ArYifynnaiBUSE akiuumi
top- Tea
COMTROUCP PIA3EM'
7
national intelligence estimate '
7
EO imt fJIcMlYnSV
tn .v
The Soviet Space Program
plRECTOR OF-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Cenmrrad In byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARDAa Indicated7
Pagesopy No.
gccrct
CQMTnOLLCD DI00EM-
The following intoHrgerK* organization* participated in fh* preparation ol thit estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agencythe intelligence wgansemom o' ihe Depart-menti of Stole. Defense, the AEC. and th* NSA.
Concurring.-.
Dr. Edward W. Proctor, tot th* Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Mr.vghei, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Departmenttate
It. Gen. Joteph F. Carroll, Director, Defame Intelligence Agency Dr. Charles H. Reichordt, (or the Auirtarrt General Manager, Atomic Energy CommHwon
Dr.. ToroVUo, (or the Director, No'lonol Security Agency
Abstaining:
Mr. William O. Cregor, for the AtMtant Director, Federal Bureau of Irneshgation, the subject being oortide of hii junuliclion.
CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
SUMMARY AND
SPACE LAUNCHES OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS
Flight
C Unmanned Scientific Satellites
and Planetary Prol**
Satellites
Meteorological Satellite*
Communication* Satellites
System*
Photoreconnaissance
Space Weapon*
Spare
AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE
IIL OTHER FACTORS
IV. OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR TERM
A_
Lunar Landing
Space Station
Cimitn lunar
and Planetary Pro
Satellited
C. Possible Soviet Military Use* of Space
R Unmanned Exploration of Near
V. THE LONG-TERM
of Soviet Cooperation in SpacePossible Undertaking*
ANNEX:
ESTIMATED TIMING OF MAJOR SOVIET SPACE EVENTS SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES0 HISTORY OF SOVIET MANNED SPACEFLIGHT PROJECTS HISTORY OF SOVIET LAUNCHINCS OK LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES
THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over theoears.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
space program hasigh priority amongobjectives. The number of space launches attemptedpast two years was nearly equal to the total of theNevertheless. Soviet achievements were less spectacularFor the most part, the Soviets exploited existingcarry out unmanned space exploration and intensive satelliteand to expand space applications. There have beenflights since
continuing high level of development activity andof major new launch facilities suggestew series ofspace missions is likely in the next few years. Untilthe Soviets used military boosters almost exclusively, butnow developing launch vehicles, specifically for the spaceThey haveew boosterhrusto 3which was used to launch the Proton satellites. And theya major new launch facility (Area J) at Tyuratam thatable to take vehiclesirst-stage thrust in thepound range; it will be completed next year.
Soviets have probably planned some form of7 in connection withh anniversary' ofRevolution orh anniversary of Sputnik I. Thisthe orbiting5 ton spaceew mannedor some activity involving both. We cannot predict the precise
nature of the spectacular but believe that the event will be confined to near-earth space.
of the Soviets space program have risen sharply overfew years, but now appear to be leveling off. The programtoignificant share of resources of ihe same typefor strategic military programs and for economicthe present Soviet leaders may try to effect economies insectors, we consider it unlikely thai they can effect anyin the overall nature of the program for the next fivefor the longer termtoearsdoubt thatleaders have yet come to firm decisions as to the scopeof their space program; certainly we have no basis forof Soviet space activities during this period.
view of competing claims on their resources, we believeSoviets will not be able to undertake simultaneously all thetheir technical capabilities. Further, we do not believe thatwill seek toarge space station and to achievelunar landing concurrently. The dates estimated forare based on technical feasibility; we cannot estimate thein which they may be attempted.
Lunar Landing. Two years ago. we estimatedSoviet manned lunar landing program was probably notbe competitive with the Apollo program as then projected,atime period. We believe this is still theis the possibility, however, that depending upon their viewApollo timetable, the Soviets may feel that there is some prospectgetting to the moon first, and they may press their programof being able to do so. Considering the Soviet technicalthe status of construction at Area J. and the variousmight be employed, we estimate that the earliest the Sovietsa manned lunar landing would beethat the most likely date is sometime inime period.
Circumlunar Flight. The Soviets will probablya manned circumlunar flight during the next few years.consider this venture one of the few within theircould offset some of the propaganda valueuccessfullanding. We consider it unlikely that the Soviets would attempt
this mission before the first halflthough it is conceivable that they would accept the high risks involved in making the attempt as tin anniversary spectacular in
Space Stations. We believe that the establishmentmanned space station isovietpaceounds weight and capable ofrew ofmore could probably be orbited in the first halfylaunch vehicle under development for Area J, the Sovietsa space stationounds by aboutat the earliest, but we believe sometime into be more likely.
Systems. The expansion of the Soviet satelliteproject over the last two years shows that projects ofstrategic value can and will be funded. The Soviets willcontinue to support this program at about tbe present levelit with unproved collection and data-handling systemsnext few years. They will probably give increased emphasiswhich have both civil and military support applications,communications, meteorological, and navigation satellites.
J. During the past year, the Soviets have conducted flight tests which could leadtrategic space weapon system. We estimateractional orbit bombardment system could be deployed in small numbers by7 ore cannot at this time estimate the likelihood that the Soviets will choose to deployystem. On the one band, it would complicate the US defense problem; on the other, it would be more complex, more costly, and less accurate than ICBMs. Ifystem is deployed, the Soviets would probably regard itupplement to existing strategic attack forces and would deploy it in relatively small numbers. In view of Soviet agreement to the treaty on peaceful uses of space as well as theultiple orbit bombardment system, we do not believe that the Soviets will deploy and maintain weapons In space during the period of this estimate.
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS A. General
During (he past two years the Soviet space program has retained its high priority among major national objectives. It has placed significantly increased demands on the economy for scarce resources of the same general type and quality as those required for strategic military programs and for investment for economic growth. The number of space launches attempted in this period nearly equals tbe total number of bunches attempted in the previous seven years.
Tlte Soviets scored some dramatic "firsts" during this period, including the spacewaHc by Leonov during the Bight of Voskhod II. the lunar soft landing ofnd the lunar orbitingut in general, their achievements in space were much less spectacular than previously. For the most part, they exploited available hardware, especially boosters, to engage in unmanned space exploration, an intensive photoreconnaissance program, and an expansion in the scope of their space applications.
The Soviets have, however,igh priority to researchnd D) on new space systems. Three new programs were brought to flight phase during the past two years: theound) Protonwhich were launchedillion pound thrustaneuverable satellite capable of small orbital adjustments;ystem which probably relates to tbe development of fractional orbit weapons, depressed trajectory ICBMs. or both. In addition, construction of major new launch facilitiesn associated hardware for more advanced future missions has continuedapid pace.
The Soviets have failed to carry out certain activities which we consider essential to. their manned space program and which we believe they could have undertaken5hey have not attempted rendezvous and docking, although test of unmanned maneuverable space hardwareay relate to the development of this capability. They have neta long duration manned flighteeksanned flight scheduled for the spring6 and later cancelled may have related to this problem, and there2 day flight of two dogs earlier in the year. No high speed reentry tests to simulate lunar return problems have been conducted, and no water landing and recovery techniques which probably would be required on lunar return have been demonstrated. Most notable, however, is the hiatus in manned space flights of any kind in the nearly two vears since5
B. Manned Flight1
be only manned flight conducted by the Soviets56 was Voskhodwo man mission which was launched oo5 and
'See Anno for tuttory of Soviet manned spaceflight project*.
successfully decrbited tlie following day. The Voskhod II incorporated anwhich allowed one of the cosmonauts to perform the first extravehicular activity or spacewalk ever attempted. Cosmonaut Leonov emerged from the vehicle via the airlock and spent *omeinutes outside, attached to theby an umbilical line but without any propulsion aid. Leonov experienced some of the discomforts subsequently noted by several US astronauts. During the Bight of Voskhod II thereailure in the retro-orientation system during preparation for reentry, which forced the cosmonauts to resort to their manual back-up system for deorbll. The manually controlled deorbit resulted in. "overshoot" of Ihe planned recovery area.
nhe Soviets launchedhichoskhod-like vehicle containing two dogsariety of other biological specimens. Thenvironmental control system was probably intended toonth-long flight with dogs, the equivalent ofan days.
view of the importance of the manned space effort in terms ofcosmonaut framing, and national prestige, we do not believeSoviets originallyap of as long as two years in theirprogram. Available evidence provides no certain explanation forIt may beombination of technical and politicalthe decision to cancel the Voskhod flight scheduled to take placeperiod. It appears that the Voskhod spacecraft has been exploited tolimit. Bather thanore daring venture than the Voskhod IIat worst might have resulted in failure or at best comparedthe achievements of the US Gemini program, the Soviets may haveforego further manned missions until theyew spacecraft, whichto be under development. An earlier gap ofonths in Sovietflights occurredhile minor modifications were made tocapsule to upgrade it to the Voskhod.
