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6
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HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
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OF CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE
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Concurring!
Vice Adm.I. Taylor. Deputy Director of Cenlrol InleJIigonee Mi.enney,ew The DMeoc- of Intelligence ond fteteorch, Dc-ppilmonl of Stole
Lt. Get Joieph f. Cor roll, tht Director. Detente kvelfcjeoce Agency Or. louii " Tordello, lor Ihe Director. Naiionol Security Agency Or. Charlei H. Heiehordt, lor lhe Anlitoot General Monagee. Aiomlc energy Commotion
AbtJoining.
I.or- O. Oegcw. for the Attatenr Dwetfor. federal Bureaui-i. lhe subject being ovHide of hit piettdknoo.
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CONTENTS
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
L POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC DEFENSE
II. ORGANIZATION OP STRATEGIC DEFENSE
DEFENSE
Surveillance and
Early
Ground Controlled
Future
Capabilities
Fuiure
Future
Surface-to-Alr Missile
System
SAM
MISSILE DEFENSE
Radars
ABM
Capabilities
D- Future
Research and Development
V. ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE
VI. CIVIL DEFENSE
ANNEX; TABLES
-JOP-Se'CSW-
SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and rmss.le defense forces throughnd general trends in these forces
CONCLUSIONS
Soviet leadersigher priority to strategicdoes the US; they allocate about equal resources to theirand their strategic defense forces. The Soviet object inthe* strategic defenses is to contribute to deterrence and to for.
S^Pp0rt' andamaSe the US could inflict on he USSR. The Soviets will continue to emphasize strategic defense throughout the nextears, and will pursue their efforts to meet the changing US threat. They will seek, through both offensive and de-fenswe programs, to improve their strategic position relative to that ol the US. )
Soviets have steadily improved their strategicaerodynamic vehicles over the last decade, by upgradingsurveillance system and by developing and deploying bothand surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Throughthey haveormidable capability againstlow-supersonic aircraft attempting to penetrate at mediumaltitudes lo principal target areas. Current systems areless effective against higher performance aircraft standoffand low-altitude penetrations. At present, Soviet strategichave virtually no effectiveness at altitudes below about 1 )
ofepart,
]
w NBVV'fat the aliatcgtc defense manned ioicictbIoiina a,ee, man indicated tn the teat. pa.^Hy'm^
TOP SCCHCr
Soviets will be deploying over lhc next few yearssurveillance radan, air defense communications and controland defensive weapon systems with capabilities againstvehicles. They are now deploying an interceptor withlow-altilude capabilities. We believe they will alsointerceptorsetter capability to defend againstand higher performance aircraft, Although wc thinkwill continue to work on the problem of defenseeet, we do not expect any system with suchto be operational before
he Soviets have been constructing complexes formissile system for strategic defense, which we call theThere are nowomplexes (each withsites) under construction. We believe all of these7he deployment concept appearsboth forward defense on likely approaches to theof European USSR and local defense of selected targets.that the rate at which new complexes have been startedin the past year or so. and that this system will bethroughout the USSR,
information available at present is insufficient for uswith high confidence die capabilities and mission of thcSuch evidence as wc have leads us to believe that thesignificant capabilities against high-speed aerodynamicat high altitude and that its mission is defense againstepending on the characteristics of somethe system could have capabilities against ballistichave therefore assessed the potential of thc Tallinn system inSAM and antiballistic missile (ABM) roles.
' U. Gen. joscirh F. Carroll, Director,. Cen. Chester L. Johnson. Acting Assistant Chiel ol* Su9 for Intelligence. Department of trie Amy. end Mai- Cen. Jack E. Thomas, Aii-iUiM Chief of StssT. Intelligence. USAF. believe (hat the many uncerUiattes eemrnioj fromin of available evidence do aotonfidento whether the mission of Ihe TlIIinn-type defensive system is SAM, ABM, or duel purpose. They acknowledge th.it the available evidence docsonclusion that these sites mayefensive mission against the aerodynamic threat. However, on balance, cocisldriing sD Information available, they believe it is sneee lately that the lystrmj being deployed are for defense agiimi ballistic mutilai with ancapability to defendigh Hying supersonic nerodynamic vehlelei.
the SAM role, we believe the Tallinn system representsimprovement over currently operational Soviet SAMsof range (on the order, altitude (up toand ability to deal with supersonic targets (up to Mach 3We do not believe it is the Soviet answer to tlieIf the.system was designed as an ABM, then data wouldbe fed to the complexes from off-site radars in order for themareas large enough totrategic ABM defense.the Tallinn complexes are in locations where they could takeof such data from known radars of appropriate types, butnot. With such data, the Tallinn complexes may be capableintercept of incoming ballistic missiles atnd thus each complex couldairlyWithout such data, the ABM capabilities of each complexseriously reduced and limited to local and self-defense.
an intensive ABM research and developmentSoviets decided at least 6ve years ago to deploy an ABMMoscow. This system (which we call the Moscow system)an initial capability in the next year or two, and all sitesconstruction will be completed byeong-range exoatmospheric systemarge kill radius,the primary purpose of its present deployment is the defense )
Moscow ABM system probably willooda numerically limited attack by cuirently operational USIts capabilities could be degraded by advanced penetrationand it could not copeery heavy attack.system utilizes data from large radars for it to function mostWithout these radars, the capabilities of the system wouldreduced, though if the launch sites were designed tothe system could still intercept some missilesMoscow. The present deployment will coverartPolaris threat to Moscow. )
cannot now identify any wholly new ABM system inand we do not expect any to become operational before theIn view of the presently limited capabilities of the ABMnow under construction, wc believe the Soviets will devote sub-
stantial efforts to upgrading their present hardware, developingABM systems, and improving their detection and trackingThe Soviets might decide that ABM defenses for thedefense of the USSR are too costly. Wc think it likely, however, that they will eitcnd their ABM defenses. But wc think they will be cautious about committing themselvesixed policy with respect to ABM deployment over the long term. They will probably adjustprogram they pursue on the basisumber of factors,the capabilities of present defenses to deal with penetration aids, the advances in ARM technology, the cost of additional deployment relative to the protection it is likely to afford, and the US reaction to Soviet strategic developments.1 )
J. In thc course of their ABM program, the Soviets have developed large radars which have good capabilities for tracking ballistic missiles and spaceumber of radars of this type, now underwill become operational. Although they do not all have thc same functions, we believe that in the aggregate they will provide the USSRational space surveillance capability. Within theoears the Soviets will probably develop andariety of space systems (such as infrared detection and other types of warning) in support of their strategic defensive forces.)
