The following intelligence organizations participated inparation of this estimatei
The Control InleiTigence Agency and the intelligence organnationi of ihe Depart-mem* of Slot* ond Detente, and ih* NSA.
Or. R. J.or rhe Deputy Director. Centrol Intelligence
Mr.vghea. the Director of InteUgence and Research. Depan*eni
Vice Adm. Vernon I. lowrence. for tho Director. Defense Intelligence Agency Mr. OliverR. Klrby, for fhe Director. Notionol Security Agency
Dr. Charles H. Beknordt, for the Assisionl Cenerol Manager. Atomic Energy Com-minion and Mr. Wlliom O. Oegor, for the Aulitoni Director, Fedora! Bureau of InreUlaction. the upb|ect being euliida of (heir jurisdiction.
TV* materialnformation affecting the National Defense of thet within the ateoning of the espionoga laws.SC, the Irani, mluion or reveloiion of which In ony manner lo on unauthorized personrohibited.
I INTRODUCTION .
a. j i
j L BACKGROUND AND CURRENT POLITICAL.
In the White Community
B. Among tbe Nonwhites
III. APARTHEID: RACIAL POLICY ANDTHE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTSV. EXTERNAL
and Mozambique ..
with the US
estimate developments in South African domestic and foreign policy over the next five years.
present South African Cwernment, under Primehas made some effort to promote good relations withblack African states. Its hopes of improving relationsblack African states are unlikely to be realized. It Ismaintain its current support of the Smith regime in )
believe it highly unlikely that South Africa willup South-West Africa or accept UN supervision of thefurther believe that any attempt forcibly to dislodge Southon the territory wouldajor military effort,significant participation by the US. )
Africa especially wants to improve relations with theif possible, to obtain some expression of US approval for its
' Mr- Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and rVwarrh, DcparfcneQt of Suit. Miew* lhat "mlpufieof KifiVSenOy desertpttvo of African reaction and prefers "oowed and pollBeaBy Inactive as the reiuU of Ihei ippresilse polletet."
attempts to appear more flexible. It will probably permit the US to use present space and tracking installations at least during the period of this estimate, provided the US does not participate in significant sanctions against South Africa. We believe, however, that the whites will hold steadfasdy to their policy of white dominance and that significant changes in South Africa's policies either in response to domestic developments or external pressures are highly unlikely in the next five years.
'Baa* Adm. Eu^neockey, AaUUcI Ollrf of Naval OprratMaaepart, meat of the Navy, bebrvrt tha economic, labor, an! doewaoc eondtriooj are overly drawn In Ota eatanetr, aad that Sooth Africa') foreignore lofturncad by in re'.attotuhlp with other Africannd lb desire to ma In bin biillrr itaFes In (heirotus <juo. the*ndicated In the eiiimate. Ha also believes the cumnt utoaUoa. end the prospect) for Sooth Africa'sarttcolar wSth regard to dbtrtbatSoa of the products of the economy. poilDcaJ stability and eaaeanret of domertK:he better than rtated In tae esutnaie.
it: if ill
Africa Is now under great pressure from much of the worldof its racial laws andhe overwhelming concern ofin South Africa is that their historic dominance, indeed their very waynot be scrioosly menaced by theho already outnumberoSee4 This consuming fear affects virtuallypolicies. The governments strength has been aided by aand the fact that the net effect of growing international criticismracial policies, together with troubles in newly independent Tropicalbeen to drive whites together. However. South Africa's racial attitudesit to become something of an international outcast. In this senseitself a. beleaguered;
AND CURRENT POLITICALIn tha White Community
South African society is based on the supremacy of the whites, politically, economically, and socially. The whites, particularly the Afrikaners, regard South Africa as theirs by settlement and development. They claim that they builtargely unpopulated area by their efforts and that the Bantu were drawn to the area by the accomplishments of the whites. They further feel that it is only white dominance which can keep the prosperity which all enfoy, black and white alike. The whites are convinced that any concessions to the Bantu will inevitably lead to black domination through their weight of numbers,onsequent disintegration of the country.
