November 6 SC6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder Program in North Vietnam
I06
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
ckx* i
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lassified information nffrctlnp the national *reimlynited Stater within (he meaning of the espionageL'SB... The law prohlWU itsiismn or the rttc'ulmn ol its contents in any manner to miftin.ell as its use in any manner prejudicial to On 'jf<r intrmt of the United State* or for Ihr benefit of any fciv teno the detriment of the United States.
s in r- $rrn only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and autfcnrlml In recrlVfENCE infor-malum. Us tutUy must br maintained In accordance with COM-MUN [CATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
nilinn fc to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONSwhich may be ronUined herein, regardless of theto br gained, unlrv, such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
CONTENTS
Page
I. The Rolling Thunder Attack in6 .
of
C Aircraft
D. Cost Effectiveness of Operations Against North
Vietnam6
II. Target Systems Attacked in6
Electric Power
Petroleum Storage
Lines of
of Opportunity (Armed Reconnaissance
Mission*)
C- Laos Air
III. The Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program6
A. Physical
top segret^Trine
Pace
IV.
Casualties6
1. North Vietnamese Claims of Casualties
Casualties from Strikes
Against Fixed Targets
Casualties from Armed
Reconnaissance
C North Vietnamese
Repair and
Civil
and Manpower
of Population and Industry
Civil Defense Measures
a.
n. North Vietnamese Political
E- Soviet and Chinese Communist
Military Aid
Economic Aid
General Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program .
C-
Trade
Developments in North
Country
Soviet and Eastern European
Communist China's Attitude
Page
Tables
Sorties by US/CVN Forces in Southeast Asia,
5 and6
Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia,
6
by Model of Fixed-Wing Aircraft, During
6
of Rolling Thunder Strikes on Major
Fixed-Target Systems: nd January-September
of Rolling Thunder Strike Sorties on
Major Fixed-Target Systems: 5
Vietnam: Airstrikes Against JCS Targeted
Bridges.5 and6
Vietnam: Estimated Total Length of Time
Railroad Lines were Interdicted for Through Rail
Service.5 and6
Bridges Destroyed or Damaged, by Line,
hrough6
9- Reported Losses of Transport Equipment Duein North Vietnam, 5
and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered
to North5
and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered
to North Vietnam, 6
Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam.
North Vietnam: Rolling Stock Inventory as of56
North Vietnam: Cargo Truck Inventory as of56
- vi -
TOP SECRE^TRINE
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM IN NORTH 6
The Rolling Thunder air offensive against North Vietnam has been accelerated sharplyompared with operationsttack sorties flown in the first nine months6 against targets in North Vietnam were aboutimes5 effort;ons of ordnance dropped wasimes the ordnance delivered on targetsir operations have also been carried out more efficiently than5 campaign. The average bomb load per attack sortie has increased, and the rate of aircraft losses has been someercent of5 rate.
In spite of these improvements, it is estimated that the costof the air campaign diminishedhe direct operating cost ofollar's worth of damage in North Vietnam hasby aboutercentrom an05 tohe major determinants of this decrease in costhave been the far greater proportion of attack sorties accounted for by armed reconnaissance strikes (as opposed to initial strikes on fixed targets) and the geographic concentration of the air effort against logistic targets in the southern areas of North Vietnam, principally Military Region IV.
* This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from the normalexchange with other agencies at the working level, thishas not boon coordinated outside CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports and was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and conclusionsthe host Judgment of tho Directorate of Intelligence as
By the endrowing scarcity of fruitful fixed targetsof sanctuary areas, as well as other ope rational restrictions virtually forceda continually increasing emphasis on armed reconnaissance. This trend was temporarily interrupted by the strikes against majorstorage installations, which began late intrike sorties against JCS fixed-target systems dropped from more thanercent of
the total sorties flown5 lo lessercentrmedsorties increased byercent, fromorties5lmost two-thirds of these0 sortiesere directed at the southernmost areas of North Vietnam, the Panhandle section south of Vinh.
The air campaign over Laos shows similar emphasis on the attempted interdictionof the infiltration network into South Vietnam. Attack sorties flown under the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs increased0 sorties5 to0 during the first nine monthsinety-five percent of the attack sorties flown in Laoi6 were on armed reconnaissance missions.
The major measurable effects on North Vietnam of Rolling Thunder attacks are:
Aboutercent,f the total military forces are engaged directly In defensive programs and countermeasures against the Rolling Thunder program.ull-timeart-time workers have been diverted to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs in North Vietnam and Laos.ersons are tentatively estimated to have been casualties of air attacks In the North.
Physical damage to economic andtargets has also increased- This damage amountedillion5 and anillion in the first nine monthsf the latter total, overercent represented damage to economic targets.
Despite the increased weight of air attack, North Vietnam continues to increase its support to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The Rolling Thunder program has not beenable to prevent about athreefold Increase in the level of personnel infiltrationhe external logistic rup-portneeded to maintain theexpanded VC/NVAforee in South Vietnam has been adequate. In particular, despite the neutralization of the major petroleum storage facilities in the North, petroleum supplies haveto be imported in needed amounts.
RINE
roader view, during the course of the Rolling Thunder program the North Vietnamese capability to support the war effort has improved.
The capacity ol the transportationat least as it affects the ability to handle the flow of men and military supplies toSouth Vietnam, has been increased.
The sizable manpower drain has peaked, unless thereharp increase in estimated VC7 NVA manpower losses in South Vietnamadical change in the nature of the air campaign against North Vietnam.5orth Vietnam had to mobilizeercent of its physically fit males as they reacheddraft age. Subject to thejust delineated, this levy could be as low asercent of7 class.
Aid from the USSR and Communist China received56 has amounted, invalue, to about five times the total damage caused by Rolling Thunder attacks.
The factarge share of the imports now flowing into North Vietnam isnot militaryaidbut machinery and equipment seemssignificant. On the one hand, itillingness of the major Communist powers to provide additional equipment for war-relatedfacilities, probably encouraged by the fact that the modern industrial sector of the North Vietnamese economy has been largely off-limits to air attack. On the other hand, it suggests that adequate reserves ol skilled manpower, electric generating capacity, and other essential inputs are availableignificant scale for conversionar-supporting role. While this new emphasis accelerates the ability to support militaryin the short run, it does postpone Hanoi's long-run plans for the development of heavy industry.
Nor has Rolling Thunder served visibly to reduce the determination of Hanoi to continue the war. We see no signs that the air attack has shaken the confidence of the regime, and with increased Soviet and Chinese aid to bolster Its capabilities, North Vietnam in the short term, at least, will apparently take no positive stepegotiated settlement. In any event, it is estimated that Hanoi will continue to be insistentessation of Ihe bombingsrerequisite for negotiations. Analysis of popular attitudes in North Vietnamontinued firmness in support of the regime's policies. Although the long-term effects of the war may have some wearying effect on the population, there is no evidence
that it has yetoint sufficient to deter Hanoi's leaders from their present policies.
Finally, the course of the air campaign6 has had noeffect on the attitudes of third countries. From the resumption of the bombings in6 to the escalation represented by theof the petroleum storage facilities, third-country attitudes have been, predictably, relatively constant. The unyielding attitude of the North Vietnamese, particularly during the January bombing pause, hasomewhat sobering impact on some third countries. Indeed, the escala-tion against POL storage facilitieseaction more restrained and less critical than had been anticipated. Among Communist third countries, the USSR and the Eastern European countries wouldegotiated settlement because theyontinuation of the war as potentiallydangeroustothemselvcBandinany case as posing an awkward dilemma for them within the Communist world. The Chinese Communists, however, remain adamant in their attitudes toward the war and any steps leadingegotiated settlement.
Over and above the measurable effects discussed in the foregoing, the Rolling Thunder program has certain intangible aspects such as enemy morale and determination whichare much more difficult to assess. The Rolling Thunder program has been the object of much neutralist criticism and the targetoncerted Communist diplomatic and propagandaIn one sense, this mast serve to stiffen Hanoi's back; at the same time, the program has oecome one way Hanoi probably measures US determination--though the extent of US commitment on the groundthis determination far more persuasively. Moreover, the Rolling Thunder operation carries some threat of further escalation, and In this way mayertain worrisome pressure on Hanoi. On the other hand, if Rolling Thunder were to be terminated at this point withoutthe United States would be deprived of one form of leverage against Hanoi which it now has.
