CONTENTS
Pag,
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
I. POLICY TOWARD STRATECIC DEFENSE
II. ORGANIZATION OF STRATECIC DEFENSE
III. AIR DEFENSE
Surveillance and
Early
Crouod ControUcd Intercept
Future
CapabUiUea
Future Models
Future
Surface-to-Air Missile
System
SAM
IV. BALLISTIC5
Radars
ABM
System
Research and
V. ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE 21
VI. CIVIL DEFENSE 22
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v fiPPilOVED FOR RELEASE
CISPflOSR^J
SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces throughnd general trends in these forces
CONCLUSIONS
A- The Soviet leadersigher priority to strategic defenses than does the US; they allocate about equal resources to their strategic attack and their strategic defense forces. The Soviet object intheir strategic defenses is to contribute to deterrence and topolicy support, and to limit the damage the US could inflict on the USSR. The Soviets will continue to emphasize strategic defense throughout the nextears, and will pursue their efforts to meet the changing US threat. They will seek, through both offensive andprograms, to improve their strategic position relative to that of the US.
B. The Soviets have steadily improved their strategic defenses against aerodynamic vehicles over the last decade, by upgrading their air surveillance system and by developing and deploying both manned interceptors and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Through these systems they haveormidable capability against subsonic and low-supersonic aircraft attempting to penetrate at medium and high altitudes to principal target areas. Current systems areless effective against higher performance aircraft, standoffand low-altitude penetrations. At present, Soviet strategic air defenses have virtually no effectiveness at altitudes beloweet.' )
'm. E. B. Flockev, Assistant Chief ofnboniepartment of tho Navy, believe! that Ihe strategic defense manned Interceptorsreater capability at altitudeseel than Indicated lo the teat, particularly la some sei approaches.
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Soviets will be deploying over the next few yearssurveillance radars, air defense communications and controland defensive weapon systems with capabilities againstvehicles- They are now deploying an interceptor withlow-altitude capabilities. We believe they will alsointerceptorsetter capability to defend againstand higher performance aircraft. Although we thinkwill continue to work on the problem of defenseeet, wc do not expect any system with suchto be operational beforeParas.
he Soviets have been constructing complexes formissile system for strategic defense, which we call theThere are nowomplexes (each withsites) under construction. We believe all of these7he deployment concept appearsboth forward defense on likely approaches to theof European USSR and local defense of selected targets.that the rate at which new complexes have been startedin the past year or so, and that this system will bethroughout the USSR.
information available at present is insufficient for uswith high confidence the capabilities and mission of theSuch evidence as we have leads us to believe that thesignificant capabilities against high-speed aerodynamicat high altitude and that its mission is defense againstepending on the characteristics of somethe system could have capabilities against ballistichave therefore assessed the potential of the Tallinn system inSAM and antiballistic missile (ABM) roles.
'Lt. Cen. [oteph f. Carroll, Director, DIA, MaJ. Cen.ohnson, Acting AssisUnt Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army; sod Maf. Ceet. Jack E. Thonui. AssisUnt Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, believe that the many uncrrtainOa* Hemming from analyrii of available evidence do notonfident judgment a* lo whether the mission of Ihe TaHlrnwrypa defeoshe system is SAM. ABU. or dual purpose They acknowledge chat theevscWaxe dononckaaan that these sites aaayefensive incision against the aerodynamic threat. Howe ear. on balance, considering all anformatinn available, theys room likely that the systems being deployed are for defense against bolllitli niMillea with an additional capability to defend against high flying supersonic aerodynamic vahlclas.
OCCULT
F. In thc SAM role, we believe the Tallinn systemonsiderable improvement over currently operational Soviet SAMs in terms of range (on the order, altitudo (upnd ability to deal with supersonic targets (up toe do not believe it is the Soviet answer to the low-altitude threat. If the.system was designed as an ABM, then data would have to be fed to the complexes from off-site radars in order for them to defend areas large enough totrategic ABM defense. Some of the Tallinn complexes are in locations where they could takeof such data from known radars of appropriate types, but some are not. With suoh data, the Tallinn complexes may bo capable of exoatmospheric intercept of incoming ballistic missiles at distances out tond thus each complex couldairly large area. Without such data, the ABM capabilities of each complex would be seriously reduced and limited to local and self-defense.i)
an intensive ABM research and developmentSoviets decided at least 6ve years ago to deploy an ABMMoscow. This system (which we call the Moscow system)an initial capability in the next year or two, and all sitesconstruction will be completed byeong-range exoatmospheric systemarge kill radius,the primary purpose of its present deployment is the defense )
Moscow ABM system probably willooda numerically limited attack by currently operational USIts capabilities could be degraded by advanced penetrationand it could not copeery heavy attack.system utilizes data from large radars for it to function mostWithout these radars, the capabilities of the system wouldreduced, though if the launch sites were designed tothe system could still Intercept some missilesMoscow. The present deployment will coverartPolaris threat to Moscow. )
cannot now identify any wholly new ABM system inand we do not expect any to become operational before theIn view of the presently limited capabihties of the ABMnow under construction, we believe the Soviets will devote sub-
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stantial efforts to upgrading their present hardware, developingABM systems, and improving their detection and trackingThe Soviets might decide that ABM defenses for thedefense of the USSR are too costly. Wc think it likely, however, that they will extend their ABM defenses. But we think they will be cautious about committing themselvesixed policy with respect to ABM deployment over the long term. They will probably adjustprogram they pursue on the basisumber of factors,the capabilities of present defenses to deal with penetration aids, the advances in ABM technology, the cost of additional deployment relative to the protection it is likely to afford, and the US reaction to Soviet strategic developments.' )
J. In the course of their ABM program, thc Soviets have developed large radars which have good capabilities for tracking ballistic missiles and spaceumber of radars of this type, now underwill become operational. Although they do not all have the same functions, we believe that in the aggregate they will provide tbe USSRational space surveillance capability. Within theoears the Soviets will probably develop andariety of space systems (such as infrared detection and other types of warning) in support of their strategic defensive forces.)
