Europe Today, Soviet Policy, and the Acerlcan Interest
The goals vhich American policy act itself In Europe lo the early
postwar period have been achieved in large measure. Western Europe has not been attacked, and in recent ycara even the veiled threats of Soviet attack faced earlier hove ceaaed. Internal Conounlst forces have declined greatly ln uotency. The crippled societies5 recovered confidence behind the Aecrlcan shield, with the result that disintegrating forcea were contained and moderate and constructive elements were able to donlnate the politics of the recovery period. Rapid economic growth followed, and for the first tine ln Europe'a history the benefits began to be more widely chared. In addition, Ancrlcan Influence helped to foster tho European unity aoveaent, end thla, together with HATO,raneworl: for reintegrating West Gemany into Europeespectable nnd responsible state.
It was foreseen that the recovery of strength and pride in Europe would produce sooe reseotoent of the vaatly disproportionate power of the US arid of its predominant weight ln the Alliance. Hot only has this happened, but in recent years zeny Europeans hove had an increasing aeuse of not bclnr: ncster ln their own house. Thla feeling has been sharpened by fonvd of on American investment invasion faded with vuet resources awl technological auprtsaacy, by American pressures for creater
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military effort under American revloions of strategic doctrine, and by appeals for active support of Aawricon policy in other areas, notably in Asia. Anerlcannce called for to heal Europe'shas often, when it ves actually provided, been received as unpalatable medicine. De Gaulle, in the French manner, has elevated such discontentseneral theory and made tlimn the basisolicy whichrepudiates the present Amoricon role in Europe. This policy has produced an organizational crisis in the Alliance.
The voices of discontent have found sooe echo in West Germany, always hitherto the "atannchest" of American purt-iers in Europe. There, economic strains, American pressure for offset poycents, and concern that Allied policy was coving toward acceptance of on indefinitely divided Geraany have combined with weak leadership to produce sooe political disarray. 7or the first tine in the postwar period, the barometer of Gernan-American relations lias tended to register heavy weather.
Sods of the distemper in European-American relations arisesevised view of Soviet policy which has gained wide credence ln recent years. Sincewhen the Sorteta allowed the Berlin "crista" to fade away in the oftermoth of the Cubnr. confrontation, the USSR has refrained from crude preaourea under military threat. The main theno of its policy has been Europcun security, that in, -lottlenent and stabilisation on the
basis of tho ctatas quo In Gernan/. 'Aero- isstrong ueilre in Western Europe to believe that stable and Increasingly constructive relations vith the East arc possible, end no groat desire to allow thin vision to be aborted by cJains of the Gonnana to the unity of their country. aood that looks forward to enjoying the fruits of Western Europe's growing productivity, without further intrusion of the alarms, excursions, and costs of cold war. Inevitably makes the burdens ofilitary alliance built on the assumption that thereeal threat of Soviet attack, harder to boar.
It la natural that by now questions ohould also begin to be raised In this country about tbe American role in Europe. Do we really need large military .forces there more then two decades after the ond of World War ZXf Are the costs acceptable in view of Europe's prosperity and American burdens elsewhere? Are there not persuasive indications that the USSR no longerthreat'1 to Western Europe? The answers to these questions naturally give some difficulty In tho context of domestic politics. They arer sought in tents of the long-range interests of the United Statesorld power.
Itut still valid, to declare that the till&nment of Vcstcm Europo In world politics remains vital ror ua. There is some tendency nowadays to think of that nrco na parochial, withdrawn in
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weariness from the balance of power cane, ond there Is auch in the European mood that supports this. But this area is still the mostconcentration of productive forces outside the US and USSR. Historically, its political dynamism has been formidable. To consign it to the backwaters of world politics, touiet Europe at peace with itself andfroo struggles that proceed elsewhere, would probably notound wager on the future.
