IBRARY
76
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Situation and Prospects in Haiti
SuboWfed 6/
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred mi hy Iht UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A* ind;tared overleaf
6
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CONTENT5
Page
THE
1
DISCUSSION
L
II. THE PRESENT
of Rule
Forces
Economy- "
III. THE OUTLOOK
Duvalier Continuing in
(he Event of Duvalier's Departure
SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN HAITI
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the situation anil outlook in Haiti over the next year or so, and to consider what might happen in the event of President Duvalier's deathverthrow.
CONCLUSIONS
A Duvalier's position still seems fairly strong, despite the sporadic plotting and political tension normal in Haitian affairs. We think the chances arc better than even that he will remain in power during the period of this estimate. If he does, there will be continuingrepression and economic stagnation or decline.
overthrow would probably have to be largelyjob, with some key members of the securitythe PresidentialWc doubtosition to organizeoup has the will or theattempt it. None of the many small groupings among theHaitian exiles could succeed in overthrowing Duvalierdecisive help from the US or some other foreign government.dictator might, of course, die suddenly of naturalhe is onlynd in reasonably good health, assassination ispossibility, though he takes unusual precautions.
departure would probably be attended bv someviolence in Port-au-Prince and other towns. Whether thislimited and sporadic or became widespread and intensivein large part on the manner of his going. The dangerhostilities would probably be greatest in the eventwere assassinated inoup attempt that failed atminute could produce equally nasty results.
D- The most likely successor to Duvalier wouldilitary junta which might or might not choose to exercise powerivilian front Initially at least,overnment would probably not be stable, and there would likely be maneuveiing for power among its members-
two Communist parties are too small and weak to becontend for power ovenisorderly situation followingWe doubt that outside CommunistSoviets, or Haitian Communistbo forthcoming onscale. We believe that the Haitian Communistssee their best chance of gaining influence as comingof their administrative assistance to new governmentthan through any attempt to seize power on their own, andthey would act accordingly.
a situation where order had completely broken down,of American States (OAS) would almost certainlyin action by the US to evacuate foreign nationals. Anyfor US or OAS intervention to restore order and establishgovernment, however, would encounter strongthe OAS. Any contention that such intervention wasorder toommunist takeover would be disbelievedOAS members unless the supporting evidence wasWhatever the purpose for intervening, the US wouldcriticism internationally.
C The initial Haitian reaction to the landingS force would probably be favorable, butilitary occupation were at allopposition would develop. Nevertheless, the problems in Haiti are such that it might prove more difficult toorce out than to put it in, as was the case
DISCUSSION I. BACKGROUND
Haiti ii lhe most backward country in the Western Hemisphere and one of the moil backward in thes resources are poor in quality andpopulation pressure iserhapsercent of the people are literate in French; the rest are Illiterate and speakocal dialect. Most Haitians are superstitious as well as uneducated; voodoo beliefs are more influential than the country's nominal Catholicism. Standards of health and sanitation, though somewhat improved with foreign aid, are still abysmally low. Malnutrition is (lie rule, not the exception; malaria, tuberculosis, typhoid,infestation, tetanus, and syphilis are widespread. The bulk of thewhich subsists by farming small plots of depleted land in the countryside, is politically apathetic.
Ever since Haiti became, antagonism between mulat-loes and blacks has been the most sensitive factor in Haitian politics. The mulatto elite were very few in number; but, because of their virtual monopoly of education, their services were indispensable in the administration of the government and,lass, they were able to exercise effective control through behind the scenes manipulations, even after it became normal for the President to be black.
Haiti has never developed an effective electoral process. Political power has always been acquired and held by military force, overt or latent. Since Haitian Piejidents have seldom, if ever, retirede facto system developedilitary junta would depose each President at the end of his constitutional term. His successor would then be selected in back room consultations and this selection would be formalized by duly constitutional processes.owever, this system broke down because each of Ihe several black leaders who thought himself in line for the Presidency refused to be passed over.eriod of turmoil and instability, the army conducted an election which brought Dr. Francois Duvalier to the Presidencyis-year term.