'RINE
I. The Rolling Thunder Attack in6
of Operations
During the first nine monthsS/GVN forces flew0 attack sorties against Northf this total, the United States0 sorties and the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) the, The combined effort represents an increase ofercent over the0 attack sorties flown against North Vietnam in all As shown in Tablehe air attack on North Vietnam6arger share of the total attack in Southeast Asia than it did The number of attack sorties flown in South Vietnam, on the other hand,maller share of the total number of attack sorties in Southeast Asiahan it did
Attack sorties specifically flown as initial strikes or restrikes on fixed targets from the target list of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have become very rare. uch sorties accounted forf all attack sorties flown against North Vietnam, and armedsorties accounted for approximatelyercent. 6 the share of fixed target attack sorties not involving any armedhad shrunkercent, with armed reconnaissance sorties accounting4 percent. This changeontinuationrend already under way in the latter monthshen, in comparison with previous levels, fixed target sorties declined both absolutely andhare of the total attack op North Vietnam. The decline undoubtedly reflects the diminishing number of new fixed targets available for attack, broadened authorization for armed reconnaissance, and, at least ir.hange in definitions used. Restrikes on JCS fixed targets were also carried out by armed reconnaissance sorties. Including these restrikes on armed reconnaissance,orties, or somewhat lessercent of the total number of attack sorties on North Vietnam, were directed against JCS targets.
During the first nine months0 tons of ordnance were delivered or North Vietnam, or aboutimes the
* Attack sorties Include: strike, flak suppression, armedand air interdiction.
Attack Sorties by US/CVH Forces in Soulheant Asia5 and
Percent 20
Number ol' Sorties
61*
7
6
Arm
US VKAJ
Number of 3ortlea Percent
North Vietnam
22
South Vietnas
US
VKAF
Lnoa
Lo
All areas of operation
1
VFJAF
7
tonnage delivered The amounts delivered on North Vietnam during the early months of the year were much smaller than in the later months. The total for the three-month period January-March wasons,ons were delivered in Julyons in August. The amount delivered in August was equal to approximatelyercent of the total delivered on North Vietnam
The total ordnance tonnage delivered by air in Southeast Asia, however, has remained fairly constant throughout the year. Itittle0 tons in January and had increased to0 by August. As indicated in Tableuring the early months of the year, when tho tonnage delivered on North Vietnam was small, the tennage delivered on Laos was relatively large. In the spring and summer the tonnages delivered on Laos decreased as the tonnagea delivered on North Vietnam increased. Deliveries on targets in South Vietnam have remained relatively constant.
TOP SECRET-TRINE
Table 2
Ordnance Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia6
Tons
Vlotniur
Vietnam
February
March
April
Miy
June
July
August
3
0
8
During the first nine months6 thtf average ordnance load per attack sortie against North Vietnamittle more thanons perlight increase overons per sortie averagedn6 the average load wasons, approximately the same as the average load per bomber sortie flown by US Air Forces against Germany in World War II. In6 the average load per attack sortie Hown against North Vietnamons.
C. Aircraft Losses
A totallanes, including support as well as attackwere lojt during the nine-month periodll were US aircraft. The ratio of total losses to attack sorties was about8 percentomparedatio of5 percent This is equal to an average lossittle moreircraftttack sortiesomparedoss ofircraftttack sorties Losses, by model, of fixed-wing aircraft56 are compared in Table 3. Lossesercent of total sorties flown by models of aircraft most used either remained the same or declined.
Table 3
Losses by Model of Fixed-Wing Aircraft5 and6
inp
Losses in6
value of the aircraft lost on sorties against North Vietnam6 may be estimated at0 million, on the basis of average costs for production models of the types of aircraft lost. reliminary estimate of the sortie overhead costs for the attack sorties and for the accompanying support sorties is0 million. If the ordnance mix6 was about the ;ame ashe cost of the ordnanceby sorties against North Vietnam6 may have been ii the
neighborhood0 million. On this basis, the direct operating coat (excluding manpower losses) of the aerial attack on North Vietnamtho first nine months6 may be estimated ats follows:
Aircraft losses Sortie overhead costs Ordnance costs
Total
US $
480
A preliminary estimate of the damage done to North Vietnam by the aerial attack isillion. Tnus the cost of one dollar's worth of damage to the DRV may be estimated at This is an increase of aboutercent above the estimated coat0 per dollar's worth of damage The increase in cost per unit of damage has been caused by loss of planes of more expensive models, by the increased sortie overhead costs resulting fromarger number of sorties,and by the fact that many of the most at'ractlve targets were destroyed
TOPSEGRETTRINE
II. Target System* Attacked in6 A. Fixed Targets 1. Genrral
The Rolling Thunder attacks during6 continued trends that were well defined by the last quarter The growing scarcity of fruitful fixed targets which were eligible for attack by the criteria of Rolling Thunderontinually increasing emphasis on armed reconnaissance missionsonsequent decline in the number of fixed target strikes. ixed targets were struckost of6 counterpart effort was in restrikes of these targets, yew fixed targets were struck in the first nine months6 (see Attack sorties flown against JCS fixed target systems dropped dramaticallyompared boutercent of total attack sorties were flown specifically as fixed-target sorties. ncluding both fixed-target sorties and restrikes of fixed targets on armed reconnaissance sorties, only somewhat lessercent of total attack sorties were dircctod against JCS fixed targets. (See Nevertheless, the effectiveness of fixed-target strike attacks, measured in terms of damage costs, more than doubled. Damage directly attributable to airstrikes on fixed targets roseer sortie5er sortie The principal cause of this rise undoubtedly Is the concentration of the attack effort on high cost target systems such as powerplants, bridges, and POLoas. Strikes on these throe target systems accounted for overercent of the fixed target program thus farhereas they comprised onlyercent of the effott Other factors, such as the reduction in average strike site, may have contributed to the rise in fixed-target strike effectiveness, but it is apparent that target selection is the key element.
Strikes on military Installations included in the JCS fixed-target system accounted for onlyercent of the total fixed-target strike sorties The major portion of this program consisted of restrikes on targets already hitnd, in general, these attacks produced damage of lower economic cost than those directed against industrial
2. Electric Power Targets
Despite the destruction of about one-third of North Vietnam's electric power industry by US airstrikes, the loss is not yet large enough to have an important impact on the economy. The effectiveness of the strikes has been reduced by carrying out strikes against targets of small economic significance.
'NE
- II -
Table -
Comparison of Rolling 'ihunder Strikes on Major Fixed-Target5 and January-September lv66
cf
Struck
Fixed Target System
Targeted
6
Strikes6
depots/ ammunition depots
storage
and explosives plants
and eoouunications installations
US airstrikes against North Vietnamese powerts have resulted in the neutralisation of an0 kilowattsrercent,otal installed generatingw. The total cost of damage inflicted is estimated toillion. 5 thereotal oftrikes and restrikes against six Vietnamese powerplants. Theof damage inflicted is estimated to beillion, and the total capacity put out of servlct amounted0 kw. of0 kw was put back into service by6 thereotal oftrikes ar<u 'rikesive powerplants. The cost of damage6 is estimated to beillion, and the amount ofw, plus0 kw of capacity destroyed that probably would have gone into service The following tabulation presents details of the air strikes
Powcrplant
uong Bl
Date of Air Strlkea
pr8 Apr tC-ll Aug 66
Thai Nguyen)
Viet Trl
IT)
Ik Aug7 Aug 66
ulrior toul 66
Thanh Hce ep ep3 Sep 66
BenOct 66
) ct 66
Estimated Cost Of Damage
Megl.
(Million US $) Capacity Out of Service
O kv. Put back In service
No known additional damage.
Megl. Negl.
0.8
w put back In service wasw being Installed was also neutralized.
v out0 kv put out of service.
I-'cgl.
N.A. II..
Probably not out of service moreew days.
Restoration under way but estieiated not to have operated since
.
Restoration under way but estimated not to have operated since
ost of the strikesutook place In the northern part of the country, while the majority of theut5 occurred in the south. Two single strikes against the Thai Nguyen and Viet Tri powerplants and five restrikes against the Uong Bi powerplant all were in the north. The remaining missions were accounted for by five restrikes against the Ben Thuy and Thanh Hoa powerplants in the south, both of which were initially put out of operation in the summer
The6 strike against the Uong Bi powerplant rates as the most effective single strikeorth Vietnamese powerplant, severely damaging and putting out of0 kw that had been In service and0 kw that was almost ready for operation. Total cost of damage resulting from this strike alone wasillion. Loss of the plant denies North Vietnam the use of its largest and most efficient powerplant for at least one year.
TOP SECRET-TRINE
Table 5
Comparison of Foiling Thunder Strike Sortiea on Major Fixed-'inrget5 and6
Oranance in Tone
System
depots/
tlor. depots
Ordnance
POL storage
Sorties Ordnance
33T
-00
460
Sorties Ordnance
7
279
and explosives plants
Sorties Ordnance
0
.
0
Ordnance
330
H
415
Sorties Ordnance
and CovB'jnlcstlons Installations
Ordnance
20
.
20
bases, railroad yards, and ports
Sorties Ordnance
Sorties Ordnance
0
2
Airstrikes against powerplants6 generally appear to be more effective than In terma of capacity put out of operation, each atrtke averaged somew5 compared with onlyw In value terma. the coat of damage averagedor each strike5 However, if the strikes for both years are weighed in terms of long-rangethe above comparisons are misleading. Accounting of the damage to the Uong Bi powerplantignificant difference. If all the capacity put out of operation at Uong Bi is countedncluding the amount being installed which was destroyed, then average capacity put out of operation per strike5 amountsw. asw per strike The comparison in value terms would not change.
