c.'r-
KZ-.ZT.'XJW FOIl msaftBLZ JOZ7 J. KeCLC?
BtffiJSCTl Thetlatloaa WXta the C< and *TO Coaccroias Military lacuna
Following our noetic* vlthe last week,
I ooxec kr. Jehn Kulcvsea of tho Docru of ftotiavO. Citl-antra to writeajern carefoffl our views on acne cT tbe ic=uro which we tlccuaaec. Kr. L'ulaoaja, ea you know, not only has beealth tiiQ!f. ratterseriod of yearn, but
also rrprceeatod the Eoaru in the pnpanUoa or the
Lctlnate which va recently etftaltted to you eatitlcc. *are-gn ftrictlccstain IS Course- of Action Eecarc-lag VC roroca ia
2. Whether or ant one earce* with IrWtttial ia
if, IP that
Ithcuffitfui exposition of the latrluate problen vlth which you are cccccmei. It laoaI for-arc to you want ieocuaeut -rlttca for cy edification.
3- ave taken the liberty of sending copiespaper to Secretary Susk and
I boliwvo they will find it aa helpfulo.
Biehnrd Eelai Director
SEORET
3c
KSXCRA?TXMHEF
SUBJECT: The Current Negotiations With the UK aad FRC Concerning Military Issues
Problems of equitable burden sharing which arose between the UK end FBC and the US end PRC- have now led, in tha current tripartite negotiations,road reviev of ellied strategy and force requirement:. The scope and Importance af this agenda suggest that In fact what these talks are about is the future American role ln Europe. The central questions raised arc whether theattern cr" our involvement with Western Europe's security would be, and should be, changededuction In American forces stationed there.
This paper does not deal directly with the Immediate technical issues, on which much staff work is already being done. Instead, it is aa stteapt to'see this episode in lnter-allied relations in sec- historicalto define political forces at work which will affect tht future conduct of our ellles end of the Soviet Bloc, aid to suggest bow our interests night be effectedove et this time to redefine the American military role in Europe.
GROUPfreeand
SECRET
Europe Todcy,
Policy, and the American Interest
is Europe la the early
The goals whicholicy set itself
period have beet achieved ir. large measure.
Europe has
been attacked, aud In recent years even the veiled threats of Soviet attack faced earlier have ceased. Internal CossBanllt forces have declined greatly in potency. The crippled societies5 recovered confidence behind thehield, with the result that disintegrating forces were contalr.ee and moderate and constructive elements vere able oo dominate the politics of the recovery period. Rapid economic growth followed, and for the first time In Europe's history the benefits begac to be more widely shared. In addition, American influence helped to foster the Europear. unity movement, and this, together with KATO,rameworl: for reintegrating Vest Germany into Europeespectable end responsible state.
It was foresee: that the recovery of strength aad pride In Europe would produce some resentment of the vastly disproportionate power of the DS and of its predominant weight is the Alliance. Hot only has this happened, but in recent years cany Europeans here had an Increasing sense of not beinc master In their own house. This feeling has been sharpened by fears of aa American Investaant Invasion fueled with vast resources end technological supremacy, by American pressures for greater
2 -
S EGRET
military effort under american revisions of strategic doctrine, and by appeals for active support of american policy in other areas, notably in asia. americannce called for to heal europe'shas often, vhen it was actually provided, beea received as ucpalatebl medicine. de gaulle, in the french maaaer, has elevated such discontentseneral theory and cade then the basisolicy vhichrepudiates the present american role la europe. this policy has produced en organizational crisis in the alliance.
the voicesiscontent have found scae echo la west germany, alvays hitherto the "staunchest" of american partners ia europe. there, economic strains, american pressure for offset payments, anrj concern that allied policy vas coving tcvard acceptaacc of an indefinitely divided germany have comblaed with veek leadership to produce some political disarray. for the first time in the postwar period, the barcaeter of germaa-american relations has tended to register heavy weather.
some of the disteaper i- europeez-amerlcen relations arisesevisedf soviet policy vhich has gained wide credence ln recent years. sincevhen the soviets allowed the berlin "crisis" to fade away in the aftermath of the cubcn confrontation, the ussr has refrained from crude pressures under military threat. the mala theme of its policy has beea european security, that is, settleaent and stabilization on the
basis of the status cueermany. Theretrong desire in Western Europe to believe that stable and increasingly constructive relations vi the East arc possible, and so great desire to ellov this vision to be aborted by claims of the Germans tc the unity of their country. ood that looks forward to enjoying the fruits cf Western Europe's growing productivity, without further intrusion cf the alarms, excursions, and costs of cold war, inevitably sakes the burdens ofilitary alliance built on the assumption that thereeal threat of Soviet attack, harder to bear.
