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Inpact of Cutbacks on European Military Progrtcc
Political Inpact of
Effectiveness of Various us
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SUBJECT: : POKKGH KEACTIOKS TO CEETAISOUESSS qy
AHDIHG US FORCES US EUROPE
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This SSIE vas done at the request of Mr. John J. McCloy, the President'1 Special Representative for the current negotiations vith the 0cited Klngdcn and the Pederal Republic concerning Allied strategy, force levels, and financial problems. The teres of reference vere provided by bin and his staff. In view cf the special character cf the paper, the suncaryusually provided inere omitted.
TBE PROBLEM
To estimate foreign reactions to various US courses of action affecting American forces stationed In Ebrooe. The alternative courses axe:
GROUP 1
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Case 1: To maintain US ground and air forcea in West Ceraeny at
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their* present level- cn the basis cf Gemen ogreeaeat to continue to bear atubstantial portion atexchange costs.
Case 2: To0 Ben fron OS ground forceshinning-out process, which would eliminate sone subordinate units but retain the present -rcber of cootat divisions; in addition, to establish dual basing arrangements forercerrt af OS aircraft and associated personnel now assigned to Gernanv, so that they would in the future be based part of the" tine In the continental OS. These aeesures would reduce OS expenditures abroad by0 annually.
Present OS ground forces ia West Geraenr totalen (authoriseden) including five conbat divisions and three brigades and supporting elenents; present OS Air Force strength consists ofircraftO-nen including li scnadrons plus supporting elenents. The nnnber of OS navel personnel based in West Geraeny is insignificant.
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Case 3: To00 men froo OS ground forces, including withdrawal of one cccbat division; la addition, to arrange for duel basing ofercent of OS air strength. These oeasures would reduce OS dollar expenditures abroad by0 annually.
Torcnjud forces, Includingof two to three ccsbat divisions; la addition, to arrnage for dual baaing of bo percent ofir strength.
These measures would reduce US dollar expenditures abroad by0 annually.
ESrIAKATCHT NOTE: Sach of the postulated US reductions of ground
force strength given above wonld net necessarilyby the specific change In air strengthit is listed. For eraaple, the cut0 aea froa the OS ground forces could bedual basing of eitherercent,ercent, cr *qof US aircraft and associated personnel. Thuscases we have chosen ere Intended to beof orders ofde aad are not the only
FOR THS VTSTEfCIE AKD OS RHATIOPS WITH
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some tine, oaay Vest European voices, not confined to France,
called for their countries toreater influence over the
area's policies,oncomitant reduction of US predoainaace. Differ-
ences in power and interest were bound to give rise to this attitude la
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tlae, Vsri the? have received" strong stimulus froa the spreadinghat, despite the USSR's great rAlitary pcver, the liieLlhood of ft Soviet attack against Western Surope has greatly diminished. n certain countriesurther assertion of an independent European interest: the foreal Trench withdrawal from HATO, domestic attacks open the pro-US policy of the West German Government, snd auneasiness and concern ever th?Si in Vietnam. The issue of US troop levels in West Germany and the related financial problems vill obv-iccalj affect the evolving political climate of Vesiem Europe.
2. Case 1: The retention of US forces at present strength, under'7 soce financial orrangenent accepted both by the US and other SATO nations concerned, would not eliminate the present malaise in the alliance. roubled phase in German-American relations Is in prospect even if the US decides to maintain present force levels in Vest Germany. Thus, it does net appearholly amicable settlement of the offset problem is within reach, given the history erf the issue and the likely German On the other hand. If the tripartite negotiations did resultS decision to continue present farce levels, relief would be felt by those who had feared en early and radical change in US policy. Especially in Germany, there vould probably be some temporary improvement in theof relations.