Scientific Satellites
rate of launching from Kapustin Yar of the unmanned, Cosmosscientific satellites has proceededairly deliberate pace since theintroduced inhere have been no major changes over theyears in launch vehicle configurations or orbital parameters. Thesatellites, launched from Tyuratam, were almost certainly used forresearch, but the primary purpose of these firings was probably toillion pound thrust booster.
and Planetary Probes7
the past two years the Soviet program of lunar exploration hason two objectives: soft lunar landing and orbiting the moon.have included photographing the moon's surface. Six attempts were
made to softehicle on tbe moon'i surface, of which the last two were successful:nducceeded Inound package* on the moon which transmittedpanorama* of the moon'* surface and tbewere of good quality. Lunalto tested the firmness of the tuiface. Three lunar probesuccessfully orbited the moon, but only from Lunao wc have evidenceuccessful photographic mission was carried out. The photographs were of poor quality.
The Soviets attempted three Venus probes in the pest two years,nly two of these launches were even moderately successful:ransmitted no data as It flew past the planet, missing by0 no. andllegedly impacted on the planet but no lignals were transmitted during Ihe terminal phase.
Until recently tho Soviets had mod every opportunity avallabU- to launch probes toward Venus and Mars since their interplanetary probe program began0 They did not, however, take advantage of the "window" to Man which opened7 and closed in February. Failure to capitalize on this opportunity may indicate that the unprofitable planetarybeen curtailed in an attempt to reduce expenditures lor spuce-On the other hand, tbe Soviets may have elected to ttanddown their planetary program temporarilyeweady for use to that program.
E. Applied Satellites
Meteorological SoteHJtei
tbe past two years tbe Soviet* base orbited font, possibly five,their meteorological KSV program.ndothusable doudome of those fromerethe US last fall pursuant to2 bilateral agreement to exchangeweather data. This satellite ceased transmitting ooctober.and infrared photography is of about the same quality as that producedUS systems. Onhe Sovirii placedWhile the Soviet* have not ye* announced the purpose ofeteorological satellite If so, it mayof an operay*tem.
toll If ai
the past two years, the Soviets have successfully orbited foursatellites of tbe Molniya class. These satellite* have beento relay high capacity, multichannel telephone andtelevision, and other information forms between Moscowareas of the USSR, mainly Vladivostok. They have also been useda link with France tor the exchange of television programs, and toa platform for an earth-scanning television camera. The Molniyanot yet been put into routine operation but is still under development andsubjected to extensive tests and experimentation.
b
F. Military Systems Photo/cconnaiimnco
Soviet phxttoreeonnuixsaiicc satellite program has continuedbout two launches per month) over the past two years. Thisenjoyed one of the highest priorities in tbe entire Soviet space effort,for almost half of all space launchJngs during this period, Theand the use of time-tested hardware, have made thethe most successful of all Soviet unmanned space programs. Thetwo basic types of reconnaissance vehicles. One payload weighspounds andow resolution photographic mission, aon the order ofoeet under average conditions) andEttm as well. The second type of payload weighsigher resolution photographic mission, and we believe itresolutions on the orderoeel under average conditions.conditions the resolution could be somewhat better. The Sovietsphotography acquired by both systems by deorbiting the entire spacecraftKazakhstan recovery area after missions of about eight days.
considerationsto judge that this extensive leco-^naissaDee program was probablyaccomplish tbe following:
precisely target US nuclear strike forces, especially ICBM sites,their status, and to detect new deployments.
map areas of general military interest, especialh/ those bordering
c To monitor the development and testing of new military systems, not only in the US but also in Communist China.
d. To monitor large-scale military aod naval activity. Space Weapon I
lft During the past year, the Soviets haveestsystem (which we have designated thehich could leadtrategic space weapons system. This system (theCBM boosterew third stage and reentry vehicle) bas been used in two types of tests.
nn the last of three suborbital flights, the second and third stages and tbe reentry vehicle were launched. ballistichaving an apogee ofun. (Soviet ICBMs fired to the same range on normal trajectories would reach apogeeshe third stage and the reentry vehicle were reoriented and the third stage ignited, causing tbe reentry vehicle to impact on the Kamchatka Peninsula while the secondontinued on to impact io the Pacific.
res 6aaia
i Thai suggests that thisea* of components and techniqueseapon system.
IS. In September and November8 and again inbe same type of system was used to put the second and third stages, and die reentry vehicle, into low earth orbit. We thinkoorbit was intended during tha first orbit and that the vehicles were to impact on the Kapustin Yar range.observed the reentry vehicle bring deorbited in the January lest and believe that test was successful; the othor two tests were probably failures.
believe that these tests relate lo the developmentepressed trajectory ICBM. or both. Either woulddegrade the' value of the US BMEWi and complicate tbe US problemeffectivecits could ibn Matte tnultiple orbit bombardment system.
G. Urrcateooriied Space Launch**
satellites whose completeet to be determined havefrom Tyuratam under the Cmmos terics designation.heseew propulsion TcTnito orbit Another
A probable mission of these satellites was to evaluate the injection and orbit-adjust maneuver propulsion engines ami the vehicle attitude control system. Such systems may be incorporated into an Improved manned spacecraft.
4 tbe Soviets have launched seven multiple payload vehicles whoar mission cannot be determined. Th* launch systemeignitable second stage whichayloadi into -erected orbits. These launchc may be associated with the initial phases ofcoriunurucation/navigalion satellite program
II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE PROSPECTS
eneral Soviet capabilities in the baric and applied sciences will probably be adequate throughout the period of this estimate to support an ambitious space program. Any difficulties encountered are more likely to arise fromthan from scientific limitations. Spaco payloads designed by the Soviets have historically been much heavier than their US counterparts, in part, because of their early drjeision to develop boosters of very large thrust and In part because of their tendency to use cumbersome, but proven components and subsystems rather than develop new, more advanced hardware specifically for space.
JP mat irf"DCT
The weight penalty imposed by tho Soviet practice of using heavier, and simpler equipment in space payloadi ii not critical foroperations. We behove that current Soviet technology could be extended with comparative ease to conduct further operation! of this type. In more ambitious programs, tuchanned lunar landing, tbe saving of weight assumes greater importance Advances fn minwturizafjon, packaging, and other weight saving techniques as well as more powerful ptopefiants would be needed to make more complicated missions practicable. Development of such technology is almost certainlyat the present time.
High Energytudy of Soviet open source literaturean interest in high energy propellants such as liquid hydrogen and fluorine.
energy propellants in any of tbe stages. However, we believe some phases of stalk tcetfog are now being conducted and flight testing could. possibly as pert of tbe development of tbe system intended for Area J. and that0 or shortly thereafter high-energy upper stages could be man-rated and available for use with existing or more advancedsystems. Such upper stages will increase the capability and efficiency of the launch systems available to the Soviets and permit considerable flexibility in planning future space missions.