K. We have no positive evidence that the Soviets are developing antisatellite defenses, but we believe they have had an incentive to do so for some time. It would be technically possible for them toimited antisatellite capability already, based on existing radars and missiles anduclear weapon toill. When their new space surveillance radars are operational, they couldapability to destroy satellites by either nuclear or nonnuclear means after the satellites had passed over theew times. The Soviets may also explore techniques for neutralizing satellites without destroyinganned satellite inspection and antisatellitecould be developed In. We believe, however, that the Soviets would seek to destroy or neutralize US satellites only if they believed general war were imnuhent. There might also be some other special circumstances in which they would use antisatellite systems in.
' For too views oi Bear Adnv E.hackey. Assistant Oaf of Naval Operation*afaataaaa* of theaot hai footnote to paragraph So.
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peacetime, such as an occasion in which they believed they wereagainst US interference with their own satellites.)
L. Over the past decade or more the Soviets have developed an extensive civil defense program, which is now administered by the Ministry of Defense. The current program is characterized bypublic training, the use of simple shelters, and plans for urban evacuation in advance of hostilities. Shelter space is available for less than one-sixth of the urban population, and adequate shelter for key personnel only. We have detected no recent major changes in the priority or pace of the program and we have no indication that the Soviets wouldtepped up civil defense effortecessary adjunct to extended ABM deployment. We anticipate continued slow but steady improvement in overall civil defense effectiveness.)
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discussion
olicy toward strategic defense forces
he soviet leadenigher priority lo strategic defensive forces than docs the us. this li partly due to the longstanding soviet preoccupation with defense of thc homeland, but more specifically to the great size and diversity of us strategic attack forces. the us, withstrategic attack force in being at the end of world war ii. hasnded to rely mainly on retaliatoryand thus has concentrated on building strategic attack forces. the ussr, on the other hand, confronted by these us forces, has placed more nearly equal emphasis on both strategic defense and strategic oflense. bout
one-fifth of thc total soviet force-orjenled military expenditures were allocated
to each of these strategic missions.*
aced with the us threat, the soviets have developed and deployedgenerations of increasingly effective radars, communications systems, interceptors, and suiface-to-air missiles (sams) over tho past two decades. in addition, they have already embarked upon deployment of anfiballiitic missile (abm) defenses. in their efforts toefense in being, the soviets have generally elected toefensive system quite early, even if it did not meet the whole threat, rather than to wait for the developmentore effective defense. when an improved system has been developed, deployment of an older system has often stopped, but it haa not been rapidly retired or replnced. consequently the soviets tend lo have extensive defenses deployed in depth, usually with considerable redundancy. but some elements of these defenses are somewhat out of date and do not represent the most effective counter to new us systems or concepts of operation.
* The force-oilentcd military erpcmlilures are the eipendifures for the Ihiee mafat force components (strategic attack, strategic defense, and general purpose) as daUnct from BBV penditura* fee *paea. command and general support, aad research, development, tearing, and evaluation, which support all the foins. The major force-oriented erpendirurn account (or aboulercent of lolal eiiimtted soviet militaryome portion ofercent ii also cipended In support of the strategic defense force*.
" an touted deatruction capablityn after the. enemy *tr&cs first, lo guare the dWaitaBon of hi) population aad industrial centers in retaliation.
n our view, the soviets continue to regard strategic defense and attack forces as their primary instruments for deterring the us and forilitary buttress to their foreign policy. in thc past, the soviets have notufficiently powerful strategic attack force to justify high confidence in its effectiveness for the foregoing purposes. now. with thc large-scale deployment of dispersed and hardened intercontinental ballistic missilesheirin their assured destruction capability* must be growing. despite this improving posture, however, the soviets evidently believeational strategic policy for them continues toombination of offensive and defensive forces which could limit damage to the ussr if war comes.
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a. Soviet calculations of their damage limiting requirement* will, of course, be complicated by manifold uncertainties regarding the effectiveness of the offensive and defensive forces of both sides under the various circumstances which could exist at the outsetar. Among the most critical uncertainties will be those concerning the effects on their defenses of US penetratioo tactics and (especially in thc case of ABM defenses) US penetration aids. Indeed, the variables are so great that we think: the Soviets almost certainly cannotonfident calculation of the actual damage limiting capabilities of their own forces over the period of this estimate. For this and other reasons, we believe thc Soviets would not consider it feasible to achieve, by thetrategic capabilities which would make rational tho deliberate Iniriation of general nuclear war. Nevertheless, the Soviets will seek, through both offensive and defensive programs, to improve their strategic position relative to that of the US.*
believe that Soviet emphasis on strategic defense will continuethe next decade, and that the Soviets will pursue their efforts to meetUS strategic threat. Their rnost critical requirement, and thedifficult of solution, is ABM defense. Increasing efforts willdevoted to pushing research programs in the Geld of ABM defense and toABM systems of increasing effectiveness. We also expect aSoviet effort lo counter the low-altitude aircraft threat as well asstandoff threat. Soviet planners probably foresee ain the US bomber force over the nextears,ualitativeas the US introduces new systems and concepts for air attack.
II. ORGANIZATION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES
For farther ducuieion ol these quesOom. see NIE IM-K, "Main Trends In Soviet MilltoryatedECRET and, -Soviet Capabilities foratedOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.
"Tha air surveillance mauSoo inrJodea early -arnioa; and raacbag.
The Soviet air defense mission is the responsibility of PVO So any (Antiair Defense of thehose Commander-in-Chiefeputy Minister of Defense ranking with tho heads of the ground, naval, air, and strategic missile forces. The PVO is composed of three major elements, each of which performs one of the key functions of the air defense. airnterceptor, and SAM operations. In addition to forces directly assigned to the PVO Strany. other Soviet forces which can contribute to thc air defense mission are also operationally available to this command.