The Nationalist Partyprimarily 'he political vehicle of the Afrikaners. In6 general elections the Nationalists (then led by the late Prime
The official Sooth African term for the. black Afr'Taiw. Whiteo peoph of Etwipenn eittflction. includinge Engtah-rpeofttng South Africans ut Lri'.lsh descent and the Afrikaners, tbe Afrlkaans-rpeaklrig descend tints of Dutch. Huguenot, Flemish, and German settlers. Tbe. terra "Colored" refer* to those ot* mired blood.
Estimates of Totals
Hendrlk Verwoerd)eavy majority in the Parliament. The Nationalist eMremuti. who advocate the strictest form of racial domination, however, were badly beaten, and partyow securely in the hands of Afrikaner bureaucrats and businessmen, In recent years it has attracted growing support from the younger English-speaking voters who are beginning to identify their interests with those of the Afrikaners.
rime Ministerenter, who succeeded Dr. Verwoerd when the litter was assassinated ins representative of the new crop of Nationalistawyer, his experience in government is chiefly that of Police Administrator and Minister of Justice. Thus far his style of governing has been pragmatic, with emphasis on reasonableness and affability. He has drawn on the top civil service and party ranks for Cabinet appointments, and ministers have enjoyed more responsibility than they did under his more autocratic predecessor. Nevertheless, he is gradually asserting his control over the party, and seems likely totrong Prime Minister.
he United Party (UP) furnishes the main opposition lo the Nationalists, and finds its following principally among the Englbb-speaking population, which comprises aboutercent of the white community. The bitter duTereiices between Afrikaners and English have diminished. The UP supports racial separation, though it would adminbter Itore genteel manner, and its objectives arc scarcely dbtinguiihable from those of the Nationalists. The UP's support has gradually fallen awayonsequence of weak leadership, vague policies, and the loss of much of the support it once had from Afrikaners; it has no chance of assuming power. Northe Progressive Party, composed largely of upper-class English-speakingignificant political force, though its single repiesentabve in Parliamentigorous critic of the government.
b. Among the Nonwhites
a The two most important black African political movements, the African National Congress (ANQ and the Pan African's! Congress (PAC).officially banned and exist largely as exile organization* based in Dar es Salaam andj^gt, don. Both alio suffer from serious weaknesses In leadership, Snances, andV"
" "' ,
Slgnulcanlly. the aridity of either "organisation to conduct campaigns of violence or sabotage, which at one time appeared fairly good, has been stifled. In largo part this Is dueigl ly effective police apparatus (greatly aided by Bantuacked by an array of stem legal measures.
olitical expression try the nonwhite population has been almostlupprcvied by the government The politicil impotence of the non-whites is also in part the result of the fragmentation of the races. While the Individual rights of the nonwhite have beend'iccd he has,had some share in the cconcmie prosperity|
_ . are disposed lo leave the
struggle for political righu and majorityater generation whichniirnerxs-Uy stronger. The Colored* ando are somewhatthan lite Bantu, display scant inclination toward concerting with them,they did UVy have only marginally more economic or other resources
iii.acial policy and prospects
After the Nationalist Pnrty came lo powerhe Afrikaner leader-ship took sweeping and systematic action on the racial problem. The policy of apartheid was developed, and the largely de jacio separation of the races was made de JaVfc Apartheid coryiitjost of statutes and regulalkrns. designed to separate the races ot all levels of society. Afrikaners maintain that apartheid is not based on racial animosity, but purely on grounds that the races are different and should follow different paths ofwindling number of liberal whites still offer organized opposition to apartheid, but they are inrimidoted and penalircd Virtually all whites support white supremacy and have ccme to accept some measure of apartheid and Nationalist Party guidance on racialarge number, however, dislike and deplore the plethora of petty and humiliating regulations that apartheid has brought in its wait.
