PEKING, THE ARMY, AND THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES

Created: 4/25/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

RELEASE IH PART EXEMPTIONS: IbIM)

ATE:1

Intelligence Memorandum

Peking, the Army, and the Provincial Authorities

CONTENTS

Summary

Peking Presses Regional andParty Members...

The Provinces Fight Back

The Armed Forces on the Sidelines

The PLAhoice

The Army Gets in Line

An Olive Branch to the Party

The Role of Chou En-lai

The Trend Toward Moderation Continues..

The "Rebels" Strike Back

The Central Committee Meets

The Interim

Prospects

Annex:

North China Bureau

Northeast

Northwest bureau

East China Bureau

Central South Bureau

Southwest Bureau

Map: Chinese Communist Party Regions...

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence7

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Peking, the Army, and the Provincial Authorities

Summary

The origins of the Cultural Revolution in China are obscure, and the kind of information available concerning the disorderly course it has followedariety of interpretations. It seems likely that the trouble which has kept China in turmoil for moreear and, which brought the country to the verge of anarchy in7 had its roots in differences over policy in the fallao's plans for rekindling revolutionary enthusiasm among the people and "steeling" the next generation to ensure that China would not backslide intowere probably an importantthe major question taken upop-level meeting in Peking during September and

Conflicts generated by this basic issuebecame entwinedtruggle inside the party leadership during the winter. There is some reason to believe that Mao became seriously ill after he dropped out of sight in November, and this would almost certainly have triggeredmaneuvering to claim his mantle among the

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finely balanced forces at the top of the hierarchy in Peking. When Mao returned to take up an active role again in early spring this led to theof several major party leaders who had opposed Mao and whose ambitions and conniving had been exposed. Thefirst to affect politburo figures in sevenMao's suspicions of all the rest and thus helped set the stage forh central committee plenum in early The evidence indicates that this plenum was the scenehowdown between Mao and the old-line party apparatus responsive to Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Mao( supported by Lin Piao and Premier Chou En-lai,ictory in Peking, It was not conclusive, however, because the new team of topbasically unstablegrowing resistance from powerful leaders in the provinces. Most of these men had been clients of Liu and Teng and could read the writing on the wall.

A drive to bring- some of these provincial party leaders down began at once, but was not pressed strongly until December. By then the opposition included virtually every first secretary in the regional party bureaus and provinces and about half the commanders of theilitary regions. They were alignedumber of key party and military figures still able to function in Peking and thusotentially formidable group. They struggled desperately to retain their positions and succeeded in this until the military establishment entered the conflict on the side of Peking during the last week in January.

The basis on which leaders at the center gained positive support from the armed forces is not clear. It seems likelyumber of high-rankingofficers opposed Mao and Lin Piao on this issue inMarshal Ho Lung andther major military figures were later charged with havingcoup" and were purged shortly after the turn of the year.

There is reason to believe that up toumber of key field commanders were still uncommitted, some because they were confused by the

situation in Peking and othors because they had reservations about the course of the Cultural The military swung solidly into line in late January and early February, however,ime

when the Cultural Revolution was beingirm causal connection cannot be established on the basis of the evidence available, but theof events suggests that the views of military leaders were probably aa majorPeking's decision toamper on "rebel"

activity.

It seems likely that the military establishment is an essentially conservative political organism, and aa such would opt for stability and unity. There is no way of knowingignificant number of commanders would have defied Peking if theRevolution had not been moderated toward the end of January. Doubts on this score almostexisted at the center, however, and would have provided powerful support for arguments in favorhange in tactics.

When it appeared that the restoration of order had been given priority by Peking and moves were made to reassure the military concerning the conduct of the Cultural Revolution within the armed forces, the army moved into action decisively. Thiseflection of the extent to which China hasodern state, with an array motivated bypatriotism.

Despite indications that some military leaders wero uncertain about whom to support in Peking, andew mayime have backed efforts by regional political authorities to maintain their positions, there has been no evidence of wavering loyalty to the state within the officer corps at large or among the rank and file, or of anydisposition toovement toward secession.

Once the military took an active role,in the provinces collapsed and there were indications in February that the brakes had been applied to the Cultural Revolution. In early March,

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however, thereesurgence of "rebel"attacks on government and party officials. These apparently were ordered by Mao to reverse the trend toward phasing out the more violent andaspects of the Cultural Revolution. ew campaign launched against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping at che end of March apparently wasto prepare for their formal removal.

The outcome of these latest developments cannot be predicted,eneral forecast of continued confusion with new "twists and turns" in the months ahead as the current leaders work to construct new administrative machinery from the wreckage of the old party and government apparatus. The course of the struggle during the December-January crisis, and the final victory of the center over poweron the periphery suggest, however, that over the longer run the prospect isnified China governed on strongly nationalistic principles.

Peking Presses Regional and Provincial Party Members

on powerful figures in the regionalparty apparatus began soon after theplenum in6 and the subsequentof the Red Guardsass action politicalto forces supporting Moo and Lin Piao. activist teams fanned out all over Chinaand October to spread the Cultural"bombard the headquarters" of local authorities in

a disorderly campaign of riotous demonstrations and mob violence.

this period two of the six regionaland moreozen provincial partywere brought under varying degrees of pressure.

The political and governmental apparatus outside the capital resistedariety of devices, pretending in some instances to welcome Red Guard teams andsham cooperation, but in fact attempting to block their efforts. Local "guards" were often organized and pitted against the interlopers from Peking. forces were used by local authorites to channel Red Guard violence and where necessary to suppress hoodlum gangs attacking local leadership organs.

The pressure was stepped up by Peking during November. Red Guard organization was improved and the assault by them on the provincial apparatus was more carefully focused. Up to the beginning of December, however, the only major provincial leaders dismissed were the first secretary of the Hopei provincialwho had been in trouble prior tothe second secretaries in Shensi and Heilungkiang provinces. In Peking, Liu Shao-chl and Teng Hsiao-ping continued to show up with Mao at Red Guard rallies, although they were by then shorn of significant political power.

In December the attack from the center went into high gear. Former party leaders such as Peng Chen, already brought down, were "dragged out" by Red Guards and physically abused. ull-scale campaign, backed by Madame Mao and other leaders, was launched against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. The charges brought against Liu and Teng were tantamount to treason, and

it appeared that preparations were being made for formal proceedings against them. The new attacks, in fact.

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amountedhreatened declaration of war against power holders on the periphery. The option of abetween Peking and regional satraps was still open, though by no means an inviting one since the termsby the center were close to unconditional surrender,

5. It seems possibleew effortompromiseagreement some time around

party chief LiiBJMstLiu Lan-tao, and Northeast boss Sung Jen-chiung all came to Peking at this time under safe conduct from Taoformer first secretary in the Central South then still number four man in the centraltalks with Lin Piao. When they refused to promise allegiance, Lin reportedly wanted to arrest them but was balked by Tao Chu, who spirited the three men out of the capital onecember and then fled himself to his old power base in the south.

ever, consistent witn moves at tne ena of December to loose full-scale "cultural revolution" against bases of power in the provinces. Editorials in People's Daily at that time ordered Red Guards first into the "mines and factories" and then into the countryside.

The Opposition

7. The men threatened by this drive to finish off resistance in the provinces belonged to cohesive local groups loosely connected with each other andcrcor. interest in political survival. Mostunder attack owed their positions to Liu Shao-chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, who had been demoted ath party plenum in August. For years Liu and Teng had been building the party apparatus, both in Peking and the provinces, and their fall from grace jeopardized the positions of large numbers of key officials.

8. Apart from this, the generally united front presented by regional and provincial officials against efforts to bring them downeflection ofdeveloped among men working together in outlying

areas. Day-to-day operation of governmental and party machinery in regional organizations led, almostto the growth of self-servingmade up of officials accustomed to dealing with one another and taken up with local problems.

seems likely, moreover, that over theof these men have become progressivelyauthorities at the center who have been therelentless pressure to achieve results and whomade local officials the scapegoatscommitted in Peking. The considerableof popular support commanded by these menfrom tha regional diversity andon geographic, economic, ethnic, linguistic,differences which still exist.

The Provinces Fight Back

authorities outside the capitalPeking'sounterblow usingdenounced by central authorities underterm "economism." This was an appeal toself-interest designed to produceand at the same time to enlist supportpeople by offering them improvement in theirhad in fact issued instructions whichof the actions taken by provincialhowever, the center charged that localwere "bribing" the workers with wage increases and

a share-out of public property, encouraging them to strike and go to the capital in order to present Other devices used by local authorities included deceptionup false "rebel" groups and staging shama kind of political judo which involved overcompliance with orders from the center such as the demand that workers be placed in charge. Management technicians followed thisby leaving their jobs and thus crippling operations in key installations or shutting them down entirely.