3. Petroleum Storage Targets
Himber
US airstrlkes against JCS-designated petroleum storage target systems have destroyed almostercent of the pre-strike capacityons. Almost three-fourths of this destruction was achieved6 whenir strikes were flown againat petroleum storage targets, compared withtrikes The following tabulation summarises the air campaign against petroleum
5
JCS
Striken
Van
/
nh
-
Dinh
,
Qui
.*
SE
Destruction of JCS petroleum storage targets during the first nine months6 was as follows:
..JCS
June
October
of Strikes
Van b/
nh
Khe
Cia (Phuc Yen) b/
Ciang
Dlnh b/
Son
Tri
Qui b/
Nhan
Thon (Kep) b/
of average petroleum.
struck to date
storage facilities elaborate system Vietnamese have normal levels by from China,ecently, the use troleum from the
of neutralizing most of the major petroleum have been largely offset by the development of an of resupply and dispersed storage sites. The North been able to maintain petroleum imports atombination of movement of petroleum overlandon Soviet tankers, and. more ofon Soviet tankers delivering pe-Soviet Far East.
-
topKine
TOPSEGR&TTRINE
Difficulties in distributing petroleum internally have been noted, but they do not appear to be sufficient to cause other than highly local transportation difficulties or to interfere with the logistir reaupply of the Communist forces in South Vietnam.
4. Lines of Communications
a. North Vietnam
The rail lines, highways, and waterways of Northwere hit continually from January throughith emphasis primarily on the same areas that were struck Ofridges confirmed by aerial photography to have been struck since the start of bombing,ere targets struck for the first time. All lines of communications (LOC's) were hit with greater intensityut the only new LOC's taken under attack were the roads developed as alternates to routes bombed
Airstrikes against JCS-targetcd bridges, like strikes against all bridges in North Vietnam, have been concentrated in the southern part of the country. The number of strikes against highway bridges on the JCS target list decreasedhereas strikes against JCS bridges on the rail lines increased as shown in Table 6.
(1) Railroads
In spite of the increase in airstrikes against the rail lineshere has been no significant increase in the total length of time the rail lines have been interdicted for through rail service during the year as shown in Table 7. Aerialotal ofailroad and combination rail/highway bridges were damaged or destroyed on all rail lines in North Vietnam since the start of the bombing. This figure representsercent of all rail bridges in the country, half of which were destroyed or damaged from January through omparison of data by individual line. Theong Dang andaiphong lines, the two most important lines for the movement of both imports and domestic goods, have bean interdictedotal of only about two months and one month, respectively, The average volume of traffic moved on these two lines could easily have beenequal to that moved5 because the lines are normally used belowcapacity, thus traffic backlogged during periods of interdiction could have been moved while the lines were open. Two additional
-
top secrep-ykiNe
bridges wore struck on the Dongine6 bringing the total on this line to four bridges, all located approximately midway between Hanoi and the China border. No additional bridges were struck on the Haiphong line-Table 6
North Vietnam: Airstrikes Against JCS Targeted5 and6
Number of
Tarpeted Bridges Struck Number of Strikes
6 ^ 5 6
Type- and Location
Railroad and railroad/ highway
- Dorg Dang line
- Lao Cai line
- Haiphong line
- south c/
to
to
to
restrikes against JCS bridges.
JCS bridges initially struck
the Hanoi-Vinh line and the makeshift line south of
Vinh.
North Vietnau:
Estimated Total Length of Time Railroad Lines were Interdicted for Through Ball5 and6
Lineong Dangaiphongao Caiinhhai Nguyen
1onths Hegl.
onths Negl-
Table 8
Railroad Bridges Destroyed or Damaged, by5 Through0
KINE
Percent
Rsilroad Line
Bridges on Line
Destroyed/Damaged5
5 and
- Lao Cai
- Dong Dang
- Haiphong
- Dong Hoi
- Thai Nguyen
Theao Cai line haa been interdicted for through service for almostercentompared with about Theinh line has been disrupted for through rail service almost continually since it was first struck inxcept auring the cessation of bombing in Pour of the major bridges destroyed on this line5 have bypass bridges in place and shuttling operations under way. At leastdditional railroad and combination bridges have been struck on this lineb.
The most significant hindrance to highway traffic has resulted from strikes against routes in the southern part of North Vietnam. Strikes against the central and northern parts of the country have resulted in only minor disruptions of truck service. Routelong Hie coast to the DMZ, has been subjected to the most bombing, but apparently also continues to be the most heavily used road in tho south. Other north-south routes, such as ro-ites, have been usedas supplements or as alternates when portions of routeere interdicted. Aerial photography has confirmed the destruction or damage ofdditional highway bridges, primarily in the south, otaltghft-fl, bridges struck since the start of the bombing. In addition, roadbeds hive been cratered at chokepoints. and alternate routes have been bombed. The southernmost motorable road crossing Into Laos westk"ig Hoi, completed in April, also has been heavily bombed. The sig.ulicantly higher level of reported destruction and damage of trucks in the southhown in Table 9. has added greatly to the problem of moving supplies south. In spite of th*se heavy losses, there have been no indications of serious shortages of supplies resulting from either the loss of trucks or of lowered road capacities.
The most significant change in the movement of supplies to the south thus far6 has been the increased emphasU on the use of inland and coastal waterways. Airstrikes against the waterways followed the same pattern6 asith attacks primarily against watercraft. port areas, and other cargo-handling facilities. No significant damage to the water LOC's hasfrom the numerous strikes against tlu ports and transshipment facilities in southern North Vietnam. Dredging of waterways, an annual project for the North Vietnamese, probably increased6 in the south. Airstrikes against watercraft prcbably have been mort inortant in hindering water shipments than strikes against facilities. The number
toprTne
of water craft reported destroyed and damaged6 increased nearly five-fold The number of watercraft used in the southern area apparently has not decreased, however.
Table 9
Reported losses of TransportDue to Bombing In North Vietnam5 and6
b/
freight carr c/
data are basically those from pilot reports but adjustedto eliminate some duplication. Data probably include some
trucks were destroyed and damaged in Laos, resultinglosses ofrucks from the inventory.
small makeshift railroad cars used on the line southThis tyre of car is not included in the Inventory ofcars-
b. Laos
Air operations against lines of communications have been concentrated in the north-central and Panhandle areas of Communist-held Laos. The roads and river crossings in the Panhandle were hardest hitith aboutercent of the sorties flown in this region. Strikes have been carried out against bridges,erries, and choke-points. orties, primarily armed econnaissance, were flown against LOC's and fixed targets located in the north central area and the Panhandle during the first nine months Air attacks were heaviest during the dry season, when an average of aboutorties were flown per week. The level of sorties dropped to an average ofer weekhe rainy season, which started
in June. Pilots reported the following damage to LOC's in Laos for the periodpril through
and Ferries
North Central (Barrel (Steel Tiger/
Tiger
Aerial photography since6 has confirmed that seven bridges in the north-central region andridges in the Panhandle, most of which areon fordable streams, were heavily damaged or destroyed. It ishatrucks have been destroyed on roads in the Panhandle si.'ce the start of bombing in southern Laos.
B. Targets of Opportunity (Armed Reconnaissance Missions)
A total ofrmed reconnaissance sorties were flown in the first nine monthsomp redorties This increase ofercent reflects not only the scarcity of authorised fixed targets but alfo the increasing concern with infiltration of men and supplies Into South Vietnam- The latter concern is apparent in the fact that almost two-thirds of the armed reconnaissance sorties were directed against targets in the southernmost areas of North Vietnam, the Panhandle section south of Vinh-
The rise in damage effectiveness for armed reconnaissance0 per sortie50 per sorties principally attributable to the concentration of attack on transportation facilities south of Vinh and their systematic destruction. There are, however, two other factors that contribute to the rise in damage per sortie, neither of whichruly sound comparable indicator ofeffectiveness. The first of these is the inclusion of damageon naval endigure unavailable and thus excluded from the assessment'! strikes made The second io represented by the downing of North Vietnamese interceptor aircraft by Rolling Thunder missions. The cost of these aircraft and the number downed is not related to the number of Rolling Thunder sorties flown, and the disproportionate rise in dollar replacement cost to North Vietnam should therefore be taken into account when measuring effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder program.
C. Lnoa Air Operations
ttack sorties were flown under the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs apiinst the north-central and Panhandle areas of Communist-held Laos during the first nine months This air effortarked increase over0 attack sorties flown in similar missions Of the attack sorties flown over Laos during January-September of this year.ercent were on armed reconnaissance missions. Aboutercent of the attack missions struck targets of opportunity within the Steel Tiger area of operations; the other JO percent performed similar tasks within the Barrel Roll area.