Theoncept li one of the central features of the apartheid policy. Lands are set aside for the Bantu, termed reserves or Bantuand include someercent of the total urea of South Africa on which someercent of tho population is to be settled.illion, or nearly one-third, of the Dantu live then- now. (See Map.)
government sets considerable store by the Bantustan concept asmeans of reversing the migration of the Bantu to urban centersa livelihood for them elsewhere.reat deal of talkthey have prog.cssed slowly, and only ooe, in what wasReserve, has been formed. This is duo to the very difficultand economicnvolved in their establishment.exist largelyubsistence level and there is very little to offsetof the cities. Moreover, the government has failed to provide Ihe
'Mr. Thoesaa t- Hughes, the Director of latrUfcnee end fWaeerth. Departeacrt of Sutc. brllevn that "mJgnlnr, ihemaelvrs"otdeacnpbve ol African miction art] prefers "cowed and poliBcally Inactive as the result of the government'i represshe pouVtes."
AfrJuun* term for separate development.
oomelanderuculer set ofbaJly-cenleied. self-rovrraitit;o remain under South Afnras controlhile, but over lime couldonfederal or commonwealih relationship within the Souih African economy. South Africans Oescrtbe th* as peLtsCal Independence (thoughta Wl vasjae a* lo who wouldantustan* foreign relations) and economic interdependence.
despite "influs. control."the African population in thehas grown byercent in the past threedoubleincrease. In no major city are the whitesajority and Pretoriathe only city where whites form the largest racial group (see Tableemployers who apply to the government for' more workers arcdown and the necessary labor is often recruited in the reserves.immigration, chiefly from Europe, has averaged0 duringfive years, but it is becoming apparent that white immigrationeven the present ratio between the races. South Africanestimate that1 there will be0 more Jobs thanavailable whites (seet seems highly unlikely, therefore,Bantustans will absorb significant numbers of urban Bantu in theyears.
Aware that his mandate is to preserve white dommahon, Vorster isto make any basic relaxaron in racial policy. Indeed, he seems disposed at present to accelerate the creation of Dantustans. He Is, however, apparently willing toew needlessettyn order to mollify the many whites who support racial separation but prefer it lo be enforced unobtrusively and without undue harshness. For example, apartheid barriers have been relaxed to allow nonwhites to compete in internationalevents.
Enforcement of many apartheid restrictions against nonwhites is as rigid as ever. Pass laws are enforced diligently and roundups of suspected evaders
' The lyrtern that governs movement* by Bantu into and out of places designated as white urban areas. By ihli lactic. Use government teeb to assure an adequate Bantu labor force In the uibaa Induienal regions without betas; inundated.
OF MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS(Etumatc)
are frequent The Colored* and Asians continue lo existind ef ethnic limbo between the while and Bantu communities, but thou1 removal from white residence and business areas is being accelerated under the Croup Areashe separation of educational facilities and Ihe development of curricula tailored lo the different races continue.
n tha milieu of political and econooitc Inequality, hostility and suspicion between the races will inescapably mo'int. It has been argued tliat as the need of the economy for manpower brings more Bantu and other nonwhites into mere skilled Jobs, they will necessarily acquire an importanec which will be reflected in greater political rights. It Is sure that as the level of nonwhite participation in the economy rises, there will be greater demand for increased political and social rights- At the same time, the will of the whites to preserve their way of life by whatever mean* remains firm. While an increase in the rights of the nonwhitei may occurong period, there Is now no evidence of anyin this direction. Interna! developments which could shake white rule will almost certainly not occur for many years to come.
ver the much longer run.ecade or two. changes in the social order arc almost certain, In addition to the inherent contradictions between Ihe policy of political and social segregation and Ihe requirements of the economv for labor, other forces are at work which could decisively affect the course of events.
retoria must eventually make up III mind about the Bantustans. It may make only nominal gestures toward establishing Bantustans. or it may nol be willing or able to provide the substantial financingajor Bantuitan program would require. Under either of these alternatives, one of apartheid's cornerstones would have crumbled, and an argument which has soothed white consciences with the promise that something was being done for the Bantu wos'ld have vanished. This mightignificant psychological effect on the white establishment. It could provide un opening for liberal tendencies, for example In the Afrikaner business community, to make themselves felt In the formation of government policy. It mighten'iirnmcnt of political parties in which rnoderates and commercial interests could concertrogiam to improve ractfl relations. Or it could result in greater att'-ition to more extreme solutions such as partition,eturn to bamskaap (white dictatorial rule).
IT. On the other band, if more Bantustans rformed and are adequately financed, this too may set in train forces whi'li cannot be eosiJy controlled. Crowing political awareness among the Bantu "nee they areaste of self-government probably would lead to greater political activity, and possiblynity, among the nir.il Bantu. The Tronskei legislature has already shosvnlcpendenea of mind. Should several Bantustans come together over some issue, ihe government would be forced ettVr to suffer seriousor to exercise those retained posven whir'i svouldockery of it. claims that the Bnntu can have seif-govemmen!.
whites, however; still tend to shrink from cootemixtion of theof bbek South Africa, and the (mpl lea bora of apartheid. Instead,ifKreasingly on the government as their surrogate, placing theirthe powerful police and defense establishment and taking refuge inability to device day-to-day adjustments to apartheidsouni/estatoos- It is aof tbe times that leadership of theParty has shifted to "orga..nation men* by nature disposed toaccommodations while preserving white hegemony, but whodelay as long as possible decisions which could lead to dramatic
hinges in the society. The whites will continue to play fortune. .belje^gag that
%ko( the world will eventually be persuaded that black Africans are notfor
political autonomy and Out South Africa's racial policies are just and necessary. But in the nert decade or two. challenges to the present social syiten will come and may involve serious racial violence.
IV. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION ANO PROSPECTS
South Africatrong and diversified economy. Over the last five veer* itsh rate hasercent yearly, and though it containsen*f Africa's estimated total population. South Africa suppliesuarter of the Continent's product which enters the monetary economy. South Africa has benefited greatly from two advontages. Its largs goldercent of Free World production) have financed much of the national growth and still play an important role in underwriting South Africa's favorable balance of payments position. Alio, there has beenarge pool of very cheap unskilled nonwhite labor; nonwhitesillionotal labor forceillion. (See Table IV.)"
Mining rernafns the backbone of the money economy;6 gold output alone accounted forercent of esports.'1 But,0 rMmuacturing has
increased more thanercent, and now accounti for overercent of the grow domestic product. Meanwhile, even though only aboutercent of South Africa is arable and water supplies are becoming increasingly right, post-World War II growth in agriculture has nude the country virtually self-sufficient in foodstuffs; South Africa now exportshird of its agricultural and fishery products. The only important resource deficiency is petroleum; nohas been fotmd thoughercent of domestic requirements are met by synthetic production. South Africa, however, meets ail butf its power needs from other domestic sources, chiefly from abundant coal depositi.
igh levels of foreign trade and foreign investment arc also Important characteristics of South Africa's economy. Total trade continues to thrive, risingillion0 toillions both imports and exports have inaeased markedly. Most of South Africa's trade still is with Western Europe and North America. The UK remains its most important trading partner5 two-way trade amounted2he US is next,ifth of South Africa's imports and purchasing aboutercent of its exports.investment is welcomed in South Africa. It now amounts to5 billion- the UK's share is at7 billion and that of the US approzhnatery SflTC Jlhon. The South Africans apparently believe that large-scale US and UK investments and tradeormidable deterrent to any application of sanctions by these powers, i
Yet South Africa's racial practices hamper more rapid economic growth. Job reservation restricts numerous positions to whites with the result that many of them perform inefficiently in their protected positions. Because of urgent labor needs, to be sure, fob rcsrvation is often honored in the breach. Never-Ih-less. the Inadequacy of training facilities for nonwhites cor tributes to the rising shortage of skilled and semiskilled lal-v,
There Is significant unemployment and underemployment among Bantu on the reserves, in part because they carobs in the industrial arid urban areas due to Job reservation policy and the strict controls which prevent their leaving the reserves. The government plans to deal with this growing problem by encouraging "border industries" on the fringes of the reserves. Thisnlikely lo have much success since there are many disadvantages which are not balanced by easy access to Bantu labor. Pretoria now estimates that9 there will beonwhites on the reserves registered as seeking employment. However. Vomermade some move) to makettractive lo nonwhites. For example, he has moderated pre-viout policy so as to permit South African development corporations lo invest In the TransM. Also, he has Indicatede will restrict urban industrial expansion, and this should Indirectly encourag" the establishment of more border industries.
Despite an already high degree of arH I'fficiency, South Africa's policies aimreater degree of autarky. This re^'l'icnt has grownMiscquencc
of recurrent threats of suctions in the UW. and because ihe government is dcternuned that, whatever the price. It wilt not be caught short should economic sanctions ever be applied against it Largely to expand domestic militarydefense spending this year will total0 million. And the admin-istratioo Is currently engaged in numerous programs both to etKOurage exptora-tion for petroleum at home and to insure continued access to supplies abroad. Burgeoning erpenditures to achieve self-sufficiency haveajor source of troubling inflationary pressures during the last few yean. Vet the govern-rnent. strongly backed by the white community, cormdos these outlays to be unavoidable and Is likely toariety of measures, such as import controls and high tares, in an effort to keep prices under control.
enerally favorable ecorximic tisnsda withstanding, the economic In-efidrrjcy of apartheid and the limitations it places on economic growth will gradually become an Increasing burden. Industry's demands for additional labor can only be fuflv met bv increasing employment of nonwhites. But this win create more doubts about the feasibaity of the Bantustans and related policies such as border industries and Jobn present drcumstances, we beheve that the government will continue to turn Nelson's eye toward many violations of apartheid to meet immediate commercial needs, and will probably postpone fundamental changes in policyong time.
ranhermore, we believe that South Africa's economy will remain strong over the period of this estimate at least, though the growth rate probably willittle. The gcrvemment will continue to push for autarky in some sectors even at some considerable detriment to the economyhole. It wiU also seek new markets and investment particularly to France. West Germany, and Japan. Indeed, the prospectsontinued high rate of foreign investment generally are good. In tho unlikely event that tho UN attempts lo enforce economic saixtions or boycotts against South Africa, they would not seriously damage the economy except in the remote event that all Pretoria's major trading partners Joined in them.
V. EXTERNA! AFFAIRS A. General
lthough white South Africans, when under violent assault at the UN or in other interna Oonal forums, would like lo achieve some appreciation and understanding of their position, moat of the time they are stubborn and unyleld. tag to taternabonal admonitions. Pecently, Vorsterigorousto Improve South Africa's International Image. He has also capitalized on and expanded VerwoertTs initiatives to seek closer cooperation with neighbor, tag black African countries which are prepared to accept South Africa oo its own
-Thera will be mora talk of eulsnsatJou. butwould creaW a* many problem* as tt .olved. Automation draw, ol! needed Investment aod capital which could be used to far frrttfer advartap asae-brre, aod It would hav. (ho elect of greatly cswrestataf. Bantu unrsnploymetit with attendant aortal and political risks, j
terms. Meanwhile, however, South-West Africa and Souihern Rhodesia rem*in South Africa's most urunediatc Inirmational problems, principally because they are bve Issues in the UN.