K. We have no positive evidence that the Soviets are developing antisatellite defenses, but we believe they have had an incentive to do so for some time. It would be technically possible for them toimited antisatellite capability already, based on existing radars and missiles anduclear weapon lodll. When their new space surveillance radars are operational. they couldapability to destroy satellites by cither nuclear or nonnuclear meHns after the satellites had passed over theew limes. Thc Soviets may also explore techniques for neutralizing satellites without destroyinganned satellite inspection and antisatellitecould be developed in. We believe, however, that lhe Soviets would seek to destroy or neutralize US saiellites only if they believed general war were imrnincnt. There might also be some other special circumstances in which they would use anlisatcllile systems In,
'Km the virwt of Bear Adm. E. B. Frockey, Atastmf Chief of Neva! Opctatjonie nn it merit ofy, tee bit footnote to po it graph SR.
Gr.cno
peacetime, such as an occasion in which they believed they wereagainst US interference with their own satellites.)
L. Over the past decade or more the Soviets have developed an extensive civil defense program, which is now administered by the Ministry of Defense. The current program is characterized bypublic training, the use of simple shelters, and plans for urban evacuation in advance of hostilities. Shelter space is available for less than one-sixth of the urban population, and adequate shelter for key rjersonnol only. Wo have detected no recent major changes In thc priority or pace of the program and we have no indication that the Soviets wouldtepped up civil defense effortecessary adjunct to extended ABM deployment. We anticipate continued slow but steady improvement in overall civil defense effectiveness.
DISCUSSION
I. POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC OEFENSE FORCES
J. The Soviel leadersigher priority lo strategic defensive forces than does Ihe US. This is partly due lo the longstanding Soviet preoccupation with defense of fhe homeland, but more specifically to the great sfae and diversity of US strategic attack forces. The US,trategic attack force in being at (he end of World War II, has long tended to rely mainly on retaliatoryand thus has concentrated on building strategic attack forces. Tho USSR, on the other hand, confronted by these US forces, has placed more nearly equal emphasis on both strategic defense and strategic offense.bout one-fifth of the total Soviet force-oricnied military expenditures were allocated to each of these strategic ntisstoas.*
Faced with the US threat, the Soviets have developed and deployedgenerations of increasingly effective radars, communications systems, interceptors, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs} over the past two decades. In addition, they have already embarked upon deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses. In their efforts toefense in being, the Soviets have generally elected toefensive system quite early, even if it did not meet the whole threat, rather than to wait for the developmentore effective defense. When an improved system has been developed, deployment of an older system has often stopped, but it has not been rapidly retired or replaced. Consequently the Soviets tend to have extensive defenses deployed in depth, usually with considerable redundancy. But some elements of these defenses are somewhat out of date and do not represent thc most effective counter to new US systems or concepts of operation.
In our view, the Soviets coniinue to regard strategic defense and attack forces as their primary instruments for deterring thc US and forilitary buttress lo their foreign policy. In the past, the Soviets have notufficiently powerful strategic attack force to |ustify high confidence in its eifectiveness for the foregoing purposes. Now, with thc large-scale deployment of dispersed and hardened interconiinental ballistic missilesheirin iheir assured destruction capability1 musl be growing. Despite this improving posture, however, the Soviets evidently believeational strategic policy for them continues toombination of offensive and defensive forces which could limit damage to Ihe USSR if war comes.
"The force-oriented military cipenditures are the expenditure! for the three major force component) (strategic aiuck. strategic defense, and general purpote) as distinct fromfo* ipace, command ind genera! support, and research, development, testing, and evaluation, which support all the forces. The major force-oriented ejpendi hires account for aboutercent of total estimated Soviet military esnendltures. Some portion ofercenl is alto expended in support of the suaKgic defense forces.
'An assured destruction capabilityapability, even after the enemy strikes Ritt, to jninrantec lhe devsttatton of his population and industrial centers io letsJistlon.
top sccntr
Soviet calculations of iheir damage limiting requirement* will, of course, be complicated by manifold uncerUinues regarding lbc effectiveness of tbe offensive and defensive forces of both sides under lhe various circumstances which could exist at thc outsetar. Among lhe most critical uncertainties will be those concerning lhe effects on their defenses of US penetration tactics and (especially in thc case of ABM defenses) US penetration aids. Indeed, the variables are so great that we think the Soviets almost certainly cannotonfident calculation of thc actual damage limiting capabilities of their own forces over the period of ibis estimate. For this and other reasons, we believe thc Soviets would not consider it feasible to achieve, by, strategic capabilities which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general nuclear war. Nevertheless, the Soviets will seek, through both offensive and defensive programs, to improve their strategic position relative to that of the US.*
We believe thai Soviet emphasis on strategic defense will continuethe next decade, and lhat the Soviets will pursue ihcir efforts to meet the changing US strategic threat Their most critical requirement, and the one most difficult of solution, is ADM defense. Increasing efforts will probably be devoted Io pushing research programs in the 6eld of ABM defense and to developing ABM systems of increasing effectiveness. We also expect aSoviet effort to counter the Vow-altitude aircraft threat at well as Ihe long-distance standoff threat Soviet planners probablyuantitative reduction in the US bomber force over the nextears,ualitativeas tlie US introduces new systems and concepts for air attack.
II. ORGANIZATION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES
The Soviet air defense mission is the responsibility of PVO Strany (Antiair Defense of thehose Commander-in-Chiefeputy Minister of Defense ranking with the heads of thc ground, naval, air, and strategic missile foices. lhc PVO ts composed of three major elements, each of which performs one of lhe key functions of the nir defenseirnterceptor, and SAM operations. In addition to forces directly assigned to the PVO Strany. other Soviet forces which can contribute lo lhc nil defense mission are also operationally available to this command.