3- Cases, and U: Any of the three force cut* would raise some doubts about the firmness of the US ccemitmeut to Europe's security,to the light of earlier pledges that force levels would be neintained. Inndhe governments would reelite that the US atlll had sab-stantial military forces In place, certainly enough to conait it fully in
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case of Soviet attach. Vhiie the withdrawalivisional unit underould attract considerable notice, we doubt that in the end reactions would be significantly different from those under Case 2. Under all the alternatives, the concern would be far less with the Immediate security la? Li cations than vitb what the move night signify about US intentions over the long term. Eeverthelesa,ould give rise to instant, and
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serious alarm In many quarters. Most governments wouldonfirmation of their fears that US policy has shifted to give priority to Asia over Europe. There wouldarked loss of confidence in US leadership within the alliance, and the Germans would feel ineal concern for their long-term security.
of Cutbacks on European Military Progracs
n strictly military grounds. If such cone id crat Ions could be separated from the political implications, there would be little strong oppositlca In 3AT0 to either of the two smeller force reductions. Most HATC governments dc not believe that the military security of Western Europe
depends cm large conventional forces physically located there, cs their own
reluctance to meet SATO commitments shews. The present Vest German Govern-.
meat would argue thet its military security was endengered by even the
scaliest cut, but would do so cainly for political reasons. It woulds process of military disengagement, in Central Europe wasand that this meant tacit acceptance of an indefinitely West Germany has, in fact, tended to follow after the restopinion in downgrading the likelihood of Sovietnpossible changes of political leadership in Bonn, however, thethe German Government would uphold must be considered somewhat -
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J. In the absenceisibly revived threat from the East, we do not believe that either the smaller HATO countries or Great Britain would expend their own defense establishments to fill the military gap caused by theuts. They would net see any "gap." Great Britain'sprobless will almost certainly lead it to reduce its defensein coming years in any case. Most of the smaller NATO countries would probably reduce their defense efforts socewhat, andest Germany would almost certainly not expand its forces. Bonn has only reluctantly supported the concept of flexible response which requires large ground forces, and wouldeterrent strategy basedower nuclear threobold.
6. If the us made theut, other RATO countries would probably consider that they were politically and economically unable to nake up tbe
entire difference. Vest Germany end France night attempt to covectsaca, and perhaps eventually en enlarged, defense effort vlth other European nations vho vished to participate, but this would depend on the outcome of highly uncertain political developments in the countries
Political Jjjpact of Cutbacks
7. Though sato governments are generally agreed that the likelihoodoviet attack has diminished, all members except France vent HATO to continue to serveolitical instrument ofooperation. Most vould also like to preserve Itramework ln vhich to contain the ermans, concerning vhose future conduct there is still apprehension.
Almost all member stetes vould in fact probably try harder than ever to
keep the US politically involved in Europe.
3. The largest cutooingime of visible disarray In the alliance, vould be interpreted in some quarterseliberate OS move toward substantial disengagement from European affairs. It vouldider debate than has yet developed about the future of the alliance, and bring into question the entire structure of political and military concepts upon vhich it has beea based. Some impetus vould be given to the contention that Europe's best course vould be to move toward
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a neutral position between the OS and the USSE. This la turn could olter tbe foreign policy positions aad Internal political balance* in individual countries, and in tlae change the political and nilitary power structure of Europe. But this wouldong process, and its outcome would depend greatly upon subsequent CS policies, upon Soviet reactions and attitudes, and upon dcoestic political developments which ore cot now foreseeable.
9- France. General de Gaulle would be strengthened In bis efforts to undermine the TJ5 position In Europe, nergiaally inrndajor way if the US carried cut the largest reduction. Any US withdrawal would bring greater receptivity far de Gaulle's statements that the DS ^commitment was unreliable, and he would encourage suspicions that sraall^-cutsIf such are decided uponereirst step toward larger ones. Such tactics would probably not only gain some support in other Vest European countries for French policies, but would also strengthen de Gaulle domestically. Hone of the cuts, however, would of itself bring success to French efforts to destroy 3AT0olitical Instrument of US-Europeen cooperation.
10. The main thrust cf de Gaulle's diplomacy in the aftermathS force reduction would probably be renewed efforts to displace paramount US Influence in Bonn with his own. Pressure would be brought to get the
Gersana to adopt French views oa European cnestlocs. More comprehensive
offers of ?ncco-German collaboration nightmade, perhaps including
nev proposals in the military field. iplomatic cempeiffi would
probably meet with some success; hov mmah would depend cm developments
ia internal German politics. De Gaulle vould expect toew fluidity
developing ln Europe's power combinatiens; In these circumstances, he
would probably move cautiously in developing hia relations "with thehe would be particularly alert to any sign of acvement in
11- West German?. The question of US force levels In Europe and tha
associated financial burdens have their greatest impact on Germany, whefc they have already- helped to sharpen policy conflicts and personal rivalries. The administration cf Cnsacellor Erhard and his 7oreign and Defense Kinisters, Schroeder end von Eassel, which has In the past strongly supported close ties with the US, has for various reasons come under heavy attach. Afeature cf the current political infightingendency on the pert of Zrhard's opponents, both within and outside his party, to accuse him of having placed too mnch trust in US willingness to uphold German interests.