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this added upind ofwhich produced disorder verging onmany parts of China. Peking's propagandaa "revisionist" conspiracy to seize power lay at

the bottom of these troubles. There ts, however, nothat opposition forces were ever anything moreoose coalition, or that leaders at the regional or provincial level were playing for anything moretalemate which would enable them to retain their Most of the provincial and regional powerwere able to hold out until after the middle ofituation which would not have existed if the armed forces had been committed on the side of central authority. It seems equally clear that, if the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) had been firmly backing provincial and regional authorities, unarmed bands of troublemakers from other parts of China would never have been able to humiliate local officials andthe operation of the party and government

The Armed Forces on the Sidelines

directive publicizedhe PLA actively to support Maoistimplies that the army had until then beento stand clear of the struggle. to use the armed forces against resistanceprovinces during the August-December periodresultedecision by Mao and Lin Piaosituation was not serious enough to warrantaction, or that it was not yet time toCultural Revolutionictoriousthe early part of the period this explanation

lausible hypothesis but after the middle ofit is unconvincing. The situation outside the capital became steadily worse toward the end of the month, and by the turn of the year it had become the most serious internal security crisis faced by the regime since it took power It is hard tothat Mao and Lin would have permitted the massive disorder to drag on in East China as it did from late December to the middle ofparticular the cutting of the important Shanghai-Peking railthey had been certain of the PLA.

evidence does not indicate thatforces had ceased tooherent andorganization. The available evidence indicates.

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or "two division-size support units stationed in North Vietnam. The navyuided-raissile patrol boat exercise in the Pohai Gulf during November. ivision-size armyunit moved into Vietnam in late December, and during January two antiaircraft artillery divisions were deployed there from China. One of these units came from Manchuria, transiting the country north to south insual time required forovement. Two nuclear tests took place, one in October and the other in December, and there were two possible missile firings in West China during December. In early January the air forceajor airdrop exercise, possibly connected with supplying food to stranded Red Guard "long marchers"ass pilgrimage to Chingkangshon in central China.

on important military figures bywhich began in early January suggest thatforces were not used because some keyhad opposed plans to achieve final victoryradical program by using military means topolitical leaders in outlying areas withhad connections. They may have confronteddemands that he should relieve the crisisthe course of the revolution and coming

to terms with his opponents. The timing of events is obscure, but ifhowdown took place it seems most likely to have occurred shortly before the end of the year.

The "Plot" of Ho Lung

criticism of military leaders beganwhen Liu Chih-chien came under fire on 8 eputy director of the PLAiu had headed the army'sRevolution Group charged with purging theduring The group was reorganized

onanuary and Madame Mao was named as its

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17. An editorial in the Liberation Army Journal onanuary declared that the new body would open "ferocious fire" on the "handful" in power within the armed forces who had taken the "capitalisehe Army journal reaffirmed tho assertion made in People's Daily and Red Flag onanuary that the Culturalhad been "pushed"ew stage by recent events and reminded readers that the army is the "mainstay of thethe chief instrument of domestic control. According to poster reports, Lin Piaopeech before the Cultural Revolutionew days earlier in which he declared that the country wasstate of civil war."

16. The scope and nature of the opposition in the military leadership is suggested by charges surfaceddays after the reorganization of the army purge machinery. Posters put up onanuary charged that important party and military leaders had been involvedoup plot hatched by Ho Lung in arshal until ranks were abolished5 and aof the military affairs committee of the central committee, was said to haveroup which"many" military leaders from the general staff, the air force, navy, and the Peking and Chengtu Military regions; ere eventually identified by name.

charge that plotting of some kind had beenon among the military is credible, and involvementin the Chengtu Militarystronghold

of Southwest Bureau chief Lithe key Peking Military Region makes sense. It seems unlikely, however, that the details of the accusation, particularly the date adduced, are accurate. The charges shouldbest be viewed as symbolic ones, revealing opposition but masking its true nature. It would thus appear that the crimes were not actuallypalacend that the indictment may have beenin order to conceal the fact that Maoist forces werefacing strong opposition within the militaryover the issue of using the armed forces as Mao's iron fist to win quick political victory in the provinces.

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fall of Tao Chu, denounced in postershortly after his last appearancenother reflection of the depth of the struggleunder way in December. Until around the middle

of the month Tao had appeared firmly established as number four man in the post-August hierarchy. When he moved to tha center Tao had retained his power base in the Central South Bureau where he had for years been first secretary. He subsequently attempted toit by acquiring supporters among party leaders in East China, where the regional bureau had beenesignated head for nearly two years and had probably been managed by Teng Hsiao-ping before his downfall. Posters appearing in late November charged Tao with protecting several party bosses in theincluding Lisecretary in the East China Bureau and party chief in Anhwei Province. Tao would thus have had an interest inrive to eliminate power centers outside Peking. His sudden and unexpected denunciation at the end of December may indicate that he joined the military and partyin desperation when the issue cameead.

The Army Reacts to the Purge

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It was clear that bringing down Ho Lung and his fellow conspirators did not mark the end of the matter so far as the military establishment waa Even the newly reorganized armed forces* purge machinery was not regarded as reliable by its creators.ew days after the reorganization, twoeditors of Liberation Armybeen removed. Instead of stimulating new enthusiasm for thehe move to strengthen thepurge apparatus, together with attacks on major military figures, may actually have operated to heighten fears regarding their future position among senior troopof armies and high-ranking staff officers in the militaryinclined them to hang back.

Many of these men had former ties of one sort or another with military leaders who had come under attack, and even those with no connections which then appeared to be potentially dangerous must have been fearful ofurther enlargement of the "revolution' might bring in the way of ex post facto charges later on. Up to mid-January local political leaders had been successfully resisting in virtually every province, and commanders in almost every military region must have

foreseen tho possibility that they might bo heldfor thisaoist triumph even if they had been acting all along on the basis of orders from their superiors.

of this sort could bereinforce the fundamental lack of sympathy forRevolution which was probably widespreadof field grade or higher. We have noon which to base an assessment of the statothe officer corps of the PLA, butestablishments tend to be conservative andreasonable to suppose that by this time thesoldiers who formed its backbone hadthan enough revolutionary disorder and wouldto proposals which would bring italt.

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problem probably cameead foraround the third week in January. Aissued onanuary ordering tho army to takerole in backing pro-Mao forces. Theof "standing on the sidelines" in thecondemned and all orders to this effect were ajor editorial printed inally

the day before puts this directive into perspective. It admitted that Mao had recentlyseriousand spoke gloomily of the possibility ofviolence and "zigzags and ups and downs" before victory could be achieved. The tone was violent, almost hysterical, and the prescription given for Maoist success was to "seize powerlnd more The editorial asserted flatly that "he who is without power is nothing. Of all the important things, the possession of power is the most important!"

that troops were being uaedto subdue Mao's opponents in the provincesin Peking broadcasts immediatelyof the new directive. Claims ofby Maoists, however, indicated that inresistance was continuing and that thedid not move as one man to follow the new In some areas the response was prompt,

but in others resistance and confusion persisted for

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weeks, suggesting that theheld the key to thedragging their feet.

Liu Lan-tao, party boss in the Northwest Region where resistance had been very strong, wasto have been "dragged out" by Red Guards in Sian aboutanuary along withf his chiefhotograph of this event was posted in Pekingebruary. Li Ching-chuan, first secretary of the Southwesthotbed ofparaded in disgrace through the streets of Chengtu about the same time.

Trouble continued to be reported in many parts of China during early February, however,in Tibet and Szechwan where Red Guardsthey had been doing forthey were being suppressed by military units.

These differences cannot be satisfactorily explained on the ground that tho armed forces lacked the strength to Impose the*will of the center on provincial leaders immediately, or that the military did not have clear instructions. It appears, therefore, that the spotty performance of the military reflectedon the part of key commanders in some areas to carry out orders. Under normal circumstances the response toituation would be immediate removal and court martial of the insubordinatein troops from other areas to accomplish this if necessary.

Peking appears instead to have changed the orders, moderating the Cultural Revolution so that it would be acceptable to the armedwhich would win the active support of the military. Specific arrangements may have been madeumber of individual commanders"in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, andto the bargains struck with the warlords in thethe over-all appeal for army backing looked more like an effort to reach political consensus.

The Basis for Agreement

basis for agreement was not spelledthe main points are indicatedpeech madeEn-laianuary in which he calleddeliberate pace in the Cultural Revolution, an end

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to tha activities of roving Red Guard goon squads, and steps to minimize damage to the economic andshort an appealeturn tolike normalcy.

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printed by Poople 's Daily cn anuary and the directive ofanuary ordering the army in the Cultural Revolution fray on the side of the Maoist "rebels.- He did call for formation of the "granddemanded by People's Daily but said action should be taken "systematically.a He declared that take-over of an organization must be carried out by using the "revolutionaries" within the body as the main force utilizing outsiders only as "helpera." Chou referred specifically to military units and "those departments engaged in war preparations" in this connection, noting that "if the questionpower seizure arises it can only be carried out internally and in accordance with

the spirit of the instructions of the central committee."

His third main point was thatmanagers ororganizations which had been taken over must continue to perform their jobs with revolutionaries acting as "supervisors." Chou then called on Red Guards to go home and seize power "together with the broad masses." As for the role of the armed forces, Chou declared that the PLA wouldsupport and assist" revolutionaries and that it "stands on their side and joins in the commonn editorial in Liberation Army Journal broadcast by Peking onanuary emphasized the point that inthe "rebel revolutionaries" the army should rely on political persuasion rather than force.

a new directive to the armed forces issued onanuary provided justificationlowdown in the pace of the Cultural Revolution. According to posters observed in Peking, Mao on that day had ordered allregions to be alert against the "forces ofandpecifically mentioning Sinkiang and the military regions on China's Pacific coast. Mao was quoted as saying that in view of the currentsituation the "timetable for the Cultural Revolution may be set back somewhat." The directive was issued under the name of Yeh Chien-ying for the Military Affairs

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body of which Lin Piao had been "in charge"

directive was issued by theCommittee onanuary concerning thethe Cultura^Revolution within the armed forces. that soldiers, to be arrested oralthough they might be "ridiculed." individuals were to be permitted but itto "criticize the commandn itself. guarantee of immunity to mostuccessful attempt to reassure PLAwhich brought the weight of the armed forcesauthorities in Peking.

The Army Gets in Line

the armed forces no longer on theprovincial resistance began to collapse

during the last week in January. Onanuary afrom the capital of Anhwei Province announced the dismissal of provincial first secretary Li Pao-hua and four other local party and government figures. Li was also third secretary of the headless East China Bureau and waslient of Tao Chu.

new type of government organization began

to appear in the provinces basedhree-way alliance between military, party, and "revolutionary" elements. The first of these alliances appeared in Heilungkiangecond in Fukien onebruary,hird was announced in Kweichow onebruary. Propaganda broadcasts concerning all of these newstressed the key role of the armed forces in setting them up. epresentative of the PLA was the featured speaker in the inaugural rally in In Fukien, Han Hsien-chu, the rankingmilitary figure in the Foochow Military Region, and Wei Chin-shui, who is governorarty secretary, were the principal speakers. Military men andleadingterm Peking began to use to describe acceptable party leaders in thetook the leading roles, with "revolutionary elements"ubordinate position.

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37. Orders were apparently issued about this time aimed at curbing military participation in Cultural Revolution agitation. Authoritative posters seenebruaryirective by Lin Piao thatwho had been engaged in "exchanging revolutionary experiences" were all to return to their posts byebruary. Lin declared that all "liaison offices"local revolutionary rebel activity would soon be abolished. Messages intercepted some days later confirmed the issuanceirective by Lin and provided the additional information that military schools were to be reopened and that PLA units and schools were for the time being to drop cultural revolutionand return to regular training schedules. These orders were endorsed by Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying, and Hsiaosenior military men who had come under sporadic poster attacks in previous weeks.

all newspaper seen in Pekingescribed efforts to restore order in Inner Mongolia. The Military Affairs Committee and the State Council reportedlyoint directive on 6ordering party, army, and "rebel" units in the region to stop fighting. The poster statedlane had been dispatched to the capital city of inner Mongolia to bring representatives of the three groups to Peking to settle the conflict. lights to Tibet onndebruary may have been involvedimilar

behavior of military units and theplayed appear to have differed in someplace to place. The over-all pattern,that the armed forces displayed greatcohesion andonservativealike to the "rebel" revolutionarieslocal authorities. The PLAto have held back until the movement toand to moderate tho Cultural Revolution beganstrength.

An Olive Branch to the Party Establishment

to bring the armed forces intowere accompaniedarallel shift inapproach to the party apparatus, signaledRed Flag editorial broadcast onanuaryto experienced cadres as the "treasureparty" and warned against indiscriminatethem. This wasew line in that badin the party had from the outset been called

aut the emphasis was markedly different from that in pronouncements during December and early January.

The shift was also reflectedallobserved some time later which reported that Chou En-lai had met with representativesactionsebruary and hadeturn to the policy of correcting erringay which would not destroy their future usefulness. Chou reportedly warned that mistreatment of party cadres, particularly those at the basic level, might alienate "revolutionary forces" from theroadcast from Lhasaebruary quoted the Red Flag editorial publicized by Peking onanuary urging true "revolutionaries" to trust and use party leaders, even those who had committed errors, so long as they were not "antiparty." Those wholabeled party loaders as "persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road" were denounced.

A broadcast from the provincial capital ofMongolia onebruary denounced ultraleftists, who it said were "enthusiastic about internal war and advocate aimless fighting." imilar line was takenroadcast from Heilungkiang four days later

reprimanding party organizations for firing partysimply to "satisfy the demands of themasses." The notice specified thatcould be punished only by the partystated that this information should be postedgovernment andmilitary organizations in1

45. Provincial broadcasts soon began to reflect this new approach to the party machine at the local level. Onebruary the radio inort city in Shantung Province seized by Maoist "rebels" onanuary, lashed out at those who had charged that "all leading cadres are guilty of suppressing the revolution." The same day the Harbin station in Heilungkiang demanded that leading cadros "must be given an opportunity to repent" and enumerated broad categories of cadres who were redeemable.

Now Impetus to "Tripartite Alliances"

ditorials in People's Daily onFebruary and in Liberation Army Journal "onh underscored earlier announcements praising the policy oftripartite alliance" among old-line party officials, the army, and "revolutionary" organizations and claimed that this had already been achieved in four provinces and two municipalities. This conceptsupplanted the notion of establishing new revolutionary "communes" as governing bodies. Until early February an organization supposedly based on the Paris Commune1 was being toutedodel, and the formation of "communes" was announced with great fanfareumber of cities. Onebruary, however, the party central committee ordered that no city or province would use the name "commune" in its title and that those which had established them

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should promptly establish new "revolutionary

the same time, according toleaders in Peking questioned whetherseful guide for China. earlier the commune had been extolledand articles and its applicability toin China had been stressed. Theof the organization apparently worriedin Peking, however, and Minister ofHsieh Fu-chih was reported by posters tothat establishing communes might lead to aof central control.

The directive regarding "communea" onebruary was oneumber issued about the same time designed to put an end to confusion. Many of these reinforced earlier orders but in stronger terms. They instructed "revolutionary" forces to disbandnot approved by the central committee, to stop attacking party officials, and to include important party officials in take-over organizations. Their tone and substance was reflectedpeechgiven by Chou En-lai to Red Guards onebruary.

According to poster accounts, Chou denounced "rebels" for seizing government ministries without central committee approval. He specifically mentioned the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Public Security as organizations in which seizure of power "cannot be recognized." Chou angrily criticized "rebel" attempts to arrest the minister

of commerce after he had been invited by Chou to "rest" and declared that this action was likearrant "against the party central committee."

again deplored "revolutionary"against veteran government and party Parading them around in dunce caps couldcondoned, he said, and went on to declare"uncivilized" treatment was not necessaryPeng Chen." Chou criticized threemilitant Red Guard organizations by name,"low quality" of the posters they had put upChina. He said that the central committee did

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not necessarily agree with these posters. Thistogether with Chou's criticism of irresponsible accusations and his statement that the list of party officials to be attacked should be "boiledmplied that Peking had decided to start dismantling extremist organizations.

is insufficient evidence toonfident conclusion #ith regard to Chou En-lai'sand role during the period of revolutionary retreat, He was clearly in the thick of things, however, and the fact that the shiftore moderate course inreflects the relatively conservative position Chou has taken since last August suggests that he had gained the initiative at the center.

Chou has been notableefender ofunder attack by "rebel" Red Guards, and has repeatedly supported officials who were part of his power base within the government structure. He has alsoumber of military leaders who appeared to be in trouble. Chou has gone along with the main line of the Cultural Revolution but his statements have been more moderate than those of Lin Piao, Chiang Ching, Chen Po-ta, and other Maoist spokesmen. He has repeatedly stressed the importance of maintaining production and has come out against "excesses,"the necessity of "treating the illness to save the patient."