The intensity of the current air war ovsr Laos is varied to meet fluctuations in weather and the level of enemy truck traffic and infiltration. onthly attack sorties over Laos ranged fromn January (dry season)n August (wet season).were heavily directed against trucks, bridges, fords, ferries, and road chok'.po'nts. It Is estimated thatir attacks in Laos have inflicted at leastillion damage against the Communist forces. The bulk of this damage, primarily accounted for by truck and bridge destruction, was inflicted in the Steel Tiger area of operation-
Ht, Tho Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program6 A. Physical Damage
Attack sorties flown by the Rolling Thunder program increasedercent during the first nine monthswith allut the value of physical damage increased by only aboutercent. omparison of total measurable damage to economic and military target systems5 and6 is as follows:
Million US $
Economic targets Military torget3 Total
2
0
Damage to military targets, which accounted lorercent of the total damageccounted for less thanercent By far the greatest share of damage to military targets was inflicted on aircraft and naval craft, which accounted forercent of the total military damage No estimates of damage to naval craft are availableamage to aircraft in that year accounted for onlyercent of total damage to military targets.
The major changes in damages inflicted on economic target systems6 as compared5 were the sharp increases in the destruction or damage sustained by transport equipment and theindirect losses of exports and agricultural crops which areto the bombings. Losses in transport equipment jumped from US S6 million5illion Indirect losses of agricultural crops and export earnings almost tripled2 million5illion
Tho air attack6 shows some general correlationthe incre-.se in attack sorties and the level of physical damage. Thus, the months of July, August, and September accounted for almost one-half7 percentf the total damage sustained by
economic targets. During the same period the air attack accounted for almost Sd percent of the sorties flown to date Military damage has remained at relatively low levels6 except during the last four months, when increasing losses of aircraft and naval craft have been sustained. mulative effects, by economic sector, of the Rolling Thunder program are discussed in Part IV of this memorandum. The overall effect has been to inflict increasing damage to thesystem and to cause extensive distribution problems, most nothbly in petroleum distribution. The airstrikes have continued to depress economic growth and to cause the abandonment of some plans fordevelopment. Nevertheless, ossential economic activitiesmost transportation routes remain open. The level of damage has not been sufficient to cause any sector of the economy to collapse. Nor has popular support of the war been significantly diminished. Hanoi's support of its military activities in South Vietnamhas been made more costly and burdensome but has not been reduced below the levels required to continue military operations at the levels maintained throughout most
Casualties
estimates of casualties irom bombing North Vietnam are subject to an unknown and conceivably large margin of error because of the questionable validity of the assumptions and estimates used in the calculations. Information emanating from Hanoi is of little value in estimating casualties, with propaganda pronouncements continuing to be directed to the large but usually unspecified numbers ofinflicted from the bombing of schools and hospitals. The few numerical reports of civilian casualties produced by Hanoi have been notable for the relatively Insignificant quantities shown. By all ymrd-sticks of measurement, however, we conclude that casualties from US/GVN bombing attacks areajor effect of the air war, in the sense that this number is probably relatively small. Our estimate0 cabualties for the first nine months6 isto be preliminary.
1. North Vietnamese Claims of Casualties
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There have been no official North Vietnamese estimates of total casualties sincehen Egyptian journalists were reportedly told0 North Vietnamese had already been killed0 wounded. This claim is unsupported and far too high. etter in6 from the Hanoi Red Cross to theCommittee of the Red Cross in Geneva specifically cited
ivilian casualties inflicted sincelthough implying many more. Despite the claims concerning school children, the Education Ministry admitted in6 to the death oftudents andeachers since the inception o( the bombing In Hanoi, of course, must balance the propaganda benefits of claiming heavy casualties against the adverse effect on popular morale.
2. Estimated Casualties from Strikes Against Fixed Targets
A recent comprehensive study of civilian casualties inCS-targetcd areas, both urban and rural, carried out by the Defense Intelligence Agencyased on photography and demographicfor the targeted areas, indicatedinimum ofivilian caaualties were inflicted bytrikes. The minimum estimate, equating to about one civilian casualty per strike, presumes adequate warning for the personnel in the targeted areas. If thereceived no warning, casualties could be as high as ten times the minimum estimate, the DIA study concluded. For the purposes of our current estimate, the method derived from the Nam Dinh case study was used for urban areas. The conclusion of the Nam Dinh analysis was that casualties rangedf populationf population. For ruralinimum ratioasualties per strikeaximum ofasualties per strike) was Implied by the DIA study. For the purpose of estimating casualties against fixed targets in rural areas, the meanasualties per strike has been used in our current estimate.
The application of the Nam Dinh example6 strikes against JCS targets in urban areasotal estimateivilian casualties. If it is assumed that the rural population near JCS fixed targets has less access to sophisticated air raid warning systems and that therefore casualties per average strike are more likely to be close toverage between thendby the DIA photographic study, total civilian casualties fromirstrikes against fixed targets in rural areas in the first nine months6 probably amounted to. The combined nine6 total estimate is that civilian casualties from attacks against JCS fixed targets6 to date have not.
INE
Military casualties in fixed target areas in the first nine months6 are estimated to have been negligible.
3. Estimated Casualties from Armed Reconnaissance
The earlier analysisin our
casualty study indicated that an averagl^lT^^TvuiTn occurred per armed reconnaissance mission, each mission including an averageircraft. Each sortie thus produced an average of5 casualty. Comparative analysis of weapons effectiveness and civilian population density supplied by DIA for our first casualty study resultedatio of7 casualties per aortic. In6 thereotal of0 armed reconnaissance attack sorties (excluding those against fixedielding anof00 total civilian casualties from armed reconnaissance in the first nine monthsompared with
One casualty is normally assigned by DIA for each truck or watercraft damaged or destroyed1 casualty for eachcar or locomotive damaged or destroyed. Since0 motor trucks and watercraft have been reported damaged or destroyed during the first nine monthsasualties0 are indicated. It is estimated, however, that at least half of these vehicles are operated by civilians whose casualtiesonsequence of armedhave already been estimated above. The total derived from this method has therefore been reducednd is regarded to comprise only military personnel. Estimates for the first nine months6 are as follows:
Casualties
Civilian
against fixed
targets Armed reconnaissance
Subtotal
Military
00
lltcq30
against fixed
target3 Armed reconnaissance
Total (half killed, half wounded)
0
C. North Vietnamese Counlerrnf1. Repair and Rcconatruction
The Interne effort by the North Vietnameae to keep LOC'l open and to maintain an acceptable level of output from its limitedcapacity has improved their ability to counter the effects of US/GVN air strikes Indeed, the capacity of the transporthas been incrr%sed by their efforts. Rapid repair and expansion of the road network together with the transfer of traffic from railroads to roads and waterways have been the major determinants of North Vietnamese success.
Tho roads In North Vietnam, primarily south of Hanoi, have been kept open almost continuously since tho start of the bombing by the extensive use of bypasses to destroyed highway bridges and the construction of new alternative routes. Although the air attack6 concentrated on neutralising these new projects, the system of counter-measures inaugurated5 has been successful in diminishing the effect of bombings. We estimateiles of short bypasses and aniles of alternative routes were constructedith the larger projects completed by To complete thisystem of workcamps was organized. The Northused these work camps to anticipate airstrikes on LOC's by pre-positioning labor and materials for repairs to damaged bridges or cratered roads and railbeds. Speed and simplicity of repair have been the main features of the maintenance program which uses large amounts of highly mobile labor and local building materials to insure the required flexibility. Rather than repair highway bridges, the North Vietnamese have chosen to build multiple stream crossings such as fords, ferries, and culverts at any one point. Theof stream crossings has greatly improved their ability tothrough traffic.
Aerial photography6 hasew bridging technique based on the use of steel cables and removable bridgeto further reduce vulnerability to air attack. Thirty-eight of these cable bridges have been seen on major routes in North Vietnam to date. Comparative day and night photography of one cable bridge showed that the bridge decking is in place at night for traffic and removed at dawn, leaving only the steel cables exposed to air attack. The Northhave also expended greater effort6 in camouflagingbridges and building alternate dummy bridges with rope and netting.
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Although rail traffic has been maintained6 on their main lines from China and Haiphong port to Hanoi, the North Vietnamese have not been able to repair rail bridges rapidly or provide aa many multiple stream crossings as they have done on the highways. This has resulted in some lowering of capacity on rail lines relative to other means of transport. Comparisons of rates of repair reveal that the Dong Dang line from China and the line from Haiphong have been kept open more than the other lines. Chinese railway engineering units stationed on the Dong Dang line havebeen instrumental in keeping this line openreater time. Bypass bridges have been built and original rail bridges repaired to operable condition. ew standard-gauge rail line which runs west from Kcp to Thai Nguyen is almost complete, while an additional rail has been installed on the meter-gauge line northeast from Kep to the China border. This work provides the North Vietnamesetandard-gauge line from China and avoids the need to transload goods at Dong Dang on the China border. Bypass railroad bridges have been seen under construction next to bridges in the suburbs of Hanoi and Haiphong which have not been bombed.