12. The opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) has recently been engaged In efforts to show greater initiative on East Europeaa snd all-German policy Issues in ways aadace which the Erhard administration
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does not favor. Although these efforts are not contrary to OS policy (the SPD Is fond of relating Its activities to the concepts of President Kennedy and Presidenthey reflect inrovlng inclination to pursue German interests more independently cf OS guidance.
13- Ifcch of the German public still retains basic confidence inand probably neither of the two smaller troop cuts wouldthis confidence. There would, of course, be lessroblem if political leadership defended the OS action. In the presentInfighting, however, cost German political leaders and opinioneither be iinvilling or unable to do ^
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Either of the smaller force reductions would strengthen the arguments of German Gaullists In the cro/cSO and would further weaken the Erherd government. Either would also add to existing pressures, both from Gauliiflts advocating priority for Franco-German cooperation and from the advocates of flexibility toward the East,eexamination of West German attitudes toward the OS, France, and SATO integration. Nevertheless, despite considerable political commotion, ve believe that the basic course of present West German policy would survive this event. There would be some deterioration in the climate cf German-American relations, however, especially since other factors are independently working in this direction.
ees clearajor reduction in US forces would conriace many Germans that US support for German interests and German standing in the
alliance were on the wane, and that this ia turn couldeeply unsettling factor ia German politics. Theuts would almost certainly mcea either the end of the Erhard government orhift ia its composition that it would ia effectew government. In either case, broader *
representation would almost certainly he afforded to those Germans who advocate greater independence free American policy guidance and some degree of increased cooperation with the French,
ia internal Gemen politics aad of growing uncertainty about whether the allies support German interests, would of course stimulate Germanto consider alternatives to 3oaa's present foreign policies. The Germans have been movingecognition that their Western partners are either unwilling or unable to do anything about Germany's national problem. 3ut they realize, too, that Initiatives of their own toward the USSR have ao foreseeable prospect of success, exceptrice and with risks they ere unwilling to contemplate. olitical leadership might finally appear in Bonn which wouldolicy of rapprocheaent with East Gcrmnny. If this did cot bring movement toward unification, the West Germans would have no choice but to reconcile themselves to their situation for an Indefinite period. We cannot foresee what this might do to the
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stabliity of Germanr to the value of Vest Germany es sr.
ally.
IT- Great Britain. Basically, Britain see* no alternative at present
to the political status quo in central Europe, and believes it can be maintained vlth sane reduction of present forces as long as the basic US guarantee of European security remains firm and believable. The British Government would accept with equanimity either of the scalier force cuts and would continue with it* own plans to remove part of its forces from Vest Germany. Britain's reaction to the Casecuts would probably be for the most part negative. The predominant feeling would probably "beoncern for the long-term stability of the Continent and for the viabilffty of present arrangements for the containment of Germany.
Effectiveness of Various US Explanations
13. Throughout Europe, the impact of US force reductions could perhaps be marginally softened or considerably exacerbated by our public handling of the issue. We doubt that emphasis cu US balance-of-payments problems and US inability to work out full offset arrangements would receive much sympathy; the suns to be saved probably would not seem large enough to providefor the cuts. It would probably further complicate US policy toward RATO for the US to Join publicly and officially the cocmaon West European views that the Soviet threat to Europe had diminished. It would not be
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helpful to referree? cut tn the context of3 policy of detente. Thla explamatlcm vould have airalarly adverse effect In Vest Germany, vhcre the government argues that force reductions should be cade only in return for specific Soviet concessions oa the German question.
19. Another line of argument vould be to emphasize that significant BS forces remained in Europe aad that advances in weaponry aad logistics nov make it possible for the OS to ae-rt lta commitment to the defense of Europe vita fever forces cc hand on the Continent. This line of argument vould Dot be particularly cogent In Germany, but it vould reassure seme Europeaas that the cuts did notundamental shift in OS policy.
'20. Regardless of hcv the cuts vere explained, howost European governments and the buli of sophisticated opinion vould conclude that the reel reasons vere OS bals-ce-of-payments problems end the manpower needs of the Vietnam war. There would be widespread concern that OS preoccupation with Vietnam vould in time lead to still further withdrawals, aad many would feelut bach tied to Vietnamign that the US eight bein its commitments.