There is little doubt that the election was rigged, but Duvalier probably did have at least Ihe passive acceptance of the majority of the peasantry.he had the enthusiastic support of most of die black elite, who saw his electionevolution against mulatto domination. This meant, however, that
1 Statistics ewwvnring Haiti should conwiuentJy be treated with reserve; ihoic used In this paper, though the best available, are apjiintimations.
'The {injmlatinn3 waser square mile. Except Inr Trinidadohiefl, this is die highest population density in the Httiniiplivrc. Moreen vr. only aboil? ID percent of ilic Haitian) live in the towns, and the density ot ruralser iqtta'c mlfc of cuUiiata! land ur pollute.
JZt*tr
some among the mulatfoes immediately began lo conspire with the disappointed black leaden to unseatis position was precariousime, and it was partly In reaction to this thirst that he took the first steps to transform his regimeerroristic personal dictatorship,he course of tune he has eliminated or forced into exile every actual or suspected opponent, mulatto or black. Ex-tolling ncgrilude and representing himself as the protector of the black muses against mulatto domination and exploitation, he has deliberately intensified racism in Haiti.
II. THE PRESENT SITUATION
A. Methods of Rule
uvalier, realizing from the outstl that the military establishment was the key to power, proceeded to bring it under control by purging many of its most capable officers and by building up two countercivil militiapecial sort of secret police. The latter, called the Ton Ton Slocoutcs (Creole forerve as Duvalier's enforcers and informers. To ensure that (he military behave. Duvalier severely restricts their supplies of ammunition and their access to heavy arms, keeping the bulk of these in the cellar of thePalace
B. President Duvalier has not hesitated to solidify his control by takingof popular superstitions. He has won the support of leading voodoo priests, and has encouraged theby many inhe himself lias supernatural powers.
he President has made himself both the source of power and the chief administrator of the regime. He delegates responsibility only for minor decisions, but makes it worthwhileavored gtoup of government oficials andto cooperate in carrying out his dictates These "insiders" arcavory lot in anya few of them have connections with the Communists. Evenountry which has seldom known honesty in government. Duvalier lias set new records of venality and corruption
S1 Duvalier staged electronsew national legislature, providing his "National Unityear monopoly of seats. Subsequently he announced that since every ballot Sad carried the caption. "Francois Duvalier. President of thee had been unanimously electedecond six-year term. Ini tht: end ot lu< conititutlonal I'm. he easily bioto uj:customary military plot to Oust him Also3 he managed to overcome several minor invasion attempts by Haitian exiles., at the agee proclaimed himself President for life.1
n recent months Duvalier. apparently Ivoping toenewal of sirablc US economic aid, hasew gestures to give hisetter
' Lite ten-jTB wji euWfXWiy during the lirilean of Haitian independcrce. but Icil intowbearevious Piftioeril far Ueling squad
3*sT
image. He has ordered Tonco be less arbitrary ind more
circumspect, and. according to several sources, he has hinted that he might be willing to give up hii life tenure and toelections; It is highly unlikely, however, that he would mate any change that would impair his control of the government
B. The Opposition
mong tho few people in Haiti who arc politically minded, there is still latent opposition to Duvalier and his methods of rule. But such opponents ace cowed, non vocal, and almost entirely unorganized. There are no longer any significant opposition parties; there is however, an underground social Christian movement called the Personalities, and there arc two weak Communist parties.
IL The Pertonoltstet seem to haw no strong organization as yet. but maydherents, most of them In Port-au-Prince. Tlie two CommunistParty of Popular Accord (PEP) and the Popular Party of National Liberationthe only internal political opposition with any appreciable degree of training and organization, but lack discipline, are poorly indoctrinated, and are inclined to compete rather than cooperate with each other. Tlie two parlies may have ai manyembers, all told, in Haiti and in exile, andympathizers, many of them abroad. The PEP is Moscow-oriented and is the generally recognized Haitian Communist Party. The PPLN has ties with Cuba, where some of its former leaden are ia exile. Radio Havana, which broadcasts in Creole or French to Haiti two hours dairy, has been unsuccessfully exhorting the two parties to unite and build suength for anost exiled Haitian Communists arc in Europe or Mexico, the largest organization) being in France. There arc,rxiled Haitian Communists studying in Cuba, the Soviet Union, or other Communist couniries.