An analysis of North Vietnamese repair practices reveals that they have chosen to resort to temporary bridges and bypasses rather than attempt to provide more permanent replacement spans. Thecost for permanent replacement of all damaged bridges to dateillion, up aboutillion Since other types of bypasses were used more often to replace damaged highway bridges, the North Vietnamese have spent5 million to date to repair some bridges to operable condition and to provide bypasses to the remainder. This implies an actual North Vietnamese expenditure on repairs and bypasses amounting to onlyercent of the cost of permanent repairs. In addition we estimate it would costillion to temporarily replace the present inventory of unrepaired bridges. The total labor input required to completerepairs to all bridges to date is estimated toan-days. By comparison, it is estimated that the North Vietnamese have0 man-days on bridge repairs to date, orf what all temporary repairs would require.
2. Civil Defense
The North Vietnamese civil defense system has been characterized by increased precautions to minimize casualties and damageew dispersal of the urban population was ordered this year, and shelter systems have been improved and
and Manpower
Controlled nationallyirectorate in the Ministry of Defense, Vietnamese civil defense at the province and town levelivilian rather than military type of organization. ir defense work committees" are established in districts, towns, wards, enterprises, and on state farms. These committees are headed by Party or administrative officials, and their subordinate civil defense units are manned by local residents and employees. Steps have been taken to divide medical assets more equitably, undoubtedly because of urban evacuation and the air raids, which occur principally in areas outside Hanoi and Haiphong, In6 the North Vietnamese claimed they had substantially increased the number of medical workers and dispersed medical installations to the countryside. of the villages now have medical stations. "
Because civilian volunteers) are used almost exclusively to perform civil defense duties and because each household is responsible for providing its own shelter, no severe manpower drain seems to have been imposed by civil defense work.
Construction
Reliable observers and published statements agree that old shelters were refurbished and large numbers of new shelters prepared Most progress was reported during the June-September period, and this was probably in complianceeneral order. Shelters of various types are quickly available in Hanoi, and many of the foxholes along the streets have been lined with sections of concrote sewer pipe. According to the North Vietnamese press,0 shelters were built in Haiphong during one ten-day period. In Vinh, it is claimed that every family has its own shelter, and that there areilometers of communicationther shelter spaces, and special shelters for machines, documents, and state property- The Vinh Linh areailometers of trenches and tunnels, or nearlyeters per capita. Other provinces reportimilar mannerhousands of shelters and manyof trenches built.
Protective measures for industrial equipment are said to have been taken in Hanoi plantsrobably in the form of blast walls between machines, similar to those built in Japan during World War II.
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c. Dispersal ol Population and Industry
Although the precise degree ul urban population dis-pcrscd and rccettled outside cities is not known,percent evacuation seems to have been accomplished Efforts prior6 may have resulted inne-third evacuation of Hanoi. There haendency for evacuees to return tu the city,etdown in civil defense interest in6 may ha ermissive effect in this regard. spersal order reportedly was issueduly. Recent newspaper accounts have stated that as much asercent of Hanoi's population may now have been evacuated. However difficulties in persuading people to relocateen confirmed, and inity officialewsman the city was aboutercent evacuated but that the effort was continuing.
The population of Haiphong was partially dispersed, largely this year, after near-by bombings. According to French press reports, over half the people have left; schools are closed and "not an idle hand remains. "
Some dispersal of industry is still reported. sample photography of plants has tailed to bear out anything more than slightly decreased activity at bona fide industrialin Hanoi and Haiphong. It is probable that some small industry and shops have been moved out of urban areas. Fororth Vietnamese newspaper statedeptember, "Over one hundred handicraft cooperatives in Haiphong have been carrying out the cvacua tlon policyhe North Vietnamese concede that theof many industries is not possible because of lack of electricity outside cities.
Dispersal, camouflage, and pcrsornel shelters for construction workers are used to reduce damage at roadB forbade construction operations in one area until "adequate" air raid shelters were prepared at work sites. Special care was ordered taken to disperse materials and storehouses.
d. Other Civileasures
The North Vietnamese use camouflage, movement by night with reduced lighting, and dispersal to reduce transport Business, marketing, and the movement of people and goods is frequently restricted to evening and early morning hours.
The movement of goodi offloaded at Haiphong takes place under the cover of darkneaa. At times, poor weather, hampering airhas boon reportedactor inducing some shops to keep open during daylight hours.
In addition to the general effort to resettleresidents not directly engaged in production or antiaircraftoticeable portion of the population of Hanoi disperses during the day and returns at night. Foreign observers have reported as recently as mid-Octobern appreciable increase at night and on weekends in the slse of the capital's population. The daily exodus serves not only to reduce the concentration of people in daylight hours but also to provide manpower for industry and agriculture in outlying areas. The influx of people into the city at night has been attributedack of accommodations In the nearby countryside as well aa to the opportunity to shop and conduct business in the evening and early morning houis when markets are open.
e. Alerts
Most observers and letters agree that the North Vietnamese population usually takes shelterisciplined manner during air alerts, which are signaled by sirens, whistles, or other audible means. This, of course,isruptionndustrial and transport operation, and some personal hardship in areasapproached or overflown by aircraft. While such lostand hardships are not readily measurable, they seem cumulative in effect and may have particular consequences in some critical areas, such as ports.
For example, we have several reports fromobservations occurring at some time during each monthI^^H
| all agreed that dock work ceased completely during air alerts when workers took shelter, sjssbbbbbbbbbbjbbbsbbbbjthe alertsork and fBBBJj one ship was damaged while dot king during an alert.
It thus appearsopulation disciplined in taking shelter may be vulnerable in the production sense to frequent harassing overflights or to approaches of aircraft toward transportation andcenters.
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D. Worth Vietnamese Political Reactions
After enduringonths of air attack, the North Vietnamese appear as determined as ever to continue the war. There has been no indication that the bombing program has shaken the confidence of the Hanoi leadership in their ultimate victory. Communist leaders who have talked with the North Vietnameseave been greatlywith their firmness. olish government official recentlyShat Ho Chi Minh's first words to any Communist visitor are always. "We are winning. "
There is no sign tha: any faction of the North Vietnamese leadership is out of step with Ho on the advisability of continuing the conflict, even though the airstrikes hnve caused the postponement of some of Hanoi's long-cherished program of heavy industry development. Ath Central Committee Plenum held some timeapturedecision was made to put the program for tha devolopment of heavy industry on the shelf foruration. Since that time the leadership has appeared to be in complete agreement that the war is the number-one order of business.
One effect of the Rolling Thunder program has been tocertain North Vietnamese attitudes which existed prior to the airstrikes. For example, Hanoi has long been anxious to secure the closest possible Sino-Soviet cooperation in support of the Vietnam war. This has been one reason for the neutral position taken by the North Vietnamese in the Sino-Soviet dispute and for Hanoi's opposition to open hostility between the two powers.
The Rolling Thunder program has also resulted in Hanoi's increased emphasis on the necessityalt in US air attacksthere canegotiated settlement of the war. The current North Vietnamese position is that the United States must not expect or demand any quid pro quo in returnessation of the bombings.
The available evidence indicates that the people of North Vietnam still firmly support the policies of the Hanoi government. The regime has managed to maintain the swell of patriotism which was engendered by the first US airstrikes and has capitalizedpirit of national resistance against the "US aggressors" to spur the people on to greater sacrifices on behalf of the war in South Vietnam.
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Evldencr on the feelings of the North Vietnamese toward the war in the south prior to5 was scanty. The available information suggested that the northerners were interested in seeing the insurgents win, but that they did not relish the prospect of having to risk their own economic standing, let alone their lives, on behalf of the southern struggle. Since the bomb.ngs of Nor'h Vietnam began, however, there appears to be more enthusiasm for supporting the war in the south.
pressing active support for the government. This decline may reflect some wearying effect caused by the cumulative impact of the bombing. There are at present, however, no discernible political pressures from within North Vietnam sufficient to cause the Hanoi leaders to alter their decision to continue the war effort.
E. Soviet and Chinese Communist Assistance
1. Military Aid
During the first halfoviet and Chinese military
aid deliveries to Hanoi are believed to have been at an annual rate slightly above5 level0 million (see Tables. These data include the Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) program, the bulk offiring battalions) was providedon-SAM-related assistance6 (estimated8 million) is aboutercent higher than the total non-SAM military aidillion).
The USSR accounted foroercent of the military assistance provided by the two major Communist countries, USSR and Communist China,5 and the first half Thirty-sixf which weres) andntiaircraft guns were delivered by the USSR5 andIG's anduns during the first half In addition, as many asoviet military technicians may have been engaged in training North Vietnamese military personnel in the use ofnd aircraft.