II. CCMC"TIST KKACTI03S
21. As has been implied above, there wouldarge measure ofbetween attitudes in Western and Eastern Europe in the vnJcehange
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ta the OS posture. Moot West European opinion now proceeds fron thethat the policy cf thend its allies haa changed end ia directed toward detente. The Implication of this attitude is that there is no longer much reason toenewal of aggressive pressures from the East. If Soviet behavior in the wake of force cuts should disappoint these expectations, obviously the reactions attributed to Western Europe In the foregoing discussion would be quite different. But the attitudes and behavior of the USS3 sad Its alllea would la turn dependreat extent on the aovenent of opinion and policy ia Western Europe. 4
22. rincipal Soviet objective for soc* years past has been to obtain fron the West an acceptance cf the status quo in central Europe, Including the division of Germany. Curing the prolonged crisis over, the Soviets pursued their objective by threat and pressure. Subsequently, the Soviets used the tactics of "detente" with the US. Mare recently, their propaganda aad diplomacy have stressed the neededuction of tensions la central Europe aad for all-European security arrangements which would be built on the existence of two German states. They presumably calculate that acceptance of this thesis by the West, Including the US, would isolate the Federal Republic, introduce strains into its relations with the allies, aad ultimately set inhift of political forces within the Federal Republic more favorable to Soviet long-term purposes. The reduction of US military strength in Europe
would be see- aa favorable to these airs end tactics, aud probably alsoign that EATO's further disintegraticu was in prospect.
23- We believe that, initially at least, the Soviets would ccnsider lt to their advantage toonciliatory line toward Western Europe, except of course toward Bonn. They would probably say that the US had been "compelled"by the pressures cf European opinion and by the strains of the Vietnam warto retreat fron Its "domination" of the West European states. The Soviets would not wish to do anything to arrest this process, and they therefore would probablyjeut to tactics of urea sure and threat in Germany. They would recognize, moreover, that ths euravdevs ofUS forces did not mean aa abandonment of US coracltnents in Europe andenewed challenge there would stillajor crisis, with areversal of European attitudesenewed buildup of the American military presence.
2ii. The initial Soviet reaction, therefore, would probably be toiplomatic and propaganda stance which would encourage Westopinion to believe that no new risks threatened because of the US moves. It would be emphasisedurope ia which US influence was diminished aad the independence of European states was reasserted could easily arrive at broad and lasting security arrangements - The outline of such an all-Euroneen settlement Is contained in the Bucharest Declaration
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adopted by the Warsaw Pact states la, and this vould no doubtcenterpiece of the Soviet dlplametic effort. Its naln feeturesof existing frontiers, that is, Germany's frontiers,two German states, and their permanent exclusion from any sort ofnuclear veapons. The declaration also advocates an all-Europeanto adopt these measures and other undertakings vhlch vouldand stability in Europe for the indefinite future. Probably someline vould be the main immediate response from the East to thecreatedravdevn of US
25. The Soviets vould probably also believe thattself was more vulnerable to diplomatic and propaganda pressure byhey vould presumably intensify efforts they have nade in the past to get Norway and Denmark to loosen their ties to SATO or even to exchange this li-fr for entrycandinavian security zone. pecial security arrangement for southeastern Europe might be devised to attract Greece and Turkey avey free SATO. And the Soviets vould do vhat they could to give more substance to their rapprochement vith France. They would expect that any nev discords they might be able to foster ia the Vestern Alliance would help to accelerate the departure of US power, and bring them nearer to their ultimate goalragmented Europe in which their own power was clearly unchallenged.
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25. The Soviets would of course consider whether, to promote ea advantageous cliaate of detente, they should reciprocate US forcewith Vithcrewals of their own. We tell eve that they would sot wish to negotiate en agreement to do this, mainly for two reasons. It is their current line to emphasise deallags anong Europeans cc European questions and to Eininlte dealings with the US. Perhaps core Important at present is their policy to avoid any acts which would suggest that they were facilitating US nilitary relnforcecent la Southeast Asia.