Most non-Communists forced into exile are now living in New York or Miami, with smaller groups in Canada. Venezuela, Punto Rico, and theRepublic- There are also considerable numbers of Haitian workers living in such countries as the Dominican Republic. Cuba, and the Bahamas, but these people are not politically active. The aides' activities have been constantly hampered by divisiveness. discoid, and inability to agreeommon leadership.
In tho New York exilerf the leaders have grouped their small individual following! into an organization called the Haiti Coalition. Italf-hour daily shortwave broadcast to Haiti in French and Creole, which sometimes attacks the excesses of the Duvalier regime, but generally refrains from inflammatory content. This program has apparentlyizable audience tn Haiti and has caused Duvalier to make repeated protests to the US. His panicky reaction to two small exile incursionshich occupied the security forces for several weeks, also suggests that he regards die exiles with apprehension. Rumors of exile plansew "invasion' in6haracteristic overreaction by Duvalier In the form of
an order lo execute sumriurily all Haitians caught returning to iheir country from tlie Bahamas.
C. Security Forces
The regular Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H) numberen. All ofacers in key positions were handpicked by Duvalier. Originally aorganized by the US Marines, the FAd'H performs coast guard, border patrol, immigration, civil aviation. Etc and police, and general ruralservices, in addition to its military duties. (There is no civil policell equipped, poorly trained, and incompetently led, the FAd'H has still had reasonable success in keeping order, perhaps because it has not had to face up to any major challenge. On more than one occasion the FAd'H Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Gerard Constant, lias secretly professed willingnessoup movement, but heeak, plodding figure without the guts for risky action.
The largest organization among Haitian security forces is the National Security Volunteersivil militia ofreated by Duvalierounteriorce to the FAd'H. These arc essentially weekend soldiers,separate from the regular military, but called upon to assist in keeping order and in mobilizing popular support for Duvalier. Duvalier handpicked many of them; their loyalty is directly to him and not necessarily to higher ranking militia officers. The VSN is badly trained and Onlyhird of its members have firearms, but even those armed only with machetestrong impression on the populace.
Units of both the FAd'H and the VSN are stationed at the palace under Duvalier's direct control. The FAd'H unit is the Presidential Cuard consisting o!en selected specifically for their loyally. Theirpresent Colonel Graciaough, uneducated former messhas primary responsibility for Duvalier's safety and is thusighly strategic position. The VSN unit at the palacecarefully chosen.
Most feared of all are the Ton Ton Macoutet. With no official title or legal status, they function as "secret police" and may number as many. Save for strong control ai the top, theirs isohesive organization. It il inexpensive for Duvalier to maintain, however, since its members obtain much of their compensation from shakedowns and extortion. Essentially the Ton Tom arc thugs; some are members, as well, of the Armed Forces or theew are also voodoo priests. The Ton Ton Macoutet concentrate on acquiringon any internal opposition and on "specialmurder, assault, and intimidation. Occasionally Duvalier has found it necessary to curb them temporarily; Such restraint has never lasted long. The chief of the Ton Ton Maeoutes, one Luc Dcsir, handles political interrogation, confinement, and torture at the National Palace, and is noted for utter brutality and ruthlessncss.
D. The Economy
he level of living in Haiti, long the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, has become still worse under the Duvalier regime. Per capita gross national product (GNP) declined fromnoThe average for Latin Americahole5 was more)
The waste of human and material resources in Haiti stemsong history of mismanagement andhe economic problems are too basic nnd severe for any quick solution. Yet Duvalier, far from taking anymeasures to ameliorate them, has usually pursued policies with the opposite effect. Investment has been very low. averaging five percent or less of GNPrate probably inadequate to maintain the country's existing stock of capital. Duvalier's behavior in relations with thein particular, his blatant diversion of economic aid funds to his ownthe termination of most US aidnd the climate of insecurity and violence in Haiti has contributedharp drop in tourism, once an important source of foreign exchange.