Launch VentWes. In all their major space activities7 throughha Soviets used military boosters fitted with additional upper staging. The present Soviet inventory of boost cr* and the wide range of their paytoad capability have allowed them toiversified program. To undertake more compW space missions in the future, however, the Soviets are evidently now being forced to develop large boosters specifically for the space program; then-military vehicles are not adequate for such missions. The chart on the following page depicts ihe various launch vehlclo configurations the Soviets have used to date and shows the SL (space launcher) designations we have assigned to each.
The booster designatedhich is used in tbe Proton satellitehe first Soviet booster which we believe will be used solelypace bunches. It is possible that this booster was originally to serveelivery system forT nuclear weapon (of which Khrushchev boasted in thes well as for spaceut we now believe that the former is very unlikely toresent Sovietheystem has an estimated first-stage thrustillion pounds and has demonstrated tin eorth'Orbit payload capability of0 pounds. There are reasons to believe,that this system will soon he modified In its present two-stage con-figuration. the boosterorces too great for manned flight; moreover.
tVM.CapaaOttai for Stnt-g*atedLL SOURCE.
heith suitable upper staging would provide tbe Soviets with the capability toariety of advanced space missions, including manned space stations and manned circumlunar flights as well as more ambitiousplanrtary minions. The additionhird sfagr employing* propellants. wouldayload ofounds to be placed into neox-emrth orbit. With tius in-orbit weightuitablestage, also using conventional propelayload of0 pounds could be placedunar transfer trajectory. We estimateayload of this weight would be adequate for the Soviets toanned circumlunar flight. Tbe useigh-energy third stage wouldound_ navload to be orbited, "
'e Oeiieve fast initial unmanum aiingi oi imonventional third stage will occur in the first halfanned flights usingystem could begin some six monthsear later, depending on the rapidity and success of the unmanned testing.
The construction oft Tyuratam makes it clear that the Soviets have under development another and much larger booster.ery large launch facility which appears to be of the same magnitude as the US Apollo launch complex at Merritt Island. It has been under construction for the past 3Vi years and we estimate that it will be ready for initial launch operations in the first half8 at the earliest. We have no direct evidence on the characteristics of the new booster, but analyses of the launch facilltir* atndicate that they will accommodate vehiclesirst-stage thrust in0 pound range. It is possible that the system utilizing tbe (Booster will irxorporate thes its second and third stages. Ifombination were to be Uurscbcd initially by aboutt could be ready for manned space missions by aboutf the entire vehicle is new, however, and uses conventional propellanti in all Us stages it could probably not be man-rated0 at the earliest. Eitherwould permit payloadsounds to be put in near-earth orbit. The useigh energy pfopellant Id the out-of-earth orbit ejection stage for either of these combinations would allow them to be ready for manned Sight0 or shortly thereafter.
ew manned spacecraft which may be capable ol rimde/vous and docking has probably now reached the early, unmanned flight test phase. Onnd againbe Soviets mod ano launch. Tbeayload was doorbitcd onovember andebruary. During the Sight of Cosmos
'<kSnt convflnuonal pfopeUant* as thowr whicb bate been used thus fat In (be Soviet launch vehicle*.
nplane adjustments were made in the orbit This and other data received on the flight of these two vehicles lead us to believe the Soviets areew spacecraft.
We have iraufficient data to evaluate fully the characteristics of this new spacecraft The weight theystem can place into near-earth orbit is limited to0 pounds. We think tbeehicle weighedounds. These firings probably were for the purpose of checking newly developed capsule subsystems as well as testing an entirely new spacecraft.
A new maneuverable spacecraft, about the weight of tbe Voskhod but with more usable volume, wouldery valuable adjunct to some of the space ventures, suchanned circumlunar flight, in which the Soviets have expressed interest.ehicle could be designed for rescue, ferrying, andpurposes and thus could be useful toong-lived orbitingIt could also be adapted to an unmanned reconnaissance mission. Ifere, in fact, the first testew spacecraft, an initial manned flight could occur bye believe the Soviets will develop still larger and mare efficient manned space vehicles which will allow more sophisticated and venturesome missions to be performed.
Command and Control (or Near-Earth Orbit. The Soviet capability to undertake complex earth orbital operations Is limited by certain majorin the USSR's command and control network. Some existing deficiencies relate to point-to-point communications within tbe USSR; these will probably be eliminated in the near future as the internal network of long distancebecomes operational. Although we believe the internal command and control network generally wiD bo adequate to support most single missions, the lackorldwide tracking and communications network may handicap the Soviets in tbe performance of some orbital operations and willevere handicap If the Soviets attempt to control several operational systems, each consisting of several orbiting vehicles. Mafor improvement to Soviet tracking capability would result from additional tracking stations almost any place outside the USSR. Soviet interest in acquiring tracking stations abroad has been high. Cuba, where the Soviets have installed an optical tracking station and are going toolniya receiver station, may be the site of the first Soviet land-based tracking station outside the territory of tbe USSR. Soviet efforts toracking station in Australia have been frustrated. Current Soviet activities in tbe UAR and Somalia may foreshadow attempts to establish tracking stations in one of those countries.
Command and Control for Deep Space. The deep-space tracking facilities located in tbe Crimea and currently used in unmanned lunar and planetary flights limit tracking and communications to interrupted schedules. The actual time available for tracking and communications for lunar probes depends upon the lunar declination and varies fromoay. We believe that the ability to track and communicate with manned lunar flights4 hours per day basis is needed to help insure the safety of such missions. Tbe Soviets
could, however, undertake manned lunar flight* even with their limited tracking and communication capability by accepting the calculated risk oluig able to communicate with the spacecraft for certain periods of tone If tbe Soviets constructed facilities in their Far East areas, they could increase significantly the time available for contact with their lunar missions There is no evidence that any facilities comparable to those in the Crimea are being installed elsewhere, however, and wc believe their construction would require at least two years.
The Soviets could also extend tho time available for commtinicaHng with their lunar mission by using appropriately equipped ships as relay centers between tbe spacecraft and the control center. To bo effective,ystem woulda high rapacity communication! link between the ship and the control center. Without this high capacity hnk, cwnmunkarions would be limited to relay of verbal instructions and system status summaries and would not permit positive mission control. We have no evidence that tbe Soviets have installed the necessary equipment on any of their surface ships as yet butystem using such sm'pborne relay links is well within their capability. The Soviets could conceivably use communications satellites as relay linkssurface stations for deep space flights.
Rendezvous and Docking. Critical to many advanced typos of manned spacebe requirement to develop techniques for rendezvous and docking of vehicles in space. New Soviet spacecraft, unlike the Vostok and Voskhod. will probably be designed for rendezvous and docking and willthe necessary equipment for maneuverability, engine restart, and hook-up. Sovietufficiently advanced to make available the various sensors required for mch spacecraft,adar and transprmders. Ifere the initial testsew spacecraft designed for rendezvous and docking, tho Soviets could conduct Initial manned missions of Iheso types using currently available launch systems within tbe next few months.
Recovery. The point of reentry into the earth's atmosphere of lunar return trajectories would lie betweensouthorth latitude on the earth's surface, depending upon tbe decimation of tbe moon at the time of the flight The Soviet land mass lies well north of this band. Thus, any spacecraft which did not mcorporate some means for altering its reentry trajectory could not be recovered within tbe USSR. Since we believe having an on-board propulsion system for altering reentry trajectories would be unpractical, the Soviets need topacecraft having some aerodynamic lift characteristics or,toater recovery capability. There are no firm Indications that thcr Soviets have conducted aerodyriamlc reentry tests or that they area water recovery capability but tests of either could begin at any time. We believe thai the time required toecovery technique would notimiting factor in tbe Soviet manned lunar program.
eentry. Some Soviet scientists have Indicated that reentry at lunar return velocities Is one of the malar problems confronting them ia their lunar program. The angle of reentry into the earth's atmosphere must be kept within
very narrow limits. If the angle Is too steep, accelerations would be too greatanned spacecraft to withstand. On the other hand, if the reentry angle is too shallow the spacecraft would "skip" off the earth's atmosphere back into
An additional reentry problem Is that of beating. The ablative material used oo the Vostok would be adequate topacecraft having nolift characteristics. Heat shieldingpacecraft having some degree of liftifferent problem because the heat absorbed is greater.the higher aerodynamic forces exerted oo the spacecraft would tend to strip away tbe heat shield material.