27- We do, hcwever, believe the chances are good that the Soviets would, after they had taken sooe tine to appraise the political-cilltaryj -effects of the C3 withdrawals, carry out sane withdrawals of theirThey have advanced proposals for mutual withdrawals In the past, aad they would probably like,ariety of reasons, tc reduce their forces in East Germany, new deep the cuts might go seems to us beyond prediction, et present. The extent cf such reductions would be determined mainly by the USSR's appraisal of the condition of TiATO aad of the political 'end policy tendencies developing in Western Europe, in particular in West Germany, and
2/ MaJ. Gen. Chester L. Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartnent of the Army, believes that,ossibility of Soviet wlthdrevals exists, available evidence is insufficient toudgment thet "the chances are good that the Soviets would . .arry out seme withdrawals of their ova."
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whether these ccuid be sore advantageously influenced by intimidation orijluceuest.
38. Ia general, the reactions of the USSR's Vox-saw ?act allies to the moves discussed la this estimate would be much the Baae as those of the USSR. The ideaeveloping detente on terms which the East has advocate, would be congenial to then. They would welcome the opportunity to develop their trade with Vest era Europe, and would hope that military burdens could be eased. Some of them night want to move faster la developing relations with Vest Germany than East Germany, Poland, end the USSR would wtrrb. Tne USSR might thimh it had reaaos to be concerned about the degree cf rr.de-pendence that would develop ln time from the assertion of theseut unless there were fundamental changes ln the political and military structure of Europe, the basic aligaaent of these countries with the USSR would not be affected.
29. The Soviets would be less Interested la the reasons given for the Do coves than in what the changes meant for power relations in central Europe aad for the possibility of developing aadolitical estrangement between the US aad Its allies. If the Soviets should Judge these factors to be favorable, they might eventually depart from the cautious tactics which we believe would ears their early reactions and return once again to policies of pressure. In the general struggle with
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American power. In which they see themselves ea Inevitably involved, their aim remains to Induce as saury European states as possible toeutral position- They have shown in the past that they consider both pressure and persuasion as suitable tactics to this end, and would presumably employ both again as"their Judgment of circumstances might dictate.
30. Tne Asian CoraBirialsts. Hanoi and Peking would believe, on the one hand, that tJS resources vere being strained end that the OS hadurther setback: in its efforts to gain European support for its Asian policy. On tbe other hand, they would expect that US power vaa about to be concentratedtill greater scale In the Asian. they struck the balance, ve doubt that their will to persist inf their own declared objectives in Southeast Asia would be affected.
TJI. POSSIBLE BROADER IMPLICATIOPS
31. Interpretationsnd co doubt cverlntez-pretatioaj of the meaningS neve to change Its posture In the vital European theater would be mace by political leaders all over the world. Many would probably believe that this developmentelcome further stage in theof the cold war, at least in Europe. Some might think It provided proof that American power snd resources were overextended and reverberations
from American domestic debate might help to sustain this view. On the whole we do cot bell ere there would be any substantial political costs ia other areas in consequence of DS withdrawals from Europe.
32. Cur Judgment that no serious problems for US policy in other areas are likely to result from troop reductions in Europe applies only to the relatively near term. The alignment of forces which hrm obtained In Europe for two decades has been the central feature of the world's power structure. If, In consequence of US moves and reactions to them, it came to be believed that this alignment was changing, perceptions'-of what power relations are and where interest end security lie mightoth la Europe and elsewhere. We do not suggest that the particular easures to reduce US forces ln Europe vhlch are discussed ln this estimate would predictably have such far-reaching effects. We do, believe, however, that they might set in notion important changes In power relationsolitical alignments, the full scope of vhich cannot be foreseen. Some ur)cnown degree of risk Inevitably attaches to deliberate moves.to alter long established political-military relationships.
33. It is also true that timingey factor affecting theof such moves. Initiatives vhich at one moment and in one set of circumstances sight have entirely tolerable or even advantageous effects, might at another moment set inrain of vholly adverse repercussions.
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At present, confidence In the wisdom of Acer icon policy has Buffered In neny areas because cf Vietnam. In SATO Itself there is disarray end uncertainty owing to the French challenge to the foundations of the alliance. Partly because of the developments, Soviet prestige andappear to have gained in comparison with OS standing. Altogether,
there seems to us to be considerable risk that withdrawals from Europe, especially if they are large, would at this juncture convey an impression of American weakness in many quarters. This would probably cotasting setback to American policy, but again, bow others may reacthange in their perception of the relations of power is largely unpre- -
dictabie.
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Original document.
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