Chinese Communist military deliveries6 have beenate nearly double those Aid has consisted primarily of small arms, ammunition, and trucks. The Chinese also delivered eightighters and aboutillion worth of radar equipments well as four small naval craft In the first half In addition to the delivery of military equipment, there arehinese logistic support troops in North Vietnam working on the construction and repair of transportation facilities. An unknownof Chinese military personnel also are employed in training North Vietnamese to operate and maintain equif -ent provided by the Chinese-
2. Economic Aid
All developments foreshadow substantially increased aid to Hanoi from other Communist countries in6rend already confirmed by the volume and composition of North Vietnamese imports6 to dite. The frequent signings of aid pacts and the stress in the announcements on the support for the war effortrowing emphasis on materials and services reeded to continue the
war. : ^
meeting stated that the Pact countries had signed pledges ofillion in goods and cash to support Hanoi in the war effort. The Soviet Union would0 million of this aid.
It is estimated that deliveries of economic aid0 million, two to three times the average annual level. This sharp rise has been continuednd, ashe USSR is the major contributor. In the last nine months, deliveries ofaid totaled0 million, and an unusually large number of new Soviet industrial aid contracts with North Vietnam were not iced sBm Inoviet specialists were reported in North Vnam lo determine equipment needs for constructing new enterprises and rebuilding those destroyed by US air attacks.
After an apparent hiatus of two years. Communistassistance to Hanoi was revived in5 when Premier Kos isited Hanoi. As the war expanded, numerous new extensions of economic aid were made inut these additions are believed to have been small. Since then, the tempo of aid agreement signings has increased sharply (see Tables 12
oscow reported an agreement in May totechnical assistance, one in September forillion in "free
charge commodities" (possibly consumer goods andnd
one in October of additional grants for economic development andmilitary aid. China announced additional aid for agriculture in Julyonrefundable economic and technical agreement in August. In September andorth Korea and all the Eastern European Communist countries except Yugoslavia signed new aid agreements with North Vietnam. In addition, gifts of money and medicines from workers and other organizations in Communisthave been announcedalue ofillionillion.
Soviet and Chinese miliary Equipreot Delivered lj North Vietnam
ropseci
I
Soviet and Chinese Military Equipeent Delivered to North Vietnam6
Table 11
Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam6 (Continued)
China
(Units) (Million US t) (Units) (Million US $) (Unlta) (Million US t)
Artillery (Continued)
m
Other
Trucks and
Small arms and infantry
Communist Economic Aid Extended to Worth. Vietnam a/
IV. General Assessment ol the Rolling Thunder Program
A. Agriculture
During the pastonths the production of paddy rice in North Vietnamhe main agricultural crop in that country wasons below the average. While this isercent below the average formonth period, all of this shortfall occurred during the past six months. hortfall amounts toillion worth of rice on the international market. In addition, the production of subsidiary crops manioc, sweet potatoes, corn, and green- was probably below normal duringinter/spring season. There is insufficient information, however, on which to estimate the shortfall of these crops, which are important food substitutes for the preferred rice.
It if difficult to determine the extent to which the bombing attacks contributed to the shortfall of agricultural production. Undoubtedly, poor weather in the last half5 and in the first half6 contributed to the poor performance of agriculture. Although there is little evidence that air attacks directly damaged significant amounts of agricultural crops, the indirect disruptive effects of the bombing on agricultural production were considerable. Agriculture in North Vietnam has usually experienced difficultiesartly because of the chronically undependable weather and partlyesult of management problems associated with theof agriculture into agricultural cooperatives. The war has brought such additional problems as manpower shortagesarticularly skilled manpower disruption of normal farming and fishing schedules, and the interruption of electrically powered irrigation systems and the production and distribution of chemical fertilizers. The North Vietnamese have attempted to lessen the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks byincreased amounts of chemical fertilizers and substantial numbers of diescl generators to power the irrigation systems. These measures have not been completely successful.
The agricultural shortfall, the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks on the transportation of food to deficit areas, and the increased requirements for the war have contributed to foodn rural areas. However, food supplies in the larger cities such as Hanoi have been maintained at adequate levels, and there have been no indications of critical shortages anywhere. The continuation of theattacks will continue to exacerbate the tight food situation in North Vietnam. Howevor, the self-sufficient nature of the agricultural economy and the availability of food importsarticularly from Communist Chinauggest that food supplies arc not likoly to become critical.
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B. Industry
The North Vietnamese industrial sector has not been drastically altered since the start of the Rolling Thunder program Some changes have been made in plant production and industrial development because of the war situation, but the regime seems to have beenin keeping the disruptioninimum.
The decision to postpone the beginning of the second five-yearnd the substitution of the two-yearere the result of war pressures on the North Vietnamese economy including the step-up in US bombing. An examination of regime statements since5 on its economic plans suggests that the regime has increased the tempo of some of the programs already begun under the first five-year planispersal of industry, enlargement and mechanization of agricultural cooperatives, and evacuation of civilians to rural areas. In addition, the decision was taken to postpone heavy industry expansion, with the exception of the machine building and electric powerplants, and to shift emphasis to the increased development of light and local industry. On the surface the decision to postpone heavy industrial expansion appears to have ominous economic overtones for the continued economicof the country, but the regime has merely postponed part of its heavy industrial expansion; it has not abandoned it.
North Vietnam has published almost no aggregate industrialdata5ragmentary information availablethat present industrial production is at or above4 level of industrial output. No data on heavy industrial production have beenbut5 the central state-run light industry increased its outputercenthile the output of local industry and handicraft increasedercent Despite these smallin industrial output, the regime in6 noted that the "US imperialists have created difficulties for the economy in general and light industry in particular." No information6 output quotas for individual plants or industries is available, but nearly all the reports on individual plants in the popular press are consistent in claiming that the plants are producing at or above5 level despite varying problems.
Evidence of the postponement of heavy industrial development is provided by the recent departure of the Soviet specialists working on the Thac Ba hydroelectric powerplant, which was nearly two years away from completion. No reason was given for their departure. After an examination of the scanty evidence available on industrial
Recent reports more strongly reinforce the thesis that the North Vietnamese have not entirely abandoned their program for heavy industrial expansion. During October, Hanoi sent representatives to Poland and Communist China to examine methods and techniques for installing rolled steel capacity and making other improvements in iron and steel production. These reports imply that the regime still intends to complete the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel"forth Vietnam's only iron and steel complex.
US bombing has created some difficulties in the Northindustrial sector. However, some of th^ problems such as poor management and administration in individual plants and the shortage of skilled labor existed before the bombing began. The bombing of the electric powerplants does not appear to have seriously affected industrial output. Power shortages have been observed, particularly in Hanoi, but the individual plants have been able to cope with the situation by using mobile generators and by increasing the number of shifts at the plants.
The step-up in the dispersal program, too, caused some difficulties. Many plants attempted to operate simultaneously at both the original location and at the dispersed site. Production was slowed down by this practice, and transportation and distribution costs increased. The smooth evacuation of the plant workers was difficult. Some workers were evacuated to the dispersed site but were still expected to work at the original site; some workers did not wish to be evacuated and morale problems were evident. The organization of the evacuation was poorly handled by the cadres and the trade union leaders responsible for the movement. There is no hard evidence that industrial production has been seriously slowed down by the dispersal program. Nevertheless, most of the dispersed plants are found in the local, light, and handicraft sectors of industry, which are major components of total Industrial output; the dispersal program in these sectors has probably depressed total industrial production in the past year.
The first CIA report dealing with the bombing of North Vietnam released inistedajor industrial plants,!
| eview jf Hanoi on these plants is helpful in assessing the effect of US bombing on the North Vietnamese industrial plants. The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex is claimed to have lostadre and workers to theeffort, but still claimed to have exceeded its planned goal. The Haiphong Cement Plant reportedly sufferedhortage of coal, was harassed by the bombing, and at the end5 was just meeting its planned production quota. The Nam Dinh Textile Plan' was dispersed but announced that it was installing new machinery in arch Textile Plant in Hanoi dispersed part of its operations and found that its transportation costs had increased. The Hanoi Rubber Products PlanMost workers but claimed to have increased its overall output with the production of automobile tires up byercent in the first six months6 as compared with the same period The Viet Tri Paper Mill lost production time because of air raids.it was stated, but itthe quality of its production. The Viet Tri Chemical Combineifficult year Its machinery and equipment were old. part of it was dispersed, and it lost time because of air raids. Still, the plant claimed achievement of its production quota and began to produce new
In combination these claims add up to admitted labor shortages, temporary loss of output due to dispersal, and problems in changing the production mix. They do not. however, reflect serious and prolonged production problems even if one discounts the general claim of meeting planned goals.
In general, the machine building industry has suffered from the same problems as the other industries. One significant observation from reviewing press reports is the conversion of machine building plants to production of agricultural machinery which is aimed at alleviatingshortages through increased mechanization of the agricmp' ratlves.
The determination of the regime to continue to train its youth both at home and abroad in technical and academic skills further demonstrates that US bombing has not created severe manpower There is continuing evidence that North Vietnamese students are being sent to other Communist countries for training.were abroad5 andnd some reports havethat as many0 may go abroad for study in the next few years.) Further, the regime has just recently opened four collegeswith emphasis on technical and engineering skills.