We believe that the Soviets will have to test their new spacecraft, whatever its shape, under conditions expected on lunar return trajectories. Boostedfrom earth orbit or from high altitude ballistic trajectories could produce some necessary test data, but for full scale simulations of lunar return velocities, the Soviets must conduct an unmanned circumlunar flight or wait until theehicle is available.
On Board Power. The majority of Soviet spacecraft flown to date have used chemical batteries or solar cells for electrical power supply, Evidence of Soviet chemical battery capabilities indicates weignt-efBdeocies of aboutatt hour/pound, which compares favorably with current US capabilities. The Soviets could increase this figure toatt hour/pound if they feel the need to save weight Radloisotope/thermcielectric conversion systems which were used in two Soviet satellites orbited5ndatts of electric powerapacity far too small to be usedife support system.
Daring theears the Soviets have been pursuingirected toward the development of fuel cells. Performance testing of fuel cells using the hydrogen-oxygen reaction principle is probably underway and inoviet electrochemist claimed that tbey have successfully developed fuel cells having one kilowatt output We estimate the Soviets couki have fuel cells suitable for short space missions now.
Biomedical. The Soviets probably now have sufficient biomedical data to plan withanned flighteeks; this would be adequate foranned circumlunar or lunar landing mission. At present, however, the Soviets appear to be concerned with tbe effects oo human beings oflonger duration flightsboutays orhere are few indications of how they will solve the biomedical problems associated with flights of that duration, but we believe that practical solutions should be ready in rime for long-duration projects io tbe next few years.
The Soviets have numerous facilities for simulating various aspects of space environment including centrifugestresses, low pressure and lowchambers, suspension devices for shnukbng reduced gravity, and various devices and equipments for experimentation with men and animals in closed
environments. These (acuities and activities are probably adequate to support any of the various manned space ventures they may attempt.
ife Support Systems. In their manned space flights the Soviets hawfe support system based on an an-like mixture of oxygen and nitrogenea level pressure of onehe Soviets have apparently been able to scale up the system0 toan-day limit. They probably can adapt this system and their experiencemall, manned earth-orbiting station as well asanned drcumlunar mission. For future missions in which weight wouldreater limiting factor or In long duration flights, suchanned lunar landingarge space station, wholly new techniques probably would be required. These could be partial regenerative or dosed loop systems. The first Soviet flight withew environmental control system would probably be experimental and probably would Involve limited objectives, primarily biomedical In nature.
rsrnnrrion and Stabilization. The Soviets haveigh degree of precision in the mentation and stabilization of spacecraft when the mission requires it. On those payhere such pointing accuracies are not required, the Soviets have utilized spin stabilization or have tolerated random tumbling. All Soviet space vehicles requiring accurate earth orientation have been provided with fully automatic systems. In manned vehicles, the automatic system is backed upanual system which can override the automatic system when necessary. The manual system Is capable of accuracies consistent with the safe recovery of tbe manned vehicle.
III. OTHER FACTORS
4fl. Aside from the scientific and technical consideration! which we havethereariety of other factors which will Influence the scope and pace of future Soviet space endeavors. These include such things as tbe effect of past decisions, the views of the present Soviet leaders on the benefits to be derived from their space program, costs, the need for regaining lost prestige, and Soviet views on tho US program.
e are unable to identify organisations and individuals directing and executing the Soviet space program Broad policy directives on all space matters are probably issued by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We believe that these directives are implementedigh-level commission composed of both government and party offlciab. Tliis commbsion probablyParty Secretaryesponsible for defenseV. Smunov. Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and M. V. Keldysh. President of the Academy of Sciences. Tbe Ministry of Ceneral Machineheaded by S. A. Afanas'yev, supported by the industrial ministries such as defense, avtab'on, radio, and electronics, probably is responsible for theand production of space hardware. The Academy of Sciences provides scientific expertise to the entire space eflort, controls scientific programs, and
TIT aTlfl fS7
16
sccnrr
principally through the Cotnmliilon lor the Exploration and Utilization of Spaceponsors representatives at international meeting*
he Soviets almost certainly have already decided the nature of their space program for tbe next five years and have probably established an apptori-mate timetable for the various activities related to that program.ossible to stretchrogram overlonger period of time than originally planned or even to speedrogram somewhat to meet new deadlines,xtremely difficult torogram in its late stages to meet an entirely different objective than was initially established. While the present Soviet leaders may try to effect economies In certain sectors, wuIf unlikely that they can, at thb late date, effect uny basic changes in the overall nature of the program for the next five years,
Based largely on analogy with costs of the US space program, wc estimate that expenditures in tbe Soviet space program have been rising at an average annual rate roughly equivalent to USillion2 when about SI billion were expended,6 when about s5 billion were expended. Much of thb increase is accounted for by the major launch systems at Tyuratam and the associated program represented by the construction ofs not yet complete and the booster for use there has not yet been seen, but we believe that theufficiently advanced to permit the overall cost of Ihe Soviet space program to level off shortly and bold at aboutillion per year for the next few years. These costs include our estimates of both the military and nonmilitary portions of the Soviet space program
The recently signed Outer Spaceot likely toignificant effect oo the military or nonmilitary aspects of the Soviet space program- Tbe treaty prohibits the establishment of military installations, the testing of any types of weapons, and the staging of military maneuvers on celestial bodies. It also bans placing nuclear weapons ln earth orbit and on colctlial Imdies, but it does not prohibit the development or testing of delivery vehicle* for an orbital or fractional orbit weapon system. Further testing of they*tcm would not be contrary to the treaty as long as such tests did not involverbit DepkjJtaBBalM- iti fsjot prohibited.
The treaty pert nits the use of military personnel and equipment for the peaceful exploration ofexample,anned space station or for conducting scientific research on the moon. Whileo specific mention in the treaty of satellite reconnabsaiice, the Soviets made no effort to revive their old charges that suchllegal and they seemed to accept It as legitimate.
The extent tn which the treaty will help the USSR supplement its own space trackingncertain. According to tbe treaty, parties to Ihe treaty "shall consider" request* of other signatories to be afforded anto observe the flight of tbe requesting state's space objects; the nature
oca flgaw
ol this opportunity, as well us the conditions under which it would be aflorded, would be detemuoed by agreement between tbe states concerned. However, other signatory nations are not obliged to grant any Soviet request for observing its space objects when they are out of view from Soviet territory.
he Soviets probably feel that during the next few years they must take steps to regain some of the prestige they lost to the highly successful US Gemini program. Furthermore,7 two important anniversaries will bein the USSR,h anniversary of thendhof the October Revolution. The Soviets probably have planned some form of space spectacular to celebrate one or both of these dates. Somewhat later they will be confronted with the necessity to at least partially blunt the international impact of the US Apollo program. For these reasons andthe capability of the space hardware which tbey are now developing, we believe that the next 6ve years willeriod in which the Soviets will attempt space ventures far more complicated and spectacular than heretofore undertaken.
IV. OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR
A. General
In considering developments in the Soviet space program over the next five years, we can estimate feasible extension of all current projects hut it is difficult to determine wbich specific missions will be flown. We do not believe the Soviets have at hand all of the necessary technical and economic resources for undertaking all projects simultaneously. We therefore believe that some possible projects will not be attempted, others will be slowly paced, andresources will be committed toew. The expansion of theproject over the past two years shows that projects of demonstrable strategic value can and will be funded. While it is clear that useful missions can still be accomplished with existing hardware, it is equally dear that more spectacular and sophisticated missions will have to await the new hardware now under development.