The Soviets have occasionally mentioned Antlrocket Forces (PRO) as the organization responsible for operational ABM forces. The Commander of PVO Strany probably is assigned the mission of ballistic missile defense, but we have no information on bow ABM forces St into PVO Strany. During the past year there have alsoew referencesblue belt ofno Soviet officer Implied that thiscomplex of fourdefense missiles, aircraft, submarines, and the antimissilee have noin intelligence that such command relationships exist in practice.
he PVO forces are deployedystem of geographical divisions and subdivisions. The major divisions areir Defense Districtshese are divided into someir Defense Zonesost of which are divided into sectors for air surveillance purposes. Each of the ADDs in the USSR probably maintains direct communications with PVO Strany headquarters, and also with neighboring ADDs. We believe cornmand and control over all three functional elements of the air defense mission is exercised at the ADD and ADZ level.
air defense organizations of the Warsaw Pact countries areeach other and with PVO Strany, and for all practical pirrpose*extension of the Soviet system. Each of the Eastern European countriesWarsaw Pacteparate national system organized in much thoas an ADD. Tbe East European air defense forces are equippedwith Soviet materiel, and the USSR will continue its policy oftheir capabilities. Although the Soviet and Chinese Communistsystems still maintain some contact, cooperation between them Isbelieve that the Soviets are providing limited assistance In establishingof an air defense system in the Peoples' Republic of Mongolia.
III. AIR DEFENSE
Soviets have steadily improved their strategic defenses againstvehicles over the last decade by upgrading their air surveillanceby developing and deploying both manned interceptors and SAMthese systems they haveormidable capability againstand low-supersonic aircraft attempting to penetrate at medium andto principal target areas. These systems are progressively lesshigher performance aircraft, standoff weapons, anditudoThe low-altitude penetration tactics of Western bomber forcesthe development of the Firebar Interceptor, the deployment ofand certain modifications to theystem. Wc believe the USSRtrying to counter the threat of more advanced US aircraft and ofmissiles (ASMs).
A. Air Surveillance and Control Early Warning
the past year use Soviets have continued to improve their(EW) capability, fa particular by further deployment of theirEW radars in both the USSR and Eastern Europe. Underthe Soviet EW system con detect and track aircraft flying athigh altitudes at. distant from Soviet borders; underdetection and tracking Is virtually assured atange of the EWrogressively reduced against aircraftat lower altitudes, primarily because of line-of-sight rangethose areas liaving adequate overlapping radar coverage-^mainly In the
western USSR and in Easternbacking of an intrudingmay occur downeet. In other areas the radars are unlikely to be able to accomplish continuous trackingeet. The Soviets have virtually no continuous tracking capability beloweet
We estimate that there areadars deployed atsites in the USSR. In addition, information ii fed into tbe Soviet airsystem byadars deployed atites In thc Eastcountries of the Warsaw Pact. All radar sitea have an air surveillance capability; moat alsoimited capability to provide an input to CCISoviet radar sitesultiplicity of radars althoughew of the sets al any one site normally operate at one time. The operation of adjacent radar sites is normally alternatedchedule. The density ofheightens the probability of detection, and frequency di versification among thc sets provides some defense against electronic count crrneasurcs (ECM).
The Soviets have for thc past decade been gradually introducing areporting system into their air surveillance network, probably tothe speed and volume of data handling. Wa believe that, with thisreater number of target tracking reports can be' passed, an automatic display capability exists, and manual plotting is reduced. We estimate that the semiautomatic system is deployed extensively in about one-fourth of the ADZs, but conventional systems probably arc still employed In large measure even in these zones. The semiautomatic system probably is deployedesser extent in most of the remaining ADZs and certain East European Communist nations. We believe that semiautomatic reporting has been introduced at AD7,thereby Improving centralized control in the ADZ, and leading to more efficient operations.
Ground Controlled Intercept
About one-third of the Soviet radar sites are capable of conducting CCI operations. Wc estimate that CCI range capabilities vary from- We believe that most Soviet CCI radars now employ moving target indicators or anticlutter techniques In order to improve low-altitude coverage. Nevertheless, Soviet low-altitude CCI capability probably drops off sharply beloweet and would be almost nonexistent beloweet.
We believe thatumber of years tbe Soviets have beenata transmission system for interceptor control into their ground-to-airWe estimate that this system has been deployed extensively in the USSR and ii being used by Soviet forces in East Cermany. Poland, and Hungary. It Is probably also being employed by tho East German, Polish, and Czech air forces. We believe thatsed only with current model interceptors, which comprise about one-third of the force. The Soviets probably arcvariants of the system which would have improved data handling capacity.
ucentt
Communicalions
he Soviet air defense systemommunications network whichigh degree of redundancy, flexibility, and reliability- We estimate that the Soviets continue to use older high frequency (HFJ radio and open wiresystems, but they probably have superimposed newer high capacity cable and microwave systems, which could accountarge proportion ofcapacity. We believe that in the last few years, the Soviets have also been introducing tjopospberic scatter communications in the north; If suchbecome operational, they presumably will be used for more effective air
defense communications.
Future Trends
believe that the Soviets will continue to upgrade their airand control capabilities and will probably concentrateat the zonal echelon. We believe that semiautomatic reporting willand that1 it will be standard in the western and far easternthe Soviet forces In East Europe, and in East Germany, Poland,6 it wilt probably extend over the entire USSR andThe reporting system will probably be improved. SAM unitswill be included ia it-
The Soviets will probably continue to introduce improved radars withpower and greater design sophistication. The maximum altitudeof the most widely deployed radars will continue to exceed thealtitudes of Western aircraft. The Soviets may include frequency diversification in their new radars to reduce mutual interference problems and vulnerability toonsiderable effort will probably be expended on solving the problem of detecting and tracking low-altitude targets. We anticipate the appearance of radars and techniques specifically designed for handling such targets, particularly in areas which oiler the best routes for lowdevel penetration.
We believe that, although the capability of new radars will increase, the need for low-altitude coverage will continue to require much overlapping-the number of radar sites will probably decline only slightly. As new radan with greater sellabuity and frequency diversification aro introduced, the need for redundancy at each site will decline. We estimate, therefore, that the older radars will be phased out fatter than newer ones are tarroduced, and that the numbers of radars will decrease over the nextears, perhaps by as much as one-thud.
B. Interceptors'
estimate that, ashere wereFighter Aviation of Airess than hi
TaWc I. Annas,ining of Soviet Interceptor aircraft and their chnrac unities and capabilities.
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In addition,ighters of Soviet Tactical Aviation arc available as an auxiliary force for itralegic aii defense if required, and there areighters in the air forces of the European Communist countries of the Warsaw Pact. Nearly allighters were designed as interceptors;f them are in those regiments which probahlyrimary role of air defense.
Capabilities
he Soviet interceptor force has good capabilities against subsonicattacking at medium and high altitudes in daylight and under dear weather conditions, and somewhat lesser capabilities against supersonic aircraft under the same conditions. Its capabilities are degraded at night or in adverse weather conditions, by standoff attacks, by attack) using decoys and ECM, and byat low altitudes. All presently operational models haveail attack capability. The Soviets probably also plan to use their intercepcors against ASMs. at least as an interim otcasure.
bout two-thuds of the Soviet interceptor force is still made up of subsonic or low supersonic models introduced7 or earlier, which have little capability0 feet. (We have termed these old models in this estimate) These models are armed with guns or rockets and are thus limited to attack rangesalf-mile or less. Most of these old models are day fighters. The other one-third of the force is composed of Machmodels introduced9 or later, armed with air-to-air missilesith an effective attack range of. (We bave termed these currenturing the past two years the peripheral deployment of Firebar, gave IAPVO for the first time an all-weather intercept capability, probably downeet, especially over water approaches to the USSR Under optimum conditions, current model interceptors are capable of all-weather zoom attack on aircraft flying at up to0 feet.
Fofure rVJodefs
Until recently, the Soviets have concentrated on interceptors which achieved high acceleration, speed, and altitude at some sacrifice of othercharacteristics. For example, these aircraft have limited range, armament, and fire-control capabilities, which limit their effectiveness. The Soviets are now developing interceptors that will probably have greater range, be capable of attack from any direction, and be equipped with improved aiibornc intercept (AI) radars, more sophisticaied missile armament, and some automation ofcontrol. (Wc have termed these aircraft future models.)
The first of these future model interceptors Is the Fiddler. We believe it is now in production, and that it will probably begin to enter operational units In6 orlthough Fiddler will probably have thepeed of current interceptors, we estimate it willombat radius of. (double that of currentetter capability to attack standoff ASM carriers. We estimate that it will be the first Soviet all weather
mem
Interceptor capable of attack from any direction, and it may have an improved semiautomatic intercept system. Wc also estimate that it will have all-weather missiles with an effective range of up lo aboutuclear option.
We believe the Soviets are now testing two new improved all-weather interceptorsombat radius of. We believe the first of these is being developed for defense againstargets up to0 feet. When operational, it wul probably have speeds up to aboutnd may be capable* attack. The second interceptor is probably capable of maximum speed approachingnd of sustained flights at altitudes in excess0 feet. Both interceptors will probably utilize data link equipment for semiautomatic Intercept control. We believe that the first interceptor will be deployed and that it could be operational as earlylie secondcould probably not be readyear or so later. Wc cannot now judge whether it will be deployed then or Improved further before becoming operational.
We believe that the Sovietseed for more advanced interceptorsuitable for use in, and may already be testing such models. They probably could have an advanced all-weather long-range interceptor,of cruising at speeds of Machneriod. If they were to develop the second interceptor (seeor this role, itange. but be operational early In this period. It Is possible, though less likely, that the Soviets willew aircraft. It couldonger range, but be available later in thc period. We believe they will deploy one or the other of these aircraft, but probably not both. The extent of deployment would depend largely on their view of the US threat, their SAM capabilitiesnd their assessment of the costs of the new rystem.
Future Force
estimate that over tbe next few years the Firebar will continue tounits, and the Fiddler will be deployed. The total number ofin IAPVO will probably continue to decline throughtsame rate as over the past four years.
ESTIMATED INTERCEPTOR FORCE LEVELS
lCweanlW
Old
Current and Furore Modeb
' See Table I. Annei,ilting of themodeli Included in these groups.
estimate that,he future ntodel interceptors will beginservice In somewhat larger numbers. The total size ofecline, and2 may be about two-thuds the size of the presentforce may remain at about this level throughlternatively, if aa
advancedruise interceptor is mtTcdueed in large numbers, tbe overall force level may decline further,
C Operational Surface-to-Air Missile Systems*
Sen Tableiner,ining of SAM characterab'cs and capabdtbes. "The eailler modelystem, now used in North Vietnam, has been almost entirely retired from service In tbe USSR.
The presently operational Soviet SAM systems provide good medium and high-altitude defense against aircraft under all-weather conditions. However, they are short-range systems and are considerably less effective against small, high-speed ASMs; they are ineffective against low-altitude penetratorseet We believe that new deployment of these systems has virtually ceased.
Theystem, deployed moreecade agoouble ring ofites around Moscow,critioriiit- Wc ibdicvclic2 made improvements In the system which giveetter capability against high performance aircraft. The Soviets continue to trainroops and, most importantly, to use the system for the defense of Moscow in the face of changes in thc potential threat. Accordingly, we now believe that thcystem will probably continue in operation for some years, at least0 and possibly through
Theystem remains the principal deployed SAM system in the USSR. It is also widely deployed in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Since it was first deployedhis system has undergone several model changes both in the guidance radar and in the interceptor missfle. These changes liave progressively increased its effective range to aboutm, raised its maximum intercept altitude to0 feet, unproved its low-altitude capability down toeet, and given it better tracking and electronic counter-counter-measure (ECCM)e estimate that there wereites In the USSR ine believe thatf these sites are occupied by operational units. We believe that the rcaraining unoccupied sites are used only occasionally during peacetime and will probably provide positions for additional units during periods of emergency. We believe that theystem will remain in service over the nextears.
Theystem-appears to have been deployed primarily for low-altitude defense. We estimate, however, tbat its minimum effective altitude iseet, which makes it little more effective than an improvedeieve that new deploymen had virtually ceasedith onlyites completed. The Soviets may be continuing their attempts to improve the capabilities of theut wa erpect no further deployment. Present force levels will probably be maintained through thcnless an improved low-altitude SAM system Is developed, in which case theill probably be phased out.
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D. Tallinn System
4 the Soviets have been constructing complexesew strategic defensive system, which we call the Tallinn system in thb estimate.was begun initially near Tallinn and other locations in the northwestern USSR. At about the same time nvadifkatioris were started on three complexes near Leningrad, which had been partially constructed for another defensive system, so that they could accept the new system.5omplexes were under construction, and we believe the program is
We estimate that there arc nowallinn complexes. Most are located near Important Soviet target areas; others may be the beginning ordefenses across the northern and southern parts of the European USSR. We believe all of these complexes will become operational7
be information available atsufficient for us to estimate with high confidence the capabilities and mission of the Tallinn system. Such evidence as we have, however, leads us to believe that tho system has significant cnpabili-lies against high-speed aerodynamic vehicles flying at high altitude and that itsefense against the airbornehe capabilities of the missile and engagement radar remain majorepending on theof these components, the system could have capabilities against ballistic mbsiles; these are assessed in
Lt Can teeepfa F. CaSsI, Direetor.eo, Chaster L. Johnson. Art-gChief c* Staff forepartment of thcsrd Maf. Ceo.siotant Chwf ol Staff. Intelligence. USAF. believe tbat the many uncertainties stcntmlng from analysis of available evidence do notonfident Judgment ai to whether the mission of the Tallinn-type defensive system ii SAM. ABM, or dual purpose. Theythat rhe available evidence deesonclusion that these sites any have ambiion against thethreat However, oa balance. ccmsiderina; alavailable, they believe it is more hhely that tbe systems being deplored are for defense ag.inat ballimc "Hides with an ndditionnl capability to defendigh Hying supersonic aerodynamic vehicles.
In order to assess the capabilities of the Tallinn system against aerodynamic vehicles, we have assumed characteristics of an engagement radar andissile which, we believe, are reasonable for tho SAM role and are notwith our limited evidence. On tins basis we think the Tallinn system could engage aerodynamic targets having speeds of up tot altitudes upeet, at range* on the order. We believe that at these heights and distances, the system could useonventional warhead with homing guidance. We cannot at present define the minimum altitude capabilities of the system. Wo do not believehe Soviet answer lo the low-altitude penetration threat
The current pattern of Tallinn system deploymentoncept embracingorward defense on the likely approaches to the industrial heartland of the European USSR,ocal defense of key targets and selected major cities throughout the USSR. Rased on thb deployment concept, the
distance separating existing adjacent complexes, and the estimated rate of starts over the past year, we estimate that someallinn rystem complexes (con* taining atites of six launch positions each) will be operational byeployment may be extended to anotheromplexes or so We would expect improvements to the system duringeployment life.
E. Mure SAM Systems
know of no wholly new SAM system! under development;appears to be directed toward modification of existing systems.could seek to improve their systems by such development) as aacqubitionodified fire-control radar and guidancecould possibly adopt terminal homing. No Soviet SAMs deployed orara estimated toapability undereetthink the Soviets will be unable significantly to Improve their presentcapability by modifying existing SAM systems, they may developlow-altitude system. We would not expect any neweet to be operational before
IV. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
the past decade the Soviets have carried on an extensive,rogram to create defenses against ba lib tic missiles. Theyhave explored various ABM techniques, radars, mterceptor missiles,of system integration. They have tested their radar capabilitiesof nuclear blackout.hey began to deploy atdcfenilve system whioh, wo have previously estimated, probablyapabilitymall unsophisticated ballistic missile threataerodynamic vehicles as welL This system was later abandonedWe believe that the Soviets began deployment of an ABMMoscow2 before they had fully tested it This. In our view, bof the urgency they have attached to fielding ABM defenses.
ballistic missile defense program, of course,oodmonitor the objects in space which may be near or over one'sthe beginning of their own space program, thc Sovietside range of space tracking facilities. However, theof these facilities have been generally limited to tracking spaceradiate signals. In thc course of their ABM development andthe Soviets have also developed radars which are evidently moreto perform such functions as detecting and trackingialing objects inumber of radars of thu typecall Hen House and Dog House) have been undern (he following sections of thb paper, we discus* these radarscontextsallistic missile warning, dala acquisition for ABMantisatelliteepending on their locations and configurationsbe kept in mind, however, that In the aggregate they willational space surveillance capability when they are operational.
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hen we relate these radarsach other and to other elements of ABM defense, we are relying at present on deduction rather than on positive evidence-Moreover, in discussing ABM system performance, we have asiumed the existence of data links and computersapacity to utilize the full effectiveness of thc radars and other system components. The actual capacities of the data-handling elements, though unknown to us, will obviously be critical to Soviet ABM defense capabilities.
Radars
Soviets are constructing two detection/tracking radars,Houses, on their northwestern borders at Olcnegorsk on thc Kolaat Skrucda on the Baltic coast We estimate that both radars will7 orhese radars, developed at Sary Shagan, arephased arrays We believe these radars will serve aearly warning function and provide early tracking and predictionuse by ABM launch units. They are oriented to detect ICBMsthe US toward targets Ln western USSR; they will also be capableballistic missiles launched by submarines from parts of tbeand Arctic Oceans toward targets in the Soviet northwest.
J Their tracking and prediction accuracies are excellent for missiles launchedTrom the US toward most targets in thc western,USSR; they are degraded for other trajectories, depending on the direction of approach and thc length of time the RV is within the radar coverage The presently identified Hen Houses ptovidc no coverage for extensive areas of the USSR.
ABM
principal components of the ABM system under constructionwilluge radar, which we call the Dog House, andradars and launch positions for Galosh missiles. Wo believe thealso utilize inputs from the northern Hen House radars. Evenhave not detected tests against targets having or simulating ICBMwe believe the Moscow ABM system will achieve an IOC tomissiles7 ore believe an operationalall the Moscow system facilities now under cor.stn.cOoo
House. The Soviets are constructhe Dog House radarmiles southwest of Moscow. Itnique configuration and isa pbased-array type. It is oriented so that its northern face can scanthreat corridor from tho US to most targets in the western USSR.face now being added will be able to scan toward the Indian Ocean.
Wo have no evidence of constructionimilar radar facing the Polaris threat,
from the west. We think that the Dog House is intended to serveong-range acquisition and early target tracking facility for ballistic missile defenses
in the Moscow area, It is estimated toarge target handling capacityracking capability somewhat betteren House. It is probably
partially redundant to thc Hen Houses, but is placed within the heavily defended Moscow area, while the Hen Houses are presently less well defended.
he Soviets have also been working on pairs of Triads located at some of the outer ringites, about. from the center ofriad consists of one large building and two smaller ooes, on each ofadome is mounted. We believe that the Triads will provide terminal target tracking and missile guidance for the Moscow ABM system. We believe there are launch positions associated with each Triad. They are likely toeload capability, but it probably will be rather slowinutes after arrival of the missile ate believe this configuration andIndicates on the orderaunchers, andapacity to deal withimited number of attacking missiles.
Galosh. We believe that the Moscow system will employ tbe Galosh missile, which was firstoviet parade Inhe size and configuration of the Calosh indicate thatesigned for long-range exoatmospheric Intercept
J Tbe Calosh dees not appear to be suitable for low-attitude bigh-acceleratiOn intercept
Capabilities
he estimated characteristics of the Moscow system are such that It could probably accomplish intercepts of incoming missiles at distances out to several hundred miles from the launch positions. The small number of interceptors apparently to be employed by tha system suggests that each war bead is expected toarge lethal radius. The system's apparent reliance on exoatmospheric intercept also suggests that some large volume kill mechanism Is employed. JVe believe the chances are about even that the Caloshuclear warheadf"
" Rear Adav E. B. Fliwkej. Assistant Chief of Naval Open Donsrputmeol ofjhe Navy, believes that reload wouldonsiderablytrne.
3
Thu, we
estimate thst the Moscow systemonge-range, exoatmoipheric systemarge kill radius. The deployment of launch sitesing around Moscow and the relatively small number of launch positions under conitmction suggests the purpose is primarily (he defense of Moscow.
The estimated characteristics of tbe Moscow ABM system are such as to allow late mid course interceptions without waiting for atmospheric dboirnma-tion and thus permit more effective neutralization of threat clouds containing both penetration aids and unhardeoed warheads. Against these advantages of the system, however, must be set certain present or potential weaknesses. For example, wo believe that all the components of tbe Moscow system are un-hardened to nuclear attack. Moreover, it appears that the Dog House will be susceptible to nuclear blackout, although the Soviets' may have resolved or circumvented lo their satisfaction the problems of detection of CtfKOining RVsuclear envircement, as construction of the Dog House has progressed after Soviet tests in the fall2 investigating this problem. If tbe Hen Houses and Dog House were destroyed or blacked out the capabilities of tbe system would be seriously reduced, though if we assume that the Triads are designed to operate autonomously, the system could still intercept some missiles targeted against Moscow.
There has been no evidence that the Soviets have incorporated the use of penetration aids or advanced warheads fa their ABM tests. The ability of the Galosh torge kill radius would be subject to reduction If the attacker employed hardened warheads.
Considering the foregoing, we believe that the Moscow ABM system willood capabilityumerically limited attack on the Moscow area by currently operational missiles, but that its capabilities could be degraded by advanced penetration systems and it could not copeery heavy attack. Moreover, the present deployment will not cover all of the multidirectional Polaris threat to Moscow.
C. Tallinn System
we believe that the mission of iho Tallinn system Isthe airborne threat.'* we have also assessed itsn this assessment, we have assumed alternatea missile, which we believe are reasonable for the ABM role and are not
"See NIE ll-ll-eM. "Impacthreshold Test Baa Tiealy ooilitaryajjji. TOP SECRET,
- Lr_ Cen. Joseph P. CarroO. Dn-eeooe, DIA; Msj. Cen. Cheater I_ Johnsoe, Acting Assistant CW of Staff for Intelligence. DeparUnesil of the Army;. Can. Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief ol Staff.SAF, do notwith this judgment. Sea their footnote to
Capabilities ol* the system against aerodynamic vehicles ire discussed In paragraph
SECRET
inconsistent with our limited evidence. The assessment indicates that thia system would need Hen House and/or Dog House target tracking data tu function moat effectively. Assuming that such data were available, the system may be capable of eioatmorphcric intercept of Incoming ballistic missiles at distances out to. Weuclear warhead lor this system mightill radius of up to. against unhardened RVs. Some ol the Tallinn system complexes are so located that presently known Henr Dog House radars could not furnish useful target tracking data to them. Where this is the case, or if the Hen Houses and Dog House were destroyed or blacked out, the capabilities of the system would be seriously reduced and limited to local and self defense Thus, under these assumptions, if Hen House or Dog House data were available, the Tallinn complexes could defend areas largo enough totrategic ABM defense; without such data, they could not.11
D. Future Trends
Research and Development
We cannot now identify any wholly new ABM system in development, but In view of the presently limited capabilities of the ABM defenses now under construction, we believe that the Sennets will devote substantial effort totheb- present hardware. At the same rime we expect them toajor effort to developing improved ABM systems. These mayhort-range mUsile, possessing capabilities for atmospheric Intercept,ew long-range missile Wo would not expect such new systems to become operational before thes.
We expect the Soviets to continue their efforts to develop improvedand tracking systems. Wo expecto be undertaken in order toapability for the ducrfmination of advanced penetration aids. Soviet interest in this problem Is suggested by analysis of recent Hen House radar signals which may reflect an attempt to improve the radarsto define trajectories aod characteristics of targetsultiple target environment. Within theoears the Soviets will probably develop andariety of space systems (such as infrared launch detection satellites or other types of warning systems) in support of their strategic defensive forces.
-U. Ceo. Joseph T. CarroD, Director. DU; Maf. Ceo Chester l_ lohruoc. Actinghad oiartmaoi of tbe Array; tad Ms, Con. Jack E. Thomas. Assistant Chief of Staf. InteJLgur.ce, USAF. believe that the last two sentences la thai para-giaph unduly depreciate the potential ospsbfllnea of the Tallinn system in sn ABM terminal delenie mode. They believeore accurate to state that the Tallinneriously degraded in an area defense rale when off-ilte radar data an not provided, but coat this degradation does not apply so the Tallinn system open (in,erminal defense eacde. Ls the lereataal defense mode the defendedonsiderably reduced, bet the kepower of the eomplesea and the performance of thee radar may be such thai the capability to defend the terminal area targets would remain sigTuficant
There is evidence! thai the Soviets have been investigating over-the-horizon-detection (OHD) radar techniques. Evidence of such interest appears in Soviet literature beginriing in the. Signals coming from within the USSR for years have been suspected of being related to OHD and since4 new signals, which we think are more compatible with OHDhave been noted. General Soviet practice of designing large antenna arrays for communications purposes has resulted in the construction In the USSR of many antennas which could be adapted to OHD. Wc believe detection of missile launchesajor purpose of the Soviet OHD effort, and that their level of technology is such that they should be able to detect such launches out to. Wo have no evidence now of an operational OHD system for detection of missiles, and we cannot tell when or even if the Soviets couldufficiently reliable system to warrant deployment.
We expect more research in the Soviet nuclear weapon test program on nuclear kill techniques having still greater lethal radii.
* Deployment
We expect the surveillance system to bo extended as necessary to support ABM defenses. Less expensive technical alternatives to the Hen House or Dog House will probably be used if tbey become available.
We believe that the Moscow system will be completed01otal ofaunchers. The Soviets may continue construction to fill out the southern Triads, in which case the number would be somewhat larger.
What the Soviets will do for the general ABM defense of the USSR is still far from dear. They might deploy the Moscow system more widely; they might deploy more advanced systems based on the Moscow or Tallinn systems; they might deploy an entirely new system. On the other hand, they might decide that ABM defenses for the general defense of the USSR are too costly, but we consider this unlikely.*0
" Lt. Ceo. Joseph F. Carroll,; Maf. Can. Chester L. Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; and MaJ. Cen. Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, IntdHgence. USAF. believe that any dfacuuson of the deployment of the Soviet ballistic missile defeases should take into consideration Ibe likelihood that tha Tallinn system Is an ABM system. In tms event, the future deployment levels set forth in paragraphould reflect the deployment of the TaDino system in an ABM role.
"m. E. B. Fluckey. Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy, believe* that the Calosh system couldartoviet retaliatory assured destruction defensive weapons system. Moscow, at the hub of all defense and counter strike and (ha center of command and control, must avoid destruction long enough to provide time for decision, retaliation, damage assessment ol the Soviet Union, and rapid communication* with the outside world. Should the US strike first, the Soviets would have only aboutinutes tactical warning, compared to our own short IS minute* if the Soviets strike first. They may consider this reaction time Insufficient and so are willing to expend substantia] fund* to cover Moscow with an effective ABM system to gain as much asours grace before fallout moving In from other attack areas would degrade their capability to decide and respond. Having attained this, tbey might decide that ABM defense* for tha eeenprehenifve defense of the USSR are too costly.
GCCRCT
Their are no Indications that ihe Moscow system is being deployedin the USSR, and its probable great cost per launcher suggests that it may not be deployed further with its present capabilities. If the Soviets succeed in improving its capabilities and do notetter long-range system, an improved Moscow system might be deployed at additional locationa in the. The deploymenthort-range missile to supplement the Calosh system may also take place in about the same time period.
We cannot now Judge how successful the Soviets will be in improving existing systems or in developing new systems. We think it likely, however, that the Soviets will extend ABM defenses during the nextears. We base' this judgment on the magnitude of the threat, the wide dispersion of targets to be defended, and past Soviet proclivity for deployment of defenses when they believe they haveystem which provided atartial answer to their needs. We think the Soviets will be cautious about committing themselvesixed policy with respect to ABM deployment over the long term. They will probably adjust whatever program they pursue on the basisumber of factors, including the capabilities of present systems to deal with penetration aids, the advances in ABM technology, the cost of additional deployment relative to the protection it is likely to afford, and the US reaction to Soviet strategic developments.
V. ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE
he development by the US of military support systems, such asand navigation satellites, as well as the possibility of spaceborne weapon systems, give the Soviets adequate incentive to develop defenses against these systems. In addition, the US announced capability of an antisatellite system must have added impetus to Soviet efforts along these lines. In fact, the Soviets could have had for someimited antisateDite capability based on existing electronic facilities and an operational missileuclear warheadhe
Hen House radars at Sary Shagan and Angarsk willoveragewhichpace surveillance rystem. In addition, the Skrunda and Olenegorsk dual Hen House radars and the Dog House probablyecondary role of space surveillancc.
This space surveillance system would enable rhe Soviets to observe and track satellites during most of tbe passes over the USSR. It probably would allow the Soviets to predict the orbits and positions of non-Soviet satellites and space vehiclesigh degree of accuracy after two to four crossings over (he USSR, and thus could provide Ihe information required by an antisatellite system.
A Soviet antisatellite system employing these radars could use an existing missileuclear warhead. Nonnuclear kill, on the other hand,round-guided missile system of high precisionoming missile capable of excetmospheric maneuver, either of which could be developed In
6ECHET
about two yearsecision to do so. Although we have no evidence of such development. It could be well underway without our knowledge. Wetherefore, that at about the time tbe Hen Houses become operational inime period, the Soviets could have an antisatellite capability with either nuclear or nonnuclear kill.
A manned coorbiting antisatellite system could be developed in5 as an outgrowth of the Soviet manned spacelthough the coats ofystem would be high, operationalopportunities for inspection, nondestructive neutralization, dismantling, orjustify its development.
ore immediate measure, the Soviets might explore techniques (such as ECMJ for the nondestructive neutralization of satellites. These techniques might utilize mechanisms on the ground. In missiles, or in unmanned coorbiting satellites. Tbo time at which any such techniques could be available would depend on the type of neutralizing mechanism adopted. ,
We believe, however, that the Soviets would realize that any use of anti-satellite systems in peacetime would risk opening their own military support systems to retaliation. We trunk it likely, therefore, that the Soviets would use antisatellite systems only ii they believed that war with thc US were Imminent and that neutralization of our military aupport systems were consequently an overriding consideration. There might also be some other special circumstances In which they would use antisatellite systems in peacetime, such as an occasion fn which they relieved they were retaliating against US interference with their own satellites.
VI. CIVIL DEFENSE
The Soviets view an organized civil defense programart of their overall defensive posture.hen operational responsibility for tbe civil defense program was shifted to the Ministry of Defense, increased numbers of military officers of high rank have appeared on cavil defense staffs. The current head of (he programrominent Marshal. Subordinate headquarters at the republic and oblast levels staffed with military personnel are responsible for dissemination and implementation of instructions from the headquarters In Moscow. Military district headquarters have civil defense officers which are probably prepared lo assume operational control in any emergency. Local organizations are manned largely by civilians, and encompass rural as well as metropolitan areas. Civil defense activities are integrated with those of air defense and internal security organizations.
Soviet civil defense organizations, facilities, and capabilities have been growing over tho past decade. We believe, however, that the recent calls to "perfect" civil defense, made atd Party Congress, do not indicate any major changes in the Soviet civil defense system or any expansion of civil defense
nteb. thearedecret.
top
top Gccnct
plans. Rather, these high-level eihotlations seem intendedpur lagging ef-forts within already existing programs. These programs are generallyby widespread public training and the use of simple shelters. However, special purpose shelters for civil defense, communications, and government con' trol staffs probably are being constructed outside the major cities. Shelters for essential government, communications, support services, and civil defensepersonnel are reportedly well equipped and slocked. But adequate shelters are available only to such key personnel
e estimate that there are shelter spaces available for less than one-sixth of the urban population. Most of these shelters were built during, when new public buildings and apartment houses were constructed with special basements for civil defense purposes. Since thehe Soviets have severely curtailed their urban shelter constructionWe have noto indicate that they areesumptionajor shelter ceo-struction program except insofar as the new deep-level subway lines undoubtedly serve thb purpose. They have, however, suitable areas in apartments, public buildings, and factories that could be designated and stocked ax* falloutreas for most of the urban population. We have no Indication tbat theouldtepped up civil defense program for fallout shelters as an integral and necessary adjunct to extensive ABM deployment.
etwork of civil defense courses and schools is operated in the USSR to train civilians charged with command, operational, and technical duties in the civil defense organization and the instructors who are to give training courses to the general public. All Soviet citizens are obligated to take civil defense mstnicoon regularly in schools and at places of work. The fifth public course given5 Is approaching completion. About half the Soviet population has probably been exposed to basic self-help instruction and many have probably taken repeated courses, but apathy on the part of the public has tended to reduce the planned effectiveness of this training.
0 the Soviets have been emphasizing in their training ways to conduct planned urban evacuation in advance of the outbreak of hostilities. Current planseveloping emergency call (or substantial evacuation of Soviet cities, with most of thc population resettledural areas. Such plans, of course, would be feasible only if the Soviet civil defense authorities received several days warning.
he crvil defense program does not nowigh priority call on either budgetary or economic resources, and there is no indication that thb trend will change. The civil defense program is gearedlow but steady improvement in overall effectiveness We believe that the demands of other defense systems and of the economy will continue to preclude anv costly aug-mentation of the Soviet civil defense program.
annex
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SOVIET SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE'
IOC
plea
Utsncbers pet Site
Winau. Slute (ft)inimum Altitudearget Handling CepabuTty Rata of Slmuharaaous Fire :.
Accuracy (CEP In ft]
Warhead Weight (Ibl>
per Site er Site .
surface-to-air capabilities of lit Tallinn lyitem against aerodynamic vehicles are diicuued in
'An earlier version of theyitem. no longer deployed in the USSR but Kill deployed in East Europe. Northndbe>here,aximum Want range efro.miiriam intercept altitude.
' For rhe pair several yean no mora thaanitsdcsbeen sen oo launcher.
Original systemaoroum slant rangeaa.axkmim altitude of aboutfeet. There ara ladacaoona that th*ange and altitude capabUltWa probably have been Ba proved- Tha cepabditlea ef this system could approach those of the SA-2.
Thustimated for nlet equipped with the Fanue-control radar which is standard in the USSR.
' Theas some effccttvegeas above this alotude.
have no evidence as to the minimum effective altitude capabilities of this system
' The Soviets almost certainly wfll provide some of these mindex with nuclear warheads, and may have begun to do to.
ui
9
to.
OOI73X
/
/ 4
Soviet Dloc Air ami Missile IJcfcnsc Cartanilitk* Thmugh
Capabilities of Soviet General Purpuiic
Soviei Capabilities lor Strategic Altnck
Soviet Strategic Air anil Missile Dcrcnstis
US Intelligenceonitor
ons on Soviet Strategic
Weapons. Program i
Snvict Strategic Defenses
Soviei Naval Policies nod Programs
Warsaw Pau Fmccs Opposite NATO
Warsaw Putt Cornwpts and Capabilities for Going to War in LUrope: Implication* for NATO Warning of War
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications for Warning
Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense
Soviet Forces dou* Capabilities in the SoiitliLin Thcalci of Military Operations
WARSAWonnuclear 'llireal to NATO Airbasei in Central Europe-
DECages)
CJages)
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Craged)
Slipages)
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CTages) DRCaces)
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Original document.
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