It is natural that by now questions should also begin to be raised in this country about the American role ir Europe. Do we really need large' military forces there more than two decades after the end of World War II? Are the costs acceptable in view of Europe's prosperity and American burdens elsewhere? Are there net persuasive indications that the 0SSH no longerthreat" to Western Europe? The answers to these questions naturally give some difficulty in the context of domestic politics. They are easier if sought In terms of the long-range interests of the united Statesorld power.
Itliche, but still valid, to declare that the alignment of Western Europe in world politics remains'vital for us. There is some tendency nowadays to think of that area as parochial, withdrawn in
its political dynamism has been formidable. To consign it to the backwater of world politics, touiet Europe at peace with itself aadfree struggles that proceei elsewhere, would probably notouad wager on the future.
The USSR clearly does nothat ell power struggles ia Europe
are over, despite its relative passivity oa Europeaa Issues ia recent years. The Soviets desisted free etrasj pressures afterbecause they understood at last the great risks involved, end because they realized finally that pressures would not rupture but only consolidate the Western Alliance aad the American presence ln Europe. They have seen ln recent frictions in European-America- relations an opportunity to pursue by other aeans their nela objective of excluding American power and influence froo that area. The emphasis on detente ln Europe, on an all-Euroaezr. security settlement mace without American participatlce, alma at disrupting the Atlantic connection end et moving Western Europeore neutral position in world politics. The Federal Republic would continue to be treatedariah, held ln contemptuous isolation until it produced politicians who saw the light and were willing to come to terms with Soviet power. oviet "threat" continues to exist la
the sense that, ever, though the USSR does aot for the present menace Westsm Europe with armed attack, its basic strategy is still to
separate Western Europe free America, and thereby greatly to diminish both as power factors.
It would be absurd to suggest that this Soviet visionast shift ia the world balance of power is, because of current frictions within the Western Alliance, ever, remotely near realization. The dciminant political forces in Western Europe today are still, despite concern over some American policies, generally committed to the viev that en Atlantic coalition under American leadership is essential to their Interests. De Gaulle's doctrines have for the most part been taken' as too much en expression of personal idiosyncracy and French particularism. Els nomination of himself tohird-force European coalition has not won general acclaim; the division in SATO is still Ik to 1.
ong view, however, American policy cannot afford to beabout Europe. This countryole to playorld power, while Western Europeen states new define their interests largely In regional terms; this difference in angle of vision will inevitably strain relations from tlae to tlae. After two world wars, moreover, Europeans Incline to stand aside from Ideological strugglesorld scale, aad
to confront ua paver challenget is visibly at their own gates. At the sane time, the European unityppears tc hare stagnated, and the Gaullist Impulseevival of nationalism makes it impossible toeversion to Intra-European quarreling. And there can be no doubt that the Soviets stand ready still to exploit whatever divisions may develop Within Europe, and between Europe and the US,
Altogether, while the condition of Europe end of Atlantic relations today do not Give grounds fcr alarm, there is reason for attentive concern. Because any untoward developments or. this front haveital bearing on world power relations, and ultimately on American security, there is always reason for special sensitivity. It will be In the American Interest for a" long time to come to give highest priority to Europe, to its security and internal order, and to the preservation of our Influence there, however heavy the burdens and Intense the preoccupations elsewhere.
Eorce Reductions as an Issue ia the Alliance
The question posed In connection with the tripartite negotiations is whether the American stake in Europe and In good Atlantic relations would be prejudicedignificant reduction in American forces. Or, given the condition of Europe described above. Is this the moment when some partial ailltary disengagement can be undertaken with tolerable risk?
even if cot with full sympathy, as owing to the demands of the Vietnam war and to the balance of payments problem;ut would not be construedurning point la US policy toward Europe which confronted the alliesew situation. Ecually there is some larger scale of cutback which would be so construed. Very lively this would be true of any cut large enough to effect really aeoalagful savings for the US. It is also possible, perhaps likely, that r. ;cutrortentarger one to follow. Ia any case, what is worth discussingut, whatever its magnitude, which did lead the Europeans, aad perhaps the Sc.-lets as well, to conclude that American policy toward Europe was charging direction aad that we iattaded to lessen our lavolve-meat there. It is not necessary to discuss reactionselief that we intended simply tc abandon our European interest and ccemitaent entirely, since nobody would be likely to infer that.