Haiti's export earnings, which generateoercent of CNP, have gradually declinedoflee produces aboutercent of thesesugar and sisal, copper und bauxite, the bulk of the remainder. Thein export earnings, along with the curtailment of US aid and of income from tourism, haveorsening ol Haiti's foreign exchange position nnd haveeduction of imports. This has had some immediate impactsince Haiti has to import all its capital equipment, all its petroleum products, and much of its industrial raw materials and consumersome basic foodstuffs. Onhe country's short-term foreign indebtedness exceeded its foreign exchange reserves by someillion.
III. THE OUTLOOK
A. With Duvalier Continuing in Power
ears old, Duvalier is in reasonably good health. He appearsplaces only infrequently and then under heavy guard. The cowedmost internal opposition, continuing use of informants and enforcers, andof security forces all serve to bolster his hold on power.is an ever-present possibility; he is certainly more hated than many
'on has typicallyifficult and com plica Hog lactoi. Tlie heavy rain* in the wet scjsiki tend to le.ich and erode the soil, and the Haitians know and da little inv of concertaclan.inare droughts which seriously reilntu agricultural output Moicover Haiti is in the hurricane belt and was badly hit3 and again
"US aid at inetimC It limitedjlatia eradication programillion willblc for this program in ltKG)L-ISO Title III food-for-work program, involving USi'lsoeiltm. .idtuinistfied by three Annm'titti voluntary agenciea. Some supplies for doanlcr relief have also been furnished.
leaders of government, though harder to get at. Tlie kind of attempt most likely to succeed in killing or deposing him would be one involvingof Duvalier whom he continuedrust; further, it would probably need the participation or connivance of some 6gures in the security forces, particularly nl tlie Presidential Guard- We doubt Ihat this sort of plot or conspiracy is now in process of development.
This is not to say that weeriod of tranquillity. As in the past few years, there will probably be plots and rumors ofinternal to Haiti, some involving exileuvalier will probably respond to certain of these with sharp repressive measures. Tims, while wc look for more of the turmoil and tension which arc normal in Haiti, we think these factors aie not likelv to cause Duvalier's downfall for some time to come.
As long as Duvalier does remain in power, Haiti's political, social, and economic patterns will probably be much like those of the recent past. Duvalier ninv, from time to time, make new attempts to clothe his government in more civilized garb, particularly when an economic pinch makes foreign aid look especially desirable. But the underlying nature of his repressive, one-manwill almost certainly stay the same. He will continue to provide order and control to thenot much else.
7 will be another year of stagnation or decline. Even before the damage wrought by Hurricane Inez, it appeared that the coffee crop now being harvested would be below thatnd world market prices for codec, as well as for sugar and sisal, are not promising. These factors may be offset somewhaturrent tendency toward an increase in tourism. To the extent that they are not, imports will have to be reduced, since Haiti's foreign exchange and credit position will notrade deficit of any significantower level of trade in turn would reduce governmentduties being the source of approximately one-third of suchforce some cut in government expenditures.
All this is likely lo necessitate some further belt-tightening in Haiti and to prevent any improvement from present levels of unemployment andThose living in Port-au-Prince and the Other towns will probably be affected more than the great majority of Haitians in the countryside. Duvalier may find it more difficult than usual to pay government employees on time, but we believe that in one way or another he will 6od funds for the security forces. In sum. we believe that these economic conditions will produce further grumbling and disaffection, but that they are not likely in themselves to provide the impetusoup.
B. In the Event of Duvalier's Departure 6
uvalier's death, incapacitation, or overthrow probably would be attended by some acts of violence in Port-au-Prince and in the other sizable towns.
"Tills section of tae Estimate is tn response to specific nueilkins jmcd to us in connection Willi CO"ling*Hi) planning.
Whether the violence were limited andecame widespread and intensive would depend in large part on the manner of his going.1
The assassination of Duvalier in public would carry the greatest immediate danger otenerally violent reaction. Even (his probably would no: lead to serious strife in the counlrysidc. but it might cause fighting and blood-shed in the capital and other towns Such violence might originate with people who have suffered at the hands of the VSN and the Ton Ton Macoutcs, and seek vengeance; or if might occur between elements of the FAd'H. VSN, and Ton Ton Macoutcs. It could conceivably lead to fighting between blacks and mulattos, an unequal contest in which the mnlattoes might be virtually wiped out. It could also endangerhite foreigners, includingS0 Americans, who reside in Haiti.