The Soviets in their many official and unofficial statements about their space program, have given no indication of what the order of priority is to be. Indeed, much of what Is said is conflicting or ambiguous. In arriving at likely dates for specific missions, we haveigh but not complete level of successharing of priorities among several categories of projects, In general, the likely date for any given mission wouldear or so later than that which we consider to be the earliest practicable date. We note that delays and failures have occurred and have sometimes plagued the Soviets for king periods. Such difficulties can recur at anyupon theof hardware based on new and more complexcould delay achievementpecific missionear or two.
Tlie Soviet manned lunar landing program and the large manned space station program arc large-scale undertakings, both of which require the use of
the system intended for Area J. Tlie dates we believe these ventures can be carried out are based on technical feasibility and da not take into account the order in which they may be attempted. We do not believe they could beconcurrently. It must be understood therefore, that the one which is given priority may be carried out at the time indicated and that tbe other will Ik- deferredear or so.
B. Manned Lunar Landing
Inc estimated that Ibe Soviet manned lunar landingwas probably not intended to be competitive withollo program as then, aimed atime period. We believe this is probably still the case. There is the possibility, however, lhat depending upon the present Soviet view of the Apollo timetable, they may feel that there is some prospect of their getting to the moon first and they may press their program in hopes of being able to do so.
Several factors militate against their being able to compete with the Apollo timetable as originally planned. The status and pace of construction ofndicate that the launch system will probably not be ready for test until aboutaunch vehicle is available, we would expect toeries of tests for man-rating the system extending over atearunar landing would be attempted. In the meantime, the Soviets will need to checkew spacecraft, to test reentries at lunar return velocities, and perhaps toater recovery capability. Depending upon the technique selected, they may also need to test rendezvous and docking techniques and equipment.
Some Soviet scientists have criticized the Apollo technique and stated that their lunar flight will go directly from earth to the moon's surface and return without any orbital rendezvous required. We estimate that any lunar landing mission whichingle vehicle using conventional propellants wouldooster developing considerably greater thrust ttianan accommodate. The Soviets have alsoechnique involving the placing of components and fuel on the moon by two or more very large vehicles. Ihen having cosmonauts assemble these components on the moonehicle and fuel It for direct return to earth. This technique is risky since very accurate guidance is required to place the manned vehicle sufficiently close to the landing site of earlier flights and there is no provision for an abort of the maimed flight.
Other techniques could invoke rendezvous and docking of two or more very large vehicles in earth orbit for assembly and fueling tbe lunar vehicle, before proceeding to the moon. The Soviets could also carry out two launches to the moon, one for landing on the moon and return to lunar orbit, and anothet for lunar orbit and return to earth. Either of these missions could be attempted within the capabilities we believe the Soviets will have when theystem Is available.
however, the Soviets were to develop high energy propellants forupper stages of theehicle they could use anyide variety of
mission profiles toan on tbe moon and return him to earth. We have estimated earlier that man-rated upper stages using high energy propellants could be available0 or shortly thereafter.
things considered, we estimate that the earliest the Sovietsa manned lunar landing, would bee believemost likely date is sometime inime period.
C. Manned Space Station
The Soviets are continuing to voice generalities about manned spaceThey refer to themost of terms, such as cities in space, giant flying laboratories, scientific research institutes, refueling stations, etc. Sovietfrequently identify two broad space station functions: to pursue research objectives, and to serveaunching or an assembly base for manned lunar and planetary missions. References to military applications of space stations have been conspicuously absent.
Neither the interim nor ultimate configurationpace station1 has been defined by the Soviets, rrerequisite techniquesong-term space station would be maneuver, rendezvous; docking, and extensive useful EVA. None of these techniques have been demonstrated in the Soviet manned space program to date, although the Soviets have beenariety of laboratory simulations involving multlman crews for long periods of time.
Based on our expectation that theonventional propellant upper stage will be used in the manned space program, we believe that this system would be employed toanned space station or componentspace station weighing0 pounds and capable ofrew of throe or more could probably be placed in earth orbit In the first halfhis could be7 as an "anniversary spectacular" but only if the Soviets press this development.ew spacecraft,docking, and extravehicular operations could extend the operationalof the station to several months and perhaps as longear.the Soviets couldission in7 wherein theould be used toarge unmanned platform and theould be used to put the new spacecraft into orbit to rendezvous and dock with the platform already in orbit. Tbe crew could be augmented or exchangedan or twoime by subsequent launching*.
We believe that the Soviets will probably also develop andery large manned space station. This development will probably be onefrom their manned lunar landing program and probably not be conducted concurrently with that program at Area J. It appears likely that the booster
pace stationurantiuiDcd, nonrocovecabln orbiting vehicle intended (or prolonged useinimumbe crew could bo recovered by dtorbtUng aof the vehicle. Alternatively crew rccovmv or reiupply could be carried outerry
being developed for use with the Tyuratamaunch facilities will be capable of placing on the orderounds in near-eartheight budget of this magnitude is sufficientariety of activities about which the Soviets havepace station of this size wouldermanent or semipermanent space laboratory to be placed in orbit byt the earliest. We believe the most likely date is sometime inime period. Rotation of personnel and resupply of the station would beby spacecraftendezvous and docking capability.
Circumlunar
think it probable that the Soviets willanneda steprogram having more ambitious objectives as its subsequent
goals, suchanned lunar landing or manned Bights to explore other planets, The Soviets have sometimes describedlight as one preliminary activity leading up to the manned landing. They may also consider that an early manned circumlunar flight would pay important dividends in terms of prestige, and couldeans to offset some of the propaganda value of the US Apollo program.
The Soviets couldanned circumlunar flight by using existing hardware. In order to do so they would need toenik upper stage to theystem, man-rate this combination with aninal stage, and modify the Voskhod spacecraft to giveidcourse correction capability. Thiscouldayload of0 poundsircumlunar trajectory, which would permit the Soviets torew of twoircumlunar flight. Alternatively, the Soviets may choose toew conventional-propellant upper stage designed to be flown with theystem and the new spacecraftidcourse guidance capability inherent in its design.
Wc believe that an attemptanned circumlunar flight would be preceded by at least one unmanned mission utilizing the same mission profile and hardware. We believe that test flightseriod of about six months would be required to man-rate the system and to test tbe equipment and recovery techniques for water landing which mav be requiredanned circumlunar flight.
Optimum "window" conditionsoviet manned circumlunar flight occur during theonths of the year when the moon isortherly declination. For this reason, we believe that the earliest the Soviets wouldanned circumlunar flight would be during the first halft is conceivable that they would attempt such an operation as an "anniversary spectacular" tout because of the grave risks involved we believe that it is unlikely that they will do so.
and Planetary Probes
systems utilized tor the current phases of unmanned lunarprobably adequateariety of missions in the near future. Lunarseisraographic, and gravity instrumentation equipment may be incor-
Derated into the mission? of future soft-landers. But if the Soviets continue to employ existing lunar prohe vehicles, weight limitations probably will prevent the inclusion of all three experiments in the same mission.
Existing photographic capabilities probably will be used to provide high-resolution photographs of the moon to aid In selecting future landing sites forhicles. Weight analysis of the Lunapacecraft indicatesotal payload weight could be increased tounar mapping mission in the orbiter program;ission was possibly intended forcientific mcasuremcnts acquired by lunar orbiters will be necessary to give an account of the hazards the moon's environment will impose on lunar cosmonauts. Orbiters can alsoetermination of the moon's mass, size, and anomalies In its gravitational field. Thus, tbe data obtained by lunar orbiters wouldanned circumlunar mission as wellanned lunar landing.
Many of the techniques utilized bynd Lunan soft landing on the moon have obvious applicationanned lunar landing mission. However, very extensive modification of the descent and landing procedures used by the recent soft-landers will be required for manned lunar landing. Lunarovided more refined data on.the physical characteristics of the lunar surface which will be useful in determining techniques and weight tolerancesanned lunar landing.