The Soviets have occasionally mentioned Antlrockct Forces (PRO) as thc organisation responsible for operational ABM forces. Tbe Commander of PVO Strany probably is assigned tbe mission of ballistic missile defense, but we have no information on bow ABM forces fit into PVO Strany. During thc past year ihere have alsoew referencesblue belt ofne Soviet officer Implied that thiscomplex of fourdefense missiles, aircraft, submarines, and the antimissilee have noin intelligence thai such command relationships exist in practice.
* For further dttcuision of these queKwiu, str.Main Trandi in Soviet MiliiaryatedECRET and NIK, "Soviel Capahilillei for Strategicatedctober ISWO. TOP SECKET. RESTRICTED DATA.
"Tlie air lurvclllance minion includes early warning and trailing.
CCCitL-e
The f'VO forces areystem of geographical divisions and subdivisions. The major divisions ateir Defense Districtshese are divided into someir Defense Zonesost of which are divided into sectors for air surveillance purposes. Each of tbe ADDl in the USSR probably maintains direct communications with PVO Strany headquarters, and also with neighboring ADDs. We believe command and control over all three functional elements of lhe air defease mission is exercised at the ADD and ADZ level.
The air defense organizations of the Warsaw Pact countries are coordinated with each other and with PVO Strany. and for all practical purposes constitute an extension of the Soviet system. Each of the Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Pacteparata national system organized in much the same manner as an ADD. Tne East European air defense forces are equipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel, and the USSR will continue its policy of fro-proving their capabilities. Although the Soviet and Chinese Communist air defense systems still maintain some contact, cooperation between (hem Lse believe (hat the Soviets are providing limited assistance in establishing some elements of an nir defense system In thc Peoples' Republic of Mongolia.
III. AIR DEFENSE
Soviets have steadily improved thetr strategic defenses againstvehicle* over the last decade by upgrading their air survcillanecby developing and deploying both manned interceptors and SAMthese systems they haveormidable capability againstand low-supersonic aircraft attempting to penetrate at medium andto principal target areas. These systems are progressively lesshigher performance aircraft, standoff weapons, and low-altitudeTho low-altitude penetration tactics of Western bomber forcesthe development of the Firebar Interceptor, the deployment ofnnd ceitain tnodi&cations to theystem. We believe the USSRtrying to counter the threat of rnoro advanced US aircraft and ofmissiles (ASMs).
A. Air Surveillance and Conirol Early Wowing
Ihe past year the Soviets have continued to improve their(EW) capability, in particular hy further deployment of IheirEW radars in both the USSB mid Eastern Europe Underlhc Soviet EW system can deled and uack aircraft Bylng athigh altitudes at leastn.m. distant from Soviet borders; underdefection and tracking is virtually assured alange of Ihe EW system is progressively reduced againsi aircraft.it lower altitudes, primarily because of line-of-sight rangethose areas having adequate overlapping radar coverage mainly in the
western USSR and in Easterntracking ol an intrudingmay occur downeet. In other areas the radars are unlikely to be able to accomplish continuous trackingeet. Thc Soviets have virtually no continuous tracking capability beloweet.
We estimate that (here areadars deployed atsites In thc USSR. In addition, information is fed Into lhe Soviet airsystem byadars deployed atites In the Butcountries of the Warsaw Pact. All radar sites have an air surveillanoe capability, most altoimited capability to provide an input to CCISoviet radar sitesultiplicity of radars althoughew of the sets at any one site normally operate at one time. The operation of adjacent radar sites is normally alternatedchedule. The density ofheightens the probability of detection, and frequency diversifit ation among the sets provides some defense against electronic countermeasures (ECM).
The Soviets have lor Ihe past decade been gradually mtrodudng areporting system into their air surveillance network, probably tothe speed and volume of data handling. We believe that, with thisreater number of target tracking reports can be' passed, an automatic display capability exists, and manual plotting is reduced. Wo estimate that the semiautomatic syslem is deployed extensively in about one-fourth of the ADZs, hut conventional systems probably arc still employed in large measure even in theseii The semiautomatic system probably Ls deployedesser extent In most of thc remaining ADZs and certain East European Communist nations. We believe that semiautomatic reporting has been introduced at ADZthereby improving centralized control in the ADZ, and leading lo more efficient operalions.
Ground ConfroJiW fnlercepf
About one-third of tbe Soviet radar sites arc capable of conducting CCI operations We estimate that CCI range capabilities vary fromm We believe that most Soviet CCI radars now employ moving target indicators or antidulter techniques in order to improve low-altitude coverage. Nevertheless. Soviet low-altitude CCI capability probably drops off sharply beloweci and would be almost nonexistent beloweet.
Wa believe thatumber of years thc Soviets have beenata transmission system for interceptor control into their ground-to-airWe estimate that this system has been deployed extensively in thc USSR and is being used by Soviet fotces in East Ccrmany, Poland, and Hungary. It is piobably also being employed by Ihe East Cerman, Polish, and Czech air forcer. Wo believe that it is used only wifh current model Interceptors, which comprise about one-third of the force. The Sovieis probably are de-veloping variants of Ihe system which would have Improved data handling capacity.
9
Comm unreal ion t
Soviet air defense systemommunications: networka high degree of redundancy, flexibility, and reliability. We estimateSoviets continue to use older high frequency (HFJ radio and open wiresystems, but they probably have superimposed newer highand microwave systems, which could accountarge proportion ofcapacity. We believe that in the last few years, tlie Soviets have alsotropospheric scatter communications in the north; if suchbecome operational, they presumably wifj be used for more effectivecommunications.
future Tiendt
believe that the Soviets will coettnue to upgrade Ibeir airand control capabilities attd will probably concentrateat the zonal echelon. We believe that semiautomatic reporting willand that1 it will be standard In the western and far easternlhe Soviet forces in East Europe, and fn East Germany. Poland,6 it will probably extend over the entire USSR andThe reporting system will probably be improved. SAM unitswill be included ia it
Thc Soviets will probably continue to introduce improved radars withpower and greater design soplilsllcation. The maximum altitudeof lhe most widely deployed radars will continue to exceed lhealtitudes of Western aircraft. The Soviels may include frequency diversification in their new radars to reduce mutual interference problems and vulnerability toonsiderable effort will probably be expended on solving lhe problem of detecting and tracking low-altitude targets. We anticipate the appearance of radars and techniques specifically designed for handling such targets, particularly in areas which offer the best routes for low-level penetration.
Wc believe that, although the capability of new radars will increase, the need for low altitude cove-rage will coniinue to require much overlapping.the number of radar sites will probably decline only slightly. As new radars with greater reliability and frequency diversification are introduced, the need for redundancy at each site will decline. -We cstlmale, therefore, thai thc older radars will be phased out faster than newer ones ate introduced, and that the numbers of radars will decrease over the nextears, perhaps by as much as one-third-
B. Interceptors*
estimate lhat, ashere wereFighter Aviation of Airess ihan in
'See Table I. Anw.l Soviet interceptor sunlit and. kms&cs
and espibtlltles.
TOP SLC'iLiT
In addition,ighters of Soviet Tactical Aviation are available as an auxiliary force for strategic air defense if required, and there areighters In the air forces of the European Communist countries of the Warsaw Pact. Nearly allighters were designed as interceptors,f them are in those regiments which probablyrimary role of air defense-
Capobililios
The Soviet interceptor force has good capabilities against subsonicattacking at medium and high altitudes in daylight and under clear weather conditions, and somewhat lesser capabilities against supersonic aircraft under the same conditions. Its capabilities arc degraded at night or in adverse weather conditions, by standoff attacks, by attacks using decoys and ECM, and byat low altitudes. AH presently opcra'iooal models haveail attack capability. The Soviets probably also plan to use their interceptors against ASMs, at least as an interim measure.
About two-thirds of the Soviet Interceptor force is still made up of subsonic or low supersonic models introduced7 or earlier, which have little capability0 feet. (We have termed these old models in thishese models are armed with guns or rockets and are thus limited to attack rangesalf-mile or less Most of these old models are day fighters. Thc other one-third of the force is composed ofodels introduced9 or later, armed with air-to-air missilesith an effective attack range ofm (We have termed these currenturing tbe past two years the peripheral deployment of Firebar, gave IAPVO for the Erst time an all-weather intercept capability, probably downeet, especially over water approaches to the USSR. Under optimum conditions, current model interceptors are capable of all-weather zoom attack on aircraft flying at up to0 feat,
Fulyra Modelt
Until recently, the Soviets have concentrated on interceptors which achieved high acceleration, speed, and altitude at some sacrifice of othercharacteristics. For example, these aircraft have limited range, armament, and fire-control capabilities, which limit their effectiveness. The Soviets are now developing interceptors thai will probably have greater range, be capable of atiack from any direction, and be equipped with improved airborne intercept (AI) radari, more sophisticated missile armament, and some automation ofcontrol. (Wc have termed tliesc aircraft future models.)
The first of these future model interceptors is the Fiddler. We believeow in production, and that it will probably begin to enter operational units in6 orlthough Tiddler will probably have thepeed of current interceptors, we estimate it willombat radius of. (double lhal of currentetter capability to attack standofF ASM carriers. We estimate that it will be the first Soviet all-weather
interceptor capable of ntlack from any direrlion, and it may have an improved semiautomatic intercept system. We also estimate that it will have alt-weather missiles with an effective range of up to aboutm,uclear option.
We believe the Soviets are now testing two new improved all-weather interceptorsombat radius of. We believe the first of these is being developed for defense againstargets up to0 feet. When operational, tt will probably have speeds up to aboutnd may be capable" attack. The second Interceptor is probably capable of maximum speed approachingnd of sustained flights at altitudes in excess0 feet Both interceptors will probably utilize data link equipment for semiautomatic intercept control. We believe that the first interceptor will be deployed and that It could be operational as earlyhe secondcould probably not be readyear or so later. We cannot now judge whether it will be deployed then or Improved further before becoming operational.
We believe that the Sovietseed for more advanced interceptorsuitable for use in, and may already be testing such models. They probably could have an advanced all-weather long-range interceptor,of cruising at speeds of Mach J, ineriod. If thay were to develop the second Interceptor (seeor this role, itangem but be operational early in this period. It is possible, though less likely, lhat the Soviets willew aircraft It couldonger range, but be available later in the period. Wc believe they will deploy one or the other of these aircraft, but probably not both. Thc extent of deployment would depend largely on their view of lhe US threat, their SAM capabilitiesnd their assessment of the costs of the new system.
future Foice
estimate (hat over rhe next few years Ihc Firebar will continue lounits, and the Fiddler will be deployed. The total number ofin IA PVO will probably continue to decline throughtsame rate as over the past four yean
ESTIMATED INTERCEPTOR FOHCE LEVELS
lOcroaaalOM 8
Old
Current and Future Modeli'
Sec Tablenoer,litinj of the specific models included in these groups.
e estimate that,he future model interceptors will begin to enter service in somewhat larger numbers. The total size of IAPVO will contmue to decline, and2 may be about two-thirds the size of the present force. The force may remain at about this level throughlternatively, if an
advanccdruise interceptor Is introduced in large numbers, Die overall force level may decline further.
C. Operational Svrface-lo-Air Missile Systems*
The presently operational Soviet SAM systems provide good medium and high-altitude defense against aircraft under all-weather conditions. However, tliey are short-range systems and are considerably less effective against small, high-speed ASMs; they arc ineffective against low-altitude penetralorseet. We believe that new deploymenl of these systems has virtually ceased.
Theystem, deployed moreecade agoouble ring ofites around Moscow, remains operational. We believe that the USSR has2 made improvements In the system which giveetter capability against high performance aircraft. The Soviets continue to trainroops and, most importantly, to use the system for the defense of Moscow in the face of changes in the potential threat. Accordingly, we now believe that theystem will probably continue in operation for some years, at least0 and possibly through
Theystem remains the principal deployed SAM system in the USSR. It is also widely deployed in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Since it was first deployedhis system has undergone several model changes both in thc guidance radar and Ln the interceptor missile These changes have progressively increased its effective raDge to aboutaised its maximum intercept altitude to0 feet, improved its low-altitude capability down toeet, and given it better tracking and electronic counter-counter-measure (ECCM)e estimate thai there wereites in the USSR ine believe thatf these sites are occupied by operational units. Wc believe that the remaining unoccupied sites arc used only occasionally during peacetime and will probably provide positions for additional units during periods of emergency. We believe that theystem will remain in service over the nextears.