B. South-West Africa M
The South Africans recognize that the continuing dispute over theirIn South-West Africa is their most difficult and potentially mostexternal problem. Pretoria strongly holds that the In'cmadoruil Court of Justice decision in8 favored its case, and that subsequent action by the UN GtlMri] Assembly to tenrunate its mandate was illegal. More impoetanliy. South Africa regards control of South-West Africa as vital to its security. South Africa derives some economic benefit from tho territory's mineral and fisheries production of0 million annually. But the economic interest is not decisive. South Africa's extensive development program and its recent offer toantustan-likc adminutrntion in Ovambolond (home ofercent of the Bantu In South-Westackedreatly stepped up iccurity presence, attest to its deterrninatlon to hold on to the territory. Despite some guerrilla incursions (via Zambia and Angola) from black nationalistsanzania, we believe that insurgency will remain of minor importance because of strong security measures, the tribal animosities among the Africans, and the difficulty which Infiltratorseaching this remote territory,
Divisions within the UNs Ad Hoc Committee on South-West Africa"practical measures to administer the territory prior to Independence* and its failure toirm recommendation to the General Assembly, adds lo South Africa's doubts that tbe UN will be able to apply sanctions or force it out of the area. The South Africans have made some cooperative gestures,hey have agreed to make available to the UN information on South-West Africa, (hough they have displayed no interest in talking to the Committee. Theywillew more additional gesture- from time to time In the hope of easing international pressure. We expect that the South Africanwill continue to try to appear forthcoming lo the extent of talking to (he US. UK. and other governments about the South-West Africa problem. It will, however, almost certainly adhere firmly to the line that the UN resolutionSouth Africa of jurisdiction over the area Is invalid and without effect. Hence any dialogue with South Africa on this matter Is highly unlikely to move lhat government towards making any meaningful accommosl.ilion with Ihe UN. We believe it highly unlikely that South Africa will voluntarily give up the territory or accept UN supervision. We further believe lhat nny attempt forcibly to dislodge South Africa's hold on the territory wouldajor military effort, probably including significant participation by the US.
IV South-Writ Africa issueteoeth In two SpecialIntetarrnsc
-hhh arert% *alkL The* are; SNIE TO.ee.frica*une IMA (SECKET) aadfl.Jopnnt, fcAnrti- the UN General AwrmUe tlrwikiHon ta Trrnvnaa* the SmithAVnl Africa9 tseCRCT).
outh Africa's poocy has enabled Ian Smith'i regime to escape the wont effects of sanctions, and economic ties between Ihe two countries are growing. South Airica hu actediddleman for Rhodesian trade, cspe-aa!h- for imports of POL. andource of credit, .Yet despite widespread pro-Rhodesia sentiments at home, Pretoria has at times tried to persuade Smith to be more flexible in negotiating with thelearly, South Africa is worried that it may be sucked into this imbroglio further than it wishes lo go,t would not wish to be Salisbury! chief economic prop,arget ot ecsmontic sanctions directed primarily at Rhodesia.olicy probably will continue to be cautious and discreet. As time goes by with no solution of the Rhodes tan problem and If the cost to South Africa of financing Rhodesian imports rises, Vorster is likely again to urge Smith privately to reach some acccrnmocbtoo with the UK. South Africa's public posture will probablyto be one of support for Smith. South Africa has said repeatedly that it will not join in applying sanctions, and is convinced that successful sanctions against Southern Rhodesia would lead lo renewed calls for sanctions against it Even if South Africa became the target of UN* sanctions, we believe it would not abandon its support of Smith,
D. Angola and Mozambique
.he South Africans wish the Portuguesengola and Mozambique, but they will continue to be careful to avoid entanglement in the insurgency there. Along with Southern Rhodesia and Portugal. South Africa :hares ainterest in forestalling the rise of black African nationalist regimes in the so-called white redoubt This has ledertain amoun' coofieration in the Intelligence and defense, antiguentlli sweeps on both sides of the CMunboland border, but South Africa's disdain for Portuguese racial policies and differences oo ether Interests have mitig3tcd against across-the-board close re [aliens cr mutual defense agreements, and probably will continue to do so. i
EL Block African States
orster has recently quickened the pice of South African efforts discreetly lo build bridges to its poverty-stricken black Africaneature of these rclabonshipi has been the willingness of the South Africans to breakand to entertain black African diplomats without regard to racialos. Leaders in Lesothootswanand Malawi candidly acknowledge thai they must and will continue to depend on economic cooperation with the Republic, ami South Africa seems willing to go some distance to assist these states so long at they do not harbor active
"Thai rJnaaOon la aaarraei asser*reoaaMaiUrmiioii of looVp-nbVocr by Southernates!ctober IMShich remains valid.
Bv to doinz.
rxJc South AfricanBv so doing. the South Africans also nor* toother black African countries. We estimate that South Africa probably will provide important economic assutancc, notably to Lesotho, since projects under consideralion would also help farming and Industry in the Transvaal and Ihe Orange Free State. Economic assistance to other African states might give the RcpuMsC some experience in the problems of Afrxvtn countries and an opportunitv lo see the Continent in terms other lhan those of revolution and chaos. In'the very long run this mightoderatingon domestic polky.
hopes of establishing more tolerable relationships with Iheblack Africa will almost certainly be dashed, however. Probablywill be able to continue (ratlingumber ofand Congoespite condemnatory Organization of(OAU) and UN resolutions. Bui diplomatic relations with Africanto the north seem unlikely and South Africa will continue to heof black Africa's emotional hostility. On the other hand, the blackwill have neither the military forces nor economic resources toAfrica for many years.
F. Relations with the West
South Africa values its affiliation with the West and never fails to stress its strong anncommunism and its present aod potential Importance to the West in military and strategic terms. By and large, however, the South Africans are perplexed by and critical of what the- regard as rt deep misunderstanding of their problems by Europe and North America. Thus it is the West, particularly the US. that Is the rximary target of Vomer's campaign to achieve greater sympathy for South Africa.
Despite ddFcrences of outlook and policy, Pretoria will seek to maintain good relations with the UK. Forn though the UK has departed bom the Simonstown naval base near Cape Town. South Africa permitsUK access at ail times and the UK's allies may useartime. South Africa Is olio aware that British self-interest deters extreme UN measures; Pretoria probably estimates that the UK would veto any UN resolution calling for sanctions against it because they would seriously damage the UT$ balance oftill the prudent Afrikaners are apprehensive about the potential leverage of its major trading partners In ihe eventonfrontation with the UN. and this has manifested itselfearch for alternative political and trade. In West Germany, Japan, andesser extent. South America.
ilbmd, the third ef Use former UK High ComnvMiton Territories. -ITI probably receive Its Independence by IffTO. aad -ill peobahtyeletkmshlp with Sou*dir to that of Lesotho and Bobw-eaa.
e Th* UK he* conMsHird to seD some military items despite3 UN embargo on arms sales to South Africa.
rance, however, has become the primary berjeficiary of South African anjletie*. Fiench eiportt to South Africa have nearly trebled over the last five years aod nowtillion yearly. French investment and financial ties con tin i> to grow, France sells armored cars, electronicMirage III Jet aircraft, and helicopters to the Republic, and will probably continue to furnish modern military weapons.eci-nt agreement with France wiU enable South Africa to purchase an undetermined number of the DAPHNE class submarines. France alsoracking station in South Africa and is keen to gam access to South Africa's abundant uranium on terms which do not include the normal provisions for in(emational safeguatds. Finally, de Gaulle
regards UN policy towards South Africa as taterference In the tatter's domestic .tain.
G. Rekrtioos with the US
outh Africa particularly desires dose relations with the US. whichas the leader of the West and the first Ime of derense agHinst The South Africans are concerned about US public opinion,so much as to give up what they consider vital lotor to yield pouiical concessions to the black majority. SouthUS trade and investment and, despite annoyance over the strict .enforcement of the UN arms embargo, continues to provide sites forand tracking facilities. Moreover, It hasillingness todifficulties arising over different racial practices, as demonstratedmoderate reaction to the last-minute cancellation of shore-leaveof the US aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt Therefore,increased anli-US sentiments. Pretoria will probably continue toUS to use present space and tracking installations at least for the periodestimate, provided the US does not participate in significantSouth
he South African Covtrnment craves public recognition by thespecially the US. of its efforts to build relations with btack African states, totile more flexible on South-West Africa, and loittle 'essin International racial contacts. We believe, however, that the whites wilt hold steadfastly to their policy of white dominance and that significant changes In South Africa's policies either in response to domestic developments or external pressures are highly iinlikely in the neat five years,,
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