The likelihood of violence would be least if Duvalier died of natural causes in private, so that the key figures moving to take control might have time to deciderovisional leadership before they announced Ihe dictator's death.
The makeupuccessor government would also depend to some degree on the manner of Duvalier's going, but il would depend still more on thestrengths of the contenders for power. Here individuals would be important as well as groups, and there is no way of knowing ahead of lime how some of those in strategic positions might act when the showdown came. There arc. however, certain observations which can be made with reasonable confidence about the possibilitiesuccessor government.
Because all political individuals and groups have been so thoroughlyor (if friendly) so sharply circumscribed by Duvalier, wc think'that an individual or combination from the security services is most likely to lake the leading roleuccessor regime. Duvalier's system of countervailing forces in these services is keyed to his own command and probably could not lung survive him. If the Chief of Slaff of the FAd'Htronger figure, the regular military would almost certainly take charge once again. They will probably be Ihe strongest contender anyway. There are in the FAd'H some relatively shrewd and courageous figures who might come quickly to the top:ol. Daniel Beauvoir of the Army General Staff; Major Jose Borges. one of the amy's few competent troop commanders, and perhaps Col. Jacques Larochc. the FAd'H Deputy Chief of Staff. Initially,unta of several FAd'H officers would be more likely. The members ofunta might find if necessary to take in some leaders of the VSN, and even of the Ton Ton Mncoutcs, although that would be distasteful to them.
security forces' junta of this Wind might include, asewwho haveeasure of prominence under the Duvalier adminis.
'A pu.litula.ly ratty filuaiiOa might be wealedoup HToit ijiJctl at tJie but moment and Duvalier carried out hit fre-juent threat thai he would respond by ordering lliow lov.it to bun lo oitany and all impeded opponents
tration.abinet member oi oilier administration official mighl be used as front man lor what would actuallyilitary government.
one ol these possible junta governments would be stable from Ihetruggle for power within the Junta would almost certainly ensue This could lead to open violence between the contending factions or to the emergenceingle dictator.
he existing political parties ofon the one hand. Communists on thesimply too small and weak to compete for power evenisorderly situation following Duvalier's departure. The Communists' best chance of gaining influenceosl-Duvalier regime would he in offering administrative assistance to whatever power group emerged on top. Such assistance would be in short supply and urgently needed; oilers of help would be likely lo be accepted without tooecurity investigation. Thus the few capable Haitbn Communists wouldhancecnctiata the Haitian bureaucracy and, from that point of vantage, to exercise influence and to build up their party organizations. We believe that the Haitianthem selves would estimate their chances in this way and would pursue this course, rather than attempt to take over the govxanmcnt
e doubt that either of the Haitian Communist parties would receive much outside support for an attempt to sewe power. The Soviets wouldcounsel PEP leaders to move cautiously and aimradual accretion of political assets. Ftdcl Castro, svhose connections are with the PPLN. would probably use Radio Havana broadcasts to exacerbate any political crisis, at the time of Duvalier's removal or subsequently. He couldmall invasion force intout we think it unlikely that he would take this risk any more than he daredimilar risk during the crisis in the Dominican Republic, He might assist the small number of Haitian political eiilcs now jn Cuba and the Dominican Republic to return in hopes that they could instill new spirit among the Haitiano that they mightore decisive role at some future time.
he exile groups generally are not likely to count for much in thesituation after Duvalier. We estimate that none now has theforeignto overthrow him or toarge enough force quickly after his downfall to determine the nature of the ncsv government and the course nf future events. What the exile groups can do, if there is no
air andforcesa theoretical capability to put moreen into Haiti by sea, ait. or airdropew hours' time. This assumes no constraint by need for secrecy Oi by recognition ibat US counteraction would piobably, at Lhe least, present resupply or suppoit of their force. Several thousand people of Haitian extraction lis* In Cuba, but we have no evidence that the Caitro regime has tried lo create any military or paramilitary unit from among them.