It seems likely that the flow of events placed Chouey position, in part at least byand that he argued successfully for theof surviving authorities in the second or third

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echelon of the provincial and regional hierarchies. These men were doubtless regarded by the Maoists as dangerously tainted with revisionism but their skills and experience made them indispensable in halting the trend towardand in dealing with practical problems such asthe vital spring planting dona.

and Lin Piao had from the outset beencommittediolent course aimed atchanges of the most sweeping kind and theirhad led to an accretion of power in the handsmost radical elements in the Chinese body politic. have made it very difficult to get agreement ontoward moderation. Chou's counsel mayumber of important military leaders and

his efforts at persuasion were probably strengthened in any case by doubts which almost certainly existed at the center concerning the loyalty of the armed forces in all circumstances. Mao appears to have been forced to accept the needove toward moderation in tactics but clearly regarded itemporary expedient.

The Trend Toward Moderation Continues

The Cultural Revolution continued to lose velocity during late February and early March amidthat order was being restored. Essential services provided by the government, seriouslyfrom December on, were again available in most places by February. The Red Guard apparatus was being gradually modified and in some cases dismantled.

Onebruary Chou En-laiass meeting of university Red Guards in Peking andcited Mao as the authority for what clearly was an effort to weld the disparate revolutionary groups

ung onebruaryne band of

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reported that army units revolutionai

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mg radio put its stamp approval on the dissolution of city-wideorganizations in the Shantung city of Tsingtao. The governing revolutionary committee in Tsingtao had directedarch that the headquarters of rebel organizations be disbanded and the "tripartiteof rebels, army elements, and party cadres be formed within work units. In its announcement, Peking acknowledged that disorder had resulted when workersnit belonged tooftenorganizations.

59. Efforts to get the economy rolling again, especially in,.the vital agricultural sector, began to be evident

laid out what amountedlueprint for the role of the military in restoring order. The article identified "anarchism" as the chiefimplicit criticism of Maoistand underscored the importance of production. People's Daily, in an editorial broadcastarch, again

made the case for unity and opposed extremism and anarchy.

The "Rebels" Strike Back

61. Efforts to let the steam out of Mao's Cultural Revolution and to move China back toward something normalcy_were not unopposed.

onall newspapernine secondary-level officials had beendenouncedallyed Guards,troops at the Workers' Stadium in Peking. This

was the first such public humiliation of officials since mid-February when Chou En-lai had declared that Mao deplored "uncivilized" treatment of his enemies.arch posters and wall newspapers appeared all over Peking denouncing Tan Chen-lin, the agricultural specialist on the politburo.

Tan was the first senior party official to come under fire since the Cultural Revolution began to subside at the end of January. Posters attacking him were signed by revolutionary groups in numerousministries, suggesting that the campaign against him had high-level approval. Tan was accused of having "deceived" Chou En-lai and of having attempted to moderate the Cultural Revolution in the countryside.

The depth and seriousness of the renewedat the center over the question of moderating the Cultural Revolution was indicatedajor Red Flsg editorial broadcast onarch. The editorial complained that militant revolutionaries were not beingarge enough role in the new revolutionary governing bodies being set up throughout China. Some of these bodies, it warned, have "compromised with class enemies" by allowing too many party officials, including "some who have noto help run the new organizations. Red Flag predicted that this would lead to "new seesawn implicit threat

that attacks on what was left of the party apparatusthe capital would be resumed.

Attacks on Tan Chen-lin continued onarchally held to denounce him at the Ministry of State Farms. oster was observed onarch stating that past statements by high officialsTan had been withdrawn. He had come under sporadic poster attack in previous months but had been defended by both Chou En-lai and Madame Mao in January. Onarch Tan was denounced againarading Bed Guards, workers, and troops. In these attacks he was linked with fallen party leaders Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and the disciplined character of the demonstration indicated that it had official sanction.

Two more vice premiers joined Tan Chen-lin as targets for criticism onndarch. On these days posters went up attacking Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien and Li Fu-chun, who is in charge of state planning. Like Tan, both men are politburo members, and Li Fu-chun is also on the standing committee. Neither of these men was attacked as violently as Tan, and posters defending them as "good students of Mao" appeared along with those criticizing them.

The development was clearly regardederious light, however, and may have been an oblique attack on Chou En-lai himself since all three men were his close associates and worked under his direction. Many defensive sounding posters asserting that Chou "follows the revolutionary line laid down by Chairman Mao" were displayed in Pekingame day that an editorial appeared in the Shanghai Wen Buinewspaper in the vanguard of the Cultural Revolution lastthose who had said the Red Guards were "overdoing it" and stating flatly that anyone who criticized the guards for theirfew mistakes was opposing the Cultural Chou may have been the indirect target of this editorial in that he has on several occasions taken the Red Guards sharply to task for their excesses.

Efforts to work out an accommodation with leaders in the strategic border regions such as Sinkiang came under fire in posters put up in Peking

onarch by powerful Red Guard groups. These posters.

which wore put up all over the city, denounced Sinkiang military and party boss Wang En-mao and demanded his dismissal. ie-hard opponent of pro-Maoist revolutionaries, had been reportedinxiang broadcast onarch to have met with Mao and Lin Piao in what may haveove toward compromise. Wang was described in this broadcastgood cadre."

The Central Committee Meets

Posters put up in Peking onarch quoted Niehadical female Red Guard leader who is an Important member of the Maoist faction, asthat the central committee and the military affairs committee of that group were meeting and that the atmosphere was one of "struggle." According to the posters, Nieh declared that it was the moststage of the revolution since the "rebel" drive began in January. The main question, she said, was who is to hold power.

Another ultramilitant Red Guard leader, Kuai Ta-fu, was quotedoster as describing theas the "lull before the decisive battle." Major Red Guard newspapers circulated in Peking claimedreactionary adverse current" was running from the top to the bottom ofeference to the trend toward damping down the Cultural Revolution which had been gaining strength since

1 February.

meetings probably lasted about ait seems likely that they were similar tocommittee "work conference" held duringperiod of tension and discord in

En-la iaprrnna^tto^Shao-chi hadcentral committee session in "mid-March" and"put in minority seven times." Chou remarkodwas postponing plansrip abroadwould be "great events in China in the next

The Interim Course

Developments In late March and early April suggest that, during coming weeks and perhaps for the next few months, efforts to maintain order in theto construct new administrative machinery on the wreckage of the shattered government and party apparatus, and to get vital economic work done will continue.

Onarch the PLA, which in February had been ordered to organize spring planting, was directed to support industrial,production. essage intercepted on the same day reported that workers in Heilungchiang Province were returning to their jobs at the direction of the army. The following day Chou En-lai addressed

a Congress of Peasants in Peking, taking his usual moderate line and stressing tho importance of pushing ahead with farm work. He repeated the injunction against "power seizures" in the countryside during the farming season. Onarch Chou En-lai told aof industrial and mining workers in Peking that industry was the "leading factor" in the economy and urged them to emulate and surpass the efforts of the peasants engaged in farm work. The conferenceesolution calling upon workers to maintain the eight-hour work day and to participate in the Cultural Revolution only "during nonworking hours."

March the central committee issuet canceling plans to resume Red Guard travels andactivity in April. Madame Mao and Chou En-laially of middle-school Red Guards in Peking onarch that from then on they were to "make revolution" in school. esolution issued by the newly formed Red Guard Congress informed the students that they were to keep an eye on the country "from their classrooms."

bothndarch Chou En-laimain speaker at congresses of massmajor theme stressed on these occasions was theearly formationevolutionary committeethe city of Peking. What may be the modelprovincial governmentemerged about ain Shansi Province and was publicizedarch. This organization has taken overtasks previously carried out by theand party apparatus, and includesprovincial and municipal-level officialspositions. The senior armyappeared to be the real power. HeShansi congress and was elected rankingof the committee.

"Rebel" Counterpressure

that the February trend moderation was still continuingby evidence that militant "rebel"been instructed to get the revolution back intoand rolling ahead once again. ew attackagainst the discredited Liu Shao-chi,two in the party and still nominally chiefand against Tengof the party secretariat but clearly without

real power since the6 plenum.

Both these men had been under vicious attack in posters. Red Guard newspapers, and rallies since December. Onarch they began to come under even heavier fire from the propaganda vehicles of the central committee. Red Flag, and People's Daily. The official news agency, NCNA, carried voluminous accounts of rallies and demonstrations at which thousands of well-disciplined marchers shouted "down with Liu and Teng."

The new assault on Liu and Teng has thus far been carried on mainly in the capital and has, for

the most part, involved only major figures in the If the attacks are in preparation for formal public action to strip these men of official position and drum them out of the party, as seems likely, they could be the prelude to political intermentost of lesser figures still holding positions in the party

ForeTOP SECRET

was staffed and managed by Liu and Teng for moreecade.

A larger and more immediate purpose of theagainst the "Liu-Teng gang" is probably to rekindle enthusiasm for the Cultural Revolution, get it in motion throughout the country once more, and thus to bolster the position of the extremist militants. Militant Red Guard groups, under pressure and apparently in decline during the February retreat from revolution, have become active once more and theirlike Nieh Yuan-tzu and Kuaiagain asserting themselves. Unheard from for many weeks prior to mid-March, they have since been passing judgment on men in high places,which ones should be "watchedhich can hope to be excused if they repent and reform, and which are outside the pale of redemption.

Continuing parallel attacks on officialswith Chou En-lai and on high-ranking militarymay indicate that these men, successful proponents of moderation in February, areeturn to theand disorderly course taken by the Cultural Revolution up to the end of January. The continuing emphasis on Mao's injunction to "pursue the tottering foe" suggests thatelements in Peking are arguing that the Revolution has already achieved its major purpose and should now be conducted more deliberately andower pitch.

Prospects

immediate outcome of the latestPeking is impossible to predict,eneralof continued confusion with new "twists and turns"

in the months ahead. Communist China now appears to be ruledery small and disunited group ofriumvirate in which Mao probably plays the dominanthe chooses and is physically able. It seems likely that both the shadowy Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, in subordinate but powerful and probably antagonistic positions, make independent self-servingwhen circumstances permit.

immediate objective of those at the top

in Peking at present is probably to construct newmachinery from the wreckage of the shattered

No Foreig top s

TOP SBCRIJP-

No Foreign Dissem

party and government apparatus. This is proceedingandnail's pace, which suggests thatfactions are striving for future dominance bytheir own adherents in key positions within the new political structure.

ituation is basically unstable and might resultiolent struggle at the center which could conceivably lead to civil war. The course of events during January and early February when resistance in the provinces was subdued and differences were compromised under the aegis of the armed forces, however, makes this seem unlikely.

During that period of turmoil thehole opted for stability and national unity. Despite indications that some high-rankingsided with provincial and regional authorities against Peking, there was no evidence of wavering basic loyalty in the officer corps at large or among the rank and file, or of any disposition toovement toward secession. The PLA hasnited and functional organization throughout the course of theRevolution. When the armed forces intervened it was in general on the side of order and centraland on balance it seems probable that they would

do so again in reactingplit at the center. Thiseflection of the extent to which China hasodern nation-state.

The Seeds of Patriotism

The process started with the Westerninto Chinaundred years ago. It was carried forward by the reformers of theh century, given new impetus and direction by therevolutionaries who sought to fill the political vacuum left by the collapse of the empireapan servedatalyst, first in demonstrating that an Asian nation could stand as an equal with the powers of the West, and later as the focus of national enmity during the Japanese attempt to conquer China.

Utilizing the foundations constructed by Chiang Kai-shek and tha Kuomintang with these materials.

TOP SECREP No ForeitSn D

the Communistsew state9olitical structure fundamentally different from any which had previously existed in China. Under it the people once despairingly described by Sun Yat-senheap of loose sand" have finally become united andense of national purpose after decades of bloody and turbulent struggle. In doing this Mao and his comrades werearvest sown by their predecessors.

"New China"

Communistsovernmentthe first time in Chinese history reached alland directly affected their lives. Ruleempire had always been autocratic and Pekingultimate center of authority but the forcewas applied locallyountyonly official an average Chinese everclan and family channels. The general lines

of policy were established by the imperial court, transmitted downwardandarinatecholar officials, and interpreted by provincial authorities whoreat deal of autonomy. The functioning of the system for most of the people, most of the time, was quite accurately described by the folk saying, "The sun is in the heavens and the emperor is far away."

the new Communist rule thethe village level and operated frompassed downisciplinedchain of command which at the samePeking informed of events at the lowestwere developedoint which madepossibleillage cadre to talk

on the telephone with Mao himself. Closed-circuit loudspeaker systems were installed in both rural and urban areas to pass propaganda from the center directly to the people.

regimeigorous andon illiteracy, using simplified charactersdevices, and made progress toward establishing

a national language. These tools were used tothe population with Marxist ideology and at the same time to foster the growth of Western-style nationalism.

feeling and popularthe regime were further enhanced by thesocial achievements of the new regime. Theof the economic situation was in largeresult of reconstruction and restoration ofbut the results achieved provided aof the value of national unity. not transformedand of milk and honey,

but at least there was no mass starvation. The early social reforms instituted by the regime were harsh but they destroyed genuinebyand money lenders, the remnants of traditional familywere welcomed by the populationhole. The social services provided by the newclinics, courts, public welfarenot impressive by Western standards, were better and more abundant than anything known previously in China.

Finally, the Communistsodern national army, based on the principle of universal conscription, to replace the essentially regional armed forces with which they had won the revolution. Such an armyowerful unifying force, particularly when itajor stake in preserving the state mechanism.

Chiang Kai-shek made progress in all of these areas and had it not been for the Japanese attack might have been able tonified state. It

is likely that the Communist leaders regard their own success in doing so as the greatest single achievement of their regime. onviction that political unity is vitallybelief probably now sharedajority of the Chinesethe root of the basic consensus that seems likely to hold China

ANNEX

Recent Developments in Regional Party Bureaus, Military Regions, and Provinces

NORTH CHINA BUREAU

First Secretary Li Hsueh-feng was portrayed in February and March posterscategory three"ne who has committed seriousbut is beinghance.to serveesser role. It is doubtful if he retainsauthority. Li was under heavy andattack by Red Guards, through posters and demonstrations, in October and November (in his concurrent role of first secretary of the Peking city party committee). He apparently was replaced in his Peking job in that period by his deputy, Wu Te.

*

Little was heard of Li after Novemberhen Chou En-lai was quotedoster as saying that Li was on probation and had been sent to Tientsin to clearroublesome situation. The position of weakness from which Li is operating was clearly indicatedontrite statement he madeientsin rally onarch. Li said if he was "able to engage in useful work in Tientsin and correct his past mistakes" he would owe it all to the invincible thought of Mao. By late March, however, Li was in deep trouble again.

Shortly after the official campaign against Liu Shao-chi was launched, poster attacks on Li Hsueh-feng were resumed. Whereas Li had not been named in Red Guard blacklists prepared in January and February, an authoritative listing ofiu Shao-chi followers circulated in Pekingpril included Li's name.

In January and February, there were many reports detailing clashes involving Red Guard groups in the city of Peking, in other cities in Hopeh, and in the capital city of Inner Mongolia. Shansi has been quiet.

PEKING MILITARY REGION (Peking City, Shansi, and Hopeh)

Peking commander Yang Yung came under attack onanuary for denouncing the army'sboss, Hsiao Hua, onanuary. Hsiao was defended by top leaders onnd 22 Onanuary, Chen Po-ta stated that Yang posed an "extremely grave" problem. On the same day Chou En-lai accused Yang ofto cause confusion." edebruary reported that Yang had been dismissed. His political commissar, Liao Han-sheng, was charged early in January ofa military coup with the Ho Lunc

Wu Te, who replaced Li Hsueh-feng inor November, was described in posters in late Februarycomparatively good" cadre. Wu had been criticized from time to time and was briefly "arrested" by Red Guards in mid-January. Onanuary, however, Madame Mao sternly ordered the Guards to release Wu and let him go back to work. eking broadcast identified Wueading member of the "Peking municipality."

The broadcast avoided naming the governing body Wu leads, but posters said he still headed the party committee, byearly powerless body. Posters in late January statedaris-style commune

A-2

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Hopeh

being formed for Peking. However, Mao and other officials soon were being quoted as saying that the ideaommune was premature. Onebruary the Public Security Bureau in Peking was placed under the Peking Garrison, and the city appears to be effectively under military control.

Liu Tzu-hou, who became first secretary in October, was paraded in late Januaryumiliating way, accordingictureed Guard newspaper. The accompanying newspaper story accused Liu ofbloody incident" onanu-

Clashes between opposing factions were re ported in four major provincial cities in January and February. In several cases, PLA forces were sent in to restore order. Onoster reported that the PLA had assumed control over the Tientsin Public Security Bureau. Thus, thein this -province appears to have

and Red Guards put up by disgruntledcharged the military withrevolutionaries.* These posters appear to have been partebelto influence negotiations going on between^Peking and Jnner Mongolian authori ties at the time.

The party committee and government were abolished onanuary and replacedrevolutionary committee." The former first secretary Wei Heng apparently was not retainedeading position. He and four other party leadersally in Taiyuanebruary. All except Wei were then publicly paraded.

The chairman of the new "revolutionary committee" is former vice governor Liu Ko-ping. The party is said to benique role in Shansi, although only one of theormer secretaries has yet emerged in good standing. The Shansi "revolutionarynlike those set up elsewhere, is being run jointlyCCP Shansi core group" and therebels. The deputy head of the core group is Chang Jih-ching, political commissar of the Shansi military district. Other members named so far include Liu Ko-ping, Jenormer provincial secretary and concurrently first secretary of Taiyuan city, and Liu Kuan-i, anminor official whose former post is unknown. Lius generalof the core group.

Chou En-lai and Cultural RevolutionWang Li have singled out Liu Ko-ping as one of the few "good cadres" in China. Liu's chief merit, according to Wang Li, is that he was once "oppressed" by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Liu Ko-ping was the first secretary of Ninghaia0 when ho was dismissed for "rightist tendencies" and given the unimportant post of vice governor in Shansi.

Peking's claim that Mao's enemies in Shansi had struggled desperately before theirin January may be largely fabricated.

In previous months there had been noof any kind of trouble in Shansi. In line with the key role assigned by Peking to the military in power seizures in late January, the PLA in Shansi received effusive praise for the part it allegedly played in the take-over.

NORTHEAST BUREAU

wall posters indicat

The party apparatus of this region, which Maoselectedodel area, has emerged from the Cultural Revolution the least damaged of any in China, First Secretary Sung Jen-chiung was praised by Pekingeading revolutionary cadre andeading role in the formation of the Heilungkiang revolutionary committee established in early February. He was defended from Red Guard criticism last October by Chou En-lai, who may be his chief sponsor in Peking. Three of the bureau'secretaries have also emerged in their former positions, but appear to be functioning as observers leaders.!

only duringmost active phase of the Culturalweresubdued.

SHENYANG MILITARY HEGI.OK (coterminous with the North-

east Bureau)

Commander Chen Hsi-lien showed up at several major rallies last fall, and presumably has sided with Maoist forces, although he has not appeared

Heilungkiang

Pan Fu-sheng, first secretary of the former provincial party committee, was named director of the "HeilungkiangRevolutionary Committee"onanuary, and is the only provincial first secretary to havea revolutionary take-over. Pan's background indicates that he is acase, however. He was dismissed as first secretary of Honan forerrors8 and relegated to an obscure position in Peking until the spring6 when he unexpectedly emerged as first secretary of This record suggests that he has been out of favor with Liu and

Teng for years; his reinstatement6 probablyign that their power was already weakening. Pan was praised by Chou En-lai last fall.

Wang Chia-tao, commander of the Heilung-kiang Military District, is deputyof the new revolutionary committee. Second secretary Li Fan-wu and Liecretary, were dismissed Nine other secretaries have dropped from sight and by now it is doubtful whether few, if any, have survived.

rebels ssist-

in Harbin from the "Red Flag Army of theed Guards" in late January. Thisocal Red Guard group which had beaten,back the rebels last August and September. However, radio broadcasts and poster reports indicated that the rebels had overcome local resistance byanuary.

The first secretary is unknown. Chao Lin, second secretary, was named acting first secretary in6 when the then first secretary, Wu Te, wasto Peking. Chao has not appearedeptember, but he has also not been under attack, and thus may still hold an authoritative position in the province. Inoster charged that Wu Te had attempted toan "independent kingdom" in Kirin during hisharge notin official media or Red Guard newspapers. In early February Radio Peking stated that local PLA troops had been ordered to intervene on behalf of the rebels in Changchun in late January, when, according to posters, the rebels

our-day battle to seizeof the Kirin Daily, the public security bureau, and otherevolutionary take-over at Kirin has not been announced, but recentfrom Changchun indicaterevolutionary committee" may be imminent.

Liaoning

Both first secretary Huang Huo-ching and secondovernor Huang Ho-tung have been out of sight for moreear. Huang Huo-ching, in his roleecretary of the Northeast party bureau, was attackedanuary forin Liaoning, and posters were noted onanuary calling for the removal of Huang Ho-tung. Neither official media nor authoritative Red Guard newspapers have replayed these possibly isolated attacks.

Other party officials who have beenare the Shenyang first secretary, Yang Chun-pu, for "opposition activities" in early January, and eight Luta (Dairen) party officials who were paradedally in Luta onanuary. Nocadre (party people) have been noted active in Liaoning. ally in Shenyang onebruary was attended by Hu Chieh, describedecretary of the Northeast Bureau, Yang Chih,the Liaoning Military District, and another military figure from the Shenyang PLA units.

The apparent lack of activity may be due to confusion stemmingontinuing local power struggle. Peking radio and posters stated that PLA troops intervened on behalf of the rebels in late January. Onebruary posters appeared in Peking charging that PLA troops were "suppressing"

The Liaoning Military District commander. Ho Ching-wu, has not been noted forear. The complete absence to date of any of theultural Revolutionofficials, however, could indicate that the provincial militarymay have been shaken up.

NORTHWEST BUREAU

Poster photographs

secretary Liu

nn. Jitter Red Guard attack sinceajority of the Northwest secretariat have been paraded in disgrace. Liu hasigh Cultural Revolution official in Pekingbad hat" and probably has been ousted from office. Liu andureau and provincialwere publicly humiliated onanuary and have been frequently paraded in the streets of Sian since then. None of theureauhas yet been endorsad by Pekinggood cadre," Only three appear to h;

criticism.i

revolutionary iuuuiuh Nortnwest Bureau and Shensi provincial offices as of late February; however, "struggle" between workers and students was continuing.

with the exception of Ninghsia, this area has been the scene of consistent and much-publicized strife since mid-December. Militant Red Guards appear to have had more success here than in any other area in China.

MILITARY REGION (Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi Tsinghai)

Chang Ta-chih and his political commissar, Hsien Heng-han, were attacked in early February for suppressing rebelin Kansu and Lanchow. The rebels charged that the sons of Chang and Hsien were leading "counterrevolutionary" The rebels also charged that the Kansu Daily and the Lanchow radio station were nothing more than "mouthpieces" for the military. However, neither Chang nor Hsien have bean included in recentlylists of "black gangnd may retain their positions.

SINKIANG MILITARY REGION

The status of Commander Wang En-roao, who is concurrently the party first secretary, is discussed below in the Sinkiang section.

First secretary Wang En-mao appearsreached an uneasy compromisein February after many monthsRed Guard attacks onanti-Wang campaign culminateddisorders in December andinvolving the largeArmy in Sinkiang. Sinkiangquiet since late January,working out an

agreement^Tn^FeKingfc'ith Chou En-lai. Several times during March and April the Sinkiang provincial radio stationthat Wang attended rallies in Urumchi, still holding all his old These broadcasts, confirming earlier poster accountsang-Chou agreement, said that the Sinkianghad been stabilized on the basispoitit directive prepared by Chou and endorsed by Mao and Lin. Red Guard newspapers had reported that such ahad been issued onebruary.

Wang's position still seems insecure, Peking media have not reported that Wang is still in place or repeated Urumchi radio's accounts of Wang's Sporadic Red Guard attacks on Wang continued in Peking after Wangin Urumchi, and onpril detailed poster attacks on Liu Shao-chi accused Wang En-mao and other Northwest leaders of plotting with Liu last spring, when Liu visited Sinkiang en route to Pakistan. The resurgenceadical atmosphere in Peking since mid-March suggests that the status of all compromises reached during the February period ofsuch as the one with Wang, is now being questioned by militant elements in the leadership.

Tsinghai

Both first secretary Wang Chih-lin and second secretary Wang Chao have probably suffered the same fate as most other top party leaders in the Northwest Bureau area

i a

'held

inebruary, and Yang was criticizedoster seen in Pekingarch. No other party figures have been notedas under attack or politically

active.

nce has

been governed by the Tsinghai Military District since February.

7 April

when the in

Hsining praised the group as the of the proletarian revolutionary army" in Tsinghai.

on the party committees of the Northwest Bureau, Shensi, and Sian city. In mid-January, according to Sian radiothe rebels seized control of the three party committees. Shensi has not been recognizedrue take-over by Peking, and appears to have been little affected by the recent phase of The dominance of thesuggests that Shensi mayproblem" area with which Pekingto deal after the Culturalends in other places.

Kansu

secretary Wang Feng, who last showed up in publicppears to have been sacrificed to. November or

all poster Ted his replacement as Hu Chi-tsung,ecretary in the Kansu party committee, and then stated that Hu was "Tao Chu's timebomb in the Northwest."

The same poster charged that the Kansu party committee, in collusion with the Military District Commander and Lanchow Military Region officials, had suppressed revolutionaries near Lanchow in late Onoster charged that the Kansu Military District had "conspired" with the party committee in order tothe rebels. The sons of the Lanchow Military Region commander, Chang Ta-chih, and Political Commissar Hsien Heng-han were accused of leading counterrevolutionary organizations in Lanchow and Kansu. the military appears to be in charge of the province. No prominentor political figures have been mentioned in broadcasts

Lanchow in lata January and early February. However, most of these incidents probably involved attacks on low-level bureaucrats, as Western travelers in the area at the time did not observe any disorders or even large rallies.

Nir.ghsia

A quiet, unimportant area. First secretary Yang Ching-jen lastctober at National Day celebrations. The radioat che capital of Yinchuan hasa blackout on local news sinceanuary. In early January an intercepted message indicatedally had been called to criticize an unidentified individual in tho provincial petroleum industry about tha same time that purge rallies were going on in Lanchow. In lateoster in Peking stated that the Minghsia Daily was one of several provincial newspapers that the rebels had seized.

EAST CHINA BUREAU

Tha post of first secretary has been unfilled since the death of Ko Ching-shih inive of the East China Bureau's six secretaries have been severely criticized; two have beendismissed from office. Even tho two alternate secretaries came under attack in

The heavy casualties apparently suffered byChina party apparatus may be due inthe fact that Teng Hsiao-ping probablybureau until his political downfall Thereafter, Tao Chu, formerparty boss who was promoted into thecommittee in August,tohis influence into fnelTaksT^TrTna Bureau.

There was widespread disorder and some bloody fighting in East China in December and January. Party leaders under attack incited workers to riot and strike, and mam If and production, poster reports thi dstrative chaos for weeks. However, order was restored by February.

TSINAN MILITARY REGION (Shantung)

Although the political commissar. Tan Chi-lung, was officially dismissedebruary from his positions, the commander of theYang Te-chih, spokearch rally, and the Tsinan Military Region itself isacclaimed for its role in the Shantung seizure in early February.

NAM;*iv,-',Xiangsu, Shanghai City,hekiang)

Red Guard posters criticized this military region and, indirectly, its commander, Hsu Shih-yu, for failing promptly to back Maoist forces in early January. Until late January the operation of communications andsystems in the region wasindicating that Nanking area troops

TOP SECRETj

No Poren

were lax in restraining party leaders from organizing resistance. Inenior Cultural Revolution official praised theMilitary Region Command for finallyto restore order in January, but the status of Hsu himself has not been clarified.

FOOCHOW MILITARY REGION (Fukien, Kiangsi)

The identity of the commander is uncertain. Yeh Fei, who is concurrently politicaland first secretary of the Fukien party committee, was last identified as commander The ranking military professional in the province, Han Hsien-chu, was named deputy chief of staffnd may have replaced Yeh Fei. Nevertheless, Han, who was the leading speakervictory" rally staged by revolutionaries in Foochow onebruary, was identified onlyresponsible member of PLA units on the Fukienhe status or Yeh Fei is unclear. He was under attack by local Red Guards from August to December but authoritative Red Guardin Peking have not mentioned him. has praised the leading role of the PLA in the "triple alliance" in Fukien,that military authorities in thisare supported by the central leadership.

Shantung

First Socretary Tan Chi-lung wasousted in early February at the time of the announced take-over of the provincial party and governmental Credit for the take-over has been given to Wang Haiao-wu, an unknown who is now described as the leading party official in Shantung, and to theof the Tsinan Military Region. on other emerging leadersthat obscure governmentareeading role in the new Shantung revolutionary committee.

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top sjjgkIst

In January there were numerous reports of clashes ln the port city of Tsingtao, but elsewhere in Shantung there has been little evidence of violence.

After sustained attacks on FirstLi Pao-hua dating back to lateKofei radio announced the dismissal of Li and four other ranking leaders onanuary. Li has been included in semiofficial lists of both Liu-Teng followers and the Tao Chu group.

Onanuary, the provincialstation announced the rebel take-over of provincial party andorgans. Peking has neverrecognized this take-over. It is possible that the regime cannot agree on who il to lead this province.

Recent and frequent appearances of high-level military district leaders suggest that the PLA is running Anhwei. However, two secretariea of the former provincial CCP committee showed up in late March and probably hold posts in the new provincial administration.

Kiar.gsu

The provincial leadership has not been attacked, which is puzzling in light of the considerable violence and confusion which occurred in the province during January. First Secretary Chiang Wei-ching was active During the first three months of the year he attended seven military conferences, suggesting he was aligned with PLA forces in his area. Even in latewhen most first secretaries had disappeared from public view, Chiang made two official appearances in his

province. Chiang is one of the few provincial leaders who has not been linked with the Liu-Teng or Tao Chu groups.

Posters in early January reportedto be the site of violent clashes between "rebel factions" andfactions." Probably exaggerated accounts of incidents statedersons wereounded, and as many0 persons involved in heavy fighting. Poster accounts attributed responsibility for the violence topersons. According to oneChou En-lai charged Tao Chu and the Kiangsu and East China Bureau CCP committees with responsibility. Another poster claimed that senior partyin Shanghai had urged workers to go to Nanking and create disturbances.

newsanuary and did not end this blackout untilebruary whon it issued anon an alleged take-over of the Kiangsu broadcasting station onanuary. Since then, however,has returned to normal. The only provincial officials appearing in public since January have been leaders of the Kiangsu Military District. Thus, the fate of the party leaders in Kiangsu remains unclear.

First Secretary Chen Pei-hsien and Mayor Tsao Ti-chiu were paraded in disgrace in

January after the party committee was abolished. Rallies were still being held during February to denounce Chen and Tsao for their alleged use of economic inducements to "buy" support fromin Shanghai.

Throughout January the Shanghai take-over was acclaimedodel for other areas, but Peking's enthusiasm dimmed during February, when considerabledisorder persisted. hanghai People's Commune was formed and two members of the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, were sent down to head it. In late February, however, Shanghai radio announced that the name "commune" had been changed to the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, in line with Peking's orders Chang and Yao were described asmembers" of the renamed organization.

Residents in Shanghai have reportedcity was in constanthrougheconomic and social orderseem to have seriouslyany time. urthe first half ofreported thatShanghai were completely chaotic,with the well-organizedrecentlyof

Shanghaithe street trials and parades in February werethey saw nobrutality.

Chekiang

This province has been one of theareas in China during the current period of upheaval. Neither FirstChiang Hua or the provincial party committee has been attacked.

Fukien

have been no reports of rebelin Chekiang, and Hangchow radio was one of the few in China whichbroadcasting local news during the confused weeks of late January. Chiang Hua has notublic appearance sincee may emerge in good standing. Military leaders are the only persons who have reappeared in the last two months.

First Secretary Yeh Fei was the subject of severe Red Guard criticism throughout the fallut significant attacks on him have not appeared in recent months and his position in Fukien is unclear. Yeh's name has not appeared on blacklists of Liu-Teng and Tao Chu

supporters.

Onebruary, Peking reported onrally" in Fukienut not stating that ittoajor officer orthe commander of the FoochowRegion, presided over theChin-shui, governorartyof Fukien, andtheugust rebels also spokerally. Just three daysoochow broadcasttheugust rebelsan attack on the oochowWei had

beeneets. The forces behind the attacks on Wei and theugust group may have been either ultraleftists who lost out or entrenched party figures under Yeh

Fei.

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The situation in Fukien aa of mid-April is difficult to assess inasmuch asradio has been reporting very little local news sinceebruary.

Kianqsi

First Secretary Yang Shang-kuei dropped out of sight5 and may have been replaced long before the latest phase of the Cultural Revolution. If so, his replacement has never been publicly identified. No senior party official in tho province has come under Red Guard attack. On the other hand, none has emerged since revolutionary rebels seized power and abolished the party committee onanuary. This seizure was reported by Nanchang Radio, but like several other take-oversby provincial radios in January, it has not*been acknowledged by Peking. Recently broadcast listings of what may be new leaders include only minor military, party, and government officials.

an "peasants red militia army" to attack the pro-Maoists, but the existence ofroup has not been confirmed.

CENTRAL SOUTH BUREAU

Tao Chu hadtrong following in this region which he headed before he was brought into the inner circle of leaders around Mao and Lin in Consequently, when Tao fell from favor at the end of December, his replacement in the regional bureau and the first secretaries in four of the region's five provinces wero implicated with him. (Honan apparently had no first secretary at the time.) All have appeared in semiofficial blacklists of Tao's followers distributed in Peking in January and February.

Wang Jen-chung, the new first secretary of the Central South, was denounced by Madame Mao and other leaders at the end of December. anuary sheontingent of Red Guards from Canton to go home and arrest Wang, but whether they succeeded is unknown, since nothing has been heard of his whereaboutsen.

ajor political struggle appears to have taken place in the Central South since December, relatively little disorder has been reported. Possibly key military commanders sided with Mao and Lin from the beginning to block attempts byleaders to resist. Some clashes were reported in Kwangtung, Honan, and Hunan, but transportation services operated throughout the region with few disruptions.

WUHAN MILITARY REGION (Hupeh, Honan)

The commander, Chen Tsai-tao, has not been attacked and appears to have remained loyal to Mao and Lin. arch, Chen made an official appearance and spoke to PLA cadres on the need for them to participato in spring planting.

CANTON MILITARY REGION (Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan)

Commander Huang Yung-sheng has not appeared since6 and he has been implicated

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by poster attacks on his command. He hasties with Lin Piao, but his promotion3 under Tao Chu may cause Maoist leaders to mistrust him.

Hon an

First Secretary Liu Chien-haun, who has been in Peking since August, was identifiedarchleading member" of the Peking municipal committee. Liu'sin Honan has not been announced.

Honan was quiet last year. In lateand early March posters carried reports of clashes between the PLA and the rebels. However, the trouble seems merely to have involved attempts by local military authorities, apparently on orders from Poking, to put down unruly Red Guard groups. Al though *these groups complained bitterly in posters of their suppression by Chang Shu-chih, commander of the Hunan Military District, he appeared early in March, and the military has been running the province since then.

Hup eh

First Secretary Wang Jen-chung isfirst secretary of the Central-South Bureau. As noted above, he fell with his former boss Tao Chu at the end of December. Chang Ti-hsueh, second secretary in Hupeh, has also been severely attacked.

Military district leaders have beenthis province in recent weeks. Since early March the Hupeh military district has been issuing directives on matters ranging from afforestation and spring planting to the opening of middle schools. As yet, there has been no official announcementew governing unit for the province, but the PLA, presumably acting on orders from Peking, is clearly in command.

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Hunan

At in llupoh, First Secretary Chang Ping-hua and Second Secretary Wang Yen-chun have both come under serious criticism for their association with Tao Chu. Chang and Wang are included in blacklists of Tao Chu followers.

Local broadcasts have given no identification of new leading figures in this province; the military is currently being portrayed as running provincial affairs.

Kwangsi

First Secretary Wei Kuo-ching was included in one blacklist of Tao Chu followers publishedod Guard newspaper inbut his name is missing from other lists of this type, and no detailedof #ei has been seen.

Nanning radioebel take-over in late January which was never confirmed by Peking. Since January, only minor military officials have made public appearances, auggesting that Peking leaders havo not yet decided on new leaders for Kwangsi.

Kwangtung

First Secretary Chao Tzu-yang and the majority of senior party and government leaders have been under heavy fire since Tao Chu fell. They have not been officially dismissed, but by mid-March the PLA had taken over mi government and police functions and.

as well.

Poster reporting on Chao Tzu-yang indicates he has made desperate efforts to survive by ingratiating himself with revolutionary forces. Following reports that he was

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paraded in disgrace ooanuary, Jeering posters claimed he had staged theutile attempt toroperly adject attitude. Onebruary, Chao, byathetic figure, pleadedroup of Red Guards that he had not been able to get in touch with the central committee in Peking recently, and therefore did not know how to respond to Red Guard

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SOUTHWEST BUREAU

First Secretary Li Ching-chuan, who has been under bitter and heavy attack since the start of the Cultural Revolution, almost certainly has been brought down. Li was criticizedpeech by Madame Mao onecember for engaging in "spying activities" in Peking; Chou En-lai onanuary stated that Li's "gang bosses" in the "control units" of the western district of Peking had been arrested;oster seen in Peking onarch charged Li with manipulating the Chungking municipal committee to cause the recent death of awriter. In addition, numerous posters and Red Guard newspapers since late December have linked Li with the Ho Lung conspirators and the Liu-Teng gang. Poster photographs seen ii Peking onebruary showed Li and other officials of the Southwest Bureau being paraded by Red Guards in Chengtu, Szechwan, probably in mid-January.

Other bureau officials who have come under attack are secretaries Li Ta-chang and Liao Chih-kuo (both from Szechwan). Li Ta-chang was paraded in Chengtu, probably at the same time as Li Ching-chuan; Liao probably suffered the same fate.

CHENGTU MILITARY REGION (coterminous with Szechwan)

Commander Huang Hsin-ting, First Political Commissar Li Ching-chuan, and Second Political Conmissar Kuo Lin-hsiang appeared in lists of the "Ho Lung plot group" distributed in Peking in mid-January. Oned Guard newspaper said that Huang and Kuo had been "dismissed." Wei Chieh, Chien Chun-hua, and Li Wen-ching, deputy commanders of the Chengtu Military Region (CMR> came in for mild criticism in February under circumstances suggesting they were merely carrying out Peking's orders. oster in Peking onebruary charged that PLA troops had arrested rebel demonstrators in Chengtu onebruary; these demonstrators were attacking the military region headquarters. Another poster onebruary charged Wei Chieh and Li Wen-ching with "suppression" of rebel activities in Szechwan', implying that Wei and

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arch, Cheneputy commander of the TMR, and Yang Tung-sheng, party second secretary, presidedally which marked the "victory" of the "proletarianin Tibet. Chen's broadcast speech, however, contained no refeiommander Chant

Chang's staff has probably survived the Cultural Revolution virtually intact. Shiheputy chief of staff, appears to have sided with the Peking Red Guard groups during the earlier phase of their campaign, and may be out. Ngapo Ngawangative Tibetan who is governoreputy commander, has been criticized by Red Guards, and his present status is unclear.

Tibet

last noted

First Secretary Chang Kuo-hua, alsoof the Tibet Military Region, presently appears to enjoy the support of Peking. He has notublicsince the National Day celebrations in Lhasactober; however, Chang was alleged to have been in Lhasapril. Yang Tung-she

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simplyecretary. umber of lesser secretaries may have been sacrificed by Chang, perhaps in an attempt to placate rebel demands and alsooncession to Peking. Onoster admonished Chang for dismissing party secretaries

S zechwan

forces were used to control rioting. Rival Red Guard groups, battling for possession of various administrative organs, became involved in bitterdaily counterdemonstrations, street fights, and raids on other Red Guard headquarters. This continued into early February, when it appears that Peking sent instructions to the Tibet Military Region to clamp down on the Red Guards and restore order. Red Guard leaders and followers were arrested, martial law established, and military forces assumed control of major urban areas.

Order had apparently been restoredarch,uge rally was held in Lhasa to celebrate the emergencehree-way alliance and the ctorv" of the Cultural

Secretary Liao Chih-kao has been bitterly attacked, and may have been paraded in mid-January with Li Ching-chuan and other officials. Liarty secretary, and vice governor Chang Hu-chen were also paraded at this time. To date, no senior party cadres are known to be active. Military officials (from the

Chengtu Military Region) are running provincial affairs. Weieputy commander, and Chueputy chief of staff, and two other Chengtu Military Region officials, are the onlytive in the province since early

January.

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on spring farming,hengtu radio hasirtual blackout on local activities.

Secretary Chia Chi-yun, who was attacked by Red Guards last October, may have been purged; he certainly no longereading position in the province. The Kweichow party committee was abolished onanuary, and the "Kweichow Provincial Revolutionary Committee" which replaced it is headedilitary maninor government functionary. Itilitary-run province. The only senior party man publicly participating in the new committee is Liormer provincial partyand governor. Other members are the commander of the Kweichow Military District, the political commissarumber of lesser military figures. Li Tsia-han, one of the deputy political commissars, isthe deputy chairman is Chang Ming, who used to be deputy chief of the province'i supply bureau.

This province has been relatival/ free of rebel-instigated disorders, although it seemed to be having unusual problems with railwavtfi1

(we!

jver the radio station in Kweiyang onanuary, and

probably assisted in the revolutionaryof tho provincial press and public security bureau reported at the same time.

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chinese communist party regions

Original document.

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