Theystem'appears to have been deployed primarily for low-altitude defense. We estimate, however, that Its minimum effective altitude iseet, which makes it little more effective than an improvedeieve that new deployment had virtually ceasedith onlyites completed. The Soviets may be continuing Iheir attempts to improve the capabilities of theut we expect no further deployment. Present force levels will probably be maintained tlirough thenless an improved low-altitude SAM system is developed, in which case theill probably be phased out
"See Table II, Annei,ilting of SAM cltmeterurUcs andbe enrller modelystem, now uied In North Vietnam, hai been nlmott entirely retired from service in the USSR.
-*QP SECRfcT-
D. Tallinn System
4 thc Sovieis have been commuting completesew strategic defcnsive system, which we call the Tallinnhis estimate.was begun initially neat Tallinn and other locations in the northwestern USSH. At about the same time modifications were started on three complexes near Leningrad, which had been partially constructed lor another defensive system, so that they could accept Ihe new system.5omplexes were under construction, and wc believe the program Is
We estimate that there are nowallinn complexes. Most are located near important Soviet target areas; others may be thc beginning ofdefenses across thc northern and southern parts of Ibe European USSR. We believe all of these complexes will become operational7
The Information available at present Is Insufficient for us to estimate with high confidence (ho capabilities and mission of thc Tallinn system. Such evidence as we have, however, leads us lo believe that the system has significantagainst high-speed aerodynamic vehicles dying at high altitude and that itsefense against the airbornehe capabilities of tbe missile and engagement radar remain major unknowns. Depending on theof these components, thc system could hove capabilities against ballistic missiles; these are assessed in
In order to assess the capabilities of the Tallinn system against aerodynamic vehicles, we have assumed char act eristics of an engagement radar andissile which, we believe, are reasonable for the SAM role and are notwith our limited evidence. Oo this bails we think tho Tallinn syslem could engage aerodynamic targets having speeds of up lo, at altitudes upeet, at ranges on the order. We believe Ihat at these heights and distances, the system could useonventional warhead with homing guidance. We cannot at present define the minimum altitude capabilities of the system. We do not believe it is the Soviet answer to the low-allilude penetration threal.
current pattern of Tallinn system deployment suggestsorward defense on the likely approaches to theof the European USSH,ocal defense of key targets andcities tluoughout the USSR. Rased on this deployment concept, the
" Lt. Gen Jo-eph f. Carroll, Director, DIA,en.ohnaon. Actingof Staff for Intelligence. Department of die Army, end Maf Cea.hief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, believe the! the many uncertaintiesanalysis of available evidence do notonfident Judgment aa to whetherof Ihc Tallinn-type defensive system ii SAM, ABM, or dual purpose. Tbeythat the available evidence doeaoocluiion that thcie litihave amillion againit the aerodynamic threat. However, on balance, considering allavailable, they believetofy thai the lyueena being deployed araagainst balliitac minilei -nh an additional capability to defend agiinataerodynamic vehidei.
dhfllrpi separating existing adjacent complexes, and the estimated rate of starts over the past year, wc estimate that someallinn system complexesatites of six launch positions each) will be operational byeployment may be extendednotheromplexes or so We would expect Improvements to the system during it] deployment life.
E. Fuiure SAM Syslems
know of no wholly new SAM systems under development;appears to be directed toward modification of existing systems.could seek to improve their systems by such developments as aacqulsiHon radar,modified fire-control radar and guidancecould possibly adopt terminal homing. No Soviet SAMs deployed orare estimated toapability undereet.think the Soviets will be unable sifmifscsmtly to improve their presentcapability by modifying existing SAM systems, they may developlow-altitude system. We would not expect any neweetperational beforea
IV. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
For the past decade the Soviels have carried on an extensive, vailed, androgram to create defenses against ballistic missiles. Theyhave explored various ABM techniques, red an, interceptmissiles, and concepts of system Integration. They have tested Iheir radar capabilities under conditions of nuclear blackout.hey began to deploy atefensive system which, wc have previously estimated, probably was intended toapabilitymall unsophisticated ballistic missile threat and against aerodynamic vehicles as welL This system was later abandoned before completion. We believe lhat tlic Soviets began deployment of an ABM lyitem at Moscow2 before they had fully tested It. This, in our view, is one measure of the urgency they have attached to fielding ABM defenses.
Any ballistic missile defense program, of course,ood capability to monitor the objects in space which may be near or over one's territory Since the beginning of their own space program, the Soviets have developed andide range ol space tracking facilities. However, lheof these facilities have been generally limited lo tracking space objects which radiate signals. In lhe course of their ABM development andfhe Soviets have also developed radars which are evidently more specifically designed lo perform such functions as detecting and tracking ballistic missiles and nonradiating objects inumber of radars of this type (which we call Hen House and Dog House) have been under construction in lhe USSRn the following set*ions of this paper, we discuss these radars in various contextsallistic missile warning data acquisition for ABM systems, and antisatelliteepending on their locations and configurations. Il should be kepi in mind, however, that in thc aggregate they will provide lite USSRational space surveillance capabilily when they are operational.
15
we relate these radars to each other and to other elements ofwe arc relying at present on deduction rather than on positivein discussing ABM system performance, wc have assumed thedata links and computersapacily to utilize (he full ciTcctivetiessradars and other system components. The actual capacities of theelements, though unknown to us, will obviously be critical todefense capabilities.
Radars
Soviets are constructing two detection/tracking radars,Houses, on their northwestern borders at Olenegorsk on the Kolaat Skrunda on the Baltic coast We estimate that both radars will7 orhese radars, developed at Sary Shagan, arephased arrays. We believe these radars will serve aearly warning function and provide early bracking and predictionuse by ABM launch units. They are oriented to detect ICBMsthe US toward targets In western USSB; they will also be capableballistic missiles launched by submarines from parts of theand Arctic Oceans toward targets in the Soviet northwest
3
Their tracking and prediction accuracies arc excellentlie US loward most targets in the western USSR; they are degraded for other trajectories, depending on the direction of approach and the length of time the RV is within the radar coverage The presently identified Hen Houses provide no coverage for extensive areas of the USSR.