It should also be said that, whatever meaning Europeans night attacheduction they took to be significant, their views vould probably be little affected by reasons the US might give or by public relations manipulation. Europeaa opinion-makers ere notoriously skeptical of
official truth, and most sophisticated people would prefer to believe
the "real reasons" which would surely he provided by numerous articulate eoementators. Ac present, wheneople find in the Vietnamelcome pretext for disenchantment witholicy and forthe credibility of American official utterances, evenvery sound end defensible explanations would be likely to encounter heavy going. Tbe various liabilities of Anericao policy In Eurcpe described aboveolitical-psychological reality of the present moment. Since, as will be argued below, the political effectsorce cutback provide the main ground of concern, it would be well to recognite chat at present our ability to Influenceu:tlor. whichpinion puts on cur policies is less than it has been.
Security Ir-client ions
The cost obvious quest lor. raisedroposal to reduce OS forces Is whetherEurope would be exposed to significantly Increased risk of Soviet attack. It Is also the easiest to answer.
It is extremely doubtful that the Soviets et any tine in the postwar period seriously entertained the idea of achieving their objectives ia Western Europe by actual military attack. At various tines they threatened war if certain limited demands were not met, primer liyBerlin. Ir. the early postwar years they probably believed that such threatseal-ay defended Western Europe, together with the
j -
considerable subversive potential they
to fail, tad thatcacnstratiac of So-/let power eight, es new flsMlitl were added, lead or.eneral collapse. Ie thea,arefully-fostered Impression that they had achieved a'decisive power advantage in nuclear-rockst weapons, they revived the saee technique of assault by intimidation, and tgair. they failed. The Soviets have evidently learned that it is not possible to advance in Western Europe on the cheap, that is,ere shou of intimidating power.
The Soviets pulled back from actual attach primarily, no doubt, because they could net foresee the cons ecu-aces and Judged the likely costsajor wsr to be unacceptable. There is another reason that ought not to be underestimated. Soviet history shows that under this regime there ere serious political-ideological Inhibitions against resort to naked aggression. Advances for Cccmuaist power are supposed to be won by tadigeacus revolutionary action. he Soviet leadership eight in some circumstances bring Itself to overlook this nicety. It would have to be concerned about the reactions of the Soviet peopleajor war brought on at Soviet initiative.
There is every reason to believe that the grouade the Soviets bad for refraining from direct attack lr. the pest still apply, and would apply even if American forces la Europe vere considerably reduced,even if they were withdrawn entirely. The So"lets know that the
-
US considers It rttsi to Its own security that Cocmunlst power aot engulf
Western Europe. They would understand that overt aggression by then wouldrain cf events carrying the highest risk cf general nuclear var Thelr conduct over the last two decades proves that they Intend to stand veil back froc that contingency.
Soviet Policy In the Wakeorce Cut
It is possible, of course, that the Soviets would thlrJ:S force withdrawal ceant that Atlantic links were weakening, that if they pushed once again with tactics ofa the Western Alilar.ee would prove fragile, and thet they could then register sone demonstrative gain, say, finally- at Berlin, which would prove to all the world that the relations of power had shifted. This seens ertreaely unlikely. Any Ancricaa force cutback would no doubt be eccoopeuied by elaborate mutual pledges of continued firmness within the Western Alliance. More Important, the Soviets would know that the U3 would be highly sensitive to any new Soviet moves to exploit the situation. They would probably expect, in fact, that the American response to any opening gambit by then would be so vigorous as to preclude the nicely modulated developmentcrisis" situation under their control.
-
This is net to say that at see* later tine the Soviets eight net
come to thinkeduced American posture in Zuropeenewal of pressure tactics. 3ut this would not arise free the altered: force equation as such. It would result fron their reading of the general drift of European-American relations; they might infereally divisive loss of mutual confidence among the Allies made effectiveto new demands unlikely. Since the Soviet style is somewhat heavy-handed, there could he no guarantee that they would aot act la this oanner at some stage.
The scenario they would at first consider more promising would be entirely different. They would activate their diplomacy and propaganda to persuade Western Europe that, with the TJS beginning to disengage, new possibilities for deteateuropean basis were opening up. Some withdrawal of Soviet forces.would occur to document this trend. Cultural exchanges end economic relations would be expanded wherever possible to provide symbolism. Plausible security undertakings would be offered, and these would, of course, at least imply recognition of the status quo In Germany. Efforts would be made to give the communiques Issuing from the meetings of statesmen an aatl-Amerlcsr. nuance. The object of all this would be to commit influential political elements In Western Europe to the
view that Acericer. power was no longer needed there, and that its final departure could be viewed with equanimity. The Soviets would also hope
-
that discreet cultivation or European-Aue.-lcan cla sens ices that might arise would help torocess of political-military
The Soviets are not fools enough to believe thatampaign could achieve quick or easy success. Butould grind avey et it so long es the auspices were favorable. The assets they could bring to bear would Include their political-subversive apparatus la the West. Ia the political climate the Soviets would be trying to engender, the Communist parties would have greatly Improved chances of escaping from their chronic Isolation, end united front tactics night work tobetter effect than heretofore. Success would obviously depend or.airly wide spectrum of non -Cocnunist opinion to the view that the situatior. in Europe was changingundamental way which celled for new departures in both internal and external policy.
All thisery large order and the Soviets would have their work cut out fcr then, even if European-American relations deteriorated markedly ia the wake of force reductions. It would be the extent of deterioration over some considerable period which would determine the measure of their opportunity.
-
Repercussions i- the ALliar.ce
he eventual reaction of the European allies to vhat they sawignificant change Inilitary policy would he crucial. It Is unlikely that there would be any immediate general alarti about the security of the area. Fear of actual Soviet attack is now minimal. Sophisticated opinion would reelice that the full weight of OS power remained committed by the forces which remained, and would believe also that the OS, which has home the burdens of global struggle in other less vital areas, could not io its own interest be Indifferent to the fete of Europe. Some recriminatory voices would to doubt be loud, and De Gaulle would help to magnify them, but they would probably not be determining for the attitudes of Allied governments. There might be some initial confusion, but it would probably be manageable.
It would be the long pull which would matter. Politicians, like Investors, discount the future, however the force cuts were justified, there would be some sense that American resources were overstrained, or that some shift of priorities In American policy, presumably toward Asia and awny from Europe, was taking place. Over tlae this could mean still less inclination to support Anerican policy in other areas or to accepteadership oa matters that did not immediately involve the security of Europe.
- It -
Allionce almost never collapses all at once; It dies avay by degrees as ths participants sense that the original premises that bound them have lost Talidity. Ultimately, and this would be especially true if OS policy encountered reverses elsewhere end the generel view held of the relations of power should become lessto the US than at present, the basic alignment of Vest cm Europe could be affected. radual shift of perspective might at some critical Juncture lead Vestem European states to adopt the view that theas after ell the only first class power relevant to Europe'sand to begin to accommodateaccordingly. The Sonets vould, if they followed the policy described above, make this seem easy snd without risk- Appropriate shifts ln the internal balance of political forces would occur in Western European countries, and the end result voulderceptible moveiddle, perhapseutralist position between the US and OSS?..
This kind of outcome seems very far down the road at present, eves far-fetched. To suggest that it vould flow inevitably from any specific amount of reduction of Aaerican forces in Europe vould be very misleading. Bevertteless, the agreedispositions give the Alliance concrete expression and symbolize its meaning. When they are changed in seme significant vay, especially at the Initiative of the dominant member, it may eventually appear to other nembersrend is developing which
-
SEGRET
will finally invalidate Che original rationale. An alliance is sustained by men's belief that it reflects paver relations which can be relied on to serve their long-term es well as their Immediate national security interest.
Thus, while it cannot be plausibly arguedignificant force cut now would necessarily do irreparuble damage to the prospects of the Alliance, it can be said thatove runs the risk of storing up trouble fcr the future. The disarray already existing in SATO isood omen, and means at least that whatever unfavorable trend was set in action would be intensified In the preset context.
The Federal Republic
Generalizations which can be made with some Justice for the Alliancehole would almost certainly not apply In "nest Germany". The German reactionignificant force cutback would be serious, possibly traumat
This would not be the cese because the Germansery much greater fee- than others of the Imminence of Soviet attack, though obviously their front-line positionsychological role. On the whole, they have come to accept the view generally held in Europe that the Soviets are effectively deterred. Since they believe this is owing primarily to OS nuclear power, the withdrawalart of the ground forces would not In Itself seem immediately critical to their security.
-
The Germans axe, however, *
core sczsit.lv- than others co what chaaff
US military dispositions sight signify for the general direction of us policy. The large US military presence has oeant, net merely that the US was ccemltted to the defense of West Germanut also tothe Geman national Interest In the still unresolved straggle over the division of the country. ignificant Outback in thet presence would imply for Germans that the US was finally abandoning its sponsorship of the national claim to unity and wan accepting the status quo" for the indefinite future. Since there Is no confidence whatever that unity can be won without American bee long, there would inevitably be cries of betrayal.
It has been argued that the Germans know anyway that there is no present prospect of achieving unity, and that they are resigned to this fact. This is almostuperficial reeding for the long tern. During the postwar period the Germans have been In desperate need of recovering their self-respect end the respect of others. They ere bound to think thatill never achieve this if they resign themselves weakly to the brutal injustice of partition. With confidence reawakened by their postwar achievements,ense of guilt over the comparative lotourth of the nation, with their once great capital still heldreary hostage, it seems sore likely that they will Increasingly find the
present outcome of their history unacceptable. This mood will be sustained
-
need to reaffirm the goal of reunification. It would be prudent to think that this issue will still stir the cauldron of politics ia Germany lo vays that cannot now be foreseen.
"or the present the Germans surely have no place to go, but this may not always be true. Political changes which could come eventually lo both the PRC- and the USSR might revise the options. Or, resignation might finally end In political demoralisation aad the West would thea have aaother kind of problem;trong tad sneble Germany the Alliance would be daaserousiy weakened. Thus, the political condition of Germany wille/ factor for the security of the West.
A political shakeout is now going on la Soma, and this development hadittle connection with recent frictions ln German-American relations. It is impossible to say what further tremors would resultutback Inorces which was viewederious reversal for German policy. Probably It would become more difficult totable majority. rolonged process of political regrouping might ensue, accompanied by much agonizing soul-searching over national goals aad policies. Ia any case, it Is certain that the profacadest effect of force cutbacks would be in Germany, and that at this time aobody car. say with assurance what vould be the effect an politics end policy In the Federal Republic. As a
SEGRET
nation, the5 Germans have cot yet found an identityole.re unlikely to be able again to menace their neighbors militarily; but it remains to be proved whetherolitical sense and over the long ternill be en assetiability to European stability. ove by the US which disoriented the Germans seriously would carry some unknown, and possibly high degree of risk.
If Hot Bow, When?
The conclusion implicit io the foregoing discussion is that,ignificant cutback in US forces et this tine vould probably net have any Immediately disastrous coasecuences, the whole context is unfavorable end risks setting inrocess of deterioration ia the Alliance vhich would be ominous for the future. To take this view Is not the sane as arguinghange In the US military posture in Europe can never be undertaken without excessive risk. It Is possible to describe circumstances which might be more favorable and to suggest criteria which should govern soecision.
In principle,ecision should be taken In some positive policy framework end on calculations aimed et advancing Western Interests. The move proposed at present has nothing of that. We did not choose the time for an advantageous act of policy; instead, the impression la given that we are acting under the pressure of considerations, mainly financial.
-
vhich compel the move even at some political risk. The psychological effect is therefore negative and defensive.
A period ir. vhichove could be turned to policy advantage
leadership lc the Alliance were high. It woulderiod when general detente in Soviet-Anerlcan relations vas recognized to exist, and seen to be the consequence mainly of Soviet regard for Anerlcan strength and Western solidarity. This hind of setting would lend positive virtue to the argument that the prolonged presence of large Anerlcan forces was unwholesome for the Europeans and for us. It vould make it feasible to offset political risks and simultaneously to shore u? the Alliance by giving greater emphasis to the political content of Atlantic relations, that is, to common political objectives both within Europe end in the world at large. Finally, and of greatest importance, the kind of context described would make it possible to link force wlthdravalsew Initiative to the Sc.'lets for movement cn the Germar. problem. They might not respond, but they would be placed under some pressure and it vould be they and not we who would be on the defensive on the German issue. At least, the cutback would then be associated in the German mindositive political strategy.
It could be argued that the international setting la the year follovla the Cuban missile crisis had some features corresponding to the general prescription gives above. While it is fatuous to reel back history, that period illustrates circumstances lr. vhichS force cutback In Europe could have been undertaken with greater advantage. Similarly, it is possible that in the wakeettlement of the Vietaan war another acre propitious phase will emerge. In any case. It is evident that other contexts are conceivable which would be more promising and less hacardous then the present one.
Whatever the time, we ought to choose it deliberately and for positive reasons of policy, unless, of course, we are simply compelled by The case for force cuts In Europe is apparently not argued on the basis of such necessity, only on the ground of marginal advantage to the balance of payments. The argument cf this paper is that the political risks at this tine carry far greater weight. If we loake blunders of political judgment In our relations with our European Allies, we cannot count on the Soviets to overlook mercifully the openings we make for them. The struggle over Europe, focused in Germany, continues despite the surface cala of recent years, and that area Is still more crucial to our security than any other.
JOESA
Hoard of Rational Estimates
-
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: