NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Soviet Space Program
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I. SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES OVER THE PAST TWO
C Unrrsarmed Scientific
end Planetary Probes
Conim unJca lions
Space Weapons .
II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE
OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR
C Manned Space Station
and Planetary 20
Soviet Military Uses of22
Exploration of Near 24
A Factors Affecting 24
B.of Soviet Cooperation in Space Matters
ESTIMATED TIMING OF MAJOR SOVIET SPACE EVENTS SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHESTORT OF SOVIET MANNED SPACEFLIGHT PROJECTS 1USTORT OF SOVIET LAUNCIITN'GS OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES
the soviet space program
To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over theoears.
SUMMARY ANO CONCLUSIONS
space program hasigh priority amongobjectives. Tho number of space launches attemptedpast two yean was nearly equal to the total of theNevertheless. Soviet achievements were less spectacularFor the most part, the Soviets exploited existingcarry out unmanned space exploration and intensive satelliteand to expand space applications. There have beenflights since
continuing high level of development activity suggestsnew series of advanced space missions Ishe nexthe Soviets used military boosters almostthey are now developing launch vehicles, specifically for theThey haveew boosterhrustopounds which was used to launch the Proton satellites.believe they areajor new launch facility atwill be able to take vehiclesirst-stage thrust inpound range; It probably will be completed
Soviets have probably planned some form of7 ln connection withh anniversary ofRevolution orh anniversary of Sputnikhisthe orbiting5 ton space station, the new mannedor some activity involving both. We cannot predict the precise
nature of the spectacular but believe that the event will be confined to 'iii'Si space.
of the Soviets space program hive risen sharply overfew years, but now appear to be leveling off. The programtun oe toignificant share of resouroes of the seme typefor strategic military pirigiami and for econumicthe present Soviet leaders may try Io effect economies insectors, we coosider it unlikely that they can effect anyin the overall nature of the program for tho next fivefor the longer termtoearsdoubt thatleaders hive yet come to firm decisions es to the scopeof their space pro gram, certainly we have no basis forof Soviet space activities during this period.
view of cornpettng claims on their resources, we believeSoviets wiD riot be able to undertake simultaneously all thetheir techiucal nubilities. Further, we do not believe thatwill seek toarge space station and to achievelunar landing concurrently. The dates estimated forare based on technical feasibility; we cannot estimate theIn which they may be attempted.
Lunar Landing. Two yean ago, we estimatedSoviet manned lunar landing program wu probably notbe competitive with the ApoDo program as then pjofected,atime period. We believettTJ theIs the possibility, however, that depending upon theirnstable, the Soviets may feel that there is some prospectgetting to the moon first, and they may press their programof being able to do so. Considering the Soviet technicaland the various techniques that might be employed, wetbe ear lie it the Soviets couldanned lunarbee believe that the most likely dateinime period.
C. Manned Ctrcwnlunar Flight. The Soviets will probablya manned circumlunax flight during the nest few years. They probably coosider this venture one of the few vrithin their capabilities that could offset some of the propaganda valueuccessful US lunar landing. We consider it unlikely that the Soviets would attempt
this mission before the first halfi though It is conceivable that they would accept the high risks involved in making the attempt as an anniversary spei-taL-ular in
Space Stations. We believe that the establishmentmanned space station isovietpaceounds weight and capable ofrew ofmore could probably be orbited by then the first half ofusing tbe very large launch vehicle, which wo estimate isat Tyuratam, the Soviets couldpaceounds by aboutt the earliest,believe sometime inime period to be more likely.
Systems. The expansion of tbe Soviet satelliteproject over the last two years shows that projects ofstrategic value can and will be funded. The Soviets willcontmue to support this program at about the present levelit with improved collection and data-handling systemsnext few years. They will probably give in creased emphasiswhich have both civil and military supporteteorological, and navigation satelbtes.
J. During the past year, the Soviets have conducted flight tests which could leadtrategic space weapon system. We estimateractional orbit bombardment system could be deployed in small numbers by7 ore cannot at this time estimate the likelihood that the Soviets will choose to deployystem. On the one hand, it would complicate the US defense problem; on the other, it would be more complex, more costly, and less accurate than ICBMs. Ifystem Is deployed, the Soviets would probably regard itupplement to existing strategic attack forces and would deploy it In relatively small numbers. In view of Soviet agreement to the treaty on peaceful uses of space as well as theultiple orbit bombardment system, we do not believe that the Soviets will deploy and maintain weapons in space during the period of this estimate.
I. SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS A
: During the put two yean the Soviet spec* program ha* retained Itj high priority among major nationalt bar placed rirnificantry increased dross mis on the ocxaiomy fnr acaroe resource* of the same rencral type and quality as trice* required for Strategic military rsrograma and for raveatrnorst for ecuucanh- growth. Tha cumber of space bunches attempted in this period Deafly equals th* total number of launches attemptad in tbe previous seven years.
I The Soviets soared scene dramatic 'firsts" during Una period, including the apaewwatt by Leonov during the flight ofh* lunar soft landtag ofnd tha lunar orbfttagat in general, tbetr aefaWverna-atj faswar* much lea* spectacular than previously. For the most part, they exploited availabl* hardware, especially boosters, tonmanned space exploration, an intensive phetoreco-usaissanoe program, and aa -ipamlon ta tha aoope of their space applications.
1 Tbe Soviets have, however,igh priority io leanerch andrn!nd D) on new spaceThree new programa were brought to flighturing tbe past two years: theound) Proton aatel-litina, which ware laisnchedewrulbon pound thrustaaneuverablo satellite capable of small orbital adjuatmeota;yitem which probably relate* to tho develorrment of rractlonal orbitepressed trajectory ICBMs, or both. In addition, we he neve that tuost ruction of mayor new launch facflitle*n Basocsated hardware fee more advanced future mljssonf has continuedapid pace.
Soviets bave failed to carry out certain accrvtOe* which wato their mannad spare program and which wa believe theyShey have not attempted randexvevaalthough tests of unmanned rnaoeuvuable space hardwareay relate to the devetcvpeoeot of this capability. They haveong duration manned flight (eg,eeksuta IS day flight of two dogs earlyo high speed reentry testslunar return problems have bean crrnchictnd, and no water landingtechniques which probably would be rcerulred on hmar return baveMoat notable, however,he hiaftis in rnancsed -pace flight*kmd In tha nearly two years since
a. Manned flight'
only manned Sight conducted by the Soviet*5 andVoskhodwo man minion which was launched on0 and
'Sea Aaan lot hsrtorv of Soviet manned iparelbefat pnfaets.
succesaf'ully deorbrted the following day. The VeeVhod II incorporated anwhich allowed ooo oi the cosmonauts to perform the firstor specewalk ever attempted. Cosmonaut Leonov emerged fromvia the airlock and spent someinutes outside, attached to theby an umbilical line but without any propulsion aid. Leonovol the discomfort! subsecrueatly noted by several US astronauts. Duringof Voskhod II thereailure in the retro-orientatioo systemtt co for reentry, which forced the oosmonauts to resort to their manual
back-up system for deorblt. The manually controlled deorhit probably resultedubstantial miss of the planned recovery area.
nhe Soviets launchedhich was ajc vehicle containing two dogsariety of otherb)YraTbe Cosmos HQ errvirooineotsj control system was probably intended tomonth-long Sight with dogs, the equivalent ofan days.
view of the Importance of the manned spaceerms ofcosmonaut training, aod national prestige, we do not believeSoviets larigmallyap of as long as two years in theirprogram. Available evidence provides no certain esplanatJon forIt may beombination oi technical and politicalthe decision to cancel further Voakhod flights which may haveto take place during this period. It appears that the Voskhodhas been exploited to about Its limit. Bather thanorethan the Voskhod II Bight, which at worst might have resulted inat best compared unfavorably with the achievements of the US Geminitho Soviets may have decided to forego further manned rrosrsons untila new spacecraft, which we believe to be under developrnent. Anof IS months in Soviet manned space flights occurredmodificuttcmi were made to the Voatok caprule to upgrade it to
rats of launching from Kapustm Yar of tbe unmanned. Cosmosscientific satellites has proceededairly deliberate pace since theintroduced inhere have been no major changes over tbeyears in launch vehicle configurations or orbital parameters. Thesatellites, launched from Tyuratam, were almost certainly used forresearch, but the primary purpose of these firings was probably toilhoo pound thrust booster.
aod Planetary Probes1
the past two years the Soviet program of lunar exploration hason two objectives: soft lunar landing and orluting the moon. Both
objectrves hive Included photographing the moon'i surface. Six aheorpts were made lo softehicle on the moon's surface, of wbich lba last two were successful:nducceeded inound packages on the rrvoon which* paaoiamaa of the moon'i surtace and thaware of good quality; Lunalso tsstad the firmness of the ratface Three lunar probesI.uccessfully orbited the moon, but o'-'y from Lunao we have aviderseeuccessful photographic mjsiun was carried oof- The photographs were of poor cruaJaty.
he Soviets attempted three Venus probes ra tbe past two years, aD Only two of these launches were even moderately ruoceesful:ransmitted no data as ft Bew psat tbe planet, re busing by0 candllegedly Inspected on the planet but no signals were trsrunjtftted during the terrnloal phase
IL Until recently tbe Soviets had used every opportunrty available to launch probes toward Verrui and Mars arntw their Interplanetary probe programhey did not. however, take advantage of the "window" to Mars which opened7 aod dosed lo February. Failure to capitalize on thus opportunity may Indicate that tbe unprofitable planetarybeam curtailed ba an attempt to reduce expenditures for space. On tho other band, the Soviets may have elected to itanddown their planetary program temporarilyew lyatatm Ii ready for use tn that program.
E. Applied Sate Bites
n the past two years the Soviets have orbited tour, possibly five, satellites tn their meteorological ESV program.ndoth pro-doced usable cloud photographs. Some of those fromere sent to tbe US last fall pursuant toS bilateral agreement to enhenge sateQrte-coUeoted weather data. This satellite ceased transmitting onctober. Thetv .od mfrared photography is of about the seme quality as that produced by dan Oar US systems. Onhe Soviets placeda or bet. While the Soviets have oot yet essoouooed tbe purpose of this vehicle.
n the past two yean, the Soviets have ruceassfully mhited four com-munlceOoos satellites of the Molrstya class. These satellites have beam used csperimentally to relay communications, television, aod other Information forms between Moscow and distant arrets of the USSR, mainlyhey have also been used tonit with Franca for the exchange of televisionand to servelatform for an eerth-ecanning television earners- The Molniya system has oot yet been put Into rounUne operation but hi still under development and is being subjected to extensive losts and esperlroentatlrai
f. Military Syrreins
Tbe Sovtet photpTCconna issance satellite program has continuedigh rate (about two launches per coonth) over the past two yean. This program bas enjoyed one ol tbe highest priorities to the rrrttre Sovtet space effort,for almost half of aD speos iMiischings during this period Tbe high prsorsty aod tbe was of Urne-tietiJ headware, have made the peastoroccrsneffort the moat ruccessfu' of all Soviet unmanned apace programs The program ta vol vas two basic types of reeonnstaaanco vehicles. One payload weighs0 pounds andow resolution photographicround resolution on the order ofoeet under average conditions; and probably orrOeets Eltnt as well. The second type of payload weighs0 pounds; itigher rraohjuon photographic mission, and we believe tt achieves ground resolutions on the orderoeet under average conditions. Under ideal conditions the resolution could be seessewhaa better. Tha Soviets recover the pfsotography eccjuirrd by both systems by deorbrttng the entire spacecraft brio the Kasaihs-an recovery area after rrsiestaos of about eight days
Carreers!us to fudge that this extensive rseonrsalasancs program vnu prose ory uuontaken to accomplish the following:
a. To precisely target US nuclear strike foroes, aspectsDy ICBM sites; to monitor thetr status, and to detect nave deployrnents, h. To map areas of general military interest, especssdh/ those bordering ibe
C Te rnoasraor the drirJopmeot and testing of new mibtary ry at ecru, not only In ihe US bat also ta Corrsmusssst Qttoa
d. To Dsrssitor Wge>acsJe rnurosry aad navsd activity. Spore Weapons
im During the pest year, the Soviets haveestsystem (which we have designated thehich could leadtrategic space weapons system This system (the SS-fl ICBM boosterird stage and reentry vehicle) has been used ta two types of testa.
e ISa the east of three suborbital fhgfats, the second and third stages and the reentry vehicle were launchedm. bsJhetichaving aa apogee ofSoviet ICBMs fired ta the tsasne range oo narma) trajectories would reach apogeeehe third stage and the reentry veeJole were reoriented and the third stage Ignited, causing the reentry vehicle to Impact on tbe Semchatka Peninsula while the second stage continued on to stapaot la tbe PacaaVa. j
Thb suggests (hu thbest of components and technique! forweapon system
iS. In September and November6 and again inho aaim type of system was tiled to put the lecond and third Jtagea, and the reentry vehicle. Into low earth orbit. We thinkeorbft wu trended during the mat cahft and that tbe vehicles were to Impact on the Kapustin Yar range. We observed the reentry vehicle being deorblted In the January test and believe that test was successful; tho other two tests were probably failures.
We believe that these tests relate to the developmentractional bombardmentepressed trajectory ICBM, or both. Either woold to degrade the value of the US BMEWs and complicate the US problem of developing elective ABM defenses. The tests could also relate toultiple orbit bombardment system.
G. Uncoteoorizect Spate Launches
wo satellites whose complete mission Is yet to be determined have been launched from Tyuratam under the Cosmos series designation. These vehicles
that these vehicles em*
a new propulsion device tor Injection of tbe payoacl tnto orbit. Another
probable mission of these satellites ie (fie iBjecCcn and orbit-adjust maneuver propulsion engines and the vehicle attitude control system. Such systems may be to corpora ted rnto an improved manned fpaceeraft
4 the Soviets have launched seven multiple payload vehicles whose mission cannot be determmed. The launch systemeJgnitable second stage whichayloads into selected orbits. These launches may be associated with th* initial phasesorraiiuiuc*tion/ navigation satellite program
II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE PROSPECTS
enerai Soviet capabilities to the basic and applied sciences will probably be adequate throughout the period of this estimate to support an ambitious space program. Any difficulties encountered are more likely to arise from trjeh-nological than from sclrmtlflc limitations. Space payloads designed by the Soviets bave historically been much heavier than their US counterparts, in part, because of their early decMoo to develop boosters of very large thrust and. In part, because of their tendency to use cumbersome, but proven campements and subsystems rather than develop new, more advanced hardware specifically for space.
h* weight [serially imposed by tba Soviet pnctkMg heavier, and simpler equipment in ipace payloads ii not critical for near-earth operation!.believe that currant Soviet technology could be rot coded with cornparative eaaa to conduct further operation* of thii typa ln more amhUknu programs, ruchanned tuner landing, the aaving of weight ejsumee greater Importance. Advances In rrdruaturitatioo, packaging, and other weight saving techniques as wall as more powerful propellent* would be needed to make more complicated millions practicable Etevcloprornt of such technology Is ahncet certainly under-way at the present time.
igA Energytudy of Soviet open source literature lodl-catas an Inter eat in high energychd hydro een and fiucasue.
|To data, no Soviet Bight teats or space launchas have oaen oVtected wnicn used high energy propellents sn any of tba stages. How-aver, we beheve some phases of static tcamg are now berng conducted and flight tee ring could begin, posaibly as part of tha devetopmerrt of tbe oery large launch system which Is probably underway at Tyuietam.0 or shortly thereafter high-energy upper stages could be man-rated and available for rue wfth coasting or mora advanced apace launch systems Such upper stages arm mexeaae tha capability and esSctaacy of tha launch system available to tha Soviets and permit considerable fieiibllrry in planning future space
aunch Ventctet. In all their major space actJvtflos7 throughhe Soviets used military boosters fitted with additional upper staging. Th* present Soviet Inventory of boosters and tha wide rang* of their payload capability have allowed them to pursueill iilfinl program. To undertake mora eornphrs space miMion* in the future, however, the Soviets ar* evidently now being lurced to develop bug* booster* spertSoaDy for the space program; tberr mUHary vefucte* are not adequate for ruch missions. The foUowihg chart oVplct* th* various launch vehicle configurations tha Soviets have used to date and shows the SL (space lanncber) designation* we lurve assigned to each. The oery large launch vehicle which we believe ia now under development at Tyura-tasn Is not Included In thi* chart.
be booster designatedhich is used fai the Proton satellite program, is the first Soviet bouvter which wa beheve will be used *oleh/ asspace launcher.ossible that thai booster was originally to serveelivery system for theMT nuclear weapon (of which Khrushchev boasted ln theD*s) as well as for spaceut we now believe that th* former I* very unlikely toresent Sovietheystem has an estimated first-stage thrustillion pounds and has demonstrated an earth-orb* payload capability of0here are reasons to believe, how-aver, that tJtss system will soon be rrsodifled. Inpresent two-stage con-
NIE, "Sonet CapabUtOai tor Soawgio AHafkTOP
figuraiion. Ihe boosterarces too great for manned mght Weestimatehird stage will toon be employed with the baric SL-9.
rteBne eooventsraul tnopeOants as thoaa which have been used thee far rn the Soviet
Tbetth suitable upper stsgtrig would provide tbe Soviets with the csrpabsJir? to attemptvariety of advanced rpaoo rrussions. rncruding mannedsUUons andcrrcurruunar fUghta ae wall aa more ambitious rm-raanned planetary meatona The additionhird stage employ aig con-venckaud4 propelknts. wouldayload ofounds to be placed tnto near-earth esrbA. With lbs in-orbit weightuitablestage also usurg looveuttooaleylcaad of0 pounds could be placedunar transfer trajectory. We estirnsteayload of this weight would be adequate tor the Soviets to artaarroed drnanhnui flight, lba useigh easergy third rtage wouldound payload to ba or beted, but we do not beheve that high energy upper stages will he used. Wo believe that initial unmanned brings of theonventional third stage will occur tn the first halfanned Sights using this system could begin some ssx morrthjear later, depending on the rapidity and success of the unmanned testing.
We have previously estimatedew oery large launch system Is under development. There is evidence that the Soviets areery large launch facility at Tyuratam which is probably of the aame magnitude as the US Apollo launch camples at Merrill Island. We estimate that this fadllty wiQ be ready for mftial launch Crperatsdo* to the first half8 at the earliest. We have no direct evidence of thef the oew very huge booster but consader It likely that ft willirst-stage thrust In0 pound range. It ia possible that the system utilising this booster will rrecorponts thes ftf second and third atsgee. IIombination were to be launched tornadJy by aboutt could be ready for manned space missions by shoutf the entire vehicle Is new, however, and uses oonverrtioruU prupeUasiU la all its rtsgea it could probably not be rasa-rated0 al the earsther combination would permit pay loads ofpounds to be put so rtsss-eerth orbit. Tbe useigh energy propellent in thejection stage for either of these coqUxMtioos would aDow them to be reedy for manned flight0 or shortly thereafter.
ew manned ipeeecrefl which may be capable of rerrderveais and oocang has probably now reached the early.flight test phase-Onnd againhe Soviets used ano bunchheayksad wu deorbrted onovember andebruary. During the flight of, aplsae adhrstnseots were made In the orbK. This sod other data received on the flight of these two vehicles lead us to believe the Soviets areew macecrafL
We have fnniffidoit data to evaluate hilly the charact eristics of this new spacecraft. Tire weight theystem can place into near-earth orbit is limited to0 pounds. We think theehicle weighedounds. These Stings probably were for the purpose of checking newly developed capsule subsystems as well as testing an entirely new spacecraft.
A new marreuvernbl* spacecraft, about the weight of the Voskhod but with more osable volume, wouldery valuable adjunct to some of the space ventures, suchanned circumlunar flight. In which the Soviets have expressed interest.ehicle could be designed lor rescue, ferrying andpurposes and thus could be useful toong-lived cebrtmgIt could also be adapted to an unmanned reconnaissance mission. Ifere, in fact, the first testew spacecraft, an Initial manned flight could occur bye believe the Soviets will develop still larger and more efficient manned space vehicles which will allow more sophisticated and venturesome missions to be performed.
Command and Control for Neat-Earth OfhU. The Soviet capability to undertake complex earth orbital operations is limited by certain majorin the USSR's command and control network. Although we believe tbe internal command and control network generally will be adequate to support most single missions, tha lackorldwide tracking and communicationsmay handicap the Soviets tn the performance of. some orbital operations and willevere handicap if the Soviets attempt to control several operational systems, each consisting of several orbiting vehicles. Major Improvement to Soviet tracking capability would result from additional tracking stations almost any place outside the USSR. Soviet interest in acquiring tracking stations abroad has been high. Cuba, where th* Soviets have installed an optical tracking station and are going toolniya receiver station, may be tbe site of the first Soviet land-based tracking station outside the territory of the USSR. Soviet efforts toracking station in Australia have been frustrated. Current Soviet activities in th* UAR and Somalia may foreshadow attempt* to establish tracking stations in one of those countries.
ommand and Control for Diep Space. The deep-space tracking facilities located In the Crimea and currently used In unmanned lunar and planetary flights limit tracking and communications to interrupted schedules. The actual time available for tracking and communications for lunar probes depend* upon the hinar declination and varies fromoay. We believe that the ability to track and communicate with manned lunar flights4 hour per day basil is needed to help insure the safety of such missions. The Soviets could, however, undertake manned bin or flights even with their limited tracking and communication capability by accepting the calculated risk of not being able to communicate with the spacecraft for certain periods of tun* If the Soviets constructed facilities In their Far East areas, they could Increase significantly the time available for contact with theb lunar missions There is no evidence that
any VcoaTperarJe too US* Crimea are being installed anew he ie. however, and we relieve their construction would require at least two years
The Soviets could alio extend the tarse available lor corrixrrcaucannj with their lunar mission by using appropriately equipped ship* as relay centers between the spacecraft and tha control center. To be effective,ystem woulda high capacity communications link between the ship and (he control center. Wrthout this high capacity link, eoerrmunlcetlons would be united to relay nf verbal icjuTjcnonj and lystem status rainrnaries and would oot permit positive rtuaaibn control. We have ao evidence that the Soviets have rrartaOed th* necessary aournarreM on any of uSerf surface shape a* yet butystem using such ship borne relay hnk* ia wall within their cnpabtitty. The Soviets could conceivably use coramurucaiione satellites as relay linkssurface riatious for deep space nights.
flandnoour ond Docking. Critical to many advanced type* of manned space missions is the reoutremerrt lo develop techniques for remdezvous and docking of vehicle* In space. New Soviet spacecraft, unlike tbe Voatok and Voskhod. wiC probably be designed for reodervous and docking and willthe necessary ecjurpenent for rrurneuverablhry. engine restart, and hook-up Soviet technology is ruffldenOy advanced to make available tbe various seniors required for such, radar and transponders. Ifere the initial teatsew spacecraft designed for reodazvoua andthe Soviets could conduct initial manned mluions of these types using currently available launch ryrtenu within the neat few months.
useoesry. Tba point of reentry into tbe earth's atmosphere of lunar return trafactorJae would beouthorth ktJtirde on thaurface, dependmg upon th* declmenon of tha moon at the time of the tight. The Soviet land mas* He* well north of this band Thus, any spacecraft which did not axorporate some mean* (or altertng its reentry trajectory could not be recovered within the USSR. Since we believe having an co-board propulsion system for altering reentry ttarectories would be Impractical, tbe Soviets need topacecraft having some aerodynamic bit thai ait eristics or, akorna-lively, toater recovery capability. There are no arm indication* that the Soviets have conducted aerodynamic reentry teat* or that they area water recovery capability but testa of either could begin at any tunc We believe that the tfert* required toecovery technique would notinting factor In the Soviet manned lunar program.
aeniry. Some Soviet scientists have Indicated that reentry at lunar return velocities is one of the major problems confronting them in their lunar program. The angle of reentry Into tho earth's atsrscepherc must be kept wflhtn very narrow bkrets. If Use angle at too steep, accelerations would be too greatanned spacecraft to wit bet aad On the other band, if the reeatry angle I* too shallow the spacecraft would "ikjp" ofi th* earth'* atmosphere back tnto space.
a additional reentryhat ot brntng, Tbe abLiUve iruterlat rised on the Voetok would be adequate topacsxsaft rasvtstg nobft csWactrs-istsrsL Heat shjcl<hnr foespevoeeraft having tome degree of Bft preaenodifferent problem because the beat absorbed la greater. Further-oxee, the higher aerodynamic forces exerted on tha spacasnrsft would tend to strip away tbe beat shield cnatrsrtal
e believe that the Soviets wiTl have to test ibeir new spacecraft, whatever its shape, under corrdiirorss espeoted on hrnar return trajectories Boosted re-entnes from earth orbst or from high altitude ballistx trayectorici oould produce some Decenary test data, but lor full scale sinmutions of hrnar leturn velcrrties, the Soviets must conduct an unmanned ctreurnlunei Sight or wait tmfil the new eery large launch vehicle is available.
On Board Power. Tbe rmyorfty of Soviet srseoexraft ftowo to date have nsed cheroics) batteries or ssslar ceils for electrical power supply. Evidence of Soviet chernkcal battery capabilities irschcates welghtefScseoaei of aboutatt hour/pound, wfalch compares ravorabh/ with curreot US capers brie* The Soviets could Increase this figure toatt hour/pound if they feel the need to rave weight Rsdioisotope/oSsrrooeiectric conversion systems which were used tn two Soviet sotetKros orbited5nd II watts of electric powerapacity far too small to be usedfe support system.
During theears the Soviets have been pursuingirected toward the devearsprnerat of fuel cells. Performance leering of fuel ceBs using the hydjogia-oaygen reaction prtrvctple Is probably underway and inoviet electrocbemiit claimed that they have successfully developed fuel cells having one Wlowstt output We estimate the Soviets oould have fuel cells suitable for short space missions now.
Bkmtdical. The Soviets probably now have rufBdent biomedical data to plan withanned flighteeks, this would be adequate totanned crrrsuralraraar or lunar lending rrusitoa Al present, however, the Soviets appear to be concerned with the eflecta oo human beings of oon-siderabry longer duration flightsboutays orhere are few indications of how tbey wiD solve the baornealical problems associated with flights of that chjabon. but wa believe thatolution, should be ready fn time for long-diiration projects tn the next few years.
The Soviets have srumerrjssa faalrtiea for simulating various aspects of space envtronmeot including cerstjifugestresses, low pressure and lowchambers, suspension devices for snrrulsting reduced gravity, and various devices and equipments for experimentation wtth moo and animals In closed environments. These facilities and activities are probably adequate to support any of the various manned space versturea they may attempt.
ift Svppoet Systsvu. In their msrrjoed spece flights the Soviets haveife support system based oo en air-like mixture of oxygen and
whrogenea level pressure ol oatba Soviets have apparently Varan able io scale up the ryttamoan-day limit. They probably can adapt ihtf system aod their eipsieneesanned earth-orbiting Station as weB aaanned cUcumluoar rnisaicei. For tvture rrujaoons in which weight wouldreater Irsnrting factor or bs long duration fbghts, suchanned lunar lacingarge space starroo. wholly new technique* probably would be required. Theae could be partial regenerative or closed loop systems. The first Soviet Sight withew environmental control system would probably be experimental and probably would Involve limited objectives, primarilyature
rSen/eSton ond SrfobihsaWkm. Tbe Soviets haveigh degree of precision in the orientation and stabilisation of apeoeesait when tbe mission rwrseirvs It On those pay loads where such pointing ecrur-scies are not required, rite Soviets have utilised spin stafrurration or have tolerated ismdorn tumbling All Soviet space vehicles requiring accurate earth orientation have been provided wtth fully autcmanc systems. In manned vehicles, the automatic system la becked upanual system which can override the automatic system when neceerary. The manual system Is capable of accuracies consistent with the safe recovery of the manned vehicle
ssde from the aoeratrSe and tctssrucsl cceisldeseiicn* which we havethereariety of other factors which wiD influence the scope and pace of future Soviet space endeavors. These include such things aa the effect of past decisions, lhe views of tbe present Soviet leader? on the benefits to be derived from their space program, costs, the need for regaining lust prestige, and Soviet views on the US program.
We are unable to identify organisations snd individuals directing and executing the Soviet apace program. Broad policy directives on all apace maters are probably Issued by tbe Fohtburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We behove that these chrectrves are trrmlrmvrrrtedu'gh-kvel commission corrrpoted of both government and patty ofBciab- The Ministry of Ceneral Machine Building, supported by the industrial mmistries such as defense,radio, and electronics, rxobohty as responsible for the development and production of space hardware. The Academy of Sciences provides scientific espertlse to Ihe entire space efiort, cootrols scientific programs, and acting principally through the Commission for the Expke-atlon and UtilluliOD of Spaceponsors representatives at mternatsonal meetings.
The Soviets almost certesnly have already decided the nature of their space program for the nest five years and have probably established an appros> mate timetable for the vartoos activHkea related to that program Whale it tt pnssihle to stretchrogramonger period of rime than originally plannedeven to speedrogram eomewhat to meet new deadlines, it is
extremely difficult to re-tailorprogram In Its late stage* io meet an entirely different objective than was initially established. While the present Soviet leaders may try to effect economies in certaih sectors, we consider it unlikely that they can. at this late date, effect any basso changes In the overall nature of the program for tbe next five years.
Based hugely oo analogy with coats of tha US space program, we estimate that expenditures in the Soviet space program have been rising at an average annual rate roughly equivalent to USillion3 when aboutillion were expended,8 when aboutillion were expended. Much of this increase is accounted for by the major launch facilities at Tyuratamthose which we estimate are being developed for the eery large launch system. We believe the latter program Is sufficiently advanced to permit the overall cost of the Soviet space program to level off shortly and bold at about5 billion per year for the next few years. These costs include our esti-mates of both th* military and nonmllrlary porticos of th* Soviet space program.
Th* recently signed Outer Space Treaty is not likely toignificant effect on the military or pop military aspects of the Suviat space program. Tbe treaty prohjbits the estsbhsbroent of military Installations, the testing of any type* of weapons, and tbe staging of military maneuvers on celestial bodies. It also ban* placing nuclear weapons In earth orbit and on celestial bodies, but ft doe* not prohibit the development or testing of delivery vehicles for an orbital or fractional orbit weapon system. Further testing of theystem would not be contrary to th* treaty as long as such tests did not Involveuclear weapon Irs orbit Deployment of an operational system on the ground is not prohibited.
he treaty permits the use of military petrsoonel and eqiripmerit for the peaceful exploration ofexample,anned space station or forducting scientific research oo the moon. While there is no specific mention in the treaty of satellite reconnaissance, the Soviets made no effort to revive 'heir old charges that such activity Is illegal and they seemed to accept it a* legitimate.
The extent to which the treaty wfH help the USSR ropplement its own space tracking capabilities Is uncertain. According to tbe treaty, parties to the treaty 'shall consider* requests of other signatories to be afforded anto observe the flight of the requesting state's space objects; tbe nature of this opportunity, as well as the conditions under which It would be afforded, would be determined by agreement between the states concerned. However, other sigrratory nations are not obliged to grant any Soviet request for observing its space objects when they are out of view from Soviet territory.
Tho Soviets probably feel that during the next few years they must take steps to regain some of the prestige they lost to th* highly successful US Gemini program. Furthermore,7 two important anniversaries wiH be ob-
served uj Ihe USSK.h anniversary of thendhof the October Revolution. The Soviets probably have planned some form of space spectacular to celebrate one or both of these dates. Somewhat later they will be confronted with the necessity to at least partially blunt tbe rrtternational impact of the US Apollo program. For thee* reasons andhe capability of the space hsddware which they are now developing, we beheve that tbe next five years willeriod In which the Soviets will attempt space ventures far more complicated and spectacular than heretofore undertaken.
IV. OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR. General
n considering developments In the Soviet space program over the next five years, we can estimate feasible extension of all current projects but rt is difficult lo determine which specific missions will be flown. We do not believe the Soviets have at hand all of the necessary technical and economic resource* for undertaking all projectse therefore believe that some possible project* will not be attempted, others will be slowly paced, andresources will be committed toew. The expansion of theproject over tbe past two years shows that project* of demonstrable strategic value can and will be funded. While it is dear that useful missions can still be accomplished with existing hardware,qually clear Ihat more spectacular and sophisticated missions will have to await the new hardware now under development.
he Soviets fn their many official and unofficial statements about their space program, have given no indication of what the order of priority is to be. Indeed, much of what Is saidonflicting or ambiguous. In arriving at likely dates for specific missions, we haveigh but not complete level of successharing of priorities amoog several categories of projects. In general, tho likely date tor any given mission wouldear or so later than that winch we consider to be the earliest practicable date. We note that delays and failures have occurred and have socnctUr.ca plagued the Soviets for longuch difficulties can recur at anyupon theof hardware based on new and more complexcould delay achievementpecific missionear or two.
be Soviet manned lunar landing program and th* huge manned space station program are large-scale undertakings, both of which require tho use of tbe oery large booster and associated launch facilities which we estimate are being developed at Tyuratam. The dates we believe these venture* can be carried out are based on technical feasibility and do not fake Into account the order In which they may be attempted. We do not believe they could be undertaken corrcisrreotly. It must be understood therefore, thai the one which bt given priority may be carried outhe time indicated and that the other will he deferredear or so.
B. Manned Lunar Landing
In5 we estimated that the Soviet maimed lunar landingwas probably not Intended to be competitive wtth tho Apollo program as then projected. Lev, aimed atime period. We believerobably still the cue There is the possibility, however, that depending upon the present Soviet view of the Apollo timetable, they may feel that there Ii noma prospect of their getting to the moon first and they may press their program in hopes of being able to do so
Several fact on militate against their being able to compete with the ApoDoriginally planned. We believe that the required launch system will not be ready for test until aboutaunch vehicle is available, we would espect toeries of tests for man-rating the system est ending over atearunar landing would be Attempted Io the meantime, the Soviets will need to checkew spacecraft, to teatst lunar return velocities, and perhaps toater recovery capability. Depending upon the technique relected, they may also need to test rendervous and docking techniques and equipment.
5B. Some Soviet scientists have criticized the Apollo technique and stated that their lunar flight will go directly from earth to tbe moon's surface and return without any orbital rendezvous required. We estimate that any lunar landing mission whichingle vehicle using conventional propellents wouldooster developing considerably greater thrust than any weare being developed. The Soviets have alsoechnique involving the placing oi components and fuol on the moon by two or mote very largethen having cosmonauts assemble these components oo the moonehicle and fuel it for direct return to earth. This technique is risky since very accurate guidance is required to place the manned vehicle sufficiently close to the landing site of earlier flights and there is no provision for an abort of the manned flight.
Other Techniques could involve rendeavour and docking of two or more very large vehicles in earth orbit for assembly and fueling the hrnar vehicle, before proceeding to the ntoon. The Soviets could alao carry out two launches to the moon, one for landing an the moon and return to Kiner orbit, and the other for lunar orbit and return to earth. Either of these otisssoos could be attempted within the cspabQltset we believe the Soviets will have when the new eery large lauoch system is available.
If. however, the Soviets were to develop high energy propel lants for use In upper stages of the new eery large launch vehicle they could use anyide variety of mission profiles toan on the moon and return him to earth. We have estimated earlier that man-rated upper stages using high energy propcDanU could be available0 or shortly thereafter.
All things considered, we estimate that the earliest the Soviets couldanned lunar landing, would bee believe that the roost likely date isInime period
C. Mormad Spoce StoHori
Tha Soviets tie conttnulnr to voice gerseralitie* about tnanned spaceI be. refer to themost of terms, such as cities In space, giant frying laboratories, scientific reaeaich Institutes, refueling stations, etc. Sovietfrequently identify two broad space station functions; to pursue research objectives, and to serveaunching or an assembly base for manned lunar and planetary missions. References to military applications of space stations have been oonrplcuously absent.
Neither the Interim nor ultimate configurationpace station* has bean defined by th* Soviets. Prerequisite technique*ig-term space Station would be maneuver, rerrdesrvoua, docking, and extensive useful EVA. None of these techniques have been dexrsooatraled Sn th* Soviet manned space program to data although the Soviet* bave beenariety of Uboratcev Simula boos tnvoMcg muftiroeo crews for long periods ot ttrna
ased on our expectationonventional pi opepper stage will be used tn the manned space program, we believe thai this system would be *ciployed to oranned space station or componentspace station weighing0 pounda and capable ofrew of three or more could probably be placed in earth orbit in the first half of ISOa This could be attcrnpted in7 as an "anniversary spectacular" but only if th* Soviets press this developmentow spacecraft, rcodex-vous, dorJong. and eitraveblcular operation! could extend the operatkma)oi the station to several moo ths and perhaps aa longear.Ihe Soviets couldission In7 wherein theould be used toarge unmanned platform and thanuld be used to put the new spacecraft into orbit ta rendeavous and dock with the platform already Sn orbit Tbe crew could be augmented or exchangedan or twoiro* bv lubaeeruent launching*.
OS We believe that the Soviets wifl probably also develop and eetabfcshlarge manned epace station. This development will probably be on*from then manned lunar landing program and probably not bewithoery large booster which we estimate ta
being developed will probably be capable of placing on the orderounds in near-eartheight budget of this magnitude is auJbleJeritariety of activities about which Ih* Soviets havepace nation of this size wouldermanent or semipermanent space labca-atory to b* placed in orbit byt the earliest Wo beheve the moat likely date is scmetlme inune period. RcWtJon oi per
' Wapace sUnaeiumaiasaod. ooorecovmU* otkmne vetUrae biteodrd for prolongedunbnunoe orvw oeakl be receveieJ bynr-Pea of the vehicle, akamtjvaly crew recovery or roMpeljr could bs earned outam/ vaaicla.
sonneltmupvty ol Ihetoo would be acoarrrphshed by spoors-raftendezvous and clocking capability.
e think it probable that the Sovntj willanned circ-amlunar flightteprogram having more ambitious objectives aa iti subaequent goah. suchanned lunar landing or manned flights to explore other planets. Tbe Soviets have sosnctlmes describedlight as one preliminary activity leading up to the manned landing Tbey may also consider that an early manned circumlunar flight would pay important dividends in terms of prestige, and couldeans to (jflset mme ol tho propaganda value of the US Apollo program.
he Soviets couldanned clrcumhinar flight by using existing hardware. In order to do so they would need toesJl upper stage to tbeystem, man-rats this comblnallon wills aninal stags,fv the Voeibod spacecraft to giveid. nurse coriection capability. This conv bustton couldayload of0 poundsfrcumlunar trakxiory. winch weald pcrrost the Soviets lorew of twoxrenmiuner flight. Alter-satfveJy. the Sovlrta may chocee toewc*lW upper stage designed to be fewn with theystem end lhe new specs-craftascourse guidance cepebdity bxherent In Its design
W# believe that en attemptanned ctrevmhaxsr fhght would be preceded by at least one untnarmed mission utilising the same mission profile and hardware. We believe that tost flightseriod of about sis months would be required to man-rate the system and to test the equipment and recovery techniques for water lending which may be requiredanned circumlunar flight.
Optimum "window" conditionsoviet manned drcumlunar flight occur during theonths of the year when the moon Is atnortherly decHnstkm. Fee this mason, wc believe lhat the earliest the Soviets wouldanned circumlunar flight would be during tbe first halft is conceivable that they would attempt such anas an "srxtuversary spectacular" inut because of the grave risks involved we rxlieve thatnlikely that they wtD do an
and Planetory Probes
systems utilised far the current phases of unmanned hrnarrsrocebh/ edequetesjiefy cf mtssioos to the Dear future. Lunarsexsnsogisphlc, and gravity irurtrumentetton equipment may beInto the rrussioris of future sort-larsclers. But if the Soviets corttfmseexisting lunar probe vehicles, weight Unas ta fionj probebfy willinclusion of all three ex-perttiwnfs ta the seme mission.
diting photographic capabilities probably will be used Io provide bigh-resohition photographs o( the moon to aid in selecting futuie landing sites for manned veliicles. Weight analysis of the Limapaenraft Indicatesotal payload weight could be increased tounar mapping mission in tbe arbiter program;inion was possibly intended forcientific meetusements acquired by lunar arbiters wiD be ncceaaaxy to give an account of the haaards the moon 'a onvuorsrnent will Irnpoae on funar cosmonauts. OrbMers can abasetermination of tbeass, sue. and anomahes in its gravitational Bead. Thus, the data obtained by lunar or briers wouldsuiaed ctrramroner mutton ax weQamoed lunar kmdsng
any of the techntquer utilized byad Lunan soft landing on tbe moon have obvious applicationanned lunar landing mission. However, very extensive modification of the descent and Landing procedures used by the recent eoft-landers will be required for manned lunar landing. Lamarovided more refined data on the physical characteris'lis ol the hinar surface which will be useful in determining techniques and weight tolersnoesanned hinar landing.
Soviet program for unmanned planetary esplcrsttoa probablyprincipal objectives; to collect photography and adentlfic data byand to make planetary atmosphere sod surface meerur eaves Is. Inthe failure of the Soviets torobe toward Mars during thatarry thai year, we be hew planetary eaptorattoe will continue.wiB probebh/ avail mrmsetvet of the neat "window* to Venus inpossibly using theaunch system Theaunch systctw. wtthpayload capability. wiDariety of otherto be attempted as Ihe period progresses. These could includeVenus arbiters. Mercury and Jupiter fly-by probes, and Mars and Verms
f. Applied Satellites
Soviets have started construction of aboutew groundthe northern and eastern areas of the USSR as part of their project toMeanrys oomrnunication satellite system into their coram unica bonabelieve that aD of the new terminals will be operational by Novemberreceive satellite relayed neasmisnona. We believe that this saetworkcontinue to expand as mare sophisticated cemmuriicauons saieThteeand that stations wH! be equipped toroad range ofservices0 the Soviets probably will have tested theof brnedtssstlng directly to hrane roceivers or to relatively simpleantennae
7ft We estimate that the Soviets will launch meteorological satellites in in-cjcasing number* during the next five years; there are Indications that they plan to launch shoutf these vehicles duringeriod. The Soviets
will probably develop more sophisticated inaOuroeutatioa for use a) theirsatellites lo obtain Information on *uch thingsatmospheric teaTipereture. rrurnidify. sod precipitation. MtiMolopol set elbtes may also be used to contract additional obeervioora such ai geological mapping, crop surveillance, and ice reccen-uUssaoce.
G. PoislbU Soviet Military Uses ot Spoce
hroughout tha period of the estimate Ihe Soviets will eroerfmeritariety of space systems which could be used for military purposes. Newspace application* will be introduced as Soviet technology advances and as requirements for such systems areilitary role for man to space may emerge prior to the end of the period, particularly as the ability lo operate manned space rta'iocj grows.
ilitary Swmport Systenu The launching of recoverable photographic and Elmt reconnelasance satelhtea from Tyuratam and Plesetsk will probably coritinue at about th* present rate until similar missions of longer duration, or manned orbital.tanae platforms, ar* employed. To improve data handling time the Soviets will probably develop an Imrrroved photavtdeo systemultiple film capsule recovery system for long duration missions, they willo use comrnutacatkm relay satellite* in an attempt to achieve near-real-time data handling ber "ten widely separatedatellite with lun;'ed maneuver capability for clcctromagaetlc and phot or rconi >alasanee may be developed to mart rmitary needs sn tbe neat few years.
h* high priority evident In tha recoverable pbotographic raconneiiaence satellite project will probably ba eatendad to Other selected military support aystrana which the Soviet leaders decide are easential; these will probably Include system* for improved global communloetlims and TV relay, weather observation, and navigation.
SO OffurkM, Weapon Syrtemj On th* buss of Soviet teat* of thesea paragraphs, wa estimateirst feneration fractional oebet bombardment syttem usmg tbe SL-I1 booster could ba deployed us small numbers by7 orA It could be deployed In lb* same type of silo* a* thee*el*ied with theCBM. That system, using all martial guidance, couldEP on the order. depending on the range and couldarhead ofound*.*hort-lived multiple orbit
telfcve that a* tads system were U) be IbedortiarJy tra|*cMry toward the US coveringhe CEP could be oo the orderun. If. Iitrwever, the Soviets were to aonch the synernoutherly trajectory covering. to attack tba US Iron the eeotfc, tha CEP could be on the orderm- This Judgment is based on our etunutt of Soviet technical cspebDitke and assume aa aU-taatUal guidance system. We bava no Ibm ban (or judging -bai lb* arauacy ot thu lyiWm would be ia an oprnKroralold be somewttal leu accurals et an eerty IOC If, tn the future, now moere for trajectory conecuon were to ba bcorporeted lo tne system, the CEP could bo Improved somewhat.
bombardment rriim couldelcrped from tho same hai'nl deployed to tbe same manner but we believe thatnlikely.
There is on identified program which Indicates that the Soviets ore develcpmr an offensive1 space weapon system Ihat would ba deployed and rjufauuned ta orbit Several saw system components wot Id reed toong-life powar source and an sttsrude reference system However, much oi tba space technology and hardware currently befog tested by tbe Soviet* could ba usedasis for th* development ofystem.
For th* foresceabl* future, w. thinkultiple orbit bombardment system deployed In space will not compare favorably with ICBMs tn terms nl effectiveness, relUbihty, vulnerability, average life and susceptibility to loss of control du* to accident or couiitaibe Soviet leadership probably would retogr.iae thai the deployment tn ipaca of aorbital bornbardmeat system would be an act of major mternabonal import wbkb would mtenSfy greatly East-West hostility andtrong oew stimulus ton view of these factors, tha much greater coat of such orbital weapons, aad Soviet agreement to tbe treaty on peaceful use* of apace, wethat the Soviets are unlikely toultiple orbit bombardmentm space during tbe period of this eetimate.
W* recognise that the Soviets might reach different larrdnstons as to cost and effectiveness and that altered political considerations tn soca* future phase of East-Weal relations might lead themhfferent dacrrtoa Even ta these crcuaastaBcea, we beheve that they would regard space weapons priti**jiryeans of supplementing eaisUng forces, of tetroducmg additional ccnnplicarkms into US defena* planning, aod of supporting Soviet claims to strategic parity or even superiority.
Defmttoe Weapon Syatewu. Th* Soviets almost certainly havesystems for use against satellites. The deployment oi sons* of the Hen House/Dog House radars, aad their technical characteristic* indicate that they could be used In support of an enheateUrte weapon syriem. Ahhouga this could provide one of tha eaeenrtal elements of an antrsetelUte system,o intelhgence as to tba method of Intercept Developmentoorbttel intercept system wouldajor undertaking, but because of the added capability of mspoction and th* greater operational nVribflity against satellites at higherprovided byystem, tha Soviet* may explore such en approach In addition to, but not in placeirect ascent enenatelLta system.
ba Soviets have demonstrated as part of their missile and space programs, marry of the necessaryubsystems, and capabilmaa applicableoorbrtal inteeeaptor clevelopsnentndode the preciie control of launch time; some of tha operational procedure* required for rendezvous, orbital transfer; stability and control systems; and an engine restart capability. These psovide the* for the Soviet* to develop an Initial unmanned coorbltal
syrtera by tba time th* Hen How/Dog Ho-.se radar sy*Urw becnusae fuQy operationalantern would be very expensive aod would probably b* severelyIn target selectionimited plane change capability, and Inspection would be limited to TV. For these reasons we doubt that tbe Soviets would developystem. Wa de not eaclud* the poeilbillty, bowevar, that tba Soviets may elect toore rActerit uaneoned coca total tnepectton eeriebOfty at son* time later in the period
A manned coorbHal system could be developed In the* an outgrowth ol lb* Soviet manned space program. Although tha costs ofystem would be high. operationalopportunifwe lor bafpacOon, neodeatruetrve Mutralbattoo. orpurnfy Itsmoot.
The totfrfereuc* with orbiting ateHltc* Is prohibited In the spaoa treaty bat th* developmentapability to do io is not. Wc believe that the Soviets would realtor* that any use of antisatelllte systems in peacetime would rtah opening thetr own miliary support systems to rrtanatlon. We trdnh rt likary. uWafora, that the Soviets would use antisatalllto systems only if they believed that war with th* US was Imminent and that neutralization of our military support system, waa consequently an ovamding consideration. There might also ba other spaoa)s as which they would us* anttsatefljta systems la peacetime, for eaampla, they might believe thai they were retaliating against US mterferwice with their own satellite*.
K LWnned rjpterarkmr Spoce
apkaabon of near Space to data has beenowSoviet scientists haveide rang* ol* scientificba studied by mean* of satellites and spacehe* stated plansprobes and satellites for ob*ervlnj solar electromagneticstreams, coarnic rays, radiation balls, rugrsenc nerds, theand mfrared and ultraviolet radiation. Many of thesebeen and will continue to be carried out by Ibe small Kapustin YarAdditional satellites may be launched from Tvuratam todata at great distance* from the earth.
V. THE LONG T'RM OOTLOOK A. foctors Affecting
bar* httl* evidence oraacernjng long-term Soviet objectives itcan estimate th* Ulely scope of the Soviet spacenlyery tentative basis. Some cosmonauts, scientists,other Soviet space enthusiasts have often referred to possible futureas toterpknetary ezpicaaodo, but the political leadership during tbe pastor so ba* made little public reference to rpace acflvrtiaa, and has avoided
any opm reference toprograms boy' Tho leadership has probably not yet decided which particular venture* to empbaxiso ben/cod the manned lunar landing era, and almcet certainly her been unible to gauge with any degree of precision the ernounl of reeources Hfceiy to be available for apace program* in the neat decade.
The question of resource aBocnHonentral one in Soviet polities. Competition for resources hat intensified since the, when the marked slowdown in Soviet economic growth began, and political inflghting. in pert based on this competition, has become characteristic of fare within the leadership. The post-Khriuhcfsev collective leadership has not Indicated any substar.tial ability to resoNe problems associated wtth the establishment of economic priorities; ft has as yet been unable to agree on the final version of the current Five-Year-Plan, which began moreear ago. In tbe meantime, competingand space, growth andall, in effect, been assured high priorities.
One of the principal causes of economic difficulties in tbe USSR during3 has been the preemption of highly skilled human resources and top-grade material reeources by rapidly growing programs to advanced weapons and space- Among other things, these pogrom* have impfnged on the quality and effectiveness of investment elsewhere in the economy, and the present collective if surely aware of tins. Aside from eScats to achieve DiarginaJ economies,the leadership has not sought to attack the problem by reducing or even leveling off erpendltures lo these areas, and we estimate that it at unlikely to do so over the next four or five years. If important programs must be cut, avilian claimants are the most likely to suffer, as in the recent past.
OS. Whether the Soviet leaders will be willing to approach the problemew way Inul of course, depend on many factors: tbe state of tbe economy, the international climate, the composition and nature of the leadership, the mterptay of domestic poUtical and economic pressures, the progress of specific military and space programs, tbe progress and scope of comparable US programs, and tbe leadership's calculations as to the costs of the program versus its probable returns, scientific, military, and political Tha latter factor, the political, hi likely to he of particular rnrportsuxe. The propaganda and prychologicel benefits of the program, both at borne and abroad, have always been of prime interest to the Soviet regime; tbe USSR's pJorseertagIn space added greatly to its International prestige and probably helped to justify the regime to Its own people. It may be, however, that such benefits wul drmiruah with time and familiarity, and that Scrviet prestige is less bsrery in the future to increase agnificaatly on the basis of individual exploits, such as Sputnik.
'Even the pstceUDea for the ctnrant Ptve-Teerc aorta hnef end antonly concerning tha appacattoo of space tetiaofegy to van on aarttuovide la tha ax-yea* planhe further study of apses end the appUest-ou ef the obramed reaurtt for toprevloe radio (Voa&iialiaUOoi, radio navtsxttior. and tslevuSoo. for weatherand lee ether practical pttrpceaa."
ossibility of Soviet Cooperation in Space Matters
Until recently, the Soviet- hud rtsunchry refused to offer any mdkatkni that tbey were wflltng to cooperate in soy field of sptce activity.2 the Soviets agreed to exchange satellite -collected weather data with the US, and in6 passed the first of their data to the US. This step plus the cooperative Soviet attitude evidenced during the recent discusaions on the UN treatypeaceful uses of space and the sg-reernent with France on relay of TV and other cooperative space projects lead us to beheve that the Soviets will become more willing to exchange various scientific and technical data with the US and ether nations as the various programs progress. Tbey may, for example, be willing to exchange such data on radiation belts, solar effects, gravity anomalies, additional aod more detailed meteorology.
Apart from technical difficulties, there are three factors which would tend to limit tbe extent of Soviet cooperation Id space. First, the prestige of being tbe first nation to accomplish various space missions continues to he Important to the USSR. Second, the prospective gain in cooperating beyond the exchange of scientific and technical data would have to be convincing to the Soviets as long as major International political Issues remain unresolved. Third, the close association of military and civilian space programs in tbe USSR would restrict tbe areas of cooperation which the Soviets would be willing to consider. We believe, however, that if the advantages to be gained are persuasive, the Soviets may agree to some ventures in which compatible equipments could be launched by the USSR and another nation and link together to perform functions of mutualommunications systemarge portion of the globeorldwide meteorological system. We consider it unlikely, however, that within the period of this estfmato the Soviets will be willing to coerperate to the extent of exchanging space hardware.
We have considered the possibility that at some time beyond tbe lunar exploration eta the costs and technical complexity of more extensive planetary exploration may be so great that ooe nation would not consider ft feasible or practical to undertake tt. We believe it less likely that the Soviets would be wining to Join the USilateral venture than to participaterogram sponsoredroup cfne under the aegis of the UN.
C. Possible Undertakings
ecause we are unable to estimate Soviet intentions in space over tlie long term, our consideration of possible space activities must real heavily on our estimates of likely Soviet capabilities tn the field. Moreover, even on this bards, we must make the assumption that the various projects tbe Sovietsin the near term wiD for the most part be successful and that long-term ventures will be sble to proceed from earlier achievements.
oviet writings and oratory haveroad spectrum of potential undertakings in apace but have railed, probably deliberately, to highlight any particular one or ones as those likely to be pursued by the USSR. However.
curtain venturer are mentioned more often than others and thb repetition may provide the clue to future Sovieteview of Soviet wrfftogi, speeches, and mtervfews over Ihe part two year* lhowi that the following possi-UUtiej are th* meat often addraesed:
expansion of the applied satellite program in the field* ofmeteorology, geodesy, and navigation.
of the sun and planets.
c Large complex mace srabons, to serve as sdenfifk research bases, as launch platforms for other space sliips, as aitrooomlcal observe tod re, etc,
unar Use or laboratory" toariety of functions mdudlng astronomicalaunching station for deep space probes, meteoro-logicalsan for the exploration of the moon itself.
ormally missing from thefr official statements is mention of programs with chrect mlbtary applicability. Nevertheless we believe that they willto explore military application* of space,
la discussing the lunar baa* or "laboratory- the Soviets are obviouslyto something far more extensive and complicatedather small, two or three man, short duration installation. In these discussions, tbe Sovieta do not describe tbe means of puttingtation In place, but restrict the discourse to desirabilityase of thb type and the scientific advantages to be gained The constructionanned lunar base of the sire and nature Implied in the Soviet discussitms would be extremely complex and costly, and would require tha Soviets to develop equipment and techniques far morethan we IseUeve that they wiD be able to achieve within the nextears.
A tune table for the Soviet manned planetary exploration program has probably not been established Soviet developmentapability tolaunch manned vehicles from an orbital apace station launch platform could eventually lead to manned fly-bvs of Mm, Venus, or other planets. In thb correction, the Soviet* are actively engaged In the investigation of advanced electrical propulsionhich would bo efficient means of transportingpayloads over interplanetary distances. The Soviets claim to have testedevice for attitude control of thepacecraft, which they launched towardowever, the Soviet lackuitable nuclear power source for an electrical propulsion system would precludeery large payloadlanet before tbet the earliest Thestlrnatad toeriod of decreased solar activity andavorable period for such Bights. We believe, however, thatnlikely that the Soviets will have advanced sufficiently far in their programs to attempt any such flights by that time, chiefly because of th* problems inherent io the developmentife support system capable of supporting manned flights of the several years6 for interplanetary travel.
o evidence lhat tne Soviets are developingnuclear rocket engine for tnterplinotary propublon. although tbey art continuing rerearch which could be applicable toevelopment. It would probably take the Sovtruoears, after mtttatWn of the program, to develop such an
Theare believed torogram armed al developmentucwar rteetce/theerniorbc oonvvrtor pcrwer source.ystem would have greater efficiency than thermoelectric systems and an output of hundreds or kilowatts of electric power. The development program ta probably in en early stage andystem will probably not become operational until the msoVlVTOs.
Various fact are scientific, technical, andprobablytbe esplottstton of soange of poaaihfheies aa ts sedicsted by Soviet open aourceat However, the steps taken toward these programs are so Interrelated that any step taken bo soy one program would be of benefit tn others. Priority protects will probably be undertaken, but we have no evidence upon which toudgment of which program or programs will be assigned what priority.
ESTIMATED TIMING OF MAJOR SOVIET SPACE EVENTS
SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES0
HISTORY Of SOVIET /WANNED SPAttfclGHT PROJECTS
HISTORY Of SOVIET LAUNCHINGS OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES
lona Duration Monned FI iUh> or Small Spacei0
.vtorvvad Orcurnlunor Flloht
8 9 0 1 2 3
large Spot*0 lb)
Tho lightlyo* represent the earliest possible dotes wo bollove .hoow id bo iWerloken. Tho darker shading represents cur estimate aa to when the projects or* snore likely to bo undertaken.
Optimum "windows" 'or Soviet clrcomlwnor tliahts arc duringwnths of tho year.
believe the Icroe tpoce station and manned lunar Landing pnsgroew con bet undertaken concurrently but we> cannotalid eitlraote o* to which will be uivdertaban first.
16 6 1
- to i
HISTORYIKT MAHNBD BPACEPUQHT PROJBCTB
(Note: Althoughurabor of tultina. la the SovWl prom.ni.noi of any SovietraiNtraA)
Ipporting UM fnil'ir*
B Aug 00
fl (Sp-rtnlk 9)
ta. Flrwl known ftovlel oaa oi the expnaoloo "Coaaalo Bpaeaatrorookat failure; detered
enUlood two doe* analaaeataaona. Firat aueeeealojVeeSee-Uka apeeearalt. Ceaapjebaeatee :at par lot*a. la-Bightct Oct afloat* ol
npttaros rnekudlng iawiaelcelaal, anient Julenddiea.
Pejloed: lOOSBIba. Blaaller te Kentbl'uriad ap or. raaau-r Tee dee*.
Patiisre ofwr-i Tee
ontained ooa cVog.ot man-rating ot ToMob.
9 lb*oa dog. Coo-tl null on of aaae-rulng ol Voetok.
8 It*.Brat anaaaed orbital apae* Sight.
8n* ooo-Oaj aUt>loo. flfmorjnrtiorl buaaaa ability lo oat, aleep, and work nader eeaoMieee olight: veatlbular eXniarboeeaa aufrwed by easeaoeeat-
rarbaad:ba..long wit* Voatokaa tret uet e> lee *nb>*t* onset gaoenvli BaUu ooedliaaaa of apeeo Slgfat-
8 lb* Popovte*.
Pajtoad: lO.MOlte. Bykevafcly:funba*cvaluataaei of fcuatan meetnsealled apase BlgM, aapeelallr eartMraeeular tlmmliimmng.
ba.loof wtthrel tort of raelo aod female eubtaet* undar generally aleUlar eendillone; Brat Bight ot
Voekbed -uli .tuuuKiea.amt ae Votllbed.
0 lba. Cel. V. M. Booaarov, Dr. B. B.adra* Slga* mtaee* apaeaBulta; Bret Slgkt with dbeo* toHJ|Si eiarltaaloa>Mdiogody Balda.
V oak bed artU alrtoek foeUoaoaarjed Bttraedep.
Two EiUnoVlaya) - .
i" eat ot aewWot ol new epeeieralL
AllUvi areployad lbaooater. Vcatok-ralat^ Aigbu (ISmployed Ibe Loelk upper eteae. The Poljota were laooorml ae tbe aole perleedegtanlof wHa Coarae*n IBave employed tba Vanlk uppw aiage. Payload weigbta are tboee aooouaoad by Bovleu, andby other evidence.
1 Bhr daye onor to toe laaaeb ot Voakhod, CoeroeeravtdaJ Goal fllgbt nullification of the new apaeeerail. Thte ooDatitutad lba only niilBlgbt teat of tbe Voahbod earrylag all ol lu aaaooiatedour other Ccerooa, lo addition to perforating their petraary reeeaB*Jaaaoee raJenore, aerrad to oaan-rate the "rr.it pro-pultloe eteae aad poaalbly provided totting of VanlaVVoebbed MBopatabiUty and of Voaknod atrwotorel Itrlegrtty.
BISTORTOVIET LAUNCHF LUNAR AND FLANBTARYin tan fieer TrunUa)
sseea aaallaw orbit areued ana.
11. li peeled oaooa
UI. ttrearnlunar, hkidm rid. of mooa.
- i'Vi , Ncaravlo boob
nito* ot Vua elect easjoe. fmrttae. erbti act eealeeed.
aaaevmed aa katTif
I BepRep U
Moco Mooa Moo a
a Feb' es lApr ea
II Nov U
Uwrplftbr-trr-MeM vua.leeabsaa ttB fuur.
partial altltade rtabl
uJluiwUera aubaaqoMt to 4ta ftaaeBDOuaee Man I
Ktuma earaiai Jblt; 4ia Kan failed. Venle ManperklBc orott eel
|V. Faaedntes et
altar reldoearee eorreeUoa. rtebablaveet 0*
probe Vc ataet Iron orbft. FrobebU eecteetrlBC Mat of CetBetar? probe. Vahlele
nan fatted. parktaf orbrl ran aafcieveid aa Ceaaao.fter 4ta elan laaaA lena I. laKlal ualaetor* wouirl have.
lee auaeeune eemMkea4 aad IS Mar
JevOUtaBM laereaeaB and bobibm appanaair
CW*W> HISTORY OF SOVIET LA USOB OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES (Note; AH UumUoipibeen from TyomUm)
ft Aprayun 61
Moon Moon Moon
Oft 3 No* 65
Moon Moon Moon
U ok now*
itaa- felled;rbrt not aohlawod. foodowtr aaeooalered rtltSeulllee tn tret day on An-lvad Id lba vloioliy ol Mar* durlaf ta* early part of Aufuathird ruti falhtra.ailed. Loxeattempt falladeed m Sovlota rei-aaedf lunar earfaae
'aim dadcajianaLunar aoft-Undar attempt FnOed al rv*refin.kitaal awaeaaa: Veara* ty-by fjbea va* of
planet but no Blga*k> www traeaaaltfd durUe. tbe terminal pbaee. CoBtsoaM Vanue prol* attempt. Failure. Lubal. Soft lending an am pi. fallad al mtroSra. Luna *. Bdeeaaefnl arrft-etarnnaj.
Coamo* III. Loner probe alUan(Mifallad to
r; w. from eartb perklofl orWI. Lunar arbiter. act una Lunar oabllae. No plat urea. Lonarpletura* or lunar eurfaea.
Luna li- Biirraaafxl loft.tonrurn
diieet-aaeant launcher seed thaooatw and th* Lualk npper ftaat. In addition te the lavneh altempta noted In IMa aoice.elwva that there wereaunch fallnm. two la th* fall ofnd on* la
Payload estimated. Otaw payload* wore ncsouDced by tha Soviet* and anbatacUMed by other arldwoe.
Alaunihaa have need8 booator nod Venik upper atage to plane Into earth0ackage coraiatlng of the per toed and it* propulaionhit stage (knownnatb*4lho*I* deed to eject Ore payload from aarUiorbit and to pl*o* ItU target.
Payloade unknown. Believed to be tbe tame aeoaad announced by the Soviet* for tha Vacua ahot ofebruary.
CONTROLLED DISSEMOriginal document.