ABM
Tbe principal components of the ABM system under construction at Moscow willuge radar, which we call the Dog House, and Triads with radars and launch positions for Galosh missiles. We believe the system will also utilize inputs from the northern Hen House radars- Even though we have not detected tests against targets having or simulating ICBMwc believe the Moscow ABM system will achieve an IOC to intercept ballistic missiles7 orc believe an operational capability for all the Moscow system facilities now under construction will not be achieved until
Dog House. Tha Soviets arc constructing the Dog House radar aboutiles southwest of Moscow. Itnique configuration and is probablyhased-array type. It Is oriented so that its northern face can scan thc ICBM threat corridor from the US to most targets in thc westernouthern face now being added will be able to scan toward the Indian Ocean.
CHEf-
Wc have no evidence of conductionimilar radar facing (he Polaris threat from the west. We think that tho Dog House is intended to serveong-range acquisition and early target tracking facility for ballistic missile defenses in the Moscow area. It is estimated toarge target handling capacityracking capability somewhat betteren House, It fa probably partially redundant to the Hen Houses, but Is placed within the heavily defended Moscow area, while lhe Hen Houses are presenlly less well defended.
ried, The Soviets have also been working on pairs of Triads located at some of the outer ringites, aboutm from live center ofriad consists of ono large building and two smaller ones, on each ofadome is mounted. Wo believe that the Triads will provide terminal target tracking and missile guidance for the Moscow ABM system. We believe ihcrc arc launch positions associated with each Triad. They are likely toeload capability, but it probably will be rather slowinutes after arrival of the missile at launcherWe believe this configuration andindicates on thc orderaunchers, andapacity to deal withimited number of attacking missiles.
ahsh, We believe that the Moscow system will employ thcwhich was first displayedoviet parade inand configuration of the Galosh tadfeate that it fa designed formterccpt *
iow-
ZITbe Calosh dees not appear to be suitable fo altitude nigh-accclcration intercept
CapabUiliet
he estimated characteristics of the Moscow system are suchould probably accomplish intercepts of irrcorning missiles at distances out to several hundred miles from the launch positions. The small number of Interceptors apparently to be employed by the system suggests that each warhead is expected toarge lethal radius. The system's apparent reliance on exoataospherie intercept also suggests that some large volume kill mechanism is employed. We believe tlie chances are about even that the Caloshuclear warhead^
-Bear. Flucley AauUo, Chiefrationsfjhe Navy, believe, that reload wouldowtderebly longer Uml
-TOP SCCRET-
3"' Thus we
estimate that thc Moscow systemongc-rangc, exoatmospheric systemarge kill radius. The deployment of launch sitesing around Moscow and the relatively small number of launch positions under construction suggests the purpose is primarily the defense of Moscow.
The estimated characteristics of the Moscow ABM system are such as to allow late mid course interceptions without waiting for atmosphericand thus permit more effective neutralization of threat clouds containing both penetration aids and unhardened warheads. Against these advantages of the system, however, must be set certain present or potential weaknesses. For example, we believe that all the components of the Moscow system arcto nuclear attack. Moreover, it appears that the Dog House will be susceptible to nuclear blackout, although the Soviets" may have resolved or circumvented to their satisfaction the problems of detcctioa of oncoming HVsuclear environment, as construction of thc Dog House has progressed after Soviet tests in the fall2 mvestigaring this problem. IE the Hen Houses aod Dog House were destroyed or blacked out, tho capabilities of the system would be seriously reduced, though if we assume that tbe Triads arc designed to operate autonomously, thc system could still intercept some missiles targeted against Moscow.
There has been no evidence that the Soviets have incorporated tbe uso of penetration aids or advanced warheads in their ABM tests. The ability of thc Calosh toarge kill radius would be subject to reduction if the attacker employed hardened warheads.
Considering thc foregoing, we believe that the Moscow ABM system willood capabilityurnerically limited attack on the Moscow area by currently operational missues, but that its capabilities could be degraded by advanced penetration systems and it could not copeery heavy attack. Moreover, the present deployment will not cover all of tlie mdtidirectional Polaris threat to Moscow.
C. Tallinn System
SI. Although we believe that the mission of the Tallinn system is defense against the airborne threat,'* wc have also assessed its capabilities against ballisticn this assessment, we have assumed alternate characteristicsissile, which we believe are reasonable for the ABM role and arc not
" See, "Impacthru bold Test Ban Treaty on SovietOP
" Lt. Ceti. Joseph F. Carroll, Director. DIA; Maf. Can. Chester L. Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Star! for Intelligence, Department of the Army; and Maf. Cen. Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF. do not agree with thb Judgment. See their footnote to
" Capabilities of the system against aerodynamic vehicles are discussed In
TOP-SEGRET-
inconsistent witK our limited evidence. The assessment indicates that this system would need Hen House and/or Dog House target tracking data to function most effectively. Assuming that such data were available, the system may be capable of exoatmospberic intercept of incoming ballistic missiles at distances out to. Weuclear warhead for this system mightill radius of up to. against unhardened RVs. Some of the Tallinn system complexes are so located that presently known Hen House or Dog House radars could not furnish useful target tracking data to them. Where this is the case, or if the Hen Houses and Dog House were destroyed or blacked out. thc capabilities of the system would be seriously reduced and limited to local and self defense. Thus, under these assumptions, if Hen House or Dog House data were available, the Tallinn complexes could defend areas large enough totrategic ABM defense; without such data, thev could not."
D. Fuiure Trends
Research and Development
We cannot now identify any wholly new ABM system in development, but in view of the presently limited capabilities of the ABM defenses now under construction, we believe that the Soviets will devote substantial effort totheir present hardware. At the same lime we expect Ihem toajor effort to developing improved ABM systems. These mayhort-range missile, possessing capabilities for atmospheric intercept,ew long-range missile. We would not expect such new systems to become operational before the.
