thelass craft were returned to the USSR in Mayn addition,lass submarines were delivered to the UARsodem Osn-class guided missile patrol boats6 andho UAR reportedly will also receive several missile-equippedof die Kollinot Krupnyythe next few years. Another important development was the initiation of an assembly program in the UAR involving imported Soviet components. Thus far, at leastlass subchasers and small tugs have been assembled under this program at thenaval shipyard. In addition, preparations are under way for introducing the coastal defense version of the Kennel cruise missile into thc UAR some time
Ground equipment deliveries
5 medium tanks as well as other armoredide range of artillery (including coastal defensenfantry weapons, and hundreds of support vehicles also were delivered during the period. In addition, some reports have indicated that the USSR may shortly provide FROG tactical rockets to thc UAR.
In5 an agreement involving
military aid was signed. Although little information is available on this accord, it apparently was earmarked for repair facilities andassistance.
16
TOT'S EC RET
IV- Assessment of the Military Aid Program
A. CONTRIBUTION TO THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE UAR
5 the UAR's military establishment has been completely^ reequipped with Soviet materiel and its capabilitiesodest force of seven infantry brigades and three armored groups numbering0 men, the army has beentoen (exduding paramilitary units),into four infantry and two armored divisions plus otherunits including paratroops and commandoes. Although the term "brigade" has been retained, thc units bearing this name are in fact patterned on Soviet regiments, each with three organic infantry battalions and an artillery battalion. Soviet-supervised training of Egyptian units through division level has been intensive and hasexercises employing large forces from all the services.
Tbe combat capability ofman UAR air force also has improved considerablyith ats now available, anystem being established, and the installation of an early warning system proceeding apace, thc UAR Is rapidly improving its air defense capability. Ship strength ofman UAR navy has more than doubled in the pastears and now includes aline of naval craft ranging from destroyers to missile-firing patrol boats.
In spite of this accretion of military hardware, the operationalof the UAR armed forces still is seriously hampered by aof trained manpower, an inefficient logistical system,ack of maintenancethe UAR is looking to Soviet sources to supply these needs. Some improvements in these areas have been made in the pastut deficiencies continue to plague the Egyptian military establishment
Continuing weakness in the combat effectiveness of the UAR armed forces has been evident in the campaign inscene of the first combat action for the UAR forces since6 Suez conflict An average of about one-third of the army has been in Yemennd most UAR combat units have seen service there. Although0 Egyptian troops were committed in Yemen at the height
Unto" recently, all tioit*ipltnl jet aircraftoe eaampla, had to be aent back to
the USSR foe general tnabauL Now aooie of tltefe oveibaub are uerfonDnd in lhe UAH.
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of action, the outcome has been inconclusive. Thc guerrilJa-type opposition encountered in Yemen is admittedly difficult to suppress. Nevertheless, the Egyptian forces have in generaloor showing, in spite of their superior Soviet arms, and this belies Cairo's claims of military superiority over Israel
B. IMPACT ON THE UAR
I. Defense Expenditures
Although the willingness of the USSR to provide military equipment on highly favorable terms has facilitated the buildup of the UAR armedapid rise in defense expenditures hasecessaryGrowing defense expenditures, in turn, haveajor element In the continuing pressures on the UAR's severely strained economy.
The 'armed forces budget" (which omits important items ofexpenditure) grew from less0 million annually in the0 million int has subsequendy risen considerably more,4 million forotalfor defense in fiscalthose for the Ministry of War, advanced weapons development, and the United Arabestimated5 million0 million. Expenditures have rangedercent of GNP during the pastears.
Payments of principal and interest on the debt to the USSRof military equipment makeelatively small partexpenditures because of the favorable terms extendedUAR. These payments totaled an
Egyptian de-
fense expend.iu.es have been lor personnel and facilities and, in recent years, thc war in Yemen. Military expenditures have risen markedly sincehen the UAR became involved in Yemen. This adventure has been costing Cairo anillionillion annually. Tho availability of Soviet weapons to replace those lost in Yemen undoubtedly hasactor in Nasser's decision to continue supporting the new Yemeni regime.