reHiaint on their activities is to oorrtplicate in many ways the already difficult task racingnew government*
there ii such an acute lack of administrative and technicalHaitians, in Haiti or in esale. there is scant likelihood that thesucceeds Duvalier will be much better than the present oneinstitutions hive neves been aWe to survive in Haiti;arr not lively to lave cither the will or the ability to establishregime In that country. They will do well to establish an orderly andby the aiithorttarian methods that arc customary there- Ithowever,ore respectable regime than Duvalier'sset up.
iven Haiti's limited ability to absorb capital and foreign technology, economic and social development would probably remain minimal Any new regime would probably continue to view Haiti's needs for foreign assistance primarily in terms of financial support for the administration and would resist reforms that would undermine its political control. Nonetheless, the US might gain some leverage over the situation simply by being able to dealew group which would be seeking US financial aid and political backing
f the situation following Duvalier's departure became to disorderly a* to require military action to protect and evacuate foreign nationals, tlieof American States (OAS) would almost certainly acquiesce in such action by the US. Even those OAS members generally opposed to intervention art likely to go along, recognuing that Haitipecial case. It would behowever, that the US military intervention in Haitior the slated purpose ol protecting lives and property, turned intoycar military occupation Any proposal for US or OAS intervention to restore order andan effective government would encounter strong opposition within the OAS. Anv contention lhal such intervention was necessary in order to forestall atakeover would be disbelieved by many OAS members unless theevidence was incontrovertible.10
'Although thetervicej oftcnur
be likely to cameroup, by their prewnMoo* to pelitxal
O* military lei.ie nhip and iheir iVnnndi for the rWoration of eipropf-tiedbandoned property. Son* eovkt came inirnubonal cocapbcaljoal One (trip led by Cuban eute Maiferref aaaUeaa* for operalloro against Cube. Another (roup teciing.1 DewMucan "corodojuoaaioa" la Parti aMght be disposed lo aaUit theai Mi opera Uor* fromau-ji th* Dominican Republic.
"Tli" CoemmcHl of (lie Duminican Republic would be eatremely concerned about any [irotiaclnl period of dooedrr and confusion in Haiti. Elements among ihr military and on the political right, if eel Freiident Datagueruld be inclined to we the Conuiiurii: thrrat as imminent. Thui the Dominican Government would be likely to prew pmalcly for ihe landingS force In Haiti, and to leek US assurances, at wellilitary
the circumitances postulated, the Haitian townspeopleS military intervention with intense relief, asxpecting it to reestablish order and security for themselves. If
s^Tt
a military occupation were at ail prolonged, however, oppcsilion to it would develop. Whatever Haitians came to power in such circumstances would be bitterly denounced by all the disappointed aspirants forontinuing US militaiy presence might be required to sustain Ihe new regime. Ast would be easier to get into Haiti than to get out.
These reaclions would be generally limited to the towns and theirenvirons. The remote: peasants would almost certainly remain inert unless and until something happened to affect them directly and adversely.
Much of the international reactionanding of US forces inwhatever the reasonprobably be adverse, particularly that of countries with neutralist or leftist governments.rief US intervention to evacuate foreign nalionals might face criticism on two counts. First it would beew "imperialist'"iolation of the Charter of the OAS, and an unjustified interference in the affairsmall nation. And second, if the force departed quickly when the foreigners were out and the Haitians then went back to chopping at each other, the US would be criticized for saving the whites and not caring what happened to the Negroes.
The following intelligencearticipated fcj preparation ol this ettimate:
The Cenrro! Intelligence Agency ondintelligence orgoniialmnt of thefefense, ond the NSA.
Concurring:
Dr. It. J. Smith, for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas I. Hushes. The Director of Intelligence ondepartment al Slate
It, Gen. Joseph f. Carroll, lhe Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Or. Louis W. lordella. for the Director, National Security Agency
AblrOimnej
Mr. Howcd C. fiVown,heD| Monogw. Alomk Energysior. and Mr. Wilton. O. Geoex, for tha Aslant Direcor. fede-o: lureeu ofm* svtveaafiioW of nW jwssrfctloA.
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