We expect the Soviets to continue their efforts to develop improvedand tracking systems. We expecto be undertaken in order toapability for the discrirninaUon of advanced penetration aids. Soviet interest in this problem is suggested by analysis of recent Hen House radar signals which may reflect an attempt to improve thc radarsto defino trajectories and characteristics of targets in a. multiple target environment Within theoears the Soviets will probably develop andariety of space systems (such as infrared launch detection satellites or other types of warning systems) In support of their strategic defensive forces.
Chala Johnson. Acting Assislant
Chid ol SlsFf lor Intelligence, Department of the Army, snd Mai. Cen. Jack E. Thomas Assistant Chiel of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, believe tnat the last two sentences Idepreciate the potential capabilities ol Use Tallinn system in an ABM terminal defense mode. They believe It it more accurate to state that the Tallinn system is seriously degraded in an area defense role when off-site radar data are not provided, but that this degradation does not applyhe Tallinn system operatingerminal defense mode. In the terminal defense mode the defended area is considerably reduced, but the firepower of the complexes and the performance of lhc on-site radar may be such that the capability to defend thc terminal ires targets would remain significant.
SECRET-
TOP GCCR&*
There is evidence thai tin' Sovieis have been investigating ovcr-the-bori/.on-delection (OHD) radar techniques. Evidence of such interest appears in Soviet literature beginning in thc. Signals coming from within the USSH for years have been suspected of being related to OHD and since4 new signals, which we think are more compatible with OHDhave been noted. General Soviet practice of designing large antenna arraysrnmunicalions purposes has resulted in the construction in the USSR of many antennas which could be adapted to OHD. We believe detection of missile launchesajor purpose of the Soviet OHD effort, and that ihcir level of technology Is such that they should be able to detect such launches out to. Wo have no evidence now of an operational OHD system for detection of missiles, and wc cannot tell when or even if the Soviets couldufficiently reliable system to warrant deployment,
We expect more research In the Soviet nuclear weapon test program on nuclear kill techniques having still greater lethal radii.
Depioymenl"
We expect the surveillance system to be extended as necessary to support ABM defenses. Less expensive technical alternatives to thc Hen House or Dog House will probably be used if they hecome available.
We believe that the Moscow system will be completed01otal ofaunchers. The Soviets may continue construction to fill out the southern Triads, in which case the number would be somewhat larger.
What the Soviets will do for the general ABM defense of the USSR Is still far from dear. They might deploy the Moscow system more widely; they might deploy more advanced systems based on the Moscow or Tallinn systems; they might deploy an entirely new system. On the other hand, they might decide that ABM defenses for the general defense of the USSR are too costly, but we consider this unlikely.**
" Lt. On. Joseph V. Carroll. Director,. Can. Chester L. Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Stall for Intelligence, Department of the Army; and Maf. Can. Jack E. Thomaa. Assistant Chief of Stall. Intelligence. USAF. belteva thaidiacuaaion of the deployment of the Soviet ballistic ntaanle defenaei should lale mee roniidereticn the bVeliSood (hat the Tallinn syitcm tc an ADM system. In thai event, tbe future deployment levels act forth in paragraphould reflect the deployment of the Tallinn system in an ABM role.
Bear Adm. E. B. Flueaey. Assistant Chief of Navalpartment of tlie Navy, believes that the Caloib system couldartoviel retaliatory assured destruction defensive weapons system Moscow, at (he bob of all defense and counter rtric and thc center of command and control, mot avoad d'ltracoon long enough to provide time for deciiion. retaliation, damage auenment of the Soviet Union, and rapid comrnunlcaborts with the outside world. Should lha US itake Grit, the Soviets would have only aboutinutei tactical warning, compared lo our own shortinutes If the SovieU itrfte Grit. They may consider thm reaction time inmfirtent and ao arc willing lo eipend aabtUMtal hinds to conee Moscow with an effective AIM system lo gain as4 hours greet before fallout moving in from other attack arrai would degrade lhe* capability to decide and respond. Having attained this, ihey might decide that ABM defense* for the compcehcitalve defease of the USSR ere loo costly.
GCCFrCT'
here me no indications that (lie Moscow system is being deployedIn the USSH, and itsper launcher suggests thatnot be deployed further with ils present capabilities. If the Sovietsimproving its capabilities and do notetter long-rangeimproved Moscow system might be deployed at additional locations. The deploymenthort-range missile to supplement themay also take place in about the same time period.
GO. We cannot now judge how successful the Soviets will be In improving existing systems or in developing new systems. We think it likely, however, thai the Soviets will extend ABM defenses during the nextears. We base this judgment on the magnitude of the threat, the wide dispersion of targets to be defended, and past Soviet proclivity for deployment of defenses when they believe they haveystem which provided atartial answer to their needs. We think tlie Sovieis will be cautious about committing themselvesiled policy with respect to ABM deployment over the long term. They will probably adjust whatever program they pursue on the basisumber of factors, including the capabilities of present systems to deal with penetration aids, the advances in ABM technology, the cost of additional deployment relative to the protection it is likely to afford, and the US reaction to Soviet strategic developments.
V. ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE
Tlie development by the US of military support systems, such asand navigation satellites, as well as Ihe possibility of space borne weapon systems, give the Soviets adequate incentive to develop defenses against these systems In addition, the US announced capability of an antisatellite system must have added impetus to Soviet efforts along these lines. In fact, the Soviets could have had for someimited antisatellite capability based on existing electronic facilities and an operational missileuclear warhead (eg. the
Hen House radars at Sary Shagan and Angarsk willoveragewhichpace survoillanco syslem. In addition, the Skrunda and Olcnegorsk dual Hen House radars and the Dog House probablyecondary role of space surveillance.
Tills space surveillance system would enable the Soviets to observe and track satellites during most of the passes over the USSR. It probably would allow the Soviets to predict the orbits and positions of non-Soviet satellites and space vehiclesigh degree of accuracy after two to four crossings over the USSR, and thus could provide the information required by an antisatellite system.
A Soviet antisatellite system employing these radars could use au existing missileuclear warhead. Nonnuclear kill, on thc other hand,round-guided missile system of high precisionoming missile capable of exoatmospheric maneuver, either of which could be developed In
?1
-TOP SECRET-
about iwo yearsecision to do so. Allhough we have no evidence of such development, il could be well underway without our knowledge. Wctherefore, that at about the time the Hen Houses become operational inime period, fhe Soviets could have an anlisatellile capability with either nuclear or nonnuclear kill.