The USSR clearly does not think that all power struggles in Europe are over, despite its relative passivity an European issues in recent years. The Soviets dealated free (cross pressures afterbecause they understood at laat the great risks involved, and because they realized finally thnt pressures would not rupture but only consolidate the Western Alliance and the American presence ln Europe. They have seen in recent frictions in European-Anerlean relations an opportunity to pursuether means their main objective of excluding American power and influence from that area. The emphasisetente in Europe, on an all-European security settlement aade without American participation, alas at disrupting tho Atlantic connection and at moving Western Europeore neutral position in world polltlca. The Federal Republic would continue to be treatedariah, held in contemptuous Isolation until lt produced politicians who saw the light and were willing to come to terms with Soviet power. oviet "threat" continues to cxiat in
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ths leasen tcough the USSR does not for the present menace Western Europe vith armed ottack. Its basic strategy Is still to separate Western Europe froa America, and thereby greatly to diminish both as power factors.
It would be absurd to suggest that this Soviet visionast shift ln the world balance of power is, because of current frictions within the Western Alliance, even remotely near realization. Tbe dominant political forces in Western Europe today are still, despite concern over some American policies, generally committed to tho view that an Atlantic coalition under American .leadership Is essential to their interests. De Gaulle's doctrines have for the most part been token as too much cn expression of personal ldiosyncracy and French particularise. His nomination of himself tohird-force European coalition has not von general acclaim; the division la HATO is still
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ong view, however, American policy cannot afford to beabout Europe. Thisole to playorld power, while Western European itates now define their interests largely ln regional terms; this difference In angle of vision will inevitably strain relations from time to time. After tiro world wars, moreover, Europeans incline to stand -aside from ideological strugglesorld scale, and
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to confront no power challenge unless lt ia visibly at their own gates.
At the same time, the European unity movement appears to have stagnated.
and the Gaul-list impulseevival of nationalise cakes lt impossible toeversion to intra -European quarreling. And there can be do doubt that the Soviets stand ready still to exploit whatever divisions may develop within Europe, and between Europe and the US.
Altogether, while the condition of Europe and of Atlantic relations today do not give grounds for alarm, there is reason for attentive concern. Because any untoward developments on this front haveital bearing on world power relations, and ultimately on American security, there is always reason for special sensitivity. It will be in the American Interestong tine to come to give highest priority to Europe, to its security and internal order, and to tbe preservation of our Influence there, however heavy the burden* and intense the preoccupations elsewhere.
Force Reductions as an Issue in the Alliance
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The question posed ln connection with the tripartite negotiations is whether tho American stake in Europe and in good Atlantic relations would be prejudicedignificant, reduction in American forces. Or, given tbe condition of Europe described above, is this the moment whenpartial military disengagement can be undertaken with tolerable risk?
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There Is no way of donning exactly what amount of cut in American forces would now be viewed as "significant" by the allies. Clearly there is some degree of further modest drawdown which would be understood, even If not with full sympathy, as owing to the demands of the Vietnam war and to the balance of payments problem;ut would not be construedurning point in US policy toward Europe which confronted the alliesew situation. Equally there is some larger scale of cutback which would be so cooatrued. Very likely this would be true of any cut largo enough to effect really meaningful savings for the US. It is also possible, perhaps likely,esser cut would be takenortentarger one to follow. In any case, what la worth discussingut, whatever Its magnitude, which did lead the Europeans, and perhaps the Soviets as well, to conclude that American policy toward Europe waa changing direction and that we intended to lessen our involve-cent there. It is not necessary to discuss resetlonselief that we intended simply to abandon our European interest and commitment entirely, since nobody would be likely to infer that.
It should also be amid that, whatever meaning Europeans night attacheduction they took to be significant, their views would probably be little affected by reasons the US might give or by public relations manipulation. European opinion-makers are notoriously skeptical of official truth, and most sophisticated people would prefer to believe
tbe "real reasons" vhlch would surely be provided by nuaerous articulate connentators. At present, vhen many people find ln the Vietnamelcome pretext for diaenchantment with American policy and forthe credibility of American official utterances, oven very sound ond defensible explanations would be likely to encounter heavy going. The various liabilities of American policy In Europe described aboveolitical-psychological reality of the present monent. Since, as will be argued below, the political effectsorce cutback provide the main ground of concern, it would be well to recognize that Dt preaont our obllity to influence tho construction wliich European opinion puts on our policies is loss than it has been.
Security Implications
The nost obvious question raisedroposal to reduce US forces Is whether Western Europe vould be exposed to aigniflcantly Increased risk of Soviet attack. It is alao the easiest to answer.