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A Rolling Thunder program could have done great damage to the modern industrial sector of the North Vietnamese economy. However, Rolling Thunder target systems chosen did not include the main industrial facilities. The Hanoi regime, possibly now acting on the assumption that industrial installations will not be the main targets of attack, continues to request accelerated deliveries of machinery, goods, and even industrial plants from other Communist countries. Perhaps, if Rolling Thunder had more heavily damaged some of these targets, the North Vietnamese wouldarder time convincing their Communist partners tosending industrial aid.
C. Transportation
The transport system of North Vietnam continues to function adequately. There have been and continue to be periodic delays in the movement of goods,which produce temporary local shortages. But transportation is supporting the essential segments of the economy and is providing the required support for the war in the North and in the South.
The rudimentary nature and somewhat primitive character of the system is probably more of an assetindrance in overcoming the effects of the air war on It. The small, light-weight, antiquated railroad system is augmented by reasonably modern but low-capacity motor trucksew modern craft on the inland and coastal But, for the most part,transport is provided by primitive sampans and junks and animal transport) carts, bicycles, and human bearers. Traffic per capita is exceedingly small. Rumania, forountry with substantially the same populationore area, hasimes the tonnage per capita that is found in North Vietnam. Thus North Vietnammall Industrial baseopulation with simple wants and needs can existudimentary primitive type of transportation system, and the task of impairing significantly the movement of traffic over it by the use of air power becomes difficult.
RINE
The initial attacks against transportation in the Rolling Thunder program affected the southern part of the country, which is of relatively minor importance to the economy. Concentration of the attacks in this area provided time for the North Vietnamese to obtain advice from the North Koreans and advice and aid from the Chinese. During thisrganizations were also established for the repair of damage and for the marshaling of all forms of transport for the movement of traffic.
These organizations have been remarkably effective in making therepairs, in providing alternate facilities, and in commandeering all forms of transport to keep the essential traffic moving. onsequence afteronths of attack under the Rolling Thunder program, in spite of the heavy cost in terms of manpower and material, the transportation system is better able to continue operating while coping with damage and loss of personnel than it was when Ihe program began.
If the level of attacks achieved during the first nine months6 is maintained for the remainder of the year, total transport performance6 will continue to increase as it has in past years in terms of tons carried, but will decrease slightly in terms of ton-miles, as it didS (see, Rail transportation has been more affected by the attacks than other forms of transport. by railroad transport has been reduced both in terms of tons carried and ton-miles, but rail transportation continues to be themode of transport in terms of ton-miles. Increases in tons carried by other modes have more than compensated for the loss in rail tons carried.
The reduction in rail traffic has not affected the volume of imports and exports moved by rail between China and North Vietnam. The volume of such shipments probably will increase again6 as it had Halting of through traffic by destruction of bridges on the two lines important for the movement of foreign tradehe lines from Hanoi to Dong Dang and Haiphong has extendedelatively small percent of theonths.
Destruction of bridges and other facilities on the lines from Hanoi to Lao Cat and Vinh has been more continuous and thus more serious for the domestic economy. Especially noteworthy have been the attacks on the Viet Tri bridge onao Cal line and the Phu Ly bridge on the Vinh line. These bridges have remained out of service for fairly long periods of time. Traffic within the modern industrial sector of the economyetween Hanoi and the industrial cities ofao.Viet Tri .and Nan.as thus been disrupted. Limited through service has now been restored between these cities, however, and shuttle service between the breaks and the line Is in use on the remainder of the lines.
The North Vietnamese with the help of Chinese engineers have expanded and improved the railroad system by the addition of some dualew line, and alternate rail bridges for some of the bridges on theong Dang andaiphong lines.
North Vietnam: Estimated Transportnd6
Total Performance
Million tons carried Million ton-miles
International Trade by Rail
Imports (thousand tons carried) Exports {thousand tons carried)
180
220
5 66 7
N.A, H. A.
projected for the full year,ontinue-tlon of performance at the level of the first nine months.
Dual tracking on the Dong Dang line, which permits both Chinese standard-gauge and North Vietnamese meter-gauge equipment to be used, very likely now extends from the Chinese border south as far as Kep, and some preparations have been made to extend the dual tracking from Kep to Hanoi. ew standard-gauge line from Kep to Thai Nguyen may also have been completed, thusore direct route for shipment of Chinese coal to the iron ana steel complex at That Nguyen and an alternative route for rail traffic between Kep and Hanoi. Another improvement directly related to the war effort is the extensionow-cost makeshift rail line south of Vinh toward the Demilitarized Zone. This line is kept in service with inexpensive expedients in spite of intensive bombing.
North Vietnam hasigh level of destruction of railroad rolling stock, particularlyut there is no evidencehortage of loccmotives or freight cars. It is estimated that the inventory of locomotives remains at about the5 number. The North Vietnamese freight car inventory, however, has been significantly reduced (see The Chinese probably have made freight cars available to North Vietnam from the meter-gauge rolling stock of Yunnan Province and formerly used for the Chinese transit traffic through North Vietnam. The loss of this traffic and other traffic such as Ihe transport of apatite after the
Lao Cai line was interdicted in July5 has reduced the require-ment for rail transport. Furthermore, Chinese standard-gauge equipment can be used on the new dual-gauge and standard-gauge lines in North Vietnam. Much of the reportedly destroyed rolling otock probably consisted of the makeshift equipment used on the line south of Hanoi, the type that probably could be built in North Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam hasigh level of destruction of rolling stock and has continued to operate the railroadseasonable level. The North Vietnamese are ne-'erthclcsa negotiating with the Chinese to buy quite large numbers of rolling stock, presumably to avoid using Chinese equipment within North Vietnam.
North Vietnam is making increasing use of highway and inland and coastal water transport. Traffic moving over these networks is more difficult to disrupt than is traffic on the railroad system. and water transport is also being used to shuttle traffic around breaks in railroad lines. It is estimated that performance by these modes increased5oth in terms of tons carried and ton-miles. These increases have been made possible by theexpansion and improvement of the road and inland waterand maintenance of the inventory of transport equipment at the necessary level. New alternate roads have been built and additional waterways dredged. Alternate highway bridges, for the most part pontoon or cable types, as well as ferries and fords have been or are being built. Imports of motor trucks by North Vietnam from Communist countries far exceeded the destruction of these vehicles by air attack5 and have kept pace with such destruction so far6 (see, In spite of extensive destruction of watercraft, the numberin use is constantly increasing. The North Vietnamese can build many of the small types observed in use, and Communist countries are providing small modern tugs, dry cargo barges, and tank barges.
The truck route into and through southern Laos is likewise considerably more capable of supporting infiltration now than it was
onths ago. The fairweather truckable network has been greatly extended and provided with many miles of alternate routes. The portion of the year during which trucks can use the route has been increased by better road alignment and surfacing. After the heavy rains in the
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fallruck traffic began to flow south intoonth earlier than it had This year, truck traffic ir.lo Laos has begun to move in significantonth earlier than it did
North Vietnam: Rolling Stock Inventory of the End456
Unite
Locomotives (totals rounded)
Aa of the end of
Imports during
Domestic
As of the end of
Imports during January-September
ej
Asctober
Freight -ars b/ (totals rounded)
As of the end or
Imports during
0 destroyed tines 60
As of the end of
Imports during
0 deitroyed times 60
Asctobercj
a. Probably includes some makeshift locomotives used on the rail line south of Hanoi. It has been assumed, therefore, that the mainlineinventory haB been maintained at about the end4 level by imports.
b- Reported losses of railroad freight cars have included smallcars used on the rail line south of Hanoi as veil as somefrom pilot reports. Thus onlyercent or those reportedand none of those reported damaged have been deducted from the inventory.
c. These dataignificant decrease in the inventoryut this inventory is still sufficient for performance at the level estimated. The actual number of freight cars in north Vietnam must be significantly higher than Indicated, however. Ko evl- xistshortage of freight cars in North Vietnam. Tho number of freight cars importedinimum figure. Furthermore, Communist China probably has loaned or given North Vietnam all the freight cars needed. Although no information is available to indicate that Chinese cars from Yunnan Province are operating in North Vietnam, It is logical that this province has made meter-gauge stock aviilwble to North Vietnam.
Table 16
North Vietnam: Cargo Truck Inventory a/ as of the End456
As of the end4
5
retirement
of the end5
b/
during6
in North Vietnam
in Laos
retirement
6
cargo trucks of one-ton or more capacity. Lossesdue to airstrikes were computed usingercent ofreported destroyed andercent of the number Normal retirement was computed at the rateercent
Vietnam had atdditionaluchcommand cars, ambulances, and service vehicles.
Maintenance and expansion of the transport system has been very costly to North Vietnam in terms of manpower diverted andexpended, in spite of the use of low-cost expedients wherever possible. Throughepair and restoration cost of damaged or destroyed transport facilities and equipment totaled moreillion, or almost one-third of the measurable direct and indirect cost of the Rolling Thunder program to North Vietnam, as follows:
Bridge;;
Restoration Temporary repair
Transportation cquipocnt
Railroadnd porta
Total
The restoration costthe end5 amounted toillion. The increaseillion during the first nine months6 is accounted for chiefly by damage and destruction to transport equipment amountingillion- The cost of restoring andbridges increasedillion, while railroad yards and ports increased
The sharp Increase in the transport equipment category the heavy emphasis on armed reconnaissance missions In the Rolling Thunder program These equipment losses have been largely offset by imports from Communist countries Possiblyore serious loss to North Vietnam has been the loss of trained personnel.