A manned coorbiting antisatellite system could be developed ins an outgrowth of the Soviet manned spacelthough the costs ofystem would be high, operationalopportunities for inspection, nondestructive neutralization, dismantling, orjustify its development..
ore immediate measure, the Soviets might explore techniques (such as ECM) for the nondestructive neutralization of satelliles. These techniques might utilize mechanisms on tho ground, in missiles, or in unmanned coorbiting satelliles. Tlie time at which any such techniques could be available would depend on the type of neutralizing mechanism adopted.
We believe, however, that the Soviets would realize that any use of anti-satellite systems in peacetime would risk opening their own military support systems to retaliation. We think it likely, therefore, that Ihc Soviets would use antisatellite systems only if they believed that war with the US were imminent and that neulraliration of our military support systems were consequently an overriding consideration, There might also be some Other special circumstances in which they would use antisatellite systems in peacetime, such as an occasion in which they believed they were retaliating against US interference with their own satellites.
VI. CIVIL DEFENSE
The Soviets view cn organized civil defense programart of their overall defensive posture.hen operational responsibility for the civil defense program was shifted to the Ministry of Defense, increased numbers of military officers of high rank have appeared on civil defense staffs. The current head of the programrominent Marshal. Subordinate headquarters at the republic and oblast levels staffed with military personnel are responsible for dissemination and implementation of Instructions from the headquarters in Moscow. Military district headquarters have civil defense officers which are probably prepared to assume operational control in any emergency. Local organizations are manned largely by civilians, and encompass rural as well as metropolitan areas. Civil defense activities aie integrated with those of air defense and internal security organizations.
Soviet civil defense organizations, facilities, and capabilities have been growing over lhe past decade. Wo believe, however, that the recent calls to "perfect" civil defense, made atd Party Congress, do not indicate any major changes in thc Soviet civil defense system or any expansion of civil defense
"See, The Soviet SpaceatedECRET.
scener
plans- Itather, these high-level exhortations seem intended lo spur lagging ef. foils within already existing programs. These piogiains arc generallyby widespread public Iraining and Ihe use of simple shelters. However, special purpose shelters for civil defense, communications, and goverrunent con* tiol staffs probably are being constructed outside the major cities. Shelters for essential government, communications, suppoit services, and cavil defensepersonnel are reportedly well equipped and stocked. Bul adequate shelters are available only to such key persooneL
e estimate that there are shelter spaces available for less than one-sixth of the urban population. Most of these shelters were built during, when new public buildings and apartment houses were constructed with special basements for civil defense purposes. Since thehc Soviets have severely curtailed their urban shelter construction program. We have noto indicate lhal they areesumptionajor shelterprogram except Insofar as thc new deep-level subway lines undoubtedly serve this purpose. They have, however, suitable areas In apartments, public buildings, and factories that could be designated and stocked as fallout shelter areas for most of the urban population. We have no indication lhal the Soviels wouldtepped up civil defense program for fallout shelters as an integral and necessary adjunct to extensive ABM deployment.
etwork of civil defense courses and schools is operated in the USSR to train civilians charged with command, operational, and technicalbe civil defense organization and the instructors who ire lo give training courses to the general public All Soviet citizens are obligated to take civil defense instruction regularly In schools snd at places of work. The fifth public course given5 is approaching completion. About half the Soviet population has probably been exposed lo basic self-help instruction and many have probably taken repeated courses, but apathy on the part of the public has tended lo reduce thc planned effectiveness of this training.
0 Ihe Soviets have been emphasizing in their training ways to conduct planned urban evacuation in advance of the outbreak of hostilities. Current planseveloping emergency call for luhitantial evacuation of Soviet cities, with most of lhe population resettled temporarily in rural areas. Such plans, of course, would be feasible only if lhe Soviel civil defense authorities received several days warning.
The civil defense program does not nowigh priority call on either budgetary or economic resources, and ihete is no indication that this trend will change. The civil defense program is gearedlow bul steady improvement in overall effectiveness Wc believe that Ihe demands of other defense systems and of the economy will continue to preclude any costlyof the Soviet civil defense program.
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TABLE I
SOVIET INTERCEPTORS: ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE IN AN AIR DEFENSE ROLE
trric-
TlVt
RAM
i BFEEO AT
OPT!
KIM NO
(knots)*
omit/it
COMBAT
A*
jack
(nwl
usjk unuuzirr
Old MoMt
tins/Rockets
C
D
19SS
WO
eia
E
4
*
5
A (Mlg-lW
8 (Mlg-lO)
.7
C
7
una/Rockets
D
7
eta
B
Tall
Model*
Rockets
Guna/AAMa
{SU-9)
A Mi
D
e
F (Mlg-si)'
top stCRn
i A A
< <
W *o
S
S3
is
i
-
^
ijiilii iiisisi
I
SOVIET SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CiUrUCTERISTICS AND PEBFORM ANCE*
aod)
IOC
Sites pei56
I I'Ti perDai)
Maiimum Slant Range (tan)IS
Masurium
Minimum
Target Handling Capability per
Rata of Simultaneous Fire per20
Accuracy (CEP lo50
Warhead
Mobility
" The surface-to-air capabilities of lite Tallinn lyitem agiinit aerodynamic vchiclu are discussed In
1 An earlier version of theystem, OO longer deployed b> the USSR but lull deployed ia East Europe. North Vietnam, and eUe-arbcae.aximum slant range ofinimum intercept altitude.
'For tbe past several years no more thannlet have been seen oo launcher
per site.
Original systemaximum ilant rangem.arimmo alutude of0 feet. There are iodxabeni lhat theange and altitudepcobably have been Improved Tbeiritcm could approach these olSA-S.
' ThU range is estimated for sites equipped with Uie Fanire-cootrol radar which is standard In tlie USSR.
'Theas some effectlvencea above this altitude
' We have no evidence aaheeffective altitude capabiliUea of thiihe Soviets almort certainly will provide tome of these roatauea with noclcai warheads, and may hive begun to do so.
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