It is extremely doubtful that the Soviets at any time' in the postwar period ooriously entertained the Idea of achieving their objectives in Western Europe by actual military attack. At various times they threatened war if certain limitedaonda were not met, prioarilyBerlin. In the earlyears they probably believed that auch threatseakly derenCod Western Europe, together with the
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considerable subversive potential they then had there, night cause Western will to fall, and thatemonstration of Soviet power might, as new demands were added, lead oneneral collapse. In thes,arefully-fostered Impression that they badecisive power advantage ln nuclear-rocket weapons, they revived the same technique of assault by intimidation, and again they failed. The Soviets have evidently learned that it is not possible to advance in Western Europe on the cheap, that is,ere show of intimidating power.
The Soviets pulled back from actual attack primarily, no doubt, because they could not foresee the consequences and judged the likely costsajor war to be unacceptable. There Is another reason that ought not to be underestimated. Soviet history shows that under this
regime there are serious political-Ideological inhibitions against resort
to naked aggression. Advances for Communist power are supposed to be won by indigenous revolutionary action. Even if the Soviet leadership might In some circumstances bring itself to overlook this nicety, it would have to be concerned about the reactions of the Soviet peopleajor war brought on at Soviet Initiative.
Therevery reason to believe that the grounds the Soviets had for refraining froa direct attack ln the past still apply, and would apply even if American forces in Europe vere considerably reduced,even if they were withdrawn entirely. The Soviets know that the
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US considers it vital to its own security that Cceaminlst power not engulf Western Europe. They would understand that overt aggression by them wouldrain of events carrying tho highest risk of general nuclear war. Their conduct over the last two decades proves that they intend to stand veil back from that contingency.
Soviet Policy In the Wakeorce Cut
It is possible, of course, that the Soviets would thinkS' force withdrawal meant that Atlantic links were weakening, that If they pushed once again with tactics of intimidation the Western Alliance would provend that they could then register some demonstrative gain, say, finally at Berlin, which would prove to all the world that the relations of power had shifted. This seems extremely unlikely. Any American force cutback would no doubt be accompanied by elaborate mutual pledges of continued firmness within the Western Alliance. More Important, the Soviets would know that the US would be highly sensitive to any new Soviet novea to exploit the situation. They vould probably expect. In fact, that the American response to any opening gambit by them would beigorous as to preclude the nicely modulated developmentcrisis" situation under their control.
This is not to say that at some later time the Soviets might not come to thinkeduced American posture in Europeenewal erf pressure tactics. But thla would not arise from the altered force equation oa such. It would result from their reading of the general drift of European-American relations; they might Infereally divisive Iocs of mutual confidence among the Allies made effectiveto new demands unlikely. Since the Soviet style is somewhat heavy-handed, there could be no guarantee that they vould not act ln this manner at some stage.
The scenario they would at first consider more promising would be entirely different. They would activate their diplomacy and propaganda to persuade Western Europe that, with tbe US beginning to disengage, new possibilities for detenteuropean basis vere opening up. Some withdrawal of Soviet forces would occur to document this trend. Cultural exchanges and economic relations would be expanded wherever -possible to provide symbolism. Plausible security undertakings would be offered, and theeo would, of course, at least imply recognition of tbe status quo in Germany. Efforts would be made to give the cccniuniquos issuing from the meetings of statesmen an anti-American nuance. The object of all this would be to commit influential political elements in Western Europe to the view that American power was no longer needed there, and that its final departure could be viewed with equanimity. The Soviets would also hope
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that discreet cultivation of European-American dissensions that night arise would help torocess of political-military
The Soviets are not fools enough to believe thatampaign could achieve quick or easy success. But they vould grind avay at it so long as the auspices were favorable. The assets they could bring to bear would include their political-subversive apparatus in the Vest. In the political climate the Soviets would be trying to engender, the Communist parties would have greatly improved chances of escaping from their chronic isolation, and united front tactics might work tobetter effect than heretofore. Success would obviously depend or.airly wide spectrum of non-Communist opinion to the view that the situation in Europe was changingundamental way which called for new departures In both Internal and external policy.
All thisery large order and the Soviets would have their work cut out for them, even If European-American relations deteriorated markedly in the wake of force reductions. It would be the extent of deterioration over some considerable period which would determine the -ensure of their opportunity.
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Thus, tho eventual reaction of the European allies to what they savignificant change in American military policy -would he crucial, it is unlikely that there would be any immediate general alarm about the security of tho area. Fear of actual Soviet attack is now minimal. Sophisticated opinion would realize that the full weight of U3 power remained committed by tbe forces which remained, and would believe also that the US, which has borne the burdens of global struggle in other less vital areas, could not In its own interest be indifferent to the fate of Europe. Some recriminatory voices would no doubt be loud, and Do oeulle would help to magnify then, but they would probably not be determining for the attitudes of Allied governments. There might le some initial confusion, but It would probably be manageable.
It would be the loDg pull which would cotter. Politicians, like investors, discount the future. However the force? cuts were Justified, there would be some sense that American resources vere overstrained, or that some shift of priorities in American policy, presumably toward Asiaway from Europe, was taking place. Over time this could mean still less inclination to support American policy in other areas or to accept American leadership on matters that did not Immediately involve the security of Europe.
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A military nlliancc almost never collapses oil et once; It dies evay by degrees as the participants sense that the original, premises that bound them have lost validity. Ultimately, and this would be especially true if US policy encountered reverses elsewhere and the general rlev held of tbe relations of pover should beeone leasto tho US than at present, the basic alignment of Western Europe could be affected. radual shift of perspective might ot florae critical Juncture lead Western European states to adopt tbe vlev that the USSR vas after all the only first class pover relevant to Europe's arrange-sents, and to begin to accommodate themselves accordingly. The Soviets vould, if they followed the policy described above, make this seec easy and without risk. Appropriate shifts in the internal balance of political forces would occur in Western European countries, and the end result woulderceptible moveiddle, perhapseutralist position between the US and USSR.
This kind of outcome seems very far down the road at present, even far-fetched. To suggest that it would flow inevitably from any specific eiaount of reduction of American forces in Europe would be very misleading. Reverthelesa, the agreed military dispositions give the Alliance concrete expression and symbolize its meaning. When they are changed in some significant way, especially at the Initiative of the dominant member, it may eventually appear to other membersrend is developing which
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will finally invalidate the original rationale. An alliance is sustained by oen's belief that it reflects pover relations vhich can be relied on
to serve their long-term as well as their Iraedlate national security
Interest.
Thus, while it cannot be plausibly arguedignificant force cut now vould necessarily do lrrepcrablc damage to the prospects of the Alliance, it can be said thatove runs the risk of storing up trouble for the future. The disarray already existing in NATO isood oaen, and means at least that whatever unfavorable trend was set in motion would be intensified In thet context.
tha Federal Republic
Generalisations which can bt node with some justice for the Alliancehole would almost certainly not apply in Vest Germany. The German reactionignifleant force cutback would be serious, possibly traumatic.
Tills would not be tbe case because the Geraonaeryfear than others of the imminence Of Soviet attack,their front-line positionsychological role. Onthey liave come to accept the view generally held in EuropeSoviets arc effectively deterred. Since they believe this into US nuclearart of the ground
forces would not in itself seem inwdlotely critical to their security.
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Tbe Germans are, however, far more aensitlve than others to what changes In US ollitary dispositions night signify for the general direction or US policy. The largo US ollitary presence has meant, not merely that the US vna committed to the defense of West Gorman territory, but also tothe German national interest ln the still unresolved struggle over the division of the country. ignificant cutback in that presence vould imply for Gerueas that the US was finally abandoning its sponsorship of the national claim to unity and vaa accepting the status quo for the Indefinite future. Since them is no confidence whatever that unity con be von without American hacking, there would inevitably be cries of betrayal.
It has been argued that the Germans know anyway that there la no present prospect of achieving unity, nnd that they are resigned to this fact. This is almostuperficial reading for3 term. During the postwar period tho Germans have been in desperate need of recovering their self-re3pect and the respect of other*. They are bound to think that they will never achieve this if they resign thcaselveao the brutal injustice of partition. With confidence reawakoned by their postwar achievements,enne of guilt over the comparative lotourth of the nation, with their once great capital atill heldreary hostage, it seL-ms more likelythey will Increasingly find the present outcome of their history unacceptable. This mood will be sustained
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by politicians who, to avoid being outflanked by other politicians, vlll need to reaffirm the goal of reunification. Tt would be prudent to think that this issue will still stir tho cauldron of politics in Gemany ln ways that cannot now be foreseen.
For the present the Germans surely have no place to go, but this may not always be true. Political changes which could come eventually ln both the FRG and the USSR might revise tho options. Or, resignation might finally end in political demoralization and the West would then have another kind of problem;trong und stable Germany the Alliance
vould be dangerously weakened. Thus,litical condition of Germany
willey factor for the security of the West.
A political shakeout is nown in Bonn, ond this development hadittle connection with recent frictions ln German-American relations. It la impossible to say what further tremors would resultutback in US forces which was viewederious reversal for German policy. Probably it would become oord difficult totable majority. rolonged process of political regrouping might ensue, accompanied by much agonizing soul-searching over notional goals and policies. In any case, it is certain that theeffect of force cutbacks would be in Geraany, and that at this tine nobody can say with assurance what would be the effect oa polities snd policy in the Federal Republic. As a
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nation, theGermans have not yet found an identityole. They are unlikely to be able again to menace their neighbors militarily; but it remains to be proved vhetherolitical sense and over the long term they will be an assetiability to European stability. ove by the US which disoriented the Germans seriously vould carry some unknown, and possibly high degree of risk.
If Wot flow. When?
The conclusion implicit in the foregoing discussion is that,ignificant cutback in US forces at this time would probably not have any immediately disastrous consequences, the whole context is unfavorable and risks setting inrocess of deterioration in the Alliance which would be ominous for the future. To take this view is not the some as arguinghange in tho US military posture in Europe can never be undertaken without excessive risk. It is possible to describe circumstances which might be more favorable and to suggest criteria which should govern soecision.
In principle,ecision should be taken in some positive policy framework and on calculations aloed at advancing Western interests. The move proposed at present has nothing of that. We did not choose the time for an advantageous act of policy; instead, the impression ia given that we arc acting under the pressure of considerations, mainly financial.
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vhlch cocpel the stove even at some political risk. The psychological effect is therefore negative sod defensive.
A period ln whichove could be turned to policy advantage would be one in which American credit generally and regard for American leadership in the Alliance were high. It woulderiod when goneral detente in Soviet-American relations was recognised to exist, and seen to be the consequence mainly of Soviet regard for American strength and Western solidarity. This kind of setting vould lend positive virtue to the argument that the prolonged presence of large American forces wo3 unwholesome for the Europeans and for us. It vould make It feasible to offset political risks and simultaneously to shore up the Alliance by giving greater emphasis to the political content of Atlantic relations, that is, to cocoon political objectives both within Europe and ln the world at large. Finally, and of greatest importance, the kind of context described would make it possible to link force withdrawalsew initiative to the Soviets for movement on the German problem. They might not respond, but they vould be plnced under some pressure and It vould be they and not ve vho would be on the defensive on the German issue. At Irmst, the cutback would then be essoclated in the German mindositive political strategy.
It could be argued that the international setting in the year following the Cuban missile crisis had some features corresponding to the general prescription given above- While it is fatuous to reel back history, that period illustrates circumstances in whichS force cutback in Europe could have been undertaken with greater advantage. Similarly, it is possible that In the wakeettlement of the Vietnam war another more propitious phase will emerge. In any case, lt is evident that other contexts are conceivable which vould be more promising and less hazardous than the present one.
Whatever the time, we ought to choose lt deliberately and for positive reasons of policy, unless, of course, we are simply compelled by The case for force cuts in Europe is apparently not argued on tha basis of such necessity, only on the ground of marginal advantage to the balance of payments. The argument of this paper is that the political risks at this time carry far greater weight. If ve make blunders of political Judgment in our relations with our European Allies, we cannot count on the Soviets to overlook mercifully the openings we make for them. The struggle over Europe, focused in Germany, continues despite the surface calm of recent years, and that area is still more crucial to our security than any other.
JOHN EUIZEHGA
Board of national Estimates
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Original document.
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