The North Vietnamese, with Chinese aid, have gained inand efficiency in expanding routes and making the necessary repairs.onsequence the transport system is now considerably less vulnerable than it washe system is performingevel adequate for military and essential economic needs- It can be expected to operate at this level unless thereasic change in the pattern and weight of air attack against transportation in North Vietnam.
D. Foreign Trade
North Vietnam's foreign trade, since the initiation of Rolling Thunder, has beenmarked by two majorn increasing volume of imports from Communist countries (Free World Imports have been largelyeneral reduction in exports. By the falleaborne imports seemed to haveeak set
by the capacity of ports and their connecting rail distribution facilities, while known exports continued to decline.
Recent aid agreements signed by other Communist countries with Hanoi signal the intention toigh level of shipments to North Vietnam. Imports were sharply accelerated in5 Goods received from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reached ar, estimated value0 million* nearlyercent more Comparable value data arc not availableut the vol-ut.ic of seaborne imports from Communist countries in the first nine months averaged aboutercent more than the same periodmports of manufactured goods (largely machinery, equipment, and rolled steel products)ajor share of the imports from Communist countries and accounted for the sharpest increases in volume of shipments. Imports of fertilizer and petroleum have also increased significantly.
* The estimated distribution of these imports, which include economic aid, is as follow*: from China and the Sovietillion each; and from the Eastern Europeanillion.
The value of North Vietnam's exports remained steadyange0 million0 million in4 Seaborne exports of apatite, which had an average f. o. b. value ofonth in the first seven monthsirtually ceased following the initiation in5 of recurrent interdictions of the rail linethe apatite mines at Lao Cai with Haiphong. The major export losses, however, followed the strikes against coal processing facilities at Cam Pha in Seaborne coal exports In the first quarter6 had an average f. o. b. value8onth, but have had an average value of6onth since April and the trend is still downward. There have been additional reductions in seaborne exports of cement, pig iron, and manufactured goods, but the decline in these exports cannot be directly rcl-tcd to the effects of bombing. It is aUo possible, but not probable, that increased volumes of these commodities have been shipped undetected to Communist China. of the present degree of retardation of shipments of coal and apatite will cause North Vietnam's export earnings6 to be atillion loss thanpproximately half of which is in Free World hard currency, thereby worsening the already largebetween imports and exports.
The Rolling Thunder program, together with other US/GVN military actions in South Vietnam, hasignificant strain on North Vietnam's manpower resources. The allocation of manpower in response to the air attacks has taxed the ingenuity of North Vietnam's leadership, has forced the country lo make meaningful sacrifices in terms of disruption to some normal civilian pursuits, and has inflicted real costs resulting from disruptions of economic activity, most notably in agriculture, transportation, and construction. At the same time, the regime has allocated the bulk of its physically fit youth coming ofage to building up its military forces. In spite of these pressures there are several indications that the quantitative drain on manpower ma/ have peaked
The buildup of North Vietnam's armed forces and theof manpower losses in South Vietnam have required theof aten This figure may be largerubstantial number of troops are being discharged because of age or illness. inimum, total conscription for militaryprobably has approachedercent of the number of physically fit males- reaching the draft age of. There is.otal pool estimated at aboutillion toillion males inoge group who are physically fit for military service.
A large measure of the military build-up in North Vietnam is accounted for by forces committed to defensive programs in reaction to the Rolling Thunder program. At0 North Vietnamese troops, or close toercent of the armed forces, are assigned to units involved almost exclusively in defensive programs and counter-measures against the Rolling Thunder program. This estimatethose forces assigned to the Atr Force, to AAA and SAM units, and to engineering and transportation units. Inarge number of militia are assigned to air defense activities.
The mobilization of civilian labor has exceeded the manpower needs for the build-up of military forces. Byorthhad to reallocate large amounts of labor to repair oractivities and to dispersal ?nd emergency programs directlyto the Rolling Thunder attack. These programs are believed to have required the full-time servicesorkers and the part-time jtilization of. The obligation of
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persons to fulfill civil defense responsibilities has created an additional part-time diversion of labor.
The size of this commitment of labor is estimated to havestable Although the weight of air attack hasthe labor forco hasreat deal of experience in making quick repairs, using camouflage, and adopting other innovations to neutralize the effects of air attack. The experience gained in this type of construction work has enabled the North Vietnamese to develop faster recupcrability from airstrikes. As the expertise and hence the labor productivity of the North Vietnamese improves, and assuming the pattern of air attack does not change, it Is estimated that the North Vietnamese will be able to reduce 'he size of the repair-of-damage labor force and still increase its effectiveness. The commitment of labor could be greater, however, if more of the airstrikes against the logistic target system were concentrated on the rail and combination rail/highway bridges on the major LOC's in the northern part of the country.
Two other manpower drains of some significance are the North Vietnamese assigned to repair and construction activities on theroute through Laos, and casualties resulting from the Rolling Thunder program.
The road repair and construction activities in Laos require the commitment of00 persons, about three-fourths of whom are North Vietnamese. Since the pattern of this activity has not changed appreciably in the last six months, it is estimated that this commitment has remained stable.
Casualties inflicted6esult of the Rolling Thunder program are tentatively estimated at0 This would be an increase ofoercent over the level estimated Casualties are probably about three-fourths civilian {principally persons engaged in logistic and transportation activities in directof the war effort) and one-fourth military.
The drain on North Vietnam's manpower resulting fromand civilian mobilization and casualties in both North and South Vietnam has amountedersons. This includes an estimated military mobilization of atersons and the full-time assignment ofersons to war-associated tasks in North Vietnam and Laos,onsequence of Rolling Thunder. This total diversion amounts toercent of North Vietnam's civilian labor force.
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The ability of North Vietnam to meet theanpower resources is apparent. However, there are many indications th.it. the manpower drain has inflicted strains on the Recent indications of possible war-associated strains onare reports that additional women have been trained and are serving in agricultural occupations and in the militia, and that the regime is tryingpparently with limited successto make greater use of unskilled workers from the peasant and urban population. The disappointing fifth-month harvest has probably made it Incumbent on the regime to provide more agricultural manpower in order touccessful tenth-month harvest. The regime has also been forced to shelve some plans for industrial expansion.
F. 'ihird Country Attitudes
There has been little significant change in the attitudes of Free World countries toward the US bombing program during the last two years, either because of its continuation or escalation. Free World reaction to the latest escalation of the bombingshe strikes against the POL, storage facilities in the Hanoi-Haiphonghe normal leftist and Communist cries of "outrage" in Free World states. The overall official reaction, however, was moreand less critical than expected.
The so-called non-aligned, or neutral, nations who have attempted from time to time to serve as intermediaries in getting negotiations started have not altered their basic positions during the past yearesult of the continued US airstrikes. The unyielding attitude of the North Vietnamese, however, hasomewhatimpact on certain of these neutral nations. In particular, they have realized that the United Statesalid point in demanding some sign from Hanoi that it will respond positivelyessation of the This has notwing toward the United States uy these nations, but it has served somewhat to mitigate North Vietnamese efforts to convince the neutrals that the United States is solely to blame for the continuation of the war.
1. Soviet and Eastern European Attitudes
The effectiveness of the US airstrikes in destroying North Vietnamese miliU'.ry hardware and in disrupting the transportation system in North Vietnam has caused Hanoi to place increasing demands on the USSR and the Eastern European countries. In response, these countries have agreed to provide additional economic and military goods.
At the lime time, however, there is growingin the USSR and the Eastern European countr'es that their own national interests will be threatenedontinuation of the bombing raids. On numerous occasions during the past several weeks, Eastern EurafMtu diplomats have assured the United States that their increased
aid to Hanoi is designed to wean the North Vietnamese away from China and thus improve the chances of getting Hanoi to the negotiating
table.
These diplomats clearly believe that there is no chance ol getting Hanoi to negotiate until the United States ceases its bombing of North Vietnam. Thus far, however, neither the USSR nor any of the Eastern European countries has indicated that it can assure the United States that Hanoi willositive move toward negotiations if US airstrikes cease. The Poles have advised the United States that they do not intend to crry US overtures for negotiations to Hanoi again unless they are given some sign that such activity on their part will be productive.
2. Communist China's Attitude
The Chinese have not altered their position on the waresult of the Rolling Thunder program. They remain asas ever to oppose any move toward peace which does not entail total US capitulation to North Vietnamese demands. Chinese policy remains even tougher than that of the Vietnamese on what it will take to get negotiations started. Peking still insists that the United States must withdraw its troops from South Vietnam before talks can begin.
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Original document.
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