The Nasser regime has resorted to deficit financingainto support its enlarged military forces, develop the economy rapidly, and raise living standards. The result has been inflation,payments problems, and some internal discontent. Untilhe military establishment was virtually unaffected by thethat had been introduced in4 in other sectors of the
66CBP
economy. In recent months, however, it, too, has been feeling the effects of the government's financial stringency.
oreign Trade
The Soviet military aid program has considerably increased the role of. the USSR in Egyptian foreign trade. Part of this change is. the direct result of large Egyptian imports of Soviet military equipment and Egyptian exports required as payments on tho military debt. Indirectly, the change also reflects the contribution tliat military aid has made to improved Soviet-Egyptian relations and thus to the expansion of economic aid deliveries and repayments as well ascommercial exchanges.
Most military deliveries are omitted from the official UAR trade statistics. Nevertheless, the recorded Soviet share of total UAR trade turnover Jumpedercent5 toercentarge program of Soviet economic aid, the willingness of the USSR to actesidual market for UAR exports, and9 on) payments in goods for military credits maintained thcSoviet share of UAR tradeinimum ofercent7 and raised it toercenthese shares would be much larger if UAR imports of military equipment were reflected in the trade statistics. Such imports amounted to an5 million, or about one-third more than the recorded value of imports.
In spite of thc generous terms under which Soviet military items have been supplied, payments on military credits through deliveries of UAR goods haveignificant impact on the Soviet sltare of UAR exports. Thc initial abrupt rise in this4 percent6 toercent inbefore payments began on thedebt and reflected closer Soviet-Egyptian economic relationsthe Suez crisis. But tlie maintenance of the share atoercent9 reflects sizable UAR deliveries of goods in servicing this debt.hese deliveries constituted about one-third of UAR exports to thc USSR andercent of total UAR exports. Especially striking is thc growth in the Soviet share of the UAR's dominant export item, cotton. The USSR accounted forercent (by weight) of total UAR exports of cotton duringarketing year but has accounted foroercent of the total in subsequent years.
4 the UAR has had increasing difficulty balancing itspayments. It therefore has successfully sought two revisions in
19
Ihc payments schedule for its niilitary debt to the USSR. Inthc USSR agreed to reduce scheduled annualoscow fur-
ther agreed to postponehe payments due,
muiougb. this rescheduling win ueip co-ease the hnancial squeeze on the UAR in the next several years, it results in fairly large scheduled payments in the
C. "RELATIONSHIP TO POIICY OBJECTIVES OF THE UAR AND THE USSR
The USSR's provision of rniUtary aid to Egypt has promoted the foreign policy objectives of both countries and has contributed to their unproved relations. Nasser has reason to be pleased with the aid program. It has supported his efforts during the past decade towhat he considers to bc imperialist influences in the Middle East, toore vital role in Afro-Asian affairs, and to develop thc Egyptian economy. Soviet mihtary aid, in particular, has supported the efforts of Egypt to wield influence out of proportion lo its resources.
The inescapable counterpart of Nasser's policies and his acceptance of Soviet military aid in support of them has been growing UAR dependence on the USSR. At the same time, since the traditional foreign influences in thc Middle East have been largely those of the West. Nasser's policies have brought him into frequent conflict with Western interests and have alienated many sources of Westernassistance. Nasser's proclivity for maintaining good relationshe USSR thus reflects, in part. Ids heavy dependence on it for,all types ofeconomic, and technical. His dependence on Soviet arms has been particularly acute because some of his policies in the Middle East havetrong military posture.
The aid program also has furthered Moscow's policies, yielding closer relations with the largest and most influential Arab country and bolstering UAR policies in which the USSRtrong parallelThese policies include the overthrow of conservative Arabreduction of Western influence in thc Middle East, opposition to Western policy in other parts of the world, and the fostering of socialist-oriented institutions in the area. For example, Cairo'sin thc Yemeni revolution2ew opportunity for thc USSR to expand its influence in thc Middle East Moscow has underwritten Nasser's policy in Yemen and has enabled tlio UAH toubstantial military force there. Egyptian pressure on other Arab governments to purchase Soviet arms through thc United Arab Commandeans of standardizing military hardware in the Arab world also serves Soviet policy. Moreover, Moscow undoubtedly has been pleased with Egyptian criticism of US and British policy in various parts of tlic world as well as by Egypt's severance ofrelations with West Germany over thc lattcr's arms deliveries to Israel.
Although the USSR has generally been reluctant to associate itself with efforts to overthrow moderate regimes in the Middle East and Africa, it has encouraged the UAR to engage in such activities. On its own or in collaboration with the USSR, Egypt has delivered arms to the Congolese and Angolan rebels, to dissident groups in the South Arabian Federation, and to the Algerians before theyhe UAR has also provided military training for "freedom fighters'" from Angola, Cameroon. Nigeria, Portuguese Guinea, and other areas and has made significant financial contributions to thc African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity. In addition, the UAR served as an intermediary in providing Soviet military equipment and training for tho armed forces of Cyprus.
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cccncr
Indonesia, Iraq, and Somalia prior to thc conclusion of Sovietwith these countries.
Moscow's support for Nasser's policies has not been without its drawbacks. Such support frequently has impeded Soviet efforts to improve relations with Middle Eastern countries opposed to Nasser's aspirations in the area, with Cairo tending to view thcse-efforts as strengthening opposition regimes. Moreover, Soviet support forconsidered by the UAR to be within its sphere of influencehas elicited unfavorable reactions from Nasser. Soviet military aid to thc Kassem regime in Iraq inor example, added an important Irritant to those already existent in Soviet-Egyptian relations at thc Kmc and triggered the first polemical exchange between Nasser and Khrushchev.
Nasser's suppression of local Communists has remained an irritant in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Soviet criticism of sucheated exchange between Nasser and Khrushchev inrictions of this kind, however, have been brief, and the USSR apparently has been willing to overlook Nasser's domesticin the overall interests of Soviet foreign policy.
V. Outlook
As long as Egypt and thc USSR can pursue their separate butobjectives in the Middle East, tbe USSR probably will continuerovide substantial amounts of military assistance to the Egyptian-military establishment. The military equipment that Nasser requires to pursue his regional objectives is not likely to become availableFor its part, Moscow has almost certainly concluded that thc military aid program serves Soviet objectives reasonably well and ought to be continued. The program will afford the USSR furtherfor developing influence in the UAR and other Arab countries not available through more conventional means. Moreover, the UAR's estrangement from thc West, its serious economic difficulties, anddeepening involvement in thc UAR's economy and military establishment havoependence which the .USSR will seek to continue as long as it serves Soviet purposes.
Present trends suggest that the USSR will continue to expand thc list of advanced arms and weapons systems made available to the UAR (seet is highly unlikely, however, that the USSR will reverse its longstanding policy of refusing to provide either nuclear weapons or strategic missile systems. The increasingly complexbeing sold to the UAR in any caseigh level ofboth for the troops operating and maintaining the equipment and for the staffs controlling its use. Thus, training and technical assistance will continue to he emphasized.
Although theyontinuing burden on tbe hard-pressed economy, expenditurestrong militaryNasservital to hisalmost certainly continue to be accorded high priority by Egypt. Military outlays probably will at leastmaintained at the current high level during the next few years in order to finance continued modernization of the armed forces and the development of advanced weapons.
23
APPENDIX A
Soviet Military Equipment Delivered to the United Arab Republic'7
Utte
I^nd ormonunti
Heavy
Medium
LlRhl tankj
SeB-propcTJed assault
1'enouoel comers, mnutwl and
Artillery
Naoei thipt
Submarines
>
Submarine
Motor torpedo
Guided ataOe patrol
Audliary veaaels
Mfcrifi
Jot medium.
Jet light
Jet
Heavy transports
Other
Guided missile systems *
Atr-to-eurfaee
Air-to-air (AAMs)*
Sirrfae*-to-air
Surfacc-to^urtaec (ship-launched) (SSMs)'
deliveries to the UAH by CzecWlovakla under the Soviet-(pooioted accords
* Aircraft, ships, vehicles, and sitesistuc cpabdlty.
'ircraft equipped with ASM'* (two per aircraft).
'ircraft equipped with AAMs (two to lour per aucraft).
SAM Bring sites (sis launcher* per site and lour uUtsucs pernly about half of which ore ope ratio oil.
' fComor- and Ota-dan patrol boats equipped with SSM's (two or four per vessel).
'Vehicles equipped with missiles (throe or lour per vehicle).
BET
BLANK PAGE
APPENDIX B
United Arab Republic Advanced Weapons Programs*
urface-to-Air Missiles (SAM's)
Besidesreat variety of conventional armaments tothe USSR has introduced several types of advancedinto that country. During Defense Minister Amir's visitinhe USSR agreed tourface-to-air missileso pro-
tect Cairo and the Nile River Delta. Subsequentnd Soviet missile equipment and technicians beganin the UARonstruction first began at thecomplex at Dahshurhile work on missilebegan shortly thereafter. Asanuary
Sites in varying stages of construction were identified inh
About half of these were believed to be operational.bottlenecks and lack of trained personnel to man the sites have been the primary difficulties which have delayed achievingstatus for the entire system.
A group of Soviet missile experts visited the UAR late5 to direct the integration of SAM's, antiaircraft artillery, radar,oordinated air defense system. When the SAM system becomes fully operational, perhaps in several years, the UAR willastly improved air defense capability. The presentystem is effectiveistance of aboutoautical miles and at an altitude00 feet Its minimum effectiveheavily on sighting conditions and technicalconsidered toeet. Even when die missile
/
complex is fully completed, therefore, die UAR wuTstfll lack andefease against low-level aircrafttypo of attack most likely to be experienced In the event of open hostilities with Israel.
urfoce-lo-Swfaee Missiles (SSM'i)
With thehe
UAR has had under development two types of liquid-fueled short-range sinface-to-snrface missilesVictor and theCairo's missile program has been plagued by technical,and financial difficulties practically since it beganhe two missiles under development thus far liavc proven to be unreliable and inaccurate. Although troublesome, time consuming, and costly, thc problems associated with tho program apparently have not been considered critical enough by the UAR to override the regime's desireomestically produced advanced weapons status symbol.the USSR has not participated in the UAR's SSM program to date, Moscow reportedly has recently agreed to provide missileand some components beginning inithout vastly expanded foreign technical assistance, however, the prospectscployablc SSM system in the UAR remain remote.
ihcr Types of Misiilo* o. AiV-io-Suffoco (ASM'sJ
Thc presence of theennel ta thc UAR was suspected al the time deliveries ofedium jet bombers* were first anticipated. Thc first of these aircraft delivered, however, were early models not equipped for mounting (he inissilc, but the that arrivedere believed to be so equipped. Thceam-riding missilenautical-milc range, can be equippedigh-explosive or nuclear warhead. Aboutennels were known lo be in the UAR by the end of
b, Air-to-Ak (AAMt)
All of thoet fighters delivered to tlio UAR are believed to carrytoli AAM's. Thc Atoll is an infrared homing missileive-aautical-iiiile range andigh-explosive warhead.
^oo^ul deW
tlx. KandanJrx thi* miBile fa fceedium (e< bomber.
I
c. Surfocc-fo-Surface (Ship-launched)
The UAR has received eight Korrur-class missile patrol craft, each armed with tworuise missiles, andsu-class craft, each mounting four missiles. Thcnautical-mile vehicle, is primarily an anbship weapon, but it can be used for shore bombardment and coastal defense as well.
uclear Capability
Neither the UAR nor any other Arab state now has any capability to develop nuclear weapons. The UARmall Soviet-built reactor, but its operation has been confined to basic research and limited isotope extraction. It is unlikely that the country could develop any sort of nuclear weapons capability without extensive outside assistance.
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Original document.
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