The Soviet program for unmanned planetary exploration probably has two principal objectives: to collect photography and scientific data by fly-by probes, and to make planetary atmosphere and surface measurements. In spile of the failure of the Soviets torobe toward Mars during the recent "window" early this year, we believe planetary exploration will continue. The Soviets will probably avail themselves of the next "window" to Venus inossibly using theaunch system. Theaunch system, with its considerable payload capability, willariety of other Interplanetary missions to be attempted as the period progresses. These could include Mars and Venus orbiters. Mercury and Jupiter fly-by probes, and Mars and Venus soft-landers.
F, Applied Satellites
The Soviets have started construction of aboutew ground terminals in the northern and eastern areas of the USSR as part of their project to integrate the Molniya communication satellite system into their communications structure We believe that all of the new terminals will be operational by7 to receive satellite relayed transmissions. We believe that this network will probably continue to expand as more sophisticated communications satellites are developed and that stations will be equipped toroad range ofservices.0 the Soviets probably will have tested theof broadcasting directly to home receivers or to relatively simple community TV antennae.
We estimate that the Soviets will launch meteorological satellites innumbers during the next five years; there are mdications that they plan
to launch aboutf these vehicles duringeriod. The Soviets will probably develop more sophisticated instrumentation for use in theirsatellites to obtain information on such things as atmospheric temperature, humidity, and precipitation. Meteorological satellites mav also be used to conduct additional observations such as geological mapping, crop surveillance, and ice reconnaissance.
G. Possible Soviet Military Uses of Space
Throughout the period of the estimate the Soviets will experimentariety of space systems which could be used for military purposes. Newspace applications will be introduced as Soviet technology advances and as requirements for such systems areilitary role for man in space may emerge prior to the end of the period, particularly as the ability to operate manned space stations grows.
Military Support Systems. The launching of recoverable photographic and Elint reconnaissance satellites from Tyuratam and Plcsctsk will probably continue at about the present rate until similar missions of longer duration, or manned orbital reconnaissance platforms, are employed. To improve data handling time the Soviets will probably develop an unproved photovidco systemultiple film capsule recovery system for long duration missions; they will probably also use communication relay satellites in an attempt to achieve near-real-time data handling between widely separatedatellite with limited maneuver capability for electromagnetic and photoreconnaissancc may be developed to meet muitary needs in the next few years.
The high priority evident in the recoverable photographic reconnaissance satellite project will probably be extended to other selected muitary support systems which the Soviet leaders decide are essential; these will probably include systems for improved global communications and TV relay, weather observation, and navigation.
Offensive Weapon Systems. On the basis of Soviet tests of thesee paragraphs, we estimateirst generation fractional orbit bombardment system using theooster could be deployed ra small numbers by7 ort could be deployed in silosfrom those associated with theCBM. This system, using all inertia! guidance, couldEP on the order. depending on the range and couldarhead ofounds.4hort-lived multiple orbit
'Wc believe that tf this system were to ho Bredortherly trajectory toward the US coveringhe CEP could be on the orderun. K, however, the Soviets were to launch tbe systemulrierly trajectory covering0 nan. to attack the US from the south, tbe CEP conld be on th* order. This Judgment Is based on our estimate of Soviet technical capabilities and assume* an all inertial guidance tyitem. We have no turn basis for judging what tbe accuracy of thfet system would be in an operational mode; it could be. somewhat less accurate al an early IOC. If, in the future, some means for trajectory correction were to be incorporated in the system, the CEP could be Improved somewhat.
bombardment system could be developed from the same hardware and deployed in the same manner but we believe thatevelopment ts unlikely.
SI. There is no identified program which indicates that the Soviets are developing an offensive space weapon system that would be deployed and maintained in orbit. Several new system components would need loong-life power source and an attitude reference system. However, much of the space technology and hardware currently being tested by the Soviets could be usedests for the development ofystem.
For the foreseeable future, we thinkultiple orbit bombardment system deployed in space will not compare favorably with ICBMs in terms of effectiveness, reliability, vulncrabibty. average life, and susceptibility to loss of control due to accident orTbe Soviet leadership probably would recognize that the deployment in spaceuclear-armed orbital tiombardment system would be an act of major international import which would intensify greatly East-West hostility andtrong new stimulus to USprograms. In view of these factors, the much greater cost of such orbital weapons, and Soviet agreement to the treaty oo peaceful uses of space, wethat the Sonets are unlikely toultiple orbit bombardmentin space during the period of this estimate-.
We recognize that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness and that altered political considerations in some future phase of East-West relations might lead themifferent decision. Even in these circumstances, we believe that they would regard space weapons primarilyeans of supplementing existing forces, of introducing additional complications into US defense planning and of supporting Soviet claims to strategic parity' or even superiority.
De*rrsrtoe Weapon Systems. The Soviets almost certainly havesystems for use against satellites. The deployment of some of the-Hen House/Dog House radars, and their technical characteristics indicate that theysed in support of an antisatelllte weapon system. Although this could provide one of the essential elements of an antisatelllte system, there is no intelligence as to tbe met hod of intercept. Developmentoorbltal intercept system wouldajor undertaking but because of the added capability of inspection and the greater operational flexibility against satellites at higherprovided byystem, tho Soviets may explore such an approach in addition to, but not in placeirect ascent antisatelllte system.
Soviets have demonstrated, as part of their missile and spacecf the necessary technologies, subsystems, and capabilities applicablecoorbltal interceptor development. These include the precise control ofsome of the operaticmal procedures required for rendezvous; orbitaland control systems; and an engine restart capability. Thesetechnological base for the Soviets to develop an Initial unmanned coorbital
24
EECftff
syitem by the time the Hen House/Dog House radar system becomes fullynystem would be very expensive and would probably be severely constrained in target (electionimited plane change capability, and inspection would be limited to TV. For these reasons we doubt that the Soviets would developystem. We do not exclude the pcettibihty. however, that tbe Soviets may elect toore efficient unmanned coorbital inspect wo capability at some time later in the period.
anned coorbital system could be developed in thes an outgrowth of the Soviet manned space program. Although the costs ofystem would be high, operationalopportunities for inspection, nondestructive neutralization, otjustify its
he interference with orbiting satellites is prohibited in the space treaty but the developmentapability to do so Is not. We believe that tbe Soviets would realize that any use of anrisatcllite systems in peacetime would risk opening their own military support systems to retaliation. We think it likely, therefore, that the Soviets would use antisatcllite systems only if they lielieved that war with the US was imminent and that neutralization of our military support systems was consequently an overriding consideration. There might also be other specialin which they would use antisatellitr systems inor example- they might believe that they were retaliating against US interference with their own satellites.
Unmanned Exploration of Near Spoce
exploration of near space to dote has beenowSoviet scientists haveide range of sderrtmCbe studied by means of satellites and space probes. Then stated plansprobes and satellites for observing solar eLvSrornagneticstreams, cosmic rays, radiation belts, magnetic fields, tbeand infrared and ultraviolet radiation. Many of theseand will continue to be carried out by the small Kapustin YarAdditional satellites may be launched from Tyuratam todata at great distances from earth.
V. THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK A. Factors Affecting
have little evidence concerning long-term Soviet objectives incan estimate the likely scope of the Soviet spacenlyery tentative basis. Some cosmonauts, scientists,other Soviet space enthusiasts have often referred to possible futureas interplanetary exploration, but the political leadership during the pastor so has made little public reference to space activities, and bas avoided
JcUIU.
TO? 3CCBET
any open reference to any particular programshe leadership has probably not yer decided which particular ventures to emphasize beyond the manned lunar landing era. and almost certainly has been unable to gauge with any degree of precision the amount of resources likely to be available for space programs In the next decade.
The question of resource allocationentral one in Soviet politics. Competition for resources has intensified since the, when the marked slowdown in Soviet economic growth began, and political infighting, in part based on this competition, has become characteristic of life within the leadership. The post-Khrushchev collective leadership has not indicated any substantial ability to resolve problems associated with the establishment of economic priorities; it has as yet been unable to agree on the final version of the current five-year plan,gan moreear ago. In the meantime, competingand space, growth andall. In effect, been assured high priorities.
One of the principal causes of economic difficulties in the USSR duringas been the preemption of highly skilled human resources and top-grade material resources by rapidly growing programs in advanced weapons and space. Among other things, these programs have impinged on the quality and effectiveness of investment elsewhere in the economy, and tho present collective is surely aware of this. Aside from efforts to achieve marginal economics,the leadership has not sought to attack the problem by reducing or even leveling off expenditures in these areas, and we estimate that It is unlikely to do so over the next four or five years. If important programs must be cut, civilian claimants are the most likely to suffer, as in the recent past
Whether the Soviet leaders will be willing to approach the problemew way inill, of course, depend on many factors: the state of the economy, the international climate, the composition and nature of the leadership, the interplay of domestic political and economic pressures, the progress of specific military and space programs, the progress and scope of comparable US programs, aod the leadership's calculations as to the costs of the program versos its probable returns, scientific, military, and political. The latter factor, the political, is likely to be of particular importance. The propaganda and psychological benefits of the program, both at borne and abroad, have always been of prime interest to the Soviet regime; the USSR's pioneering accomplbh-ments in space added greatly to Its international prestige and probably helped to Justify the regime to its own people. It may be, however, that such benefits will dirninish with time and familiarity, and that Soviet prestige Is less likely in the future to Increase sfgnificandy on the basis of individual exploits, such as Sputnik.
'Even the guldehoei fat the current Five-Tearrc quite brief and are specific only concerning the application of space technology to uses on earth- To provide In the five-year planbe further study of space and the application of the obtained remits for improving radio couunonicotjoos. radio navigation and television, for weather forecasting snd for other practical
B. Ponifailily ot Soviet Cooperation in Space Matter*
Until recently, the Soviets bad staunchly refused to offer any Indication that they were willing to cooperate in any field of space activity.2 the Soviets agreed tu exchange satellite collected weather data with the US. and in6 pasted the first of their data to the US. This step plus the cooperative Soviet attitude evidrraoed during the recent discussions on the UN treatypeaceful uses of space and the agreetnent with France on relay of TV aad other cooperative space projects lead us to believe that the Soviets wiD become more willing to exchange various scientific and technical data with the US and othor nations as tbe various programs progress- They may. for example, be willing to cichange such data on radiation belts, solar effects, gravity anomalies, and additional and more detailed meteorology
Apart from technical difficulties, there are three factors which would tend to limit the extent of Soviet cooperation in space. First, the prestige of being the first nation to accomplish various space missions continues to lie important to the USSR. Second, the prospective gain in cooperating lieyond the exchange of scientific and technical data would have to be convincing to the Soviets as long as major international rwlltical issues remain unresolved. Third, the close association of military and civilian space programs in the USSR would restrict the areas of cooperation which the Soviets would be willing to consider. Wc believe, however, that if the advantages to be gained are persuasive, the Soviets may agree to some ventures in which compatible equipments could be launched by the USSR and another nation and link together to perform functions of mutualommunications systemarge portion of the globeorldwide meteorological system. We consider it unlikely, however, that within the period of this estimate the Soviets will be willing to cooperate to the extent of exchanging space hardware.
We have considered the possibility that at some time beyond the lunar exploration eta the costs and technical complexity of more extensive planetary exploration may be so great that one nation would not consider it feasible ca practical to undertake it- We believe it less likely thai the Soviets would be willing to join tlie USilateral venture than to participaterogram sponsoredroup ofne under the aegis of the UN.
C. Possible Undertakings
Because we are unable to estimate Soviet intentions in space over the long term, our consideration of possible space activities must rest heavily on our estimates of likely Soviet capabilities in the field. Moreover, even on this basis, we must make the assumption that the various projects the Sovietsin the near term will for the most part be successful and that long-term ventures will be able to proceed from earlier achievements.
Soviet writings and oratory haveroad spectrum of potential undertakings in space but have failed, probably deliberately, to highlight any particular one or ones as those likely to be pursued by the USSR. However.
certain ventures are mentioned more often than others and this repetition may provide the clue to future Sovieteview of Soviet writings, speeches, and interviews over the past two years shows that the followingare the most often addressed:
expansion of the applied satellite program in the fields ofmeteorology, geodesy, and navigation.
of the sun and planets.
complex space stations, to serve as scientific research bases,platforms for other space ships, as astronomical observatories, etc.
lunar base or "laboratory" toariety ofaunching station for deep space probes,observations, as well asase for the exploration ofitself.
Normally missing from their official statements is mention of programs with direct military applicabUity. Nevertheless wc believe that they willto explore rnihtary applications of space.
In discussing the lunar base or laboratory" the Soviets are obviouslyto something far more extensive and complicatedather small, two or three man, short duration installation. In these discussions, tbe Soviets do not describe the means of puttingtation in place, but restrict the discourse to desirabilityase of this type aod the scientific advantages to be gained. Tbe constructionanned lunar base of the size and nature implied in tbe Soviet discussions would be extremely complex and costly, and would require tbe Soviets to develop equipment and techniques far morethan we believe that they will be able to achieve within the nextears.
time table for the Soviet manned planetary exploration programnot been established. Soviet developmentapability tolaunch manned vehicles from an orbital space station launcheventually lead to manned fly-bys of Mars, Venus, or other planets.connection, the Soviets arc actively engaged in the investigation ofpropulsion devices, which would be efficient means ofpayloads over interplanetary distances. Tbe Soviets claim to havea device for attitude control of the Zond II spacecraft, which theyMarsowever, the Soviet lackuitable nuclearfor an electrical propulsion system would precludelanet before thet tbe earliest The periodestimated toeriod of decreased solar activity and therefore afor such flights. We believe, however, that it is unlikely that thehave advanced sufficiently far In their programs to attempt any suchthat time, chiefly because of the problems inherent in the developmentlife support system capable of supporting manned flights of the severalrequired for interplanetary travel.
top ocean
There Is no evidence that the Soviets areuclear rocket engine for interplanetary propulsion, although they are continuing research which could be applicable toevelopment. It would probably take the Sovietsoears, after initiation of the program, to develop such an engine.
Tin Soviets are believed torogram aimed at developmentuclear reactor/thermionic converter power source.ystem would have greater efficiency than therrrwclectric systems and an output of hundreds of kilowatts of electric power. The development program is probably In an early stage, andystem will probably not become operational until the.
Varioustechnical, andprobablythe exploitation of soange of possibilities as is indicated hy Soviet open sources. However, the steps taken toward these programs are so interrelated that any step taken in any one program would be of benefit in others. Priority projects will probably be undertaken, but we have no evidence upon which inudgment of which program or programs will be assigned what priority.
ANNEX
ESTIMATED TIMING OF MAJOR SOVIET SPACE EVENTS
SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES0
HISTORY OF SOVIET MANNED SPACEFlIGHT PROJECTS
HI5TORY OF SOVIET LAUNCHINGS OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY PROBES
1-
jj
O
LLI
3
a
IS
flii
major soviet space programs
67
MAN IN SPACE PROGRAM
Manned '
Unmanned
Dog : ,
PROSES
OCCP SPACE PROSES Mori
PHOTORECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES
t i ii
1 SCIENTIFICat)
COMMuNI CATIONSATELLITES
SATELLITES
0
T (OitOl.OGICAL
JUCCtM
= SUtCSS
tct jjff
HISTORY OF SOVIET MANNED SPACEFLIGHT PROJECTS(Through
Keinarkli
Launch Date
(Note: Although there havei fafluree ir. the Soviet program, we have oo avidenee supporting theany Soviet manned
Recovery
ay
Kornbl' I.
ayattempted)
ulug
(tJaannouiKwd)
Sputnik)
16
ug AO
17
2 Deoattempted)
9 Mar 61
1 Doc 40
ecar 61
Vortok I
Voatok 2
ar 61 ar2 Apr 61 pr uk 61 m 61
17
64
uk 02 ug
Voatok 3
0ontained two dogs and other biologicalirat successful recovery Of Veertok-like apaoteraft. Comprehensive bio-telemetry wpejimentation; In-flight television moaitorlug of dog; effect* of acceleration, weighl-leaanees, radiation onrgaruatna Including inununologicaL mkroblologioal and eytologieal etudie*.
ba. Similar to Korabl'urned up oo reentry. Two doge.
Failure ofooster. Tw do pi.
0 lba. Contained one dog.of man-rating of Voatok.
9ontained one dog.of man-rstlog of Voetok.
Payload: 5 lba. Gagarin; firat manned
orbital apace flight.
8itov; are* one-day mission; demonstrated human ability to cot, steep, and work under conditions of space Bight; vestibular disturbance* suffered by cosmonaut.
2 lbs. Nikolayev; along with Voatokhe firstof two subject* under generally simitar conditions ofBight.
5 It*. Popovidi.
ykovakiy;further evaluation of human reaetiona to extended apnea flight, especially cardiovascular deoondlHoning.
0emahkova; aloijg withlret teat of male and female subject* under generally similar conditions; first flightun pilot.
Voskhod with dommiea. Computed payload same a* Voakhod.
0. M. Komarov, Dr. B. B. Yegerov, aod Bog, K- Fcoktistov; firat flight without ipaoesuita; firat flight with direct lofllgbt medical obaervations, Ineluding aampllng of body fluids.
Voskhod with airlock for EVA. Unmanned. Burned up.
Two
Two dog*. Extendedays) biological
experiment, probable unmanned teat of new spacecraft. Probable unmanned test of new spacecraft.
mployed the employed tbe Venlk
4S
ugun
ugun
un 63 un 63
vertofc
6 Oct 64
7 Oct 64
Cosmo* 47
ot 61 ct 64
Voakhod
65
eb
IS Mar
eb
eb
.
..
19
16
30
9
17
324
33
32
Thi*
All launching* have employed theooster. VosWk-retatedune Lunik upper ataga. Voskhod-relatedeginning with Co*mo*npper stage. Payload weight* arc those announced bynd aubattnUated by other evidence.
Six day* prior to the launch of Voakhod, Cosmosrovided final flight qualification of the newconstituted the only full flight teat of tbe Voakbod carrying all of Ua associatedour other Coamoa., in addition to performing their primary reconnaissance missions, served to man-rat* tboVenikrage and possibly provided toning of Venlk/Voakhod comparability and of Voakbod aUuctural integrity.
lb*. Firat known Soviet uae of the Cosmic Space Ship." ltdrorocket failure; decayedailure ofooater.
HISTORY OF BOVIKT LAUNCHISGS OF LUNAR AND PLANETARY
(Through
(Nuba: All lauocblQta have been from Tjuralam)
Dee
Jan
Jun
Sep
Ort
Apr
of Direcl-Aeceal Techniquelaunch failure.
Lunik I. oan and went into orbit around win. Launch failure. Lunik II. Impacted moon.
Lunik III. Cfrcumhina). Bueeaeafullv photographed
UddeaeMeol moon. InattficicM xHomj. NaaraM approach lo moonO. COG mila.
rWlrinlm o( Partinj-OrWi TechniqueOct 60 Preenaiur* cutoff of Vnuk aUta mine, parking orbit
not achieved.
ct 80 Premature outoff of Venlkngine: parkin* orbit
notFeb 61 UHSK announced
annoiinciloiu mimical ion failure durlmt the Interpianetarj-ooaat pbaae Duucceaaful: tumbling 4lh atage producing norum.
Ur*uerraafol; lumoiina 4th atagano jadat IhrtM.
portefcU partial attitude aUUcaaUon
fall are of 4th ftaa* prod-mag aoalfunction* lubanqMOl kj M
^vtrtaannoabeerom
Moon Moon
4 Nov 62
4 Jan 63
3 Febpr 63 Moon
ov 63 Unknown Unknown
ab 64 Unknown Unknown
ar 64 Moon 'ar 64 VMu> pr 64 Veoua
parking omit; 4lhnlli-i
Venlk stage failed; parking orbit not achieved.
Lunik IV. Passedilo of moon
after midcourae correction. Probable engineering Wat of planetary
proba. Failed to ejeol from orbit.ginwrina; la> of planetary proba. Vehicle
did not achieve orb:!
VatJk Mage failed, parking orMt not aehiavad Announced aa Coamoafter 4th atage failed. Toad I. Initial trajectory would have cauatd probe to0 mill* of Vanua. Sovtata announced two imdooursn eorrecUoiii4 and; mil distance iocreaand and contact apparently Ionring
(ooiooia. aior mill.
HISTORY OP SOVIET LAUNCIIINGS OP LUNAR AND PLANBTARY PROBES
(ThroughContinued)
(Nolo: AH launching* have been from Tyumlnm)
Date
Target
(Ibe.)
Remark*
of Parking-Orbit Teeholaue(OnlisuiMfi
stag* failed: parking orbit not achieved.
Zond II power encountered difficulties In first day on
flight. Arrived in the vicinity of Man during the
early part ofourth stage failure. Third suae failure. Lunanuctnpt failed. Lunaattempt failedondreleased picture* of lunar surface
taken duringunasoft-lander attempt. Failed atenussuccess: Venus fly-by (first use of
arkingenusPartial success: allegedly impacted on tbe
planet but no signals were transmitted during tbe
terminal phase. Cosmos DO. Venue probe attempt. Failure. Luna 8. Soft-landing attempt, failed at retrafire. Luna 9. Successful soft-landing.
Coamos ill. Lunar probe attempt; vehicle failed to
eject from earth parking orbit. Lunar orbrter. No pictures. Lunar or biter. No pictures. Lunarpictures of lunar
surface.
uccessful soft-landing.
rtircet-ascfiot launches used6 booster and the Lunik upper stage, ln addition to the launch attempt* noted In this series, we believe that there were three launch failures two In tbe fall0 and one in
Payload estimated. Other pay loads ware announced by tbe Soviet and substaDUated by other evidence.
All these launches have used0 boaster and Vanik upper stags to plane. Into earth0 pound package consisting of the payload and Its propulsion stage. This stage (known as the 4th or ejection stage) Is used to eject the payload from earth orbit and to place Ilrajectory towards Its target.
Payloode unknown. Believed to be the same asound announced by the Soviets for the Venus shot of
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
document wot diueminoted by lhe Central Intelligence Agency. Thi*for the Information and use of the recipient end of person* under his jurisdiction onbasis. Additional essential dissemination may be avthorliod byoffldoU within theirepartments!
of Intelligence and Research, for tho Dcportmont of Stat*
Defense Intelligence Agoncy, for the Office of lhe Secretary of
Defensa and lhe organization of tho Joint Chiefs of Start
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of tho Army, for the
Department of the Army
Chief of Navol Operationsor the Department of lhe
Navy
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. for tha Deportment of the Air
force
of Intelligence, AEC, for tho Atomic Energyg. Assistant Director, FBI, for mo federal Bureau of ImesrigaHon
h. Director oi NSA, for tho National Security Agency
i. Director of Notional EstimoWt, CIA, for any other Deportment or Agency
Thh document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable sorority regulations, or returned to th* Control Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of National Estimates, CIA.
When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain iteriod not in excess of ona year. At the end of this period, the document should either bo destroyed, returned to tho forwarding agency, or per-mlsswn should be requested of the forwarding og*ney to retain it in aecordorK* with2
The tine of this document when used separately from tho text should bo
DtSTBIBUTIONi